ant said of her that she had had a child by a grocer in London, whereby she lost the expected marriage. The court said: "The action lies here, for a woman not married cannot by intendment have so great advancement as by her marriage, whereby she is sure of maintenance for life, or during her marriage, and dower or other benefits which the temporal law gives by reason of her marriage; and therefore by this slander she is greatly prejudiced in that which is to be her temporal advancement, for which it is reason to give her remedy by way of action at common law." § 267. Same: Loss of society or mental pain not enough. In Alsop v. Alsop (19) the defendant said of the plaintiff that he had had carnal connection with her while she was married to William Alsop, whereby the plaintiff lost the society of her friends and neighbors and became ill for a long time. This was held not enough. The result of the case would seem to require that the special damage must be more easily valued than is the loss of society of one's friends; also, that as in the case of negligent physical torts discussed in § 24, above, mental suffering is not enough. In Davies v. Solomon (20) the plaintiff alleged not merely the loss of the society of her friends but the loss of their hospitality. The court held that this was enough, saying: "The loss of hospitality of friends is sufficient special damage to sustain an action like the present, and hospitality means simply that persons receive another (19) 5 H. & N. 534. into their houses and give him meat and drink gratis. Perhaps such a definition may rather extend the signification of the word, but it is true in effect-for if they do not receive him, or if they make him pay for his entertainment, that is not hospitality. In Roberts v. Roberts (21) it is to be observed, that the loss suffered by the plaintiff by being excluded from a religious society was not temporal, and was therefore held not to be enough. But in the present case there is a matter of temporal damage-small though it be-alleged in the declaration. It is also argued, that inasmuch as this action is brought by the wife, the husband being merely joined for conformity, the damage necessary to give her a right to recover must be damage to her alone, and that the loss of hospitality which she has hitherto enjoyed, is only pecuniary loss to her husband, and not to her. That certainly is a plausible argument, as the husband is, of course, bound to maintain his wife and to supply her with food, although her friends cease to do so. I am, however, unwilling to agree with such artificial reasoning, and I think that the real damage in this case is to the wife herself. Notwithstanding that it is the husband's duty to support his wife, he is only bound to provide her with necessaries suitable to his station in life; and she might, by visiting friends in a higher position than himself, enjoy luxuries which he either could not or might not choose to afford her." § 268. Same: Liability for repetition. If the person to whom the defendant makes a defamatory statement (21) 5 B. & S. 384. should repeat this statement, is the defendant liable for such repetition? He clearly is so liable if he authorizes it; also even without authorizing it, if he intended that it be repeated; for example if he knowingly told it to a notorious talebearer and tattler. Where the repetition was neither authorized nor intended, but it was a probable result of the utterance of the slander by the defendant, it would seem that the defendant ought to be liable, but upon this point there is a conflict of authority. The point becomes important chiefly where no damage resulted directly from the defendant's utterance, but damage did result from the repetition. In Ward v. Weeks (22) the defendant said to one Bryce that the plaintiff was a rogue and a swindler. Bryce repeated it to one Bryer who thereupon withdrew his trade from the plaintiff; it was held that the defendant was not liable. In Evans v. Harris (23), however, where the defendant made a slanderous statement in the hearing of several customers of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was allowed to recover for a general decrease in his profits, though such decrease might have been due to a withdrawal of custom by persons other than the defendant's immediate audi ence. § 269. Recovery for mental pain where there is special damage. Where the plaintiff has been able to prove special damage, it would seem, upon principle, that he ought then to be able to recover for mental pain or other general damage that he has suffered just as he may in (22) 7 Bing. 211. (23) 1 H. & N. 251. case of libel, and in case of slander which is actionable per se; but upon this point there is a conflict of authority. In Dixon v. Smith (24) the plaintiff, a physician, proved the loss of a patient due to the defendant's slander; the court held that he was entitled to compensation not only for that, but also for whatever general damage he may have sustained, apparently referring to mental suffering. § 270. Whether action will lie for damage caused by non-defamatory statements. In Miller v. David (25) the defendant said of the plaintiff, a stone mason, "he was the ring leader of the nine hour system," whereby the plaintiff suffered damage in his occupation, losing his employment and being compelled to accept less remunerative work at a less convenient place. The court said: "The words used were not connected with the trade or profession of the plaintiff either by averment or by implication; so that the declaration cannot be supported on this ground. There is no averment here that the consequence which followed was intended by the defendant as the result of his words; and therefore it is not necessary to consider the question which was suggested on the argument, whether words not in themselves actionable or defamatory, spoken under circumstances and to persons likely to create damage to the subject of the words, are, when the damage follows, ground of action." The court suggests that an action ought to lie if the defendant intended to inflict the damage: this is sound; (24) 5 H. & N. 450. (25) L. R. 19 C. P. 1187. it would seem that an action ought also to lie where the damage caused to the plaintiff was the probable result of the statement and the defendant knew the statement to be untrue. Such an action, however, is not covered by the law of defamation; it partakes partly of the character of both defamation and deceit. It is like deceit in that it is necessary that the defendant should not honestly believe the statement; it is like defamation in that the damage which results is caused to the plaintiff through the medium of third persons. An illustration which has been suggested is as follows: Suppose that C wants employment from D, a miserly farmer, who wishes to have none other than miserly people around him; N falsely represents to D that C is a generous, whole-hearted fellow, so that C does not get the place. Such a statement could not, of course, be defamatory, but if it were made with knowledge of its falsity and especially if with knowledge of D's character, it would seem clear that C ought to have a remedy. The law on this point cannot be said to be settled. See § 345, below. SECTION 5. JUSTIFICATION. A. Truth of publication. § 271. General rule. In a civil action for slander or libel it is always a complete defence that the defamatory charge is true. It is immaterial whether or not the defendant believed it was true at the time he made it or what his motive was in making it. § 272. Criticism of the general rule. In the criminal law, truth is not always a defence to a prosecution for li |