vessel of Ulysses was quickly wafted from Circe's Island to the rocks of the Syrens; that he had no sooner passed this dangerous coast, than he heard the noise, and saw the swelling waves of Charybdis, and that he reached the Island of the Sun immediately after his escape from the terrors of that destructive whirl pool. It will be easily perceived, that the force of the argument depends upon three circumstances: the position of Circe's Island-the immense distance between it and the modern Charybdis-and the shortness of the time which Ulysses took to sail from that island to the Charybdis of Homer. With regard to the locality of Circe's habitation, we have the authority of Homer himself, who, as we have shown, places it at the eastern extremity of the known world, and its proximity to the Scylla and Charybdis of Homer is fairly deducible from the short interval of time which elapsed before Ulysses encountered the dangers of that formidable rock and whirlpool. If, then, the Scylla and Charybdis of Homer are the same as those of the moderns, the poet is not only chargeable with a violation of probability, in representing his hero as preferring a passage at once dangerous and unknown, to one that was known and comparatively safe; but he is guilty of an additional absurdity, in making Ulysses perform what it was impossible for him to accomplish. From these considerations, we think ourselves justified in asserting, that the Scylla and Charybdis of Homer were not situated in that narrow passage which now bears the name of the Straits of Messina. But if this was not their local po sition, where are we to find them? It is often more easy to state a difficulty than to solve it; and this is particularly the case in the present instance, as there seems to be no situation that can be substituted for the one which, in the common opinion, they have uniformly held. We have, therefore, no other alternative left, than to suppose that they were indebted for their existence to the imagination of the poet. We do not see any reasonable objection to this mode of removing the difficulty. The creative power of fancy is as legiti mately exercised in the production of a place, as in that of a new race of beings; and Homer seems to have availed himself of this privilege much more frequently than is generally supposed. The Island of Calypso, for instance, has been placed by different inquirers in different parts of the world; but a satisfactory position has not, as far as we know, ever been given to it; a circumstance that may be accounted for, by supposing it to have been only a poetic fiction. But even as creations of the poet, the rock and whirlpool under consideration must have been viewed by him as having a local situation. In order to ascertain it, it will be necessary to remember, that Ulysses passed them when returning to his native country. If, then, he sailed from the eastern extremity of the Euxine, they must have occurred in some part betwixt that place and Ithaca; and it is not improbable that Homer placed them in some imaginary strait, which, in his opinion, connected the Adriatic with the surrounding ocean. Before dismissing the subject, it may be proper to take notice of an objection which may be urged against what has been advanced. The identity of the names, it may be said, could not have been the result of chance, and, of course, there must be some connection between the Scylla and Charybdis of Homer and those of the moderns. The force of the preceding observations, however, would not be invalidated, even if no reason could be assigned for this coincidence; but we may remark, that the names were probably invented by Homer, and subsequently applied by some Grecian colonists to the rock and whirlpool between Sicily and Italy. Nothing can be more natural, than for emigrants to affix the local appellations to which they had been accustomed in their native land, to corresponding places in the country to which they have removed; and though the modern Scylla and Charybdis fall far short of the terrors with which Homer has invested those of his own creation, yet the resemblances between them are sufficient to warrant the supposition which has been made, to account for the identity of the names. Summer. THE beautiful Summer is gone! Like a bright dream of the night: The beautiful Summer is gone! We dream of its loveliness yet, We dream of its bright sunny flow'rs, Its repose we may not forget, Like the thoughts of our childhood hours. There's a voice amid Nature's decay, Yet holier these feelings to me, Or all its rich glories are. A sadness most sweet enwraps the soul, HISTOIRE MILITAIRE DE LA CAMPAGNE DE RUSSIE EN 1812. (Concluded.) In the Eighth Chapter, Colonel Boutourlin treats first of the situation of the armies during the sejour of Napoleon at Moscow, and of the Russians at Tarútino; then of the activity of the corps of partisans, a kind of guerilla force, which, at the suggestion of Colonel Davidof, was first adopted some days before the battle of Borodíno, and which, having been found very useful, was extensively encouraged by Kutúsof. The character and habits of the regular troops, or Kozaks of the Don—“ cette milice belliqueuse et infatigable”—which the banks of the Don furnish to the Russian armies, are singularly well adapted for a guerilla warfare, and always formed part of the troops of the partisans, who were able officers, and whose operations were favoured by the hostile dispositions of the peasantry toward the French. They proved most ruinous to their enemies, by cutting off their resources of provisions, and attacking their foraging parties, who dared scarcely venture five versts from their camps. "While abundance reigned in the camp of Tarútino, misery and want were the portion of the troops of Napoleon, who, upon the smoking ruins of the ancient capital of the Czars, devorait ses inquietudes, and still endeavoured to maintain a menacing attitude." The correspondence between General Lauriston and Prince Kutúsof, with respect to peace, and the profound dissimulation with which the latter acted, are well known to the public. By his cunning, he assuredly deceived Buonaparte and his Generals, and led them to entertain the most false expectations, so as the better to lead them into the snare, by the delay of their operations. After the advance of Napoleon to Moscow, Kutúsof determined to throw his forces into the rear of the grand French army. While the chief Russian army kept the enemy in check, the secondary armies were simultaneously to commence offensive operations upon its rear. General Steingell, disembarking at Renal with 14,000 men from Finland, was to proceed to Riga, and after joining some thousand troops there, was to attack the left of Macdonald's corps. Count Wittgenstein, whose corps, with reinforcements and militia, now amounted to 50,000 men, was to act against Saint-Cyr, by throwing the greatest part of his forces on the left of the Dvina, above Polótsk, to take this town (à revers) from behind, where the enemy, as formerly mentioned, was fortified. Having expelled Saint-Cyr, and thrown him upon the corps of Steingell, he was to beat back (rabattre) upon Doktchitsi, so as to put himself in intimate connection with Admiral Tchitchagóf, and to watch the course of the Ula against the grand French army. The Admiral was enjoined to gain the left of Prince Schwartzenberg, and after having left before him the third army of the west, to transport the Moldavian army by Nesvig upon Minsk, to which the corps of General VOL. XVI. D Estell was also to direct itself from Mozyr. After the junction with the last, the Admiral would have had about 50,000 men under his orders, destined to watch the course of the Beresina, and to defend the point of Borisof, and the defiles between this town and Bobr against the grand army of Napoleon. The Admiral had, besides, the most positive orders to put himself in communication with Wittgenstein. The third army was meant to throw back Prince Schwartzenberg beyond the Boog,and afterwards proceed to establish itself at Nesvig, so as to be ready to support that of the Admiral, and form the right of the three armies. By this plan, a formidable inass of 100,000 men was to be established upon the Beresina, without counting the reserve which was to direct itself upon Wilna. Marshal Kutúsof having had no objections against these dispositions, proposées par l'Empereur Alexandre, orders were forwarded to put them into execution. We shall now return to the grand armies. Though the grand army of the Russians still occupied the camp at Tarútino, the head-quarters of General Kutúsof were transported to Leteshévka, as being a less-exposed position. The militia, already organized, finished l'investissement of the French army at Moscow, by tracing round it a contiguous circle. The militia of Tver was still in that town, so as to sustain Vintzingerode; that of Yarosláf, posted at Porisláf-Zaleskoi, covered the road of Yarosláf; that of Vladimir, posted at Pokróf, covered the road of Vladimir; that of Riazan, posted at Dednovo, upon the Oka, observed the road of Riazan and that of Kazimof, by Yegoriévsk; that of Tala covered this government by bordering the right bank of the Oka, from Aleksin to Katshir; finally, that of Kalúga assembled in the town of the same name, and pushed forward a strong detachment upon Briansk, (in the government of Orel,) to defend this town, important on account of its foundry and arsenal. The militia, being for the greater part armed with pikes, could not have opposed a very numerous body, but at least they prevented the French from sending out detachments to the provinces adjoining to the government of Moscow, and obtaining new means of subsistence for their army. From Tarútino the Russians made a successful attack upon the King of Naples' advanced guard, which is called the Battle of Tchernítchnia, and then returned to the camp at Tarútino. In this combat, the French sustained a loss of 2,000 slain, (including two generals,) and 1,500 prisoners; while the Russians had only 500 men hors de combat, and General Baggavout killed by a cannon ball at the commencement of the attack. At the beginning of October, Napoleon made his preparations for a retreat. The corps of Ney, and the division of Delzons, pushed from Bóghoródsk and Dmitref, and rejoined on the 3d (15th) the army before Moscow: the division of Broussier and the light cavalry of Ornaro passed from the road of Smolensk upon that of Kalúga, directing themselves upon the village Phorninskoyé. Still Napoleon himself remained at Moscow; but the news of the defeat of the King of Naples dissipated all his hopes of peace. He now saw the magnitude of the danger, into which his delay at Moscow had drawn the army. He had no time to lose; and, above all, it was necessary to endeavour to re-establish his communications. He therefore resolved to turn the position of the Russians, by directing himself by Borovsk and Málo-Yaroslávets, upon Kalúga. If he had succeeded in arriving at this town before the Russians, he would have obtained the immense advantage of establishing his communications with Smolensk by Youknof and Viasma; and with Mohilef, by Métchovsk, Jizdra, Roslávl, and Mstislávl; and if even the subsequent events of the campaign had obliged him to fall back behind the Dnieper, this retreat, performed across fertile and undevastated countries, might have been effected without great disasters. On the 7th (19th) October Napoleon left Moscow, and although determined to retreat by Borovsk, yet he made his first march by the old road of Kalúga, so as to be joined by the advanced guard of the King of Naples at Vatutinka, and the head-quarters were fixed at Troitskoyé, an adjoining village. Mortier remained at Moscow with the young guard, so as to protect the convoy of sick, of wounded, of artillery, of ammunition, and of trophies taken in that city. On the 8th, (20th,) the Viceroy went to 1gnátovo, and on the 9th, (21st,) having regained the new road of Kalúga at Bisákova, proceeded to Phorninskoyé, and joined General Broussier. Napoleon following the same route on the 9th and 10th, (21st and 22d,) with the mass of the army, also arrived at Phorninskoyé. On the 10th, (22d,) the corps of Prince Poniatóvski was pushed forward upon Vérea, with the design of covering, on the side of Medvin, the march of the convoys which followed the road of Smolensk. The plan of Napoleon to turn the camp of Tarútino by the left, and gain Kalúga, as already explained, being now perceived by the Russians, there was not a moment to be lost in barring the new road to that town. As it was too late to think of anticipating the mass of Napoleon's army at Borovsk, it was determined to march to Málo-Yaroslávets. General Vintzingerode, having heard of the departure of Napoleon from Moscow, moved from Klin upon the capital. On the 10th (22d) he arrived with his advanced guard at the barrier of Tver. Marshal Mortier had withdrawn himself into the Kremle. Sad silence reigned in the rest of the city. Vintzingerode, followed by a few Kozáks, most imprudently penetrated into it. Some piquets of cavalry, who guarded the avenues of the Kremle, withdrew themselves without fighting. Encouraged by this reception, the General still more imprudently advanced, accompanied only by Captain Narishkin, in order to summon the troops which occupied the Kremle, and which he supposed fewer than they really were. A French post threw itself upon him. A white handkerchief which he held in his hand, in order to pass pour parlementaire, did not save him. As Colonel Boutourlin honestly remarks, "les ennemis ne pouvant raisonnablement avoir égard a une manière aussi inusitée de se présenter en parlementaire," they made both Vintzingerode and Narishkin prisoners. On the 11th, (23d,) the mass of the French army arrived at Borovsk; the corps of the Viceroy advanced even to Uvárovskoyé, and, indeed, the division of this corps of Delzons pushed forward even to Málo-Yaroslávets. On the same day Mortier evacuated Moscow, at two o'clock in the morning, and retired upon Phorninskoyé. General Ilovaiski, par interim, commanding the corps of Vintzingerode, entered Moscow, which had been thirty-nine days in the hands of the enemy. General Platóf had previously been dispatched to Málo-Yaroslávets, with fifteen regiments of Kozáks; but the army was not ready to march till the evening of the 11th, (23d). The camp of Tarútino was raised, and the army proceeded to Málo-Yaroslávets, which now became the theatre of a most obstinate conflict on the 12th, (24th). At the conclusion, the Viceroy remained master of the town. Sir R. Wilson is of opinion, that if, after the battle of Málo-Yaroslávets, so glorious to Prince Eugene and his Italian army, Napoleon had, on the second day, pushed on his advanced guard, instead of making an oblique movement to regain the Moscow and Smolensk road, the whole Russian army, in obedience to the orders already given, would have retired behind the Öka, and left a rich country, and a secure line of march in whatsoever direction Buonaparte might have chosen to re-enter Poland. The loss of the French in this combat was above 5,000 men hors de ligne, and such was the obstinacy of the combatants, that of this number there were only 200 prisoners. Generals Delzons and Lévié were slain, and Generals Pino, Gifflenga, and Fontana, wounded. The loss of the Russians was also about 5,000 men hors de combat. They had to regret General Dórokhof, who died in consequence of a wound received in this affair. The number of troops engaged in this battle, on each side, was about 20,000. The Russians had a momentary numerical advantage, which was destroyed by the French reinforcements. “The possession of Málo-Yaroslávets could only be important to the Russians, in as much as it covered the march which their army performed, so as to transport itself upon the new road of Kaluga. This end having been completely gained on the 12th, (24th,) to have stubbornly disputed this town longer would have been an operation without object." Kutúsof, therefore, in the night between the 11th and 12th, (23d and 24th,) withdrew the troops which had been engaged. The whole army took up its position upon the road of Kalúga, at two and a half versts distance from MaloYaroslávets. Prince Poniatóvski had received orders to march upon Vérea, and examine the road from that town by Medin to Kalúga, while the French army went to Málo-Yároslávets; and on the 13th, (25th,) his advanced guard appeared near Medin, when he was charged by Colonel Ilovaiskii the 9th, and thrown back upon the gros du corps, which had advanced from Vérea to Yegoriévskoyé. Although Napoleon had displaced the Russians from Málo-Yarosálvets, he was not more advanced, and had not succeeded in opening his way to Kalúga. The Russians appeared masters of his communications, but the courageous Napoleon determined upon the only plausible manner of regaining them, and of reaching the Dnieper before them, by beating back to the road of Smolensk to Moscow. It was cruel necessity which made him pursue this route, which, being completely despoiled, could not present any resources to the French troops. Accordingly he retreated upon Borovsk, Vérea, Mojaisk, and Viasma, and subsequently to Gjatsk, Viasma, Dórogobujé, and Smolensk. On the same day, the 14th, (26th,) that the French began their retreat, the Russians retired towards Kalúga, and took up their station at Gontchérovo, while the head-quarters were at Detsino. Colonel Boutourlin says, this retrograde march of Kutúsof, which was suggested by ill-founded anxiety about the road from Medin to Kalúga, was a serious fault, which might have had the most dangerous consequences, if the enemy had perceived it in time. In fact, it discovered to Napoleon the road from MáloYaroslávets to Medin, and put it into his power to have retreated by the last town, Tucknof, and Jelnia, upon Smolensk, through a country which had suffered none of the disasters of the war. Of the motions of the Russian army to protect Kalúga by the road of Medin it is needless to speak, as Buonaparte never made the attempt after the affair of Poniatóvski above noticed. The Russian forces then made various marches, and approached Mojaisk, that they might watch his motions. Colonel Boutourlin again blames Napoleon's long and imprudent delay at Moscow, and while he approves his plan of marching upon Kalúga, he censures the tardiness with which he acted, as such a step could only have been successful by its rapid execution: and he says, Napoleon might have reached Málo-Yaroslávets, on the evening of the 9th, (21st). He likewise reproaches him for not having given battle after the combat of Málo-Yaroslávets, because "he ought to have risked every thing to have endeavoured to open, sword in hand, the road of Kalúga, and thus to have spared himself the necessity of retiring by the desolated route of Smolensk, where the ruin of his army became infallible." The superiority of his forces in number at that epoch presented the chance of success, and the most complete defeat could not have had more disastrous consequences than the retreat by the road of Smolensk. A battle gained would have put him in possession of fertile provinces, and perhaps he would even have been able to have established good winter-quarters between Kalúga and Smolensk, after having thrown back the Russian army upon Orel or Túla. So says the Colonel; but neither Napoleon nor he knew that the retreat by Smolensk was to be so disastrous as it proved; and besides, a defeat at MáloYaroslávets might have endangered his whole army, and his own personal safety. While Boutourlin praises Kutúsof's conduct, he again reproaches him with the retreat from Málo-Yaroslávets to Gontchérovo. But we must pass on to other events. "Even at Gjatsk, the retreat of Napoleon began to assume the character of a flight," and its course was marked by the corpses of men and horses |