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nor is there any thing in the correspondence to lead to that conclusion. As far as relates to the goods purchased with the money sent by Gemmell & Co. of Glasgow, no question arises. The sum of 50001. remitted by Boggs, Taylor & Co., was invested in silk, the bill of lading for which was indorsed by W. & T. Gemmell & Co. of Canton, to Boggs, Taylor & Co. The silk arrived in England, after an act of bankruptcy committed by Boggs, Taylor & Co. A bankruptcy ensued, and a dispute arose between the assignees and Gemmell & Co., who claimed a lien on the silk for the amount of the bills. I think they had no such lien. There had been nothing more than an agreement on the part of Gemmell & Co. to lend their name to Boggs & Co., by renewing the bills until the goods came home. It was merely an accommodation transaction, on a stipulation that there should be a credit to a certain extent; and Boggs & Co. only wanted the funds to come home to enable them to take up their portion of the bills. There is no ground to infer that the parties did not rely on each other's personal credit. It appears to me, therefore, that there was no specific appropriation of the goods for the liquidation of the bills.
With respect to the second transaction, as to the bill for 15001., -it appears that in June 1841, G. Boggs shipped a cargo of goods by the Bewlah, which were consigned to W. & T. Gemmell & Co. at Canton for sale, and the proceeds of which they were to lay out in the purchase of other goods to be consigned to the house of Boggs & Co. in England. Boggs, after this shipment, wrote the letter of the 28th June 1841 to the Glasgow house, reminding them of their undertaking to keep Boggs & Co. out of any cash advance on their shipments to the house in China, and draw a bill on the Glasgow
Ex parte GEMMELL and others.
house for 15001. on the shipment; adding the following postscript to his letter : “Of course Boggs & Co. will put you in funds for this draft, it being understood we mutually keep each other out of cash advances on our transactions with your house in China.” The house in London therefore were to take up this bill, when it became due; and the terms of this contract were admitted by the Glasgow house, by their accepting the bill. Then, was this anything more than an accommodation bill accepted by the Glasgow house, for the purpose of keeping Boggs & Co. out of cash advances? The teas which were consigned by the house at Canton to Boggs & Co., in return for their shipment by the Bewlah, were never under the control of the Glasgow house, but were consigned direct from China to Boggs & Co. There is nothing in this transaction, therefore, to constitute a lien of Gemmell & Co. on the return cargo, or to raise any claim for an appropriation of the proceeds for the payment of the 15001. bill. But some reliance was placed at the bar on an expression in the letter of G. Boggs of the 28th June 1841, wherein, after saying that he has drawn a bill for 15001. on account of the shipment to the house at Canton, he adds, “as I put it in the bill against the above, it will appear a transaction of mine, and not mixed up with the London house." But this expression must be construed with reference to the shipment. Does it in fact amount to more than this, "I have drawn a bill on account of that shipment, and I have put on the bill a memorandum that it is drawn on account of that shipment ?" This does not give a lien to Gemmell & Co. on the return cargo, but only shows that G. Boggs intended to identify the transaction, and keep it
separate from the transactions of the London house. It appears to me, that there was no appropriation of the
teas consigned from China for the payment of this bill. The Vice-Chancellor's decision, therefore, must be affirmed, without costs on either side, the assignees taking theirs out of the estate.
Lincoln's Inn, Ex parte Perry. In the matter of COLLINS.
Fel. 26. There must be THIS was a petition of the public officer of the Devon some actual de posit
, to consti- and Cornwall Banking Company, for the usual Order on tule an equitable mortgage. An an equitable mortgage. It appeared that the bankrupt party to deposit had contracted with a party for a lease of certain prea lease, when executed, is not
mises, and that, when the lease was about to be granted, sufficient,
he gave notice to the intended lessor to place the lease, when executed, in the hands of the banking company as a security for a debt.
Mr. Bacon, in support of the petition.
Mr. Hallett, contrà.
VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE, C. J.- There is here no deposit of any thing whatever, to constitute an equitable mortgage. It is only a case of actual deposit, that excludes the operation of the Statute of Frauds. The rights of all these parties are concluded at the time of the bankruptcy. I think I can make no Order, under these circumstances. But if the petitioner's counsel wishes to look into the authorities, the matter may be mentioned again. Subject to that reservation, the petition must be dismissed, but without costs.
1843. Ex parte Glaister. In the matter of Martin.
Lincoln's Inn, This was the petition of one of the assignees, praying Feb. 26 and
March 1. that it might be referred to the Registrar to tax the The provision solicitor's bills of costs; namely, one up to the choice of the 3 & 4
c. of assignees, two up to the audit, and three others sub- s. 8., enabling
the Court of sequent to the audit.
Review to refer bills of costs to be taxed by the
Registrar, is Mr. Bacon, in support of the petition.
contined to such bills as are directed to be
taxed by the Mr. Anderdon, for the other assignee.
1 & 2 Will. 4.
the last menVice-CHANCELLOR Knight BRUCE, C. J.-Upon tioned act apply looking at the enactment of the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 47. of suit between
only to "cosis s. 8., I doubt my power to refer these bills to the Re- party and party
in the Court of gistrar for taxation, instead of sending them to a Master
bills of costs, in Chancery. The eighth section declares that it shall therefore, must
still be referred be “ lawful for the said Court of Review to order that for taxation to
a Master in any costs, which by the said secondly recited act are Chancery. directed to be taxed by one of the Masters of the High Court of Chancery, shall and may be taxed by one of the Registrars, or Deputy Registrars, of the said Court of Bankruptcy.” Now the “secondly recited act” referred to by this section is the 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 56., and the directions for the taxation of costs given by the fifth section of that act apply only to “costs of suit between party and party in the Court of Review.” It is certainly a defect in the wording of the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 47, s. 8., if it was the intention of that act, as most probably it was, to enable the Registrar to tax all costs which might have been previously taxed by a Master ; but I am bound by the restrictive words of the 1& 2 Will. 4. c.56., and therefore can only refer these bills for taxation to a
Master in Chancery, under the provisions of the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 14. The petition had better stand over, in order that it may be amended, by praying for a reference to a Master in Chancery, instead of the Registrar, to tax the bills of costs.
Mr. Baoon now said, that the necessary alteration had been made in the prayer of the petition; and referred to the Lord Chancellor's General Order in Chancery of the 26th October 1842, rule 9, which directs, that bills of costs formerly taxed by a Master in Chancery shall now be taxed by the taxing Master. It is clear, that the Court has authority to order these bills to be taxed, under the general provision of the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 14., which declares “ that any creditor who shall have proved to the amount of 201. or upwards, if he be dissatisfied with such settlement by the Commissioners, may have any such costs and bills settled by a Master in Chancery.” But, independently of the provisions in the acts of parliament, this Court has a general jurisdiction to refer the bill of any solicitor of the Court for taxation; Ex parte Copeland(a). And by the 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 56. s. 10., all the laws and statutes in force concerning attornies and solicitors are declared to extend to attornies and solicitors practising in the Court of Bankruptcy; and by sect. 16 it is also declared, that all the laws and statutes, rules and orders, relating to bankrupts or to proceedings under commissions, or to the persons concerned therein, or in any way affected thereby, shall in like manner extend in every respect to that act, and to fiats issued in pursuance thereof, and to all proceedings under the same, and to all persons con
(a) 4 Deac. & C. 86.