tive allegation to that effect, and this rule is especially applicable where a company holding itself out to the world as a corporation denies its own existence.24 In an action against a corporation, an answer upon information and belief, admitting that both plaintiff and defendant are corporations, and denying each and every allegation of the complaint, is frivolous, and creates no issue whatever.

1 See N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. 500; 2 Iowa Rev. Code (1880) 2655 subd. 2; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 437, subd. 2; N. C. Code Civ. Proc. 100; Colo. Code Civ. Proc. 57; Pratt Manuf. Co. v. Jordon Iron etc. Co. 5 Civ. Proc. R. 372; People v. Curtis, 1 Idaho, 753,

2 Livingston v. Hammer, 7 Bosw. 670; Richter v. McMurray, 15 Abb. Pr. 346; Treadwell v. Commissioners, 11 Ohio St. 183; Kitchen v. Wilson, 80 N. C. 192; Farmers' etc. Bank v. City of Charlotte, 75 N. C. 45; Maclay v. Sands, 94 U. S. 586; Ames v. Railroad Co. 12 Minn. 412; Roby v. Hallock, 55 How. Pr. 412; Metraz v. Pearsall, 5 Abb. N. C. 90; Richards v. Fuechsel, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 430; Henderson v. Manning, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 221; People v. Curtis, 1 Idaho, 753; Sherman v. Osborn, 8 Oreg. 66; Wilson v. Allen, 11 Oreg. 154.

3 Elton v. Markham, 20 Barb. 343; Heye v. Bolles, 2 Daly, 231; 33 How. Pr. 266; Hackett v. Richards, 3 Smith, E. D. 13. And see Sheldon v. Sabin, 4 Civ. Proc. R. 4.

4 Manny v. French, 23 Iowa, 250; Hautemann v. Gray, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 224, n.

5 Lloyd v. Burns, 6 Jones & S. 423; 62 N. Y. 651; Manny v. French, 23 Iowa, 250; People v. McCumber, 27 Barb. 632; 15 How. Pr. 186; Humphreys v. McCall, 9 Cal. 59. And see Sayre v. Cushing, 7 Abb. Pr. 371; Nichols v. Jones, 6 How. Pr. 355; Swinburne v. Stockwell, 58 How. Pr. 312.

6 McFarland v. Lester, 23 Iowa, 260; McPhail v. Hyatt, 29 Iowa, 137.

7 Jones v. Petaluma, 36 Cal. 230; Roussin v. Stewart, 33 Cal. 211; Kirstein v. Madden, 38 Cal. 163. And see Metraz v. Pearsall, 5 Abb. N. C. 90; Sackett v. Hadens, 7 Abb. Pr. 371, n.

8 Snyder v. White, 6 How. Pr. 321.

9 Brotherton v. Downey, 21 Hun, 436; 59 How. Pr. 206. 10 Brotherton v. Downey, 21 Hun, 436; 59 How. Pr. 206.

11 Hanna v. Barker, 6 Colo. 303; Morton v. Jackson, 2 Minn. 219; Lawrence v. Derby, 24 How. Pr. 133; Wing v. Dugan, 8 Bush, 583. And see Capital Bank v. Rutherford, 70 Ga. 57. Compare Grocers' Bank v. O'Rourke, 6 Hun, 18; Richards v. Fuechsel, 5 Civ. Proc. R. 430.

12 Hanna v. Barker, 6 Cal. 303; Humphreys v. McCall, 9 Cal. 59; Gas Company . San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; Lloyd v. Burns, 6 Jones & S. 423; 62 N. Y. 651,

13 Lewis v. Acker, 11 How. Pr. 163; Beebe v. Marvin, 17 Abb. Pr. 194; Chapman v. Palmer, 12 How. Pr. 37.

14 Edwards v. Lent, 8 How. Pr. 28.

15 Asiel v. Railroad Co. 3 Month. Law Bull. 28.

16 Goodell v. Blumer, 41 Wis. 436. And see Curtis v. Richards, 9 Cal. 38.

17 Goodell v. Blumer, 41 Wis. 436; Mills v. Town of Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50; City of Milwaukee v. O'Sullivan, 25 Wis. 666; Brown v. La Crosse City etc. 21 Wis. 51. Compare Oregonian Railw. Co. v. Oregon Railw. & Nav. Co. Cir. Ct. Oreg. 4 West C. Rep. 548.

18 Goodell v. Blumer, 41 Wis. 436.

19 Elmore v. Hill, 46 Wis. 618.

20 Macauley v. Bromell etc. Printing Co. 5 Civ. Proc. R. 431; Wadleigh v. Marathon County Bank, 58 Wis. 546.

21 Macauley v. Bromell etc. Printing Co. 5 Civ. Proc. R. 431.

22 Concordia Sav. etc. Assoc. v. Reed, 93 N. Y. 474; 18 N. Y. Week. Dig. 169; Crane etc. Manuf. Co. v. Morse, 49 Wis. 368; Brown v. City of La Crosse etc. Co. 21 Wis. 51; Bengston v. Thingvalla Steamship Co. 3 Civ. Proc. R. 263; S. C. aff'd 4 Civ. Proc. R. 260; 31 Hun, 96; 18 N. Y. Week. Dig. 411; East River Bank v. Rogers, 7 Bosw. 493; City Bank v. Drake, 5 N. Y. Week. Dig. 477.

23 Bengston v. Thingvalla Steamship Co. 3 Civ. Proc. R. 263.

24 Bengston v. Thingvalla Steamship Co. 3 Civ. Proc. R. 263; S. C. aff'd 4 Civ. Proc. R. 260; 31 Hun, 96; 18 N. Y. Week. Dig. 411. And see N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1776.

25 Pratt Manuf. Co. v. Jordon Iron etc. Co. 5 Civ. Proc. R. 372; 33 Hun, 143.

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63. What may or may not be denied. Under the Code system of pleading, a denial is confined to such allegations only as are material. And only those allegations in a complaint or petition are deemed material, which the plaintiff must prove upon the trial in order to maintain his action.2 Mere matters of inducement averred in a complaint are not the subject of denial;3 so of an averment of the belief of the plaintiff, as it regards any fact; so of allegations of time, place, value, etc., when not of the substance of the issue. So, as a general rule, a mere denial of a legal conclusion puts in issue no fact alleged, and is inadmissible; such, for instance, is a denial of indebtedness,' except where the indebtedness is merely pleaded as a fact. But authority to deny material allegations is not confined to such as are directly alleged; 9 facts impliedly averred are traversable in the same manner as though directly averred.10 So when the answer puts

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in issue material allegations, although its form and structure indicate that the intention of the pleader is to present a different question, yet the issues in fact presented cannot be disregarded, and the court cannot, by a summary judgment, deprive the defendant of the right of a trial of the issues thus formed."

1 King v. Utica Ins. Co. 6 How. Pr. 485; Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sand. 54. An answer need not traverse mere matters of surplusage: Racouillat v. Rene, 32 Cal. 450; Pence v. Durbin, 1 Idaho, 550.

2 Clay County v. Simonsen, 1 Dakota, 403; 2 Dakota, 112; Fairchild v. Railroad Co. 15 N. Y. 337.

3 Fry v. Bennett, 1 Code R. N. S. 238; 5 Sand. 54.

4 Radway v. Mather, 5 Sand. 654; Walters v. Chinn, 1 Met. (Ky.) 499.

5 Woodruff v. Cook, 25 Barb. 505; Livingston v. Hammer, 7 Bosw. 670; Davison v. Powell, 16 How. Pr. 467.

6 Kay v. Churchill, 10 Abb. N. C. 83; Emery v. Baltz, 94 N. Y. 408; 18 N. Y. Week. Dig. 226; Marsh v. Elsworth, 36 How. Pr. 532; Frasier v. Williams, 15 Minn. 288; Downer v. Read, 17 Minn. 493; Nelson v. Murray, 23 Cal. 338.

7 Pierson v. Cooley, 1 Code R. 91; Wells v. McPike, 21 Cal. 215.

8 Morrow v. Congan, 3 Abb. Pr. 323. And see Quin v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349; Anon. 2 Code R. 67.

9 Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534; Prindle v. Carutbers, 15 N. Y. 425; Lord v. Chesebrough, 4 Sand. 696.

10 Marie v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14.

11 Youngs v. Kent, 46 N. Y. 672.

264. Effect of omission to deny. - Material allegations of the complaint or petition not denied by the answer are to be taken as true, for the purposes of the action.1 And by the term "material allegation" is meant, an allegation without proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his action.2 The object sought by this feature of Code pleading is, to compel the defendant to admit every part of the plaintiff's complaint or petition which he cannot conscientiously deny; therefore, any fact sustaining the plaintiff's case admitted in one part of the answer is to be taken as true, and the plaintiff is not bound to prove it. And it is error for the court to instruct the jury that it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove facts alleged in the complaint, and not denied by

the answer. The failure to deny a material allegation is an admission of it, and the admission is conclusive evidence of the fact admitted. But an omission to deny any allegation, which is in any sense of the word immaterial, is not an admission of its truth. So, it is held that nothing is admitted by an omission to answer it except what is well pleaded. But a fact impliedly averred, if not denied, will be deemed admitted."

J

1 See N. C. Code Civ. Proc. 127; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 462; N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. 522; Wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 465; Jenkins v. OreDressing Co. 65 N. C. 563; Sands v. St. John, 23 How. Pr. 140; 36 Barb. 628; Patterson v. Ely, 19 Cal. 28; Surget v. Byers, Hemp. 715; Sparrow v. Railroad Co. 7 Ind. 369; Reed v. Arnold, 10 Kan. 111; Steele v. Russell, 5 Neb. 215; Snell v. Crowe, 3 Utah, 26; Dole v. Burleigh, 1 Dakota, 227.

2 Colo. Code, & 76; Tucker v. Parks, Sup. Ct. Colo. 4 Colo. L. R. 306; Mayor etc. v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165; Newman v. Otto, 4 Sand. 668. 3 Hartwell v. Page, 14 Wis. 49.

4 Hartwell v. Page, 14 Wis. 49; Dole v. Burleigh, 1 Dakota, 227.

5 Lillienthal v. Anderson, 1 Idaho, 673. So where an allegation in the complaint is denied by the answer, it is error to instruct the Jury that it is admitted: Dyer v. McPhee, 6 Colo. 174.

6 Lillienthal v. Anderson, 1 Idaho, 673; Burke v. Water Company, 12 Cal. 407; Mulford v. Estrudillo, 32 Cal. 131; Wright v. Butler, 64 Mo. 165.

7 Connoss v. Meir, 2 Smith, E. D. 314; Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sand. 54; Oechs v. Cook, 3 Duer, 161. So, an admission of a legal conclusion by the defendant in his answer is in no way binding upon the court: Cutting v. Lincoln, 9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 436. And see Union Bank v. Bush, 36 N. Y. 631; Downer v. Read, 17 Minn. 493.

8 Harlow v. Hamilton, 6 How. Pr. 475. And see Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sand. 54; Clay County v. Simonsen, 1 Dakota, 403; 2 Dakota, 112. Neither admissions nor stipulations can make a case broader than it is by allegation: Tucker v. Parks, Colo. Sup. Ct. 4 Colo. L. R. 311. And see Hicks v. Murray, 43 Cal. 522.

9 Anable v. Steam Engine Co. 16 Abb. Pr. 286; 25 N. Y. 470.

65. What may be shown under general denial. - Generally speaking, a party may give in evidence under a general denial anything that tends to directly disprove the allegations of the complaint or petition,1 or which goes to show that the cause of action sued upon never existed. He may introduce evidence to disprove, wholly or in part, any fact which the plaintiff must establish to show a cause of action; but he cannot, under

BOONE PLEAD.-10.

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a general denial, introduce evidence tending to show a defense founded upon new matter.

1 Caldwell . Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 270; Evans v. Williams, 60 Barb. 346. And see Jacobs v. Remsen, 35 Barb. 384; 36 N. Y. 668; Brevoort v. Brevoort, 8 Jones & S. 211; Schoenrock v. Farley, 17 Jones & S. 302; Gates v. Preston, 41 N. Y. 113; Miller v. Insurance Co. 1 Abb. N. C. 470; Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 59; Woolley v. Newcombe, 58 How. Pr. 480; 87 N. Y. 605; Raynor v. Timerson, 46 Barb. 518.

2 Greenfield . Mut. Life Ins. Co. 47 N. Y. 430; Evans v. Williams, 60 Barb. 346. And see McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297.

3 O'Brien v. McCann, 58 N. Y. 373, 376; Bridges v. Paige, 13 Cal. 640. 4 Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286; Boswell . Welshoefer, 9 N. Y. Week. Dig. 500; 9 Reporter, 630; Glover v. Cliff, 10 Cal. 303; Terry". Sickles, 13 Cal. 430; Walters v. Wash. Ins. Co. 1 Iowa, 409; School Dist. v. Shoemaker, 5 Neb. 36.

2 66. Pleading new matter in defense.-New matter is that which admits and avoids the cause of action set up in the complaint or petition, and constitutes a defense thereto. Whatever admits that a cause of action, as stated, once existed, but at the same time avoids it, that is, shows that it has ceased to exist, is new matter." Such are release, accord and satisfaction, payment,5 leave and license, discharge in bankruptcy,' act of God, and all defenses invalidating a contract which forms the subject of the action, such as fraud, duress, incapacity to contract, usury, and the like. So, all defenses based upon the asserted illegality of the contract in suit, which admit the fact of the transaction between the parties purporting to be an agreement, and apparently binding, but which insist that, by reason of some violation of the law, the same is illegal and void, are new matter.10 But an answer which merely denies the essential allegations of a complaint or petition, or states circumstances which, if testified to by credible witnesses, would disprove them, is not one containing new matter."1 New matter as a defense must be distinctly set up in the answer; 12 and a defendant cannot give evidence of any defense of new matter not set up in his answer,13