plaintiff may therein alter, modify, or extend his claim without any amendment of the indorsement of the writ." This rule is held not to apply to cases where the statement of claim is merely filed under O. XIX. r. 10, cited ante, p. 14. (See Gee v. Bell, 35 Ch. D. 161; Kingdon v. Kirk, 37 Ch. D. 141.) It does not authorize the plaintiff to insert in the statement of claim claims wholly different in their nature from those appearing on the indorsement of the writ. And it seems that such claims, if added by the plaintiff in the statement of claim without leave, might be struck out on this ground. (See United Telephone Co. v. Tasker, W. N. 1888, p. 222.) Nor does it authorize any change in the venue to be made by the statement of claim without leave being obtained for that purpose. (Locke v. White, 33 Ch. D. 308.) For the rule as to change of parties, see Parties," ante, pp. 25-32.

By O. XX. r. 7, "Where the plaintiff seeks relief in respect of several distinct claims or causes of complaint founded upon separate and distinct grounds, they shall be stated, as far as may be, separately and distinctly. And the same rule shall apply where the defendant relies upon several distinct grounds of defence, set-off, or counter-claim founded upon separate and distinct facts. But the mere fact that several different kinds of relief are claimed in the conclusion of the statement of claim, does not make it necessary to distribute the facts stated in the body of the pleading so as to show which of them support each head of the relief claimed." (Watson v. Hawkins, 24 W. R. 884.)

If alternative cases are alleged, the facts ought to be stated so as to show on what facts each alternative ground of claim is founded. (Davy v. Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473, 489; 47 L. J. Ch. 218.)

As to when it is necessary to divide statement of claim into paragraphs, see "Pleading in General," ante, p. 8.

Joinder of causes of action.]-The joinder of parties is dealt with by O. XVI., ante, p. 19, and that of causes of action by the rules of O. XVIII., below cited. Those rules do not authorize the joinder of a cause of action against one defendant with a cause of action against another defendant, which is wholly distinct and does not arise out of the same transaction. (See Burstall v. Beyfus, 26 Ch. D. 35; 53 L. J. Ch. 565; Sadler v. G. W. Ry. Co., (1896) A. C. 450, and O. XVI. r. 1â, cited ante, p. 19.)

By O. XVIII. r. 1, "Subject to the following rules of this Order, the plaintiff may unite in the same action several causes of action, but if it appear to the Court or a judge that any such causes of action cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, the Court or judge may order separate trials of any of such causes of action to be had, or may make such other order as may be necessary or expedient for the separate disposal thereof." (See the other rules of O. XVIII., below cited.)

Under this rule a plaintiff may allege alternative and inconsistent claims against the defendant, and may ask for different relief in respect of each alternative. (Bagot v. Easton, 7 Ch. D. 1; 37 L. T. 369.)

Where the plaintiff has several distinct claims or causes of action against the defendant, founded upon separate and distinct grounds, they should be stated, as far as may be, separately and distinctly. (0. XX. r. 7.)

If causes of action which cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together are joined in the same action, the causes of action so joined may be ordered to be tried or disposed of separately, under the provisions to that effect contained in O. XVIII. r. 1, above cited, or in some cases an order may be made, on the application of the defendant, under

O. XVIII. rr. 8 and 9 (below cited), confining the action to such of the causes of action as can conveniently be disposed of together, and excluding other claims. (See Bagot v. Easton, supra; United Telephone Co. v. Tasker, W. N. 1888, p. 222; 59 L. T. 852; "Parties to Actions," ante, p. 21; and the observations on O. XVIII. rr. 8, 9, infra.) It seems that the joinder in an action in the Queen's Bench Division of claims such as are assigned to the Chancery Division (see Jud. Act, 1873, s. 34), might be a ground for excluding those claims (see United Telephone Co. v. Tasker, supra).

By O. XVIII. r. 2, it is provided that "No cause of action shall, unless by leave of the Court or a judge, be joined with an action for the recovery of land, except claims in respect of mesne profits or arrears of rent or double value in respect of the premises claimed, or any part thereof, and damages for breach of any contract under which the same or any part thereof are held, or for any wrong or injury to the premises claimed." But this rule contains provisoes to the effect that in actions for foreclosure or redemption an order for delivery of the possession of the mortgaged property may be asked for and obtained, and that "such an action for foreclosure or redemption and for such delivery of possession shall not be deemed an action for the recovery of land" within the meaning of the rules.

The last-cited rule, though primarily applicable to claims by plaintiffs, is also in effect applicable to counterclaims by defendants. (Compton v. Preston, 21 Ch. D. 138; 51 L. J. Ch. 680; Clark v. Wray, 31 Ch. D. 69; 55 L. J. Ch. 119.)

Where it is sought to join with a claim for the recovery of land any causes of action other than those which by the terms of the above rule are allowed to be so joined, the plaintiff should apply to a Master at Chambers for leave to do so. Any such application should be made before the writ joining the claims is issued, or the counterclaim joining the claims delivered (see the cases next cited); and should in such case be made ex parte (2 Chitty's Practice, 14th ed., p. 1207; Ann. Pract. 1897, p. 459). But, under special circumstances, the application may be made, and the leave granted, at a later stage, where there has been sufficient reason for not making it earlier (Musgrave v. Stevens, W. N. 1881, p. 163, explaining Pilcher v. Hinds, 11 Ch. D. 905; 48 L. J. Ch. 587; Hunt v. Fensham, 28 Sol. Journ. 253; Willmott v. Freehold House, &c. Co., 51 L. T. 552; Rushbrooke v. Farley, 52 L. T. 572; Clark v. Wray, supra), and in that case it should be made by summons in the ordinary

manner.

In general, leave for such joinder of other causes of action in actions for the recovery of land will only be granted where the different causes of action are closely connected with each other and can conveniently be tried and disposed of together. (See, for instance, Cook v. Enchmarch, 2 Ch. D. 111; 45 L. J. C. P. 504; Kitching v. Kitching, 24 W. R. 901; Sutcliffe v. Wood, 53 L. J. Ch. 970; Dennis v. Crompton, W. N. 1882, p. 121.) But leave is only required where it is sought to join other causes of action (beyond those specified above) with actions for the recovery of land. It is not necessary to obtain leave in order to add to a claim for the possession of land, other claims for relief which depend on the plaintiff's title to the land, and are merely part of the "machinery" for enforcing the claim to the land. Thus, a claim for a receiver, or an injunction, or a declaration of title as to the land, may properly be joined without leave to a claim for such possession. (Gledhill v. Hunter, 14 Ch. D. 495; 49 L. J. Ch. 333; Allen v. Kennet, 24 W. R. 845; Manisty v. Kenealy, Ib. 918; Kendrick v.

Roberts, 30 W. R. 365; Read v. Wotton, (1893) 2 Ch. 171; 62 L. J. Ch. 481.)

An action brought merely to obtain a declaration of title to land without claiming possession is not an action for the recovery of land within the meaning of the rule. (See Gledhill v. Hunter, supra.)

If causes of action, other than those specified in the last-cited rule, are joined with a claim for the recovery of land without leave being obtained for that purpose, such misjoinder is an irregularity, and the defendant may apply, in such case, to have the proceedings set aside or amended. (Hunt v. Worsfold, (1896) 2 Ch. 224; 65 L. J. Ch. 548.) In a case where such misjoinder was pleaded in the defence, an application before trial to strike out such defence as embarrassing was refused (Willmott v. Freehold House, &c. Co., 51 L. T. 532); whilst in another case it was held that such an objection should not be reserved until the trial, though expressly pleaded in the defence (In re Derbon, 58 L. T. 519). The proper course appears to be to apply by summons at chambers at the earliest practicable time to have the misjoinder rectified, although the provisions of O. LXX. r. 2, forbidding applications in respect of irregularity after the taking of a fresh step in the action with a knowledge of the irregularity would appear not to apply. (See Hunt v. Worsfold, supra.)

By O. XVIII. r. 3, “Claims by a trustee in bankruptcy as such, shall not, unless by leave of the Court or a judge, be joined with any claim by him in any other capacity." (See "Bankruptcy," post, p. 120.)

By O. XVIII. r. 4, " Claims by or against husband and wife may be joined with claims by or against either of them separately." (See Husband and Wife," post, p. 220.)

By O. XVIII. r. 5, "Claims by or against an executor or administrator as such may be joined with claims by or against him personally, provided the last-mentioned claims are alleged to arise with reference to the estate in respect of which the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued as executor or administrator." (See" Executors," post, p. 199.)

As to the allegations referred to in this rule, see Davis v. Saintsbury, 1 Times Rep. 538, where leave was given to amend the indorsement of a writ by joining claims under the above rule.

Except in the cases expressly provided for by this rule, claims by or against executors or administrators as such cannot be joined with claims by or against them personally. (See Macdonald v. Carington, below cited.)

By O. XVIII. r. 6, "Claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them or any of them separately against the same defendant." (See D'Hormusgee v. Grey, 10 Q. B. D. 13; 50 L. J. Q. B. 192.)

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By O. XVIII. r. 7, The last three preceding rules [that is, rr. 4, 5, and 6, above cited] shall be subject to Rules 1, 8, and 9 of this Order."

By O. XVIII. r. 8, "Any defendant alleging that the plaintiff has united in the same action several causes of action which cannot be conveniently disposed of together, may at any time apply to the Court or a judge for an order confining the action to such of the causes of action as may be conveniently disposed of together."

By O. XVIII. r. 9, "If, on the hearing of such application as in the last preceding rule mentioned, it shall appear to the Court or a judge that the causes of action are such as cannot all be conveniently disposed of together, the Court or judge may order any of such causes of action to

be excluded, and consequential amendments to be made, and may make such order as to costs as may be just."

The two last-cited rules appear to empower the Court or judge or master to strike out some of the claims altogether, leaving the plaintiff to bring an independent action upon the excluded claims, if he seeks to prosecute them further. (See United Telephone Co. v. Tasker, W. N. 1888, p. 222; 59 L. T. 852; and see as to "excluding" counterclaims in cases of misjoinder of claims, O. XXI. r. 15, cited post, p. 573; and Compton v. Preston, 21 Ch. D. 138; 51 L. J. Ch. 680; Macdonald v. Carington, 4 C. P. D. 28; 48 L. J. C. P. 179; "Counterclaims," post, p. 572.)

In cases where there has been a misjoinder of claims in violation of the rules, the defendant may, in general, apply to have the indorsement of writ or the statement of claim, if any, set aside or amended by striking out some of the claims so as to confine the action to such of the claims as can properly be joined. Any such application should ordinarily be made by summons at chambers, and at the earliest practicable stage. (See ante, p. 59.)

The claim of debt or damages.]—The claim for debt or damages should be sufficient to cover the largest amount of debt or damages likely to be recovered, for the plaintiff, in the absence of amendment, cannot recover more than the amount claimed. (Wyatt v. Rosherville Gardens Co., 2 Times Rep. 282; and see Cheveley v. Morris, 2 W. Bl. 1300.) An amendment, however, in this respect may be allowed even after verdict. (O. XXVIII. r. 1, cited "Amendment," ante, p. 14; Wyatt v. Rosherville Gardens Co., supra; The Dictator, (1892) P. 64; 61 L. J. P. 61; Modera v. Modera, 10 Times Rep. 61.)

Where a particular sum is specified as the amount claimed, it is usually treated as meaning any amount which the plaintiff can prove, not exceeding the sum specified.

The amount thus specified in the statement of claim is not restricted by the amount (if any) indorsed upon the writ as the amount claimed. (See O. XX. r. 4, cited ante, p. 56.)

Where the claim is for unliquidated damages, it is not now necessary, though it is usual, to specify the amount claimed. (See R. S. C. 1883, App. C., Sect. VI., No. 12; Sect. VII., No. 2.)

It must be remembered that the damages in respect of any continuing cause of action are now to be assessed down to the time of the assessment. (0. XXXVI. r. 58, cited post, p. 63.)

Where the plaintiff's claim is for a debt or liquidated demand, and can be ascertained exactly, it is better, even where the statement of claim is not specially indorsed, to claim only the precise amount, as otherwise the plaintiff, under some circumstances, might have to withdraw his claim as to the excess and pay the costs (if any) occasioned thereby. (See O. XXVI. r. 1, cited post, p. 690; and see Treherne v. Gardner, 8 E. & B. 161; 26 L. J. Q. B. 359.)

As to claiming interest on debts, see "Interest," post, p. 248.

Damages.]-Damages are distinguished in law as general and special damages the former being the necessary and immediate loss occasioned by the injurious act of the defendant; the latter comprising the loss which actually followed under the special circumstances of the case as its natural and proximate consequence beyond its necessary and immediate effect. This distinction leads to the following rule: that if special damage is intended to be claimed, it must be stated with particularity; but general damage requires no particular mention; and is covered by the

general claim of damages. (See R. S. C. 1883, App. C., Sect. V., No. 10; Sect. VI., Nos. 1, 7, 14, 15; Mayne on Damages, 4th ed. pp. 522, 523; and see Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145, 152; Moon v. Raphael, 2 Bing. N. C. 310, 315; Crouch v. G. N. Ry. Co., 11 Ex. 742; 25 L. J. Ex. 137; Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524, 528; 61 L. J. Q. B. 535.)

Where the act of the defendant complained of is in itself a legal injury to the plaintiff, as a breach of contract or a trespass, the law always implies general damage, at least, to a nominal amount. (Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ald. 415; Beaumont v. Greathead, 2 C. B. 494; Sanders v. Stuart, 1 C. P. D. 326; 45 L. J. C. P. 682; Jones v. Hough, 5 Ex. D. 115; 49 L. J. Ex. 211; Rayner v. Condor, [1895] 2 Q. B. 289; 64 L. J. Q. B. 540.) The expression "special damage" is also used in a somewhat different sense to denote the actual loss which is required to be proved in order to give a right of action in those cases where the act complained of is not in itself a legal wrong. The special damage, as it is said, is, in such cases, the gist of the action (Ratcliffe v. Evans, supra); and is not necessarily or always other than general damage as defined above (Ib.). Thus, where words were published reflecting injuriously upon a business carried on by the plaintiff, but not upon the character of the plaintiff himself, it was held that proof of a general loss of business, as distinct from proof of the loss of particular customers, was sufficient to support the action. (Ib.) Such special or actual damage forms a material part of the cause of action, and should be specifically alleged in the pleading. So, too, where damage beyond general or ordinary damage has been sustained giving rise to a claim in respect of special damage as first above described (supra, p. 60), such damage must be distinctly stated in the pleading.

The object of stating such last-mentioned special damage is to give notice to the defendant of the nature and extent of the claim made against him, and of the particular facts by which it is to be supported, so as to enable him to come to trial prepared with evidence to meet it. The charge of general damage is sufficiently notified in the statement of the injury, which imports all its necessary and immediate effects. (Smith v. Thomas, 2 Bing. N. C. 372, 380.) Such last-mentioned special damage must be stated with sufficient particularity to inform the defendant what the plaintiff intends to prove, and the plaintiff is not allowed to give evidence of any special damage which is not sufficiently stated. (See 1 Wms. Saund., 1871 ed., p. 321, n. (5); Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130; Crouch v. G. N. Ry. Co., supra.) Thus, in an action by a tradesman for defamation, whereby several customers left him, he cannot prove as damage that any particular customer has left him unless the customer be named in the statement of claim (Browning v. Newman, 1 Strange, 666; 1 Wms. Saund., 1871 ed., p. 322); and in an action by a woman for defamation, an allegation that she thereby lost several suitors is insufficient to admit evidence of any particular suitor having deserted her (Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130, 132); and under an allegation of special damage by a loss of the plaintiff's lodgers, he was not allowed to prove the loss of a particular lodger (Westwood v. Cowne, 1 Stark, 172). A general loss of business or custom may be alleged and proved without having recourse to particular instances. (Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613; Evans v. Harries, Î H. & N. 251; 26 L. J. Ex. 31; Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524; 61 L. J. Q. B. 535.)

The circumstances under which an injury was committed, where they are material to the ascertainment of the nature and extent of the injury, may in general be stated and proved in order to aggravate and enhance