No. 12 shews that the other provinces of Spirito Santo, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande, Alagoas, Parahiba, Piauhy, Ceara, Maranhao, and Para, are likewise in arrear; and that of Santo Spirito to an annual deficit of 33,172 milreas.

By this simple and clear statement, your Majesty will perceive, that I have been placed at the head of a Treasury, indebted at the end of June to the amount of nearly 30,500,000 of Crusadoes (about £2,500,000 sterling), daily beset with its Creditors, who justly demand the money due to them; and without possessing any extraordinary resources to meet the extraordinary charges, which, at a moderate calculation, amount to 900,000 milreas. From none of the Provinces of the Empire can we at present expect assistance; nay, we shall be obliged to extend assistance to them, as has already been done, to the amount of nearly 280,000 milreas annually. Notwithstanding the activity in collecting the Taxes, and an exact controul of the expenses, it has been necessary to recur to Loans, Donations, naval Contributions, and even Sequestrations, yielding in all 1,000,000 of Crusadoes. It is also evident, that, notwithstanding the hope of the happiest results from the system of administration which the wisdom of the General Constituent Assembly will doubtless establish, these results will not be sufficient for the payment of 30,500,000 of Crusadoes, and at the same time provide for the ordinary and extraordinary charges necessary for the consolidation of an Empire, where every thing has to be created, and where it is necessary to extend a liberal and generous hand, if we desire to establish our independence, and be ranked among Nations of the first order. The consequences of not fulfilling its obligations are terrible at all times to States, but how much more especially must they be so, in the dangerous season of our political regeneration, when we ought to avoid creating distrust, and seek to ward off misery and distress from the Publick Servants and National Creditors!

Leaving out of view the payment of the future ordinary expenses, for which provision will, no doubt, be made by the imposition of Taxes, I shall advert to an operation in aid of our credit which I think indispensable under present circumstances. Great resources are necessary to enable the Constitutional Chief of this rising Empire to consolidate our independence, to defend us from our enemies, to promote instruction and publick prosperity, according to the Laws and Constitution of the State.

These means have been offered to us by English Capitalists without solicitation. Such is the idea which they form of the resources and exuberant wealth of the new Empire, as of those of other Nations of Europe and America, and such the interest they take in the establishment of Bra- . zilian independence. By the proposal, No. 13, which I received on the 20th of July, your Majesty will see the offer of a loan of the sum of 2,500,000 milreas, and the conditions required for prompt payment; £100,000 being promised per month for 5 successive months, as soon as the contract shall be sanctioned by the General Constituent and Legis

lative Assembly, and even before all the terms of the Loan are definitively arranged in the market in London, which, when concluded, will place the rest of the Loan at the disposal of the Brazilian Nation.

The conditions are so clear, that I think any further explanation unnecessary; it is no less clear, that the Assembly may have at its disposal 20,000,000 of crusadoes, to employ in any way it may think proper, to support the independence, and to develope the riches of Brazil. Without considerable means, we cannot accomplish so mighty an undertaking. The United States and the old Governments of Europe have resorted to loans in critical circumstances like ours. Let us not be apprehensive of distress or poverty in the Country of Gold and Diamonds. Let us profit by our resources; let us take advantage of the precious commodities which belong to us, to defend ourselves against our enemies.

The first and most essential part of the operation, viz. the prospectus of the loan, has been prepared by an experienced London Banker, on the proposal of Edward Oxenford and other English capitalists. According to their plan, £2,500,000 sterling, to be advanced by them, will be employed in the following manner:The 8th part of £3,333,333 (the sum in stock, to be sold to obtain £2,500,000 at 75 per cent.) to be em

It would be of great consequence to us to have this Plan altered

in the following manner :

For sinking fund the first Year

To pay the interest the two first half Years . . .

£60,000 200,000

For the Publick Service of the Empire of Brazil ... 2,240,000

£2,500,000

It is clear, that, if the £416,666, the eighth part of £3,333,333, is necessary for a Sinking Fund at a compound interest of 4 per cent. to pay up the capital in 54 years, the same effect would follow in 30 years according to the above alteration, by an annual payment of £60,000, laid out at compound interest at 4 per cent. It is likewise clear, that, in the beginning of the 7th Year, the Sinking Fund, by my plan, would reach £473,896, which exceeds the £416,666 reserved for the fund of the London plan. It is easy to perceive, that were this change adopted, without essentially altering the terms, we should obtain an advantage of 27 millions of Crusadoes.

MANUEL JACINTO NOGUEIRA DA GAMA.

CONVENTION between the Cisplatine State and the Province of Entre Rios.-St. José, 11th December, 1822.

(Translation.)

ARTICLES of Convention and Friendship, proposed by Major, Secretary, Don John Florence Perea, charged with this Commission on the part of the Government of the Province of Entre Rios, admitted by the Most Illustrious and Most Excellent Baron de Laguna, Captain-General of the Cisplatine State.

ART. I. The Most Excellent General Baron de Laguna will acknowledge the limits of the Province of Entre Rios; both Governments agreeing, on this principle, to remain within their lines in the best neutrality and good harmony.

II. All Traitors who have conspired against that Province shall be ordered to quit the neighbourhood of the Right Bank of the River Uruguay, and, neither directly, nor indirectly, shall any protection be given to them in carrying on hostilities against the Province of Entre Rios.

III. The Government of the Province of Entre Rios shall act in like manner, respecting the Cisplatine State, towards those who may have views opposed to the interests of that State.

IV. The Property of both Territories shall be religiously preserved and respected; and that which may have been illegally carried away shall be restored to the Proprietors, whenever they are claimed in a legal manner by them, or by the Chiefs of both lines.

V. It shall not be permitted, under the most sacred responsibility, (should it unfortunately happen, owing to causes not within the sphere of the faculties of the Governments,) to declare War, or to take any hostile step, without previous declaration or intimation; observing, in either case, the forms practised by Civilized Nations; and Notice being always given 15 days previous to hostilities.

VI. This Treaty shall take effect in 20 days, counting from the date of its being concluded, in order that the Ratification of both Chiefs may be sent from each State to the other.

CONDITIONS under which the General Baron de Laguna admits these Proposals:

I. Both Governments shall respect the Line of the Limits of the Territories, and oblige themselves not to pass them with an Armed Force, under any pretext, during the friendship and good harmony which they promise to keep and maintain by all possible means; nor to interfere, directly or indirectly, in any internal political discussions that may arise within either of the said Territories.

II. and III. Both Governments bind themselves not to give any aid, directly or indirectly, to Traitors, or other persons, who may have fled, or may hereafter fly, into either of the two Territories, for

having conspired against publick order and tranquillity, and to prevent every aggression they may attempt to make, with an Armed Force.

IV. Both Governments bind themselves to respect the goods, merchandize, and property of the Neighbours on both sides, and to restore them immediately that they are legally claimed.

V. Both Governments impose upon themselves the obligation of not committing any hostility, under any pretext, before making, reciprocally, representations and reclamations upon the causes of complaint which may arise, whether from the want of fulfilling what is agreed upon in this, or in any of the preceding Articles, or from any other unforeseen accident, and engage to clear up amicably any doubt, consistent with the national honour, and the publick convenience of the respective Provinces.

VI. This Convention shall be signed in duplicate, in order that both Governments may be duly acquainted with it.

St. Jozé, 11th December, 1822. BARON de LAGUNA.

JOHN FLORENCE PEREA.

Uruguay, 20th December, 1822.-The present Treaty is confirmed and ratified, with the Amplifications that accompany it.

LUCIO MANCILLO.

RAPPORT du Comte de Jouffroy au Vicomte de Montmorency, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, à l'arrivée de ce dernier au Congrès de Vérone.

MONSEIGNEUR,

(Extrait.)

Vienne, le 23 Septembre, 1822.

VOTRE Excellence a approuvé mon voyage à Vienne. Elle a été témoin, depuis mon arrivée, du degré de confiance que les principaux Cabinets de l'Europe m'accordent. La première considération m'oblige, comme Français, et protégé par votre Excellence, de lui parler avec une entière franchise; la seconde considération me fait espérer que mes réflexions lui paraîtront de quelque poids.

Le systême qui unit les Cours de Russie, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et les Puissances Secondaires qui en dépendent, n'a fait que se fortifier depuis le dernier Congrès. Ce Systême est une détermination invariable de s'opposer, non-seulement à la propagation des principes révolutionnaires, mais encore à celle des principes qui seraient favorables, directement ou indirectement, à la cause des révolutionnaires.

Depuis son arrivée à Vienne, votre Excellence a pu reconnaître que le tableau que je lui avais tracé, dès l'instant de son avènement au Ministère, des dispositions des Cabinets et du caractère des hommes qui les composent, était exact sous tous les rapports. Votre Excellence avait saisi avec perspicacité l'ensemble de ce tableau: plût à Dieu que tous les Ministres ses Collègues eussent apprécié également leur situa

tion et mon récit! Les instructions que votre Excellence a reçues pourront lui faire juger si mes craintes sont fondées.

Une grande question, celle du sort de l'Espagne, va être agitée au Congrès. C'est la question principale, et le Voyage de votre Excellence a eu principalement cet objet en vue; car les intérêts des Etats d'Italie, le maintien des Troupes dans cette Péninsule, et les transactions qui pourront concerner quelques économies dans l'occupation, sont des objets trop secondaires pour mériter de la part de France, des Mesures Diplomatiques extraordinaires telle que la présence de votre Excellence au Congrès. Je ne parle pas des affaires de l'Orient qui sont décidées par le fait.

La France se trouve en ce moment, par rapport à l'Espagne, à peu près dans la même position où se trouvait l'Autriche par rapport du Royaume de Naples révolté. Sa situation géographique, et les dangers du voisinage, sont les mêmes: c'est évidemment à la France qu'appartient aujourd'hui le rôle que l'Autriche a joué avec tant de succès il y a 18 mois. Je dirai plus; il faut que la France, sous peine de compromettre sa dignité et ses intérêts, prenne l'initiative dans cette affaire, et provoque, auprès du Congrès, la discussion sur les moyens à prendre pour mettre un terme aux malheurs de l'Espagne.

Ces moyens doivent être pris d'un commun accord. Les Cabinets, et particulièrement le Cabinet Autrichien, auquel on doit la justice de dire, qu'il est le mieux informé de tout ce qui se passe en Europe, n'ignorent point les tentatives infructueuses que la France a faites, depuis l'origine de la Révolution Espagnole jusqu'aux tristes évènemens du 7 Juillet dernier, pour intervenir dans cette Révolution, pour la diriger, la modifier, ou transiger avec elle.

L'Europe sait que ces tentatives ont eu pour but d'imposer à la Nation Espagnole la Charte Française, ou une Constitution analogue sur celle qui nous régit. Je dis imposer; car, bien que quelques Espagnols appartenant, soit à la classe des Révolutionnaires, soit à celle des niais à leur suite, aient appuyé auprès du Gouvernement Français un tel projet, on sait que la masse du peuple Espagnol la repousse, et réclame ses anciennes institutions, ses anciennes Lois, ses anciennes mœurs. La Proclamation de la Junte de Catalogne est, à cet égard, l'expression du voeu National, du voeu de tous ceux qui, à travers la Révolution d'Espagne, ont conservé le noble, le véritable caractère Espagnol, et je dois dire à votre Excellence, avec la plus profonde conviction, que le Manifeste de la Junte Provisoire a été jugé ainsi par les Cabinets réunis.

La situation de votre Excellence est donc assez délicate. (Elle me permettra, dans le zèle qui m'anime, de hazarder cette expression.) On croit que le Gouvernement Français, par une conséquence de sa propre situation inquiète et incertaine, a une tendance naturelle au prosélytisme Constitutionnel, à la propagation des Chartes, et à s'isole