PARTIES. PRESIDENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4. HABEAS CORPUs, 2. PRIVATEER. See ROBBERY, 3, 4. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. See SLANDER. PROTEST. See DUTIES, 3, 7, 24, 25. INTERNAL REVENUE, 20. PROVOST-MARSHAL See DRAFT, 1. Ꭱ RAILROAD. 1. Where a railroad train, while moving on a track belonging to one railroad company, is in the exclusive charge of the servants of another railroad company, the former company is not responsible for the negligence of the servants of the latter company in conducting such movement of the train. Clymer v. Central R. R. Co., 317 2. It is held by the Court of Appeals of New York, that the use of land in a public street for the purposes of an ordinary railroad, is a new burden, which cannot be imposed without previous compensation to the owner of the fee of such land. Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 379 3. It having been held by the Supreme Court of New York, at General Term, that the use of land in a city street for the purpose of an ordinary horse railroad is no new burden, but simply a new mode of enjoying the public easement, and, consequently, that no further compensation can be demanded by the owner of such land, and it having also been held by a Judge of the same Court, in an action brought to prevent the laying of a railroad track, that there existed lawful authority, under the statutes of New York, to lay such track, this Court followed such decisions, on a motion for a provisional injunction to restrain the laying of such track. id. See INJUNCTION, 4. RECOGNIZANCE. See BAIL REMOVAL. 1. Where the proceedings taken by a defendant, in a suit brought in a State Court, to remove the suit into this Court, under the provisions of the 3d section of the Act of March 2d, 1833, (4 U. S. Stat. at Large, 633,) are in conformity with the Act, the removal is imperative; and the question whether the defendant had in fact a right to remove the suit cannot be raised by a motion to this Court, before the trial, to remand the suit to the State Court. Dennistoun v. Draper, 2. 336 3. Property in custody, involved in a replevin suit removed into this Court, ought to be sold, and the proceeds should be brought into this Court and deposited, on interest, to abide the result of the suit. id. See ATTACHMENT, 1. INTERNAL REVENUE, 21. 16. S SEIZURE. See FORFEITURE, 4 to 7. INTERNAL REVENUE, 17 PRACTICE, 5, 6. SET-OFF. See EQUITY, 20. SHIPPING. See CARRIER. CITIZEN. COLLISION. LIEN. VESSEL. SLANDER. 1. The defendant conducted a mercantile agency in the city of New York, the object of which was to procure information of the pecuniary ability and standing of merchants in the country for merchants in the city, to be communicated to the latter in a confidential manner. He had some twenty clerks to whom the information obtained, and which was recorded in a book, was communicated, and who participated in communicating it to the customers of the agency or to their clerks. The defendant communicated, through his clerks, to several customers and to their clerks, facts seriously affecting the credit of the plaintiff, as a merchant: Held, that the communication was not of a privileged character. Beardsley v. Tappan, 497 2. The principle upon which privileged communications rest, which, of them 3. To sustain an indictment, under the 5th section of the Act of May 15th, 1820, (3 U. S. Stat. at Large, 601,) for forcibly confining and detaining negroes on board of a vessel, with intent to make them slaves, it is not necessary to show that physical or manual force was exercised on board of the vessel, but it is enough if the negroes were under moral restraint and fear there, their wills being controlled by superior power exercised over their minds and bodies, it appearing that they were under restraint at the time by the persons who furnished them at the vessel's side and transferred them to the vessel, and that they came upon the deck of the vessel in that condition; and any person who participated in such sort of detention is to be regarded as a principal in the offence. id. 4. In such an indictment, it is sufficient Under that section, it is an offence to receive negroes on board of a vessel, from persons who have seized them and brought them to the vessel's side, in violation of the law; and any person of the vessel's company, on board of the vessel, who is competent to commit a crime, commits such offence by voluntarily receiving, or actually participating in the reception of, the negroes on the vessel, with the intent to make them slaves. id. 7. Facts and circumstances stated which would amount to a restraint, so as to deprive the acts of a voluntary character, in the case of the subordinates of a vessel. id. Money paid under a contract made in violation of law, cannot, at common law, be recovered back, and, where a statute gives the right to recover it back by suit, a pending suit and the cause of action involved in it fall with the repeal of the statute. Kimbro v. Colgate, 229 See CRIMES, 2, 12. DUTIES, 14, 17. STATUTE OF LIMITATION. See LIMITATION. tion of the Act of July 7th, 1838, (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 304,) referred to and adopted by the Act of August 30th, 1852, (10 Id., 61,) do not apply to steam vessels used on the ferry between New York and Elizabethport, New Jersey, which was established more than eighty years ago, it being declared by the 42d section of the Act of 1852, that that Act shall not apply to steamers used as ferry-boats. Elizabethport Ferry Co. v. United States, 198 427 STEVEDORE. See CARRIER, 4. 1837, March 3, Patent, 160 1838, July 7, Steamboats, 198 1839, Feb. 28, Bail, 1839, March 3, Patent, 160 |