tenant from year to year, is liable to such of the covenants of the lease as are applicable to his new holding, but he would not be liable on an implied assumpsit to put the premises in the same state of repair as they were in at the commencement of the term, though the lease contained a covenant to that effect (r).

Where there is an express and unconditional agreement to repair and keep in repair, the tenant is bound so to do, though the premises be destroyed by fire, or other accident (s).

The law implies a promise on the part of a yearly tenant of a farm, that he will use the farm in a husbandlike manner, and cultivate the lands according to the custom of the country where they are situate (t). And in an action against a tenant upon promises that he would occupy the farm "in a good and husbandlike manner, according to the custom of the country," an allegation that he had treated the estate "contrary to good husbandry, and the custom of the country," is proved by showing that he had treated it contrary to the prevalent course of husbandry in that "neighbourhood;" as by tilling half his farm at once, when no other farmer there tilled more than a third, though many tilled only a fourth; and it is unnecessary to show any precise definite custom or usage in respect of the quantity tilled (u). But where the declaration set out a particular custom, and alleged a breach of that custom, and the plea traversed the custom set out, it was held that the plaintiff had, by his mode of declaring, tied himself up to prove the particular custom alleged, though by declaring differently, he need not have done so (x).

The custom of the country cannot be considered where the parties have entered into express stipulations in regard to the mode of cultivation. Therefore, where the declaration alleged a promise to use and cultivate a farm in a good and husbandlike

id. What considered not a breach of good husbandry, as to removing straw, &c., Gough v. Howard, Peak Addl. C. 197; Woodf. by Harrison, 447,

526.

(u) Legh v. Hewett, 4 East, R. 154; Dalby v. Hirst, 3 Moo. 536; 1 B. & B. 224, S. C.; but see Earl of Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 C. & M. 89, 110, 111; Chit. jun. Pleading, 143, 144.

(x) Angerstein v. Handson, 1 C. M. & R. 797; 5 Tyr. 583; 1 Gale, 8, S. C.; and see Hurtley v. Burkitt, 4 Bing. N. C. 687; 2 Jurist, 642, S. C.

manner, and according to the custom of the country, it was held that evidence that the agreement was to farm the land in a husbandlike manner, "to be kept constantly in grass," could not be received (y); but the existence of a written demise, or a lease under seal, will not exclude the operation of the custom, if the instrument contain no provisions having relevance to the subject (2).

If the tenant refuse to repair according to agreement, and his landlord, (the plaintiff,) who is himself a lessee, and bound under pain of forfeiture to keep the premises in repair, enter and repair them without the defendant's assent, the measure of damages in assumpsit for not repairing shall be the sum necessarily expended (a). And if the landlord (the plaintiff) do not enter and repair, and be sued by his lessor, and the tenant refuse to repair, or defend the action, the damages and costs recovered by the ground landlord, against the plaintiff, may form the measure of damages against the tenant (b). Though the jury may also give a landlord damages by way of compensation for the loss of the use of the premises, whilst they were undergoing repair (c). And the general state of the premises at the commencement of the tenancy may be taken into consideration by the jury in assessing the damages (d). But a tenant will not be allowed to go into matters of detail to show the state of the premises at the commencement of his term (e).

A landlord is not liable to an action for not repairing, if he has not expressly agreed to repair (ƒ). But the tenant will, in some cases, be at liberty to quit without notice, and will be exempt from future rent, if the premises become uninhabitable, or there be no beneficial occupation, in consequence of the landlord's default in repairing. And even where a tenant holds a house for a term certain (as three years) under a written agreement by which he contracted to keep the premises in tenantable repair, yet he may quit without notice, and by so doing free himself from future responsibility for rent, if the premises become unwholesome for

(y) Saunderson v. Griffiths, 5 B. & Bing. N. C. 467; 6 C. & P. 782, S. C. C. 909; ante, 26.

(z) See ante, 26, and post. (a) Colley v. Streeton, 2 B. & C. 273; 3 D. & R. 522, S. C.

(b) Neale v. Wyllie, 3 B. & C. 533; 5 D. & R. 442, S. C.

(c) Woods v. Pope, 1 Scott, 536; 1

(d) Burdett v. Williams, 2 Nev. & P. 122; 1 Jurist, 514, S. C.

(e) Mantz v. Goring, 4 Bing. N.C.

451.

(f) Pindar v. Ainsley, cited 1 T. R. 312; Leeds v. Cheetham, 1 Sim. 151; Brown v. Quilter, Ambler, 619.

want of sufficient drainage, and cannot be kept dry without extravagant and unreasonable labour and expense on his part (g).

The lessee of a house underlet it at Lady-day to A., as tenant from year to year, and before the end of the half year put workmen into the house, with A.'s consent, for the purpose of repairing a party wall, but the danger and inconvenience occasioned thereby were so great, that A.'s lodgers quitted the house, and he was obliged to take lodgings for his own family elsewhere, and after paying the rent up to Midsummer-day, he remained in possession, carrying on his trade till the 5th of July, and then quitted (the repairs being nearly completed) without notice to his landlord it was held that the latter could not maintain an action to recover the rent for the second half year which had thus commenced, the jury finding that there had been no beneficial occupation (h).

So where the defendant had agreed, in writing, "to become tenant by occupying" a house, it was held that he was not liable to an action for use and occupation, on his proving that the house was not in such a reasonable and decent state of repair as to be fit for convenient and comfortable occupation (i).

3rdly. Of Taxes as between Landlord and Tenant.

There are certain taxes and rates, such as land tax and sewers rates, which are eventually charges upon the landlord; though primarily chargeable upon the tenant, as regards the public. If the demise contain no provision to the contrary upon the subject of these charges, the landlord has to bear them. There are other taxes and assessments which the tenant, even as between himself and his landlord, is impliedly bound to sustain; such as the assessed taxes, or house and window duties, and parochial rates (k).

The tenant may by contract become liable to bear the burthen of taxes which would otherwise be payable by the landlord, and might be deducted from the rent (). This contract need not

(g) Collins v. Barrow, 1 M. & Rob.

112.

(h) Edwards v. Hetherington, R. & M. 268; 7 D. & R. 117, S. C.

(i) Salisbury v. Marshall, 4 C. & P. 65. There was a parol understanding between the parties that the premises should be put in proper re

pair; but he had done only some slight colourable repairs.

(k) See Woodf. by Harrison, 3d ed. 352, 355, 356. As to the redemption of land tax by landlord, Ward v. Const, 10 B. & C. 635.

(1) The general rule is, that if a statute direct a tenant to pay a tax in

in express terms mention the particular tax with which it is sought to fix the tenant: any words showing clearly that the landlord was to have the full rent reserved, without any deduction in respect of any charges upon the premises, are sufficient to fix the tenant. As if the tenant agree to pay "all taxes” (m), or agree to pay rent "free from all manner of taxes, charges, and impositions whatsoever "(n), or agree to pay "net rent ”(o).

4thly. Of Notices to Quit.

1. When necessary. In the case of a tenancy from year to year (p), of a house or land, the law requires, in order to determine such tenancy (in the absence of any express agreement or immemorial custom or usage in any particular place, to the contrary,) that one party should give to the other half a year's (q) notice to quit, expiring at that period of the year when the tenancy commenced (r). But in case of a weekly tenancy of furnished apartments, no notice to quit is in general requisite, unless expressly agreed upon, or there be an usage requiring such notice (s). The death of either party does not operate as a determination of the tenancy; and the personal representative must give, and is entitled to receive, a notice to quit (t). And

the first instance, and then deduct it from his rent, he must deduct it from the next payment he makes for rent. Andrew v. Huncock, 1 B. & B. 37; Spragg v. Hammond, 2 id. 59; Stubbs v. Parsons, 3 B. & Ald. 516; Saunderson v. Hanson, 3 C. & P. 314. Ef fect of a landlord's allowing deductions (which he was not bound to permit), in regard to a future distress on a new tenant; Bramston v. Robins, 4 Bing. 11; 12 Moo. 68, S. C. See also Waller v. Andrews, 3 Mee. & W.

312.

(m) Amfield v. White, 1 R. & M. 246. This means taxes then in force. Davenant v. Salisbury, Vent. 223. See further, and when otherwise, Watson v. Atkins, 3 B. & Ald. 647; Graham v. Wade, 16 East, 29. But under an agreement to pay all taxes, &c., that might thereafter be chargeable on the premises, the tenant is bound to pay an extraordinary assessment made by the commissioners of sewers; Waller v. Andrews, 3 Mee. & W. 312.

(n) Bradbury v. Wright, Dougl. 624; Cranston v. Clarke, Sayer R. 78; Woodf. by Harrison, 392.

(0) Bennett v. Womack, 7 B. & C. 627; S. C. in 1 M. & R. 644, and 3 C. & P. 96.

(p) What creates this tenancy impliedly, &c. see ante, 323.

(q) Not six months' notice; see Adams, Ej. 3rd ed., 138; Johnstone v. Huddlestone, 4 B. & C. 932. Notice

on 28th Sept. to quit 25th March, good; Roe v. Doe, 6 Bing. 574; 4 M. & P. 391, S. C.; or on 29th Sept. to quit at Lady-day, per Lord Ellenborough, Doe d. Harrop v. Green, 4 Esp. Rep. 198.

(r) Year B. 13 H. 8, 15 b. Right v. Darby, 1 T. R. 163; Doe v. Browne, 8 East, 165; Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128; see Doe v. Johnston, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 141.

(s) Post, 349, Huffell v. Armistead, 7 Car. & P. 56.

(t) Doe d. Shore v. Porter, 3 T. R. 16; Rex v. Inhabitants of Stone, 6 T.

even an infant, who becomes entitled to a reversion, cannot evict the tenant without a regular notice to quit (u). A mortgagee must give a notice to quit to a party who became tenant before the execution of the mortgage deed (a). And if a remainder-man affirm a letting, which he might have avoided, he cannot afterwards determine the tenancy, without giving a notice to quit, expiring at the period of the year the tenant entered (y). And a notice to quit is primâ facie necessary in all those instances in which a tenancy from year to year is impliedly created by receiving rent, or other acts recognising the existence of the relation between landlord and tenant (z). But there is this exception, that if a party tacitly become tenant from year to year upon the terms of an agreement for a lease, the tenancy expires at the expiration of the term agreed to be granted, without any notice to quit (a).

A notice to quit is not necessary, where the relation of landlord and tenant does not subsist, although a compensation for the enjoyment of the premises has been received (b); or where a man gets into the possession of a house to be let, without the privity of the landlord, and they afterwards enter into a negociation for a lease, but differ as to the terms (c). So where one member of a firm is to occupy a house of his co-partners during the continuance of the partnership, and the partnership is dissolved, ejectment lies against the partner occupying, without a notice to quit (d). And a vendee in possession, not recognised as a tenant, and who is in default as purchaser, may be evicted without formal notice (e). Nor is any notice necessary from the vendee to the vendor of an estate, nor to any person claiming under the vendor by title subsequent to the purchaser (ƒ). Nor need a fresh notice to quit be given by a tenant who adversely holds over for a year, after he has given notice to quit, provided the

446; 1 M. & P. 183; 3 C. & P. 164. (b) Right v. Bawden, 3 East, 260; Roe v. Prideaux, 10 id. 165.

(c) Doe v. Quigley, 2 Camp. 505. (d) Doe d. Waithman v. Miles, 1 Stark. R. 181. (e) Doe d. Moore v. Lawder, 1 Stark. R. 308; Doe d. Leeson v. Sayer, 3 Camp. 8.

(f) Doe d. Austin v. Cowderoy, 1 Jurist, 793.