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A single Commissioner of a Dis- |
trict Court of Bankruptcy has power
to issue such warrant.

A bankrupt having been committed
for not satisfactorily answering ques-
tions was again brought up, when the
Commissioner refused to make any
order, but afterwards issued a war-
rant for his detention, on the ground
that his answers on the last examina-
tion were not unsatisfactory, the
Court refused to grant a writ of
habeas corpus, the warrant showing
sufficient ground for his detention.
Ex parte Dauncy, 1 Dowl. & L. 608.
See WARRANT.

COMPOSITION DEED.
See FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE, 4.

COMPROMISE.

See ASSIGNEES, 13-ADVERTISE-
MENT, 5.

CONFORMITY.
See AFFIDAVIT, 5.

CONTEMPT.

A petition for the committal of a
person for publishing insulting ob-
servations on the Court of Review,
and on parties engaged in litigation
before it, with reference to proceed-
ings on a particular bankruptcy, is
properly intituled in the matter of
such bankruptcy.

The Court of Review has jurisdic-
tion to commit for such a publication,
as a contempt, and may make the
order for committal upon the petition

of the parties aggrieved, and may by
such order direct the person com-
mitted to pay all petitioner's costs,
charges, and expenses.

The publication of the observations
respecting the petitioners in such a
case was held to be, of itself, a con-
tempt of Court, and the Court re-
fused to discharge the person com-
mitted, until he apologized, as well
with regard to the petitioners as with
regard to the Court itself.

Held also, that an offer to prove
the truth of the observations, if the
petitioners would proceed upon them
as a libel, was an aggravation of the
contempt.

A petition on which judgment has
been finally pronounced, but on which
the Order has not been drawn up,
held a pending proceeding, for the
purpose of rendering the publication
a contempt of Court, even if the
actual pendency of a proceeding is
requisite to give the Court jurisdic-
tion to commit; but semble that such
pendency is not requisite.

A compromise of a contest for the
choice of assignees, by which the
business of the bankruptcy was divided
between two distinct firms of solici-
tors, who were to be jointly appointed
solicitors to the fiat, strongly disap-
proved of by the Court. Ex parte
Turner, 3 M. D. & D. 523.

CONTINGENT debt.
1. Upon a loan of 28,2001., Cuba
bonds by a customer to his bankers,
the latter engaged to replace them

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"at or within the expiration of three
months, if he should require them to
do so," and to deposit other securities
for the performance of this engage-
ment. After the expiration of the
three months without any requisition
on the part of the customer, the cus-
tomer consents to an exchange of
other securities for those deposited
by the bankers, without any new
stipulation as to the period of re-
demption, and the bankers after-
wards become bankrupt: Held, under
these circumstances, that the time for
replacing the Cuba bonds became in-
definite, and that the bankers were
not bound to replace them until re-
quested so to do; and that no such
request having been made by the
customer before their bankruptcy,
the customer had no right to prove
for the amount of the bonds under
the fiat; and that the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16.
s. 56, as to the proof of contingent
debts did not apply. Ex parte Eyre,
3 M. D. & D. 12; 1 Phill. 227.

2. A. agreed to sell to B. for
4000l. a ship employed on a distant
voyage when she should arrive at her
port of discharge in the united king-
dom, and B. agreed, within one month
after her arrival, or within such further
time as should be necessary for effect-
ing the repairs and discharging the
cargo, on the execution of a bill of
sale of the vessel, to deliver to A.
two promissory notes for the amount
of the purchase money; in default of
which A. meant to sell the ship and
keep the proceeds in part of the pur-

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chase money, B. undertaking to pay
to A. any deficiency within one calen-
dar month after such sale; and in
case the vessel should be lost the
agreement was to be void. On the
27th March the ship arrived, before
which time B. became bankrupt. On
the 31st March A. gave notice of her
arrival to the assignees, who declined
to complete the contract, and A. sold
the ship for 28331. Held, that the
agreement amounted to a contract on
the part of B. to pay a certain sum
on a contingency, liable to be reduced
on another contingency, and that A.
could prove for the balance of the
4000l. after deducting the amount of
the proceeds of the sale of the ship.
Ex parte Harrison, 3 M. D. & D.

350.

3. Covenant. The declaration
stated that the defendant effected a
policy of insurance on his life, and
assigned it to plaintiff to secure a
sum of money lent by plaintiff to
defendant, and that defendant had
covenanted to pay the premiums on
the policy: breach, that he had not
so paid the premiums.

Plea, the defendant's bankruptcy
after commission of the breaches.

Held, that the plea was no answer,
as the defendant's liability to pay the
premiums to the insurance office con-
stituted no debt, either contingent or
otherwise, between plaintiff and de-
fendant, and was collateral to the
debt, and not proveable under de-
fendant's commission. Toppin v. Field,
3 Gale & Dav. 340.

COSTS.

1. A petitioner obtaining an Order
of the Court for any purpose, which
directs him to pay the costs of another
party appearing on the petition, is
bound, on the requisition of such
party, to produce the Order to the
Registrar, pursuant to the General
Order of the 29th April 1844, for
the purpose of his marking on it the
date when it passed, preparatory to
the issuing of a writ of fieri facias for
the amount of the costs. Ex parte
Grimstead, 3 M. D. & D. 683.

2. Where bills of costs of the
solicitor to the fiat had been taxed
and paid before 1835, and the assig-
nees' accounts containing these pay-
ments had been audited and passed
by the Commissioners, and one of
the solicitors to the fiat and two of the
assignees had since died: Held, that
a petition for retaxation, presented in
1844, came too late, whether the case
came within the act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73,
or not; as to which, quære.

As to other bills delivered in and
before 1834, and paid without being
taxed by the assignees, by payments
on account, ending in 1834, held, that
the statute did not prevent taxation,
and that the petition was not too late.
Ex parte Woolston, 3 M. D. & D. 702.

3. Under a fiat in bankruptcy,
issued in the year 1840, G. was ap-
pointed official assignee, and received
possession of the bankrupt's books,
&c. On the 10th of December, 1841,
the fiat was annulled by consent of
the creditors, and the bankrupt de-

manded the restoration of his books:
but this being refused, on the 4th of
January, 1842, he commenced an
action of trover against G. for their
recovery. On the 25th of January
a second fiat was issued against the
plaintiff, and on the 12th of May the
plaintiff was duly adjudged a bank-
rupt. On the 25th of May, G., the
defendant in the suit, was again ap-
pointed official assignee. On the
23rd of February the action was
tried, and the plaintiff obtained a
verdict. Held, that the defendant
was entitled to stay the proceedings
in the action, upon payment of costs
down to the date of the second fiat
in bankruptcy. Ouchterlony v. Gibson,
3 Dowl. N. S. 1; 1 Dowl. & L. 1.

4. An executrix brought an action
of assumpsit for 47. 1s. 1d., in respect
of a debt found by the testator's
books to be due from the defendant.
Before action the defendant alleged
that he had a set-off, but he pleaded
as to 21. 15s. his bankruptcy; and as
to the residue, non assumpsit; the
plaintiff entered a nolle prosequi as
to 21. 15s., but recovered a verdict
for 11. 68. 1d. the residue. Held,
that the cause of action having arisen
in the county of Middlesex, and the
debt being reduced below 40s., the
defendant was entitled to enter a
suggestion upon the roll to entitle
him to double costs of suit; and that
his right to do so was not affected
by the position of the plaintiff as
executrix, nor by her ignorance of
the bankruptcy of the defendant, nor

by the circumstance of the bank-
ruptcy not having been put in issue.
Stilwell v. Bracher, 3 Dowl. N. S. 251.

5. The plaintiffs recovered a ver-
dict in an action of assumpsit on two
bills of exchange for 681. 6s. for
damages and costs. After a fiat in
bankruptcy had issued against the
defendant, they signed judgment.
Afterwards they proved under the
commission for the amount of the
bills of exchange, the Commissioners
refusing to allow them to prove for
the costs. The bankrupt never ob-
tained his certificate, nor was any
dividend paid under the commission.
The plaintiffs subsequently sued out
a writ of sci. fa. to revive the judg-
ment, solely with the view of re-
covering the costs. The Court
granted a rule to stay proceedings
on the sci. fa. Woodward v. Meredith,
2 Dowl. & L. 135.

6. On taxation of costs, a charge
for consulting counsel previously to
presenting the petition, and a fee to
a second counsel on the hearing, if
the petition is one of a special nature,
ought to be allowed. Ex parte Ellis,
3 M. D. & D. 600.

7. An application to review the
taxation of an officer of the Court
may be made by way of motion.

Assignees having the conduct of a
sale under the usual Order, made on
the petition of a vendor, having a
lien for unpaid purchase money, are
justified in taking the opinion of
counsel on the conditions of sale, and
will be allowed the costs of so doing,

out of the proceeds of the sale,
although those proceeds may fall
short of the sums due to the vendor.
Ex parte Lewis, 3 M. D. & D. 173.

8. The provisions of the 3 & 4
Will. 4. c. 47. s. 8, enabling the
Court of Review to refer bills of
costs to be taxed by the Registrar, is
confined to such bills as are directed
to be taxed by the 1 & 2 Will. 4.
c. 56. s. 5, and the directions of the
last mentioned act apply only to

66

costs of suit between party and
party in the Court of Review." Other
bills of costs, therefore, must still be
referred for taxation to a Master in
Chancery. Ex parte Glaister, 3 M.
D. & D. 253.

9. Quære, whether 5 & 6 Vict.
c. 122. s. 19, (which gives the de-
fendant costs in case the plaintiff
should not recover the amount for
which he filed an affidavit of debt,)
applies to a case referred for arbitra-
tion. Higginson v. Broadhurst, 1
Dowl. & L. 490.

10. A trader, against whom a fiat
has improperly issued, is requested by
the petitioning creditor to consent to
an order to annul, on payment of the
costs, &c. of the application; the
proposed Order not providing for
the costs of annulling the fiat and
incidental thereto. The trader does
not object on the ground of this
omission, but requires other and un-
usual words to be added to the pro-
posed order, which the petitioning
creditor declines inserting. Held, that
this negociation did not deprive the

trader of his costs, on his afterwards
presenting a petition of his own to
annul. Ex parte Musgrove, 3 M. D.
& D. 386.

See AGENT, 2-CONTEMPT-INSPEC-
TOR-ASSIGNEES, 6, 11--MORT-
GAGE, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17-OFFICIAL
ASSIGNEE-VOLUNTARY DEED.

COURT OF REVIEW.
Declaration in case for maliciously
suing out a fiat in bankruptcy against
plaintiff. The count averred that the
fiat was untenable, &c., and that such
proceedings were thereupon had, that
on, &c., it was duly ordered, to wit,
by the Court of Review, that the fiat
should be, and that the same then
was, rescinded and annulled, and the
proceedings on the said fiat were
thereupon then wholly ended and
determined. Plea, Not guilty.

On motion after verdict for plain-
tiff to enter a nonsuit on the ground
that the order annulling the fiat was
proved at the trial to have been the
Lord Chancellor's, and not that of
the Court of Review: Held, that the
plea of Not guilty, under the New
Rules, did not put in issuse the an-
nulling of the fiat, and therefore that
the variance, if any, was no ground
of nonsuit.

On motion to arrest judgment on
the ground that the Court of Review
had no authority, under 1 & 2 Will. 4.
c. 50, to annul a fiat: Held (as-
suming this to be so), that the state-
ment of an order by the Court of

Review, in the above count, might
be rejected; and that the residue of
the count was sufficient, after verdict.

Semble, that, if the objection on the
face of the count would have been
good on motion in arrest of judgment,
the judge at nisi prius ought not to
have permitted an amendment under
stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42. s. 23. Atkin-
son v. Raleigh, 3 Ad. & Ell. N. S. 79.
See COMMISSIONERS-CONTEMPT.

DEBT, FUTURE.
See FUTURE Debt.

DECLARATION.
See COURT OF REVIEW.

DELAY.

See ANNULLING, 2, 4, 8.

DEMAND.
See PARTNER, 3.

DEPOSIT.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE, 3-MORT-

GAGE.

DISCHARGE.

See PROTECTION FROM ARREST.

DISCLAIMER.

See OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

DIVIDEND.

1. After a dividend has been de-
clared, a party, entitled in respect of
a proof, request the assignees, by
letter, to send him the amount of his
dividend in a post office order, pro-

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