United States v. 1,756 Shares of Capital Stock. propriate a remedy, as the special count to which the defendants have demurred. This saving clause has reference to an entirely different class of actions and causes of action, which abound in all these internal revenue Acts, and relates specially to fines, penalties, forfeitures, and criminal proceedings which are provided for the enforcement of the duties imposed by the Act of 1863. It is to be observed, that the repeal is not limited to the two sections in question, but applies to many provisions of the Act, which was a general Act to raise revenue for the government. As the money was paid under a contract made in violation of law, there is no ground for the recovery of it back, upon the principles of the common law; and, as the statute which gave the remedy has been repealed, the cause of action and the suit, must, upon established principles, fall with the repeal. The constitutionality of these sections of the Act of Congress, as undertaking to regulate private contracts between individuals in the State, has been discussed; but, as the case is disposed of independently of this question, it is not important to examine it. I mention this, for the purpose of saying, that I do not mean, by thus disposing of the case, to leave any implication of an opinion in favor of their constitutionality. THE UNITED STATES vs. 1,756 SHARES OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF THE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, OF ILLINOIS. GREAT Under the Act of August 6th, 1861, (12 U. S. Stat. at Large, 319,) a forfeiture of property is provided for only in case the property is employed, with the knowledge or consent of its owner, in aid of insurrection. By that Act, one-half of the proceeds of a forfeiture under that Act goes to the informer. United States v. 1,756 Shares of Capital Stock. The whole of the proceeds of a forfeiture under the Act of July 17th, 1862, (Id., 589,) goes to the United States. A District Court of the United States in New York cannot acquire jurisdiction in rem, to declare a forfeiture, under those Acts, of shares in the capital stock of an Illinois corporation. The seizure of enemy property, by the United States, as prize of war, on land, jure belli, is not authorized by the law of nations, and can be upheld only by an Act of Congress. Under the said Acts of August 6th, 1861, and July 17th, 1862, the proceedings to condemn enemy property, when seized, must conform to the proceedings in Admiralty and revenue cases. An alien enemy has, under those Acts, a right to appear as claimant of his property sought to be condemned, as forfeited, by a prosecution in rem under those Acts, and to answer and defend the suit. (Before NELSON, J., Southern District of New York, May 29th, 1865.) THIS was a libel of information, filed in the District Court, by the United States, against 1,756 shares of the capital stock of the Great Western Railroad Company of Illinois, a corporation created under the laws of the State of Illinois, praying its condemnation, as having been the property of one Le Roy M. Wiley, and as being forfeited to the United States. The District Court decreed in favor of the libellants. The decree ordered the stock to be sold, and the proceeds, after the payment of a private debt of Wiley's, and of the costs of the suit, to be paid, one-half to the United States, and the other half to the informer mentioned in the libel. Wiley and the Company, who appeared and put in claims and answers, appealed to this Court. William M. Evarts and Charles Donohue, for the United States. Daniel Lord and Jeremiah Larocque, for the claimants. NELSON, J. The libel in this case is founded upon two Acts of Congress, one passed on the 6th of August, 1861, (12 U. S. Stat. at Large, 319,) and the other passed on the 17th of July, 1862, (Id., 589.) United States v. 1,756 Shares of Capital Stock. The 1st section of the Act of August 6th, 1861, declares, that if any person or persons, &c., shall purchase or acquire, sell or give, any property of whatsoever kind or description, with the intent to use or employ the same, or suffer the same to be used or employed, in aiding or abetting such insurrection or resistance to the laws, or any person or persons engaged therein, or if any person or persons, being the owner or owners of any such property, shall knowingly use or employ, or consent to the use or employment of the same, as aforesaid, all such property is declared to be lawful subject of prize and capture, wherever found, &c. The 2d section declares, that such prizes and capture shall be condemned in the District or Circuit Court of the United States, &c., or, in Admiralty, in any District in which the same may be seized, or into which they may be taken and proceedings first instituted. The 3d section provides, that the Attorney-General, or any District Attorney of the United States, may institute the proceedings of condemnation, and, in such case, wholly for the benefit of the United States, or, any person may file an information with such Attorney, in which case the proceedings shall be for the use of such informer and the United States in equal parts. The 6th section of the Act of July 17th, 1862, declares, that if any person, &c., being engaged in armed rebellion against the Government of the United States, or aiding or abetting such rebellion, &c., all the estate and property, moneys, stocks, and credits of such person shall be liable to seizure as aforesaid, and it shall be the duty of the President to seize and use them as aforesaid, or the proceeds thereof. The 7th section declares, that proceedings in rem shall be instituted in the name of the United States, in any District Court thereof, &c., within which the property or any part thereof may be found, or into which the same, if movable, may first be brought, which proceedings shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or revenue cases; and, if said property, whether real or personal, shall be found to have belonged to a person engaged in rebellion, or who has given aid or comfort thereto, the same shall be condemned as United States v. 1,756 Shares of Capital Stock. enemies' property, and become the property of the United States, and may be disposed of as the Court shall decree, and the proceeds thereof paid into the Treasury of the United States. Leroy M. Wiley appeared by his proctors, and put in a claim to the stock in question, and also his answer to the libel of information, which were afterwards stricken, by order of the Court, from the files. The Great Western Railroad Company also appeared by its proctors, and filed a claim and answer, which also were subsequently stricken from the files, by like order. Afterwards, a decree of default was entered against the parties claimants. Proofs were then taken, ex parte, of the facts charged in the libel of information, and a decree of condemnation of the stock was entered, directing a sale of it by the Marshal, and that the proceeds, after the payment of the costs and charges, be distributed to the United States and the informer in equal parts. The claim and answer of Wiley were stricken from the files, as appears from the papers and the opinion of the Court, upon the ground that it was shown that he was a resident of the State of Alabama, a State declared to be in insurrection against the United States, and hence an alien enemy, and that he had no persona standi in Court. The claim and the answer of the Railroad Company were stricken out, upon the ground, substantially, that they had intervened for the benefit of Wiley, a stockholder in the Company. It will be observed, that the principle or ground of proceeding, with a view to the condemnation and forfeiture of the property under the two Acts of Congress, is different. The first Act places the forfeiture upon the fact of the use or employment of the property in aiding, abetting, or promoting the insurrection or resistance to the laws. All such property is declared to be lawful prize, and liable to confiscation. The real issue under that Act is, whether or not the property seized has been so used or employed with the knowledge and consent of the owner. The owner may or may not be an alien enemy; and, even if he be an alien enemy, his property is not United States v. 1,756 Shares of Capital Stock. the subject of a proceeding under the Act, unless it can be shown to have been used or employed for the purpose mentioned. This particular use or employment lies at the foundation of the forfeiture. Now, the property sought to be confiscated in the present proceedings, is stock in an incorporated company, in the State of Illinois. Its situs is in that State; and there is great difficulty in perceiving how such an interest or species of property is capable of being used or employed in contravention of the provisions of the statute. But, waiving this, although the Court required proof of the fact of the use or employment of the stock in aiding or abetting the insurrection, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, before condemnation, we find no evidence whatever in the record on the subject; and yet, the forfeiture is declared under the Act of August 6th, 1861, as one moiety of the proceeds is directed to be paid to the informer. Under the Act of July 17th, 1862, the whole of the proceeds go to the Government. This decree must have been an oversight, as all the proofs on the record apply exclusively to the offence charged in the latter Act. There is some confusion of ideas in the libel of information, which, probably, misled the Court in the decree; for, while the libel embraces both Acts of Congress, which, as we have seen, are different in principle and ground of proceeding, it concludes by praying that the proceeds, after condemnation and sale of the stock, be distributed to the Government and the informer in equal parts; and the decree is in conformity with the prayer. The libel of information and the decree are under the Act of August 6th, 1861, while the proofs are all under the Act of July 17th, 1862. Besides the irregularities in the proceedings, already stated, it is quite clear that the Court below never acquired jurisdiction of the res, by any lawful seizure of the stock in question. The property consisted of an interest in the capital stock and dividends of an incorporated company in the State of Illinois, and which, as respects the legal proceedings in the Southern District of New York, is, in judgment of law, to be regarded as a foreign corporation, as much so as a corporation in Lon |