plaintiffs were clearly several; the undertaking of the defendants. was for different amounts due to separate individuals, and payable upon the happening of different events having no legal connection and no common element. It was, in its legal effect, a collection of independent promises to pay distinct sums of money to separate persons contained in one written instrument. $203. The Supreme Court of Indiana has stated the same. general principles of interpretation in a clear manner, and with the evident desire to comply with the spirit of the new system which characterizes all the decisions of that able tribunal. An action was brought by three plaintiffs upon a peculiar contract, entered into between themselves and the two defendants, in which each of the five stipulated for indemnity against a certain contingent liability to be given by the four others, and in which the rights and liabilities were clearly several according to the common-law conception. The court say: "The code itself is not exactly definite as to who may be joined as plaintiffs. It provides, however, that judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, which was the practice in equity, though it was otherwise at law. It also provides that all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in the relief demanded may be joined as plaintiffs. Indeed, the code seems to have re-enacted the rules which had prevailed in courts of equity as to who must join as plaintiffs, and may be joined as defendants. But as to those cases in which in equity plaintiffs might or might not have joined at their option, the code does not expressly speak, for the reason, probably, that the general rule in equity was not founded upon any uniform principle, and could not be expounded by any universal theorem as a test. And it may have been thought safe, therefore, to leave each case to be decided by the courts upon authority and analogy. That it was intended the rules of pleading in courts of equity should govern the subject, is quite evident from those provisions of the code which prescribe the relief that may be granted, and to whom; in this respect conforming entirely to the established practice of those courts, a mode of administration quite impracticable in a great many cases, unless the parties might be as in chancery. The present inquiry is, then, in view of the considerations above stated, reduced to this: Could these plaintiffs 1 Story Eq. Pl., § 539. have formerly been joined in chancery?" The opinion proceeds to examine the provisions of the contract, and, holding that the rights as well as the liabilities of all the parties were entirely several, and would have been so regarded in equity, concludes as follows: "In the case before us there is in the plaintiffs no community of interest in any matter involved in the suit; no right common to all is claimed; every thing is separate, save only that the right asserted by each is founded in a contract which, for convenience, happens to be on the same sheet of paper. We have failed to find any warrant in the adjudged cases for a joinder of plaintiffs under such circumstances."1 The equitable interpretation of the sections relating to the union of parties plaintiff is here fully admitted, and it is declared that the established rule of the equity courts is to be taken as the criterion by which to determine all questions as to the proper joinder of plaintiffs now arising, even in legal actions. The attempt to maintain this particular suit by the three coplaintiffs was condemned, not because their rights were several according to the legal notion, but because they were so unconnected that they could not have been enforced by a single action in equity. The same court reiterated this principle of interpretation in another well-considered case, and it may be regarded as the settled doctrine of that State. "The code requires all persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in the relief demanded, except as otherwise provided, to be joined as plaintiffs. It also requires those who are united in interest to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. And it then declares that, when the question is one of common or general interest to many persons, or when the parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.2 These provisions substantially re-enact the old equity rules on the subject of parties. All who are united in interest must join in the suit, unless they are so numerous as to render it impracticable to bring them all before the court; while those who have only a common or general interest in the controversy may one or more of them institute an action. This, however, must not be understood as allowing, in all cases, two or more persons having separate causes of action against the same defendant, though 1 Goodnight v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418, 419, per Frazer J. See Maple v. Beach, 43 Ind. 51, 59. 2 Code of Ind., §§ 17, 18, 19. arising out of the same transaction, to unite and pursue their remedies in one action. Several plaintiffs, by one complaint, cannot demand several matters of relief which are plainly distinct and unconnected. But where one general right is claimed, where there is one common interest among all the plaintiffs, centring in the point in issue in the cause, the objection of improper parties cannot be maintained.1 § 204. Notwithstanding the common principle which lies at the bottom of the foregoing opinions, and which has undoubtedly been adopted by a great majority of the various State courts in their construction of these statutory provisions, there has not been an absolute unanimity of decision. By some individual judges, and even by some courts, the operation of the sections. under consideration has been confined exclusively to equitable actions, while the ancient common-law rules as to parties have been declared controlling in all legal actions. A reference to two or three cases in which this ancient distinction has been still preserved, will be sufficient for my purpose. Two persons, A. and B., entered into a written contract with a third, C., for the performance of certain work and labor, at a stipulated price. The work having been completed, and C. refusing to pay the price agreed upon, A. brought an action upon the contract; demanding judgment for one-half of said sum, and making B., his co-contractor, a defendant, alleging that he had refused to be a party plaintiff, and had confederated with C. to hinder and delay the plaintiff from obtaining his demand. The Supreme Court of Missouri, in affirming a nonsuit which had been ordered at the trial, said: "If C. has violated his contract, he is liable to an action; but that action could only be brought in the joint names of A. and B., the contractors. That provision of the Practice Act which allows a party to be made a defendant when he will not join as a plaintiff, has nothing to do with this question. That was a rule of equity practice which was necessarily incorporated into a system which abolished all distinction of actions. In adopting it, it was not designed that it should have any oper 1 Tate v. Ohio & Miss. R. R., 10 Ind. 174; citing McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 516; Bouton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375; Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59. The following cases, among others, assert the general doctrine that the pro visions of the code apply to legal and equitable actions alike. Cummings v. Morris, 25 N. Y. 625; Grinnell v. Schmidt, 2 Sandf. 706; Cole v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. 74. ation but in cases where it was applicable under the former system of practice. It was never intended that it should affect the rights of parties arising out of written contracts. Nothing is better settled than the rule that, on an undertaking to two, both must join in an action on it, otherwise there is no cause of action. It is a part of the contract that both shall sue, otherwise no action shall be brought. If one will say that he had no right of action, and will not sue, why should he not have as much right as the other who says there is a cause of action?"1 The same general doctrine was accepted as the basis of interpretation, and the same restriction of the statutory provisions to suits in equity was announced, by the Supreme Court of California in an early case arising upon similar facts. "The simple question presented for our consideration is, whether there was a non-joinder of parties plaintiff or not; it being contended that § 14 of the Practice Act has introduced a new rule, and that one of several parties may maintain an action on a joint contract, in his own name, by simply suggesting the impossibility of obtaining the consent of the others to join in the action. Upon examination of this section, we are satisfied that it was intended to apply to suits in equity, and not to actions at law."2 I have placed in the foot-note a number of cases which contain expressions of opinion by individual judges, that the sections and clauses of the codes and practice acts regulating the choice and joinder of parties are confined in their scope and operation to equitable actions alone, and were not intended by the legis 1 Rainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310, per Scott J. The opinion proceeds to state a number of imaginary difficulties in the way of such arrangement of parties as made by the plaintiff in this case. The decision, and the whole scope of the argument, are an excellent illustration of the judicial mode of repealing statutes. Conceding that the new system abolishes all distinction of actions, the learned judge, in the same breath, preserves these very distinctions entirely unaffected. If these distinctions were thus abolished, it would have been natural to conclude that the former equitable rule, incorporated into the code without a suggestion of limita tion, was now to be applied to all actions alike upon a proper occasion. This natural conclusion is obviated, however, by a mere naked assumption as to the intent lature to interfere with the former rules applicable to legal actions.1 § 205. The citations given in the foregoing paragraphs confirm the conclusions which were reached by a mere analysis of the language. That these provisions as to the parties plaintiff do enact the general doctrines which had prevailed in courts of equity, is admitted by both schools of interpretation; and that these equitable rules, thus embodied in a statutory form, do apply to all actions, and are not by any implied limitation restricted to equitable actions, is now, I think, declared by the courts in most of the States which have adopted the reformed procedure. Assuming these facts as premises, all the other propositions stated in my preliminary analysis follow as a necessary consequence. In this immediate connection it should be remarked that individual judges will give greater or less scope to the liberty granted by the legislative rule, according to their personal notions of expediency. There was a numerous class of cases, under the former system, in which courts of equity recognized an election on the part of claimants either to join in one proceeding or to sue separately. This power of choice, then confined, of course, to suits in equity, stills remains in similar instances, and may even be extended to certain controversies in which the cause of action is legal. Thus, where the right is strictly several, and would be regarded as such by the common law, equity might have allowed them an election to sue separately or jointly. This power of choice, contained in the equity doctrine, is introduced into the new procedure, and is of course not confined to suits equitable in their nature. We must, therefore, expect to find, within certain narrow bounds, some conflict of decision from judges who accept and heartily approve the general principles of interpretation which have been developed in the foregoing discussion. § 206. Manner of raising the question as to the proper parties plaintiff. Before proceeding to the discussion of particular cases and special rules, a preliminary question may be here properly answered: How can the objection that an action has not been brought by the proper plaintiff or plaintiffs be raised and regularly presented to the court for its decision? The codes of 1 Voorhis v. Child's Executors, 17 N. Y. 354, per Selden J.; Habicht v. Pemberton, 4 Sandf. 657; Van Horne v. |