rupts, and that the defendants con-
verted the goods after the bank-
rutcy, were not supported by the
evidence. Edwards v. Hooper, 11
M. & W. 363.

See COSTS, 5-COURT OF REVIEW-
EVIDENCE, 1, 2-EXECUTION, 6,
9, 12-LIEN, 5.

POLICY OF ASSURANCE.
The bankrupts, being mortgagees
of various policies of life assurance,
of which the respective insurance
offices had notice, deposit them with
their bankers to secure the repayment
of advances; but the bankers give no
notice of such deposit to the different
offices: Held, that the policies must
be considered as in the order and
disposition of the bankrupts, within
the 72d section of the Bankrupt Act;
and that the same principle applied to
one of the policies, which was effected
with a mutual assurance company.
Ex parte Arkwright, 3 M. D. & D. 129.
See CONTINGENT DEBT-MORTGAGE,

11-REPUTED OWNERSHIP.

POOR, GUARDIAN OF.
See PROTECTED TRANSACTIONS.

PRACTICE.

See PLEADING-COSTS.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See AGENT.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See SURETY.

PRIVILEGE.

See PROTECTION FROM ARREST.

PROMISSORY NOTE.
See BILLS AND NOTES-PARTNer, 1.

PROOF.

1. Upon a loan of 28,2001. Cuba
bonds by a customer to his bankers,
the latter engaged to replace them
"at or within the expiration of three
months, if he should require them to
do so," and to deposit other securi-
ties for the performance of this en-
gagement. After the expiration of
the three months, without any requi-
sition on the part of the customer,
he consents to an exchange of other
securities for those deposited by the
bankers, without any new stipulation
as to the period of redemption, and
the bankers afterwards become bank-
rupt. Held, under these circum-
stances, that the time for replacing
the Cuba bonds became indefinite,
and that the bankers were not bound
to replace them until requested to do
so; and that, no request having been
made by the customer before their
bankruptcy, the customer had no
right of proving for the amount of
the bonds under the fiat, and that the
6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 56, as to the proof
of contingent debts, did not apply.

A customer deposits a box con-
taining various securities with his
bankers for safe custody, and after-
wards grants a loan of a portion of
them to one of the partners in the

banking-house for his own private
purposes, upon his depositing in the
box certain railway shares, to secure
the replacing of the securities thus
lent to him. This partner afterwards,
for his own purposes, and without the
knowledge of the customer, subtracts
the railway shares, and substitutes
others of less value. Held, that as
the proceeds of the railway shares
were not applied to the use of the
partnership, the banking firm were
not answerable for this tortious act
of their partner for his own benefit,
and consequently that the customer
had no right of proof against the joint
estate for the amount of the differ-
ence between the value of the shares
subtracted and those that were sub-
stituted.

Held, also, that the partners were
not chargeable with any loss occa-
sioned by their subtraction of the
shares, on the ground of negligence;
and that even if they were, it would
be a claim for unliquidated damages,
and therefore not provable against
the joint estate. Ex parte Eyre, 3 M.
D. & D. 12; 1 Phil. 227.

2. In assumpsit for money paid,
defendant pleaded his bankruptcy and
certificate; and that the money was
paid for a debt of defendant, for
which plaintiff was surety; that the
debt was due, and plaintiff liable for
it, before the bankruptcy; and that
the money was paid without any re-
quest from defendant, except such as
might legally arise from the premises;
and that the surety had not, when he

became liable, notice of any act of
bankruptcy.

Replication that before the pay-
ment, defendant had obtained his cer-
tificate, and a final dividend had been
made; and that there was not at any
time any debt in respect of the pay-
ment of which plaintiff could have
proved, or received a dividend. Held,
on demurrer to the replication, that
the plaintiff's claim was proveable,
under stat. 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 52, and
that the action was therefore barred
by sect. 121. Jackson v. Magee, 3
Ad. & Ell. N. S. 48.

3. The rule that a joint creditor
cannot prove against one of his
debtors, if another be solvent, is not
confined to cases of partnership, but
applies to co-contractors generally.
Ex parte Field, 3 M. D. & D. 195.

4. A proof will not be ordered to
be expunged merely because the in-
strument on which the proof was
made required a stamp. Ex parte
Byrom, 3 M. D. & D. 53.

5. A judgment creditor, who, hav-
ing taken the body of a bankrupt in
execution before the bankruptcy,
keeps him in prison till he is dis-
charged by his certificate, cannot
prove under the bankruptcy.

Whether a final judgment by de-
fault, not obtained by collusion but
adversely, which could not have been
disputed, if the debtor remained sol-
vent, may be impeached under his
bankruptcy, on a proof being tended
upon it, quære.

But if the judgment were obtained

under such circumstances as would
have been a ground for the interfe-
rence of a Court of Equity to restrain
execution, those circumstances are
a sufficient objection to the proof,
although the debtor may have omitted
to make a legal defence which he had
to the action, and although (under
such circumstances as those of the
present case) nearly twenty years
have elapsed since the judgment was
obtained. Ex parte Mudie, 3 M. D.
& D. 66.

6. Where a bankrupt, after the
commission of an act of bankruptcy,
of which his bankers had notice-
though not the act of bankruptcy on
which the fiat issued-drew upon
them various cheques in favour of
several of his creditors, which cheques
were duly paid by the bankers; it
was held that the bankers could not
prove the amount of these payments
under the fiat. Where bankers, with
the knowledge of an act of bank-
ruptcy committed by their customer,
took a guarantee from a surety on
his behalf, to secure to a given amount
all sums then or thereafter to become
due from the customer, but the surety
had no notice of the act of bankruptcy,
and afterwards paid to the bankers
the full sum for which he was gua-
rantee, without specifying to which
portion of the bankers' debt the pay-
ment was to be applied: Held, that
such payment was to go in reduction
of that portion of the bankers' debt
which was proveable under the fiat,
and not of that which was not prove-

able. Ex parte Sharp, 3 M. D. &
D. 490.

See BOND-CONTINGENT DEBT-FU-
TURE DEBT-GUARANTEE-MORT-
GAGE, 12-PARTNER-PETITION-
ING CREDITOR, 1-SURETY-TRUS-
TEE, 2, 3, 4.

PROOF, EXPUNGING.
See STAMP, 1, 3.
PROTECTED TRANSACTIONS.
A., a trader, on the 2d of October,
gave B., one of his creditors, an order
for money drawn by a board of guar-
dians of the poor on their treasurer,
payable to A., but not to bearer or
order. On the 4th of October A.
committed an act of bankruptcy, of
which B. had notice on the 5th. On
the 9th, the treasurer of the union
paid B. the amount of the order.
A fiat of bankruptcy issued against
A. on the 22d of November. Held,
that 4.'s assignees could not recover
the amount of the order in an action
for money had and received by B.,
as this was a "transaction protected
by the stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29. s. 1,"
and that the "transaction" was, so
far as the bankrupt was concerned,
complete on the 2d of October.

To determine whether a fraudulent
preference has been given by a bank-
rupt to one of his creditors by a pay-
ment, it will be for the jury to say
whether the payment was voluntary,
and without any pressure by the cre-
ditor, and was made when the debtor
knew that he must be a bankrupt,
and in contemplation of bankruptcy.

In order to constitute "pressure,"
it is not necessary that legal pro-
ceedings should have been resorted
to, for if the pressure was such that
it overweighed the bankrupt's own
inclination, and induced him to pay
against his will, that would be suffi-
cient pressure within the meaning of
the bankrupt laws.

From a person being in embar-
rassed circumstances, it does not ne-
cessarily follow that he contemplates
bankruptcy, as he may hope that his
affairs may rally and come round.
Green v. Bradfield, 1 Car. & Kir. 449.

See EXECUTION, 1, 6, 14-PROOF, 6-

REPUTED OWNERSHIP.

PROTECTION FROM ARREST.

1. A defendant being in execution
at the suit of plaintiff, plaintiff ob-
tained a vesting Order from the In-
solvent Debtors' Court, under stat.
1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. ss. 36, 37. De-
fendant did not petition that Court
for discharge, but afterwards peti-
tioned the Court of Bankruptcy, and
obtained a final order of protection
under stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116. s. 4.
Held, that he was not entitled to be
discharged from execution, the pro-
visions of stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116,
in this respect not applying to the
case of a party in custody at the time
of his petitioning. Culpeper v. Joy,
4 Ad. & Ell. N. S. 172; 3 Gale &
Dav. 619.

2. The bankrupt's privilege from
arrest extends to a committal under

the act for the Relief of Insolvent
Debtors, for nonpayment of a balance
due from the bankrupt, as assignee
under that act. Ex parte Bury, 3
M. D. & D. 309.

3. An interim order by a Commis-
sioner of bankrupt for the protec-
tion of an insolvent (under 5 & 6 Vict.
c. 116. s. 1), if in the form prescribed
in the rules promulgated by the
Judges and Commissioners of the
Court of Bankruptcy (under sect. 13),
is sufficient, and need not show on the
face of it the jurisdiction of the Com-
missioner to make such Order.

A defendant having been arrested
after such an interim order had been
in fact made (but before notice to the
sheriff or the plaintiff), this Court
ordered his discharge, although the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner did
not appear either by the Order itself
or the affidavits upon which the ap-
plication to this Court was made;
but they refused to give costs against
the sheriff or against the plaintiff.
Marsh v. Woolley, 5 M. & G. 675; 6
Scott, N. R. 555; 3 Dowl. N. S. 84.

RECEIVER.

The conditional order heretofore
issued in the first instance on appli-
cation for a receiver, under 5 & 6
Will. 4. c. 55, did not give the judg-
ment creditor priority over the assig-
nees of the debtor committing an act
of bankruptcy intermediately between
the times of obtaining the conditional
and the absolute order, nor had the
subsequent orders relation back to the

conditional order. Semble, the order
confirming the Master's report was
the order contemplated by the act.
Burt v. Bernard, 2 Conn. & Law. 271.

REGISTRAR.
See COSTS, 9.

RELATION.

A contract under seal by a trader
to execute certain works for the de-
fendant contained a stipulation that
if the contractor should become bank-
rupt or insolvent, or should from any
other cause (not arising from the act
of the defendant) be prevented from,
or delayed in, proceeding with the
works, it should be lawful for de-
fendant to give a notice to the con-
tractor requiring him to proceed re-
gularly with them; and in case the
contractor should, for seven days
after the notice, make default in
proceeding, it should be lawful for
defendant to employ others to com-
plete the work at the contractor's
expense; and that all advances made
by defendant on account before such
default should be taken as full pay-
ment for all the work done by the
contractor, and that all the balance
due to him, and all tools and mate-
rials then delivered for, and being
upon, the works should, upon such
default, become the absolute pro-
perty of defendant; and that all
materials brought and left on the
works by the contractor, to be per-
manently used on or about the same,
should, from the time of being so

brought and left, be considered as the
property of defendant, and should
not be removed without his consent.
The contractor having made default
in proceeding with the works, de-
fendant, on 11th April, duly served
him with notice to proceed. On
17th April the contractor committed
an act of bankruptcy.

Held, that the defendant could not,
on 19th April, take possession of the
tools and materials left by the bank-
rupt upon the work at the time of
the bankruptcy; because the title of
the assignees was complete by rela-
tion on the 17th. Rouch v. Great
Western Railway Company, 1 Ad. &
Ell. N. S. 51.

REPUTED OWNERSHIP.
1. An hotel keeper dies intestate,
leaving four children, upon which
one of her daughters takes posses-
sion of the stock and effects, and
continues the business for a short
time, when she admits one of her
brothers into partnership, and the
two carry on the business together
in their own names for nearly two
years, paying some of the intestate's
debts as well as her funeral expen-
ses. The daughter then retires, and
assigns her share in the business to
her brother, who carries it on in his
own name for six months longer,
when a joint fiat issues against the
two. After their bankruptcy, one of
the other children takes out adminis-
tration to the intestate, and claims the
property from the assignees. Held,