reference, to see what was due from the Receiver, and that he (the surety) might be at liberty to pay in the amount by instalments, so as such amount did not exceed the recognizance, and for a stay of the proceedings in the mean time, and that the Court made the order, upon the surety paying the costs of the motion and of the subsequent proceedings in consequence of it. It is to be noticed, that, if there is any proceeding at Law upot the recognizance, the penalty of the recognizance is the debt far which the execution will be issued.1 It may be mentioned here, that if the surety of a Receiver has paid anything on his account, for the benefit of the estate, he is entitled to be indemnified out of the balance due to the Receiver? When a Receiver has been appointed, and has given security, he cannot be discharged upon his own application, without shɔwing some reasonable cause, by affidavit, why he should put the par ties to the expense of a change.3 An instance of a Receiver being discharged on his own applica tion (on the ground of ill health) may be found in Richardson . Ward, in which case he was not only discharged and his recog nizance ordered to be vacated, but he was allowed, although this part of the application was opposed, to retain his costs "of the application, and incidental thereto," out of the balance in his hands. A Receiver is generally continued till the decree, but if the right of the plaintiff ceases before that time, the Receiver ma be discharged, and cannot be continued at the instance of a de fendant.5 In a case, in which a Receiver had been appointed in a suit for the removal of trustees, and the appointment of new ones, up the ground of misconduct on the part of one, and of age and in firmity on the part of the other, upon new trustees being appoint ed, in pursuance of the decree, an application was made on the 1 See the certificate of the Judge of K. B., in Dawson v. Raynes, 2 Russ 468 468. 2 Glossup v. Harrison, 3 V. & B. 134; Coop. 61, S. C. 32 Harr. (ed. Newl.) 503. On a final and full account, a receiver, or his representatives, may be discharged and his bond cancelled. Williamson t. Wilson, 1 Bland, 439. 4 Mad. & Geld. 266. Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 108-168; Largau r. Bowen, 1 Sch. & Lef. 296. part of the plaintiff to discharge the Receiver, on the ground that the new trustees were willing to act; and Lord Langdale made the order, although it was opposed by some of the defendants, who were beneficially interested in the property as legatees, upon the trustees undertaking, without entering into recognizances, to account half-yearly, in the same way as the Receiver.1 The appointment of a Receiver, made previous to a decree, will be superseded by it, unless the Receiver is expressly continued.2 A Receiver, however, is never discharged by decree; but the application for his discharge is usually made by motion, notice whereof should be served on all parties, and the order runs thus, "That the Receiver be discharged from being such Receiver, and that he do forthwith pass his final account, and pay the balance reported due into the Bank, or to the person entitled to receive it." Upon the Receiver's solicitor leaving the order, and the AccountantGeneral's certificate of the balance being paid in by the Receiver, or the affidavit of the payment of the balance to the party entitled with the Clerk of Enrolments, he will attend the Master of the Rolls, and get the recognizance vacated, a note whereof will be signed by his secretary on the margin of the order. Care should be taken that the recognizance be vacated, otherwise if a material error should afterwards be discovered in the Receiver's account, the money may be recovered. The sureties of a Receiver cannot be discharged at their own request; where, therefore, an application was made to discharge a Receiver on the ground of misconduct, and the sureties joined in the application, Lord Hardwicke held, that no regard was to be had to their application, unless it was for the benefit of the parties in the cause, or something of that kind" for if people voluntarily make themselves bail or sureties for another, they know the terms, and will be held very hard to their recognizance, and not discharged at their request to have new sureties appointed, for then there would be no end of it." 5 But although the general rule is not to discharge the surety of a Receiver on his own application during the continuance of the 1 Bainbridge v. Blair, 3 Beav. 422. * See Gibson v. Lord Montfort, 2 Seton on Decrees (3d Eng. ed.) 1003. Gilbert v. Whitmarsh, 24th Feb. 1818, coram Leach, V. C., 2 Mad. Ch. Pr. 298, ed. 1837. ♦ Ex relatione Mr. Rogers, of the Registrar's Office. • Griffith v. Griffith, 2 Ves. 400; see Gordon v. Calvert, 2 Sim. 253. Receivership, such rule will yield to circumstances, — "as where underhand practice is proved, and the person secured shown to be connected with such practice." 1 It seems that where a surety does procure his discharge during the continuance of the Receivership, the Receiver must enter into a fresh recognizance.2 With respect to the amount of a surety's liability, there seems to be little doubt but that it extends to all that the Receiver would have been required to pay. This point came before Lord Eldea, upon the question whether the sureties of a Receiver were liable to pay interest upon the balance in a Receiver's hands when be became bankrupt, and his Lordship said "It seems to me that it would be difficult to say that, where the principal debtor would be obliged to pay interest, there would not be an equity that the surety should pay interest in default of the principal. The per alty is forfeited by the breach of the condition; the amount of a penalty is the debt due from the sureties at Law. How can they have a right to be discharged, in this Court, from their legal li bility, till they have paid all that the principal could have been required to pay?" 4 This rule, however, is capable of relaxation where the circum stances of the case will warrant it; accordingly, as the Receiver in the case referred to, had been bankrupt with the knowledge of all parties for a considerable time, and no steps had been taken compel the passing his accounts, Lord Eldon refused to make the sureties pay interest.5 It seems that, where a Receiver has become bankrupt and the sureties are likely to be called upon to pay the balance due frez him, liberty will be given to them to attend the passing of the Re ceiver's account.6 the to be, When an action is brought against a Receiver's surety upon recognizance, the proper course for him to pursue appears to apply to the Court, by motion, to stay the proceedings on the recognizance, offering at the same time to pay the amount da from the Receiver, so as the same does not exceed the amount 1 Hamilton v. Brewster, 2 Mol. 407. 2 Vaughan v. Vaughan, 1 Dick. 90; Blois v. Blois, ib. 337. 3 Dawson v. Raynes, 2 Russ. 6. ✦ Ibid. Dawson v. Raynes, 2 Russ. ubi supra. • Ibid. 467. the recognizance, into Court; and, upon such motion, the order will be made upon the surety's paying the cost of the application, and of the proceedings consequent upon it. When the Receiver's account has not been taken, the motion should also pray a reference to the Master to see what is due from the Receiver; and it seems that, upon such application, the Court will indulge the surety by allowing him to pay the balance in by instalments.1 When a surety is called upon to pay anything on account of the Receiver, he will be entitled to stand in the place of the Receiver for anything which may be coming to him in the suit; therefore, where the Receiver of the Opera-House had borrowed money from his surety to enable him to make the necessary payments to the tradesmen and others connected with the theatre, Lord Eldon decided, that the surety was entitled to be repaid the amount lent, out of the balance in Court reported due to the Receiver.2 In conclusion, it may be mentioned that the term manager or consignee, as distinguished from a Receiver, is sometimes used with respect to certain descriptions of property, as mines, collieries or West India estates. There does not seem to be any substantial difference in the practice with respect to officers thus designated, and by the interpretation clause of the Orders of 16th October, 1852, "The word 'Receiver' includes consignee and manager."3 1 Walker v. Wild, 1 Mad. 528. Glossup v. Harrison, Coop. 61; 3 V. & B. 134. See Brenan v. Preston, 2 De G., Mac. & Gor. 815. CHAPTER XXIX. ON FURTHER DIRECTIONS, AND THE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF CAUSES. PREVIOUS to the recent changes in practice, arising out of the Chancery Amendment Act, and the Act for the Abolition of the office of Master, the first decree, in almost every cause, was in its nature interlocutory, and the consideration of further directions was reserved until after the trial of an issue, the decision upon case, or until the Master had made his report. When the issue had been tried, the case decided, or the report made, the cause was set down for further directions, and this process was repeated as often as any further directions were reserved by the decree. If, as was usual, the question of costs was reserved, as well as of further directions, the cause was then set down, as well matter of costs as upon further directions. Under the modern practice, a cause is continuously before the same Judge; and when an inquiry is directed, the hearing is simply adjourned until after the inquiry has been made, when it is set down for further consideration. upon the By a General Order of the 4th of March, 1853, "When any cause shall at the original or any subsequent hearing thereof have been adjourned for further consideration, such cause may, after the expiration of eight days, and within fourteen days from the filing of the certificate of the chief clerk of the Judge to whos Court the cause is attached, be set down by the Registrar in the cause-book for further consideration, on the written request the solicitor for the plaintiff or party having the conduct of the f Moreover, by the same Orders, "After the expiration of fourtee days, the cause may be set down by the Registrar upon the written request either of the solicitor of the plaintiff or of the solicitor of any other party. The following form of request is given in the "A. v. B. "I request that this cause, the further consideration wherea was adjourned by the Order of the day of |