cases collected; Carpenter v. Fleming, 177 Mass. 525, 60 N. E. 982. Subsequently, after the appeal was entered in this court, the insurer moved that the appeal be discharged and the case sent back to the superior court on the ground of diminution of the record, the matters alleged relating to the motion to dismiss the appeal. See Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98, 109 N. E. 887. That motion was denied after hearing. At the argument of the case on its merits the insurer offered a entered in the Supreme Judicial Court until August 6th, pending which entry motion had been filed by the insurer in the superior court to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution, or because not entered in the Supreme Judicial Court forthwith, and, after entry of the appeal in the Supreme Judicial Court, the insurer moved the appeal be discharged, and the case sent back to the superior court for diminution of the record, the matters alleged relating to the motion to dismiss the appeal, which motion was denied after hearing, the insurer's motion, at argument on the merits, that the appeal be dismissed, because not entered "forthwith," as required by Rev. Laws, c. 159, § 19, as amend-motion that the appeal be dismissed because ed by St. 1911, c. 284, must be denied. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT 417(7) WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-AWARD OF LUMP COMPENSATION TO MINOR-REVIEW. The finding of the Industrial Accident Board, on application of an injured minor employé awarded weekly compensation, for payment of a lump sum, made upon evidence which might have supported a somewhat larger award, but whose weight and credibility was wholly for the consideration of the board, cannot be disturbed, though no specific award was made for a period of about 10 weeks a matter doubtless taken into account in making the order as to the lump sum. Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Thomas E. Moran, employé, opposed by the Stafford Company, employer, and the Employers' Liability As surance Corporation, Limited, wherein the employé contested the award of the Industrial Accident Board in the superior court. From the decree in accordance with the report of the Accident Board, the employé appeals. Affirmed. Philip P. Coveney, of Boston, for appellant. Sawyer, Hardy, Stone & Morrison, of Boston (E. C. Stone, of Boston, of counsel), for appellee insurer. not entered in this court forthwith as required by the statute. Manifestly under the circumstances here disclosed that motion must be denied. [3] No reversible error is disclosed on this record. The employé, when about eighteen years of age, received permanently disabling injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment by a subscriber under the act. After receiving weekly conpensation for a time, being still a minor, he made application to the board to "provide that he be compensated 串 * by the payment of a lump sum," as provided by part 2, § 22, of the act as amended (St. 1914, c. 708). The board proceeded to consider that application, giving the employé the benefit of St. 1915, c. 236, to the effect that he was of such age and experience when injured that under natural conditions his wages would be expected to have increased. Findings were made somewhat. in detail as to increases in earnings which might reasonably have been anticipated if there had been no injury, and as to what the employé would be able to earn in his injured condition, and on these as a basis the board awarded a lump sum. It is not necessary to analyse these findings and the award with particularity. There was evidence which RUGG, C. J. [1, 2] This is a proceeding might have supported a somewhat larger under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. award. But the whole question was one which 1911, c. 751), where the employé was dis- involved a consideration of the weight to be satisfied with the decision of the Industrial given to evidence. The credibility of the tesAccident Board and caused proper papers to timony was wholly for the board. The be entered in the superior court for the pur- estimate as to future earnings involved also pose of contesting it. The decree was entered an examination of the boy and insight into in the superior court in accordance with the his probable quickness of perception and genreport of the Industrial Accident Board on eral reliability. These were pure matters of May 14, 1917. An appeal by the employé was fact depending more upon the application of taken on that date. It was not entered in sound judgment to a practical problem of huthis court until August 6, 1917, nearly three man nature than upon an accurate arithmetmonths later. In the meantime a motion ical calculation. The circumstance that no had been filed by the insurer in the superior specific award was made for a period of court to dismiss the appeal for want of pros- about ten weeks shows no error of law. ecution or because not entered "forthwith" Doubtless that was taken into account in in this court. R. L. c. 159, § 19, as amended making the order as, to payment of the by St. 1911, c. 284. See R. L. c. 173, § 117. lump sum. The findings of the board, restThat motion was denied. The superior courting upon evidence whose weight and credibilihad jurisdiction of the motion. R. L. c. 173, ty was wholly for its consideration, can§ 115, as amended by St. 1915, c. 111. Grif- not be disturbed, Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. fin v. Griffin, 222 Mass. 218, 110 N. E. 296. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737; See Daly v. Foss, 209 Mass. 270, 95 N. E. Cox's Case, 225 Mass. 220, 114 N. E. 281. 899, where the statutes are reviewed and the Decree affirmed. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes REDEMPTION. Tax deeds of the collector conferred upon the city a fee and seisin, subject to the right of redemption, in the same manner they would have upon an individual purchaser, under Rev. Laws, c. 13, §§ 43, 48, and St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 2, §§ 44, 49. 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 980(7)-TAX TITLES-PRIORITY OF EACH YEAR'S TAX. A city's tax title to land under the collector's tax deeds is subject to the later and paramount lien arising from taxes thereafter assessed; the lien of each year's tax being paramount to all previous liens. 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS · AS SECURITY FOR PRICE LIENS-STATUTES. 980(9)—LIEN PREVIOUS TAX The lien of a tax deed to an individual as security for the repayment of the purchase price is paramount to all previous tax liens acquired by municipalities or individuals, despite St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 2. §§.67, 68, as amended by St. 1915, c. 237, §§ 19, 20, and despite section 18; the general rule, that sale for valid tax gives paramount title free from ownership or incumbrance of rights previously existing, which had been carved out of the property by the owner or acquired in it by prescription or otherwise, applying. Exceptions from Land Court, Middlesex County; C. T. Davis, Judge. Petition by Harry P. Chadwick against the City of Cambridge. To the ruling of the land court for petitioner, the City excepts. Exception overruled. Wm. A. Parker, of Boston, for petitioner. John A. L. Odde, Harry F. R. Dolan, and Peter J. Nelligan, City Sol., all of Boston, for respondent. Unless the respondent files forthwith an offer to redeem there must be a decree for the petitioner forever foreclosing and barring all rights of redemption." To this ruling the respondent excepted. [1, 2] The deeds of the collector conferred upon the city a fee and seisin subject to the right of redemption in the same manner it would upon an individual purchaser. R. L. c. 13, §§ 43, 48; St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 2, §§ 44. 49; Coughlin v. Gray, 131 Mass. 56; Parker v. Baxter, 2 Gray, 185, 189. The tax title is also subject to the later and paramount lien arising from taxes thereafter assessed. "For the lien of each year's tax is paramount to all previous liens." Keen v. Sheehan, 154 Mass. 208, 209, 28 N. E. 150; Parker v. Baxter, supra; Hunt v. Boston, 183 Mass. 303, 305, 67 N. E. 244; Abbott v. Frost, 185 Mass. 398, 70 N. E. 478. [3] The respondent does not dispute that "the rule generally stated is that a sale of land for a valid tax gives a paramount title. free from the ownership or incumbrance of rights previously existing which had been carved out of the property by the owner or which had been acquired in it by prescription or otherwise" (Knowlton, C. J., in Hunt v. Boston, supra, and cases cited), but contends that the rule is not applicable where a municipality holds the earlier tax title. port thereof it relies upon St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 2, § 67, as amended by St. 1915, c. 237, § 19, which reads: In sup "If land is taken or purchased by a city or town, taxes shall, until foreclosure of the title so acquired, be assessed thereon as though the same were not so taken or purchased; and shall be deducted from the proceeds of the final sale." Also upon St. 1915, c. 237, § 18, which reads: "After the foreclosure by a city or town of the rights of redemption under a tax title or taking, as hereinabove provided, the land shall land belonging to it and held for municipal thereafter be held and disposed of like any purposes, and shall not while so held be assessed for taxes." PIERCE, J. This is a petition under the provisions of chapter 237 of the acts of 1915 to foreclose a tax title on land in Cambridge to which the respondent city of Cambridge holds earlier tax titles. The tax deeds under Also upon St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 2, § 68, as which the city claims liens for taxes were amended by St. 1915, c. 237, § 20, which prodated respectively in 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912 and vides for the sale of unredeemed land 1913. The city never sold the land as unre- "within two years after the time for redempdeemed land under R. L. c. 13, § 67, St. 1909, tion has expired; * and if, from any c. 490, pt. 2, § 68, or St. 1915, c. 237, § 20. cause, such sale shall not be made within two The tax deed under which the petitioner years, it shall be made by the collector when he deems best or at once upon the service upclaims title was dated July 9, 1915. The va- on him of a written demand of any person inlidity of the several deeds by which the par-terested therein. He [the collector] ties acquired their respective titles, is not shall deduct from the proceeds of said sale the questioned, and each one was duly executed, expense, thereof, the amount named in the collector's deed. * * * The balance shall be delivered and recorded. At the trial the re-deposited with the city or town treasurer to spondent city asserted: be paid to the person entitled to the land, if demanded within five years. "That prior tax titles made by a city constitute a lien which is not extinguished by a subsequent sale for taxes, and that any decree for the petitioner in this case must be made subject to the respondent's lien." * 串 * It is true that the title conveyed by the deed of the collector is held by a municipality "as security for the repayment of the purchase The presiding judge ruled and ordered as price" until redemption or until the right follows: of redemption is foreclosed in the manner "I rule that the petitioner's title is para- provided by St. 1915, c. 237, §§ 4 to 9, inmount to the lien claimed by the respondent. I clusive, but it is equally true that under For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes the same statutory provisions the title of, writing under seal, and contained this covean individual purchaser is held as securi- nant: ty until foreclosure of the right of redemp- "And I hereby covenant with the grantee tion. The statute above quoted relating to that I am the lawful owner of the said goods, the sale of unredeemed land taken or pur-brances, that I have good right to sell the same and chattels, that they are free from all incumchased by a municipality, does not affect the as aforesaid, and that I will warrant and defend validity or quality of the title acquired by the same against the lawful claims and deit as a purchaser at a tax sale, and was in- mands of all persons." tended only to define the method by which a The plaintiff relied on an oral warranty municipality should dispose of its tax titles that the articles constituting the equipment and account to the former owner, or person of the garage cost the defendant the amount entitled to the land, for any surplus remain-set forth in the inventory. There was no ing after deducting "from the proceeds of evidence of fraud and the plaintiff received said sale the expense thereof, the amount all the merchandise mentioned. The judge named in the collector's deed or instrument ruled that the plaintiff could not recover, of taking as due when the same was exe- and directed the jury to return a verdict for cuted, all interest, charges and subsequent the defendant; the plaintiff excepted. taxes and assessments thereon." Welch v. Haley, 224 Mass. 261, 264, 112 N. E. 860. The argument of the respondent, that "the municipality would lose its taxes unless it sells the land as unredeemed land before the expiration of two years from the purchase by an individual of a subsequent tax title," is unsound, because if it redeems from that lien it could deduct the amount paid as a subsequent tax from the proceeds of the sale of the unredeemed land. We are of opinion the lien of a tax deed as security for the repayment of the purchase price is paramount to all previous tax liens acquired by municipalities or individuals. The ruling of the judge of the land court was right, and the exception thereto is overruled. So ordered. (231 Mass. 1) CARPENTER v. SUGDEN. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. June 28, 1918.) 1. EVIDENCE 442(2)-PAROL EVIDENCE AFFECTING WRITING-WRITTEN CONTRACT. Where contract of sale of garage was in writing and contained the entire agreement of the parties, it could not be contradicted by parol evidence that defendant seller warranted that the price of the chattels sold was the price paid by him, offered to show an additional warranty, not contained in the written contract. - 2. EVIDENCE 460(2) PAROL EVIDENCE lates. Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John D. McLaughlin, Judge. Action by Fred A. Carpenter against Walter J. Sugden. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled. E. Irving Smith, of Boston, for plaintiff. C. W. Rowley, of Boston, for defendant. CARROLL, J. The plaintiff purchased from the defendant the good will of a garage and its equipment. The bill of sale was in [1] The contract of sale was in writing and contained the entire agreement of the parties. It could not be contradicted by oral evidence that the defendant warranted that the price of the chattels sold was the price paid by him. MacAlman v. Gleason, 228 Mass. 454, 117 N. E. 795; Glackin v. Bennett, 226 Mass. 316, 115 N. E. 490, and cases cited; Goldenberg v. Taglino, 218 Mass. 357, 359, 105 N. E. 883; Rochester Tumbler Works v. N. E. 438; Scholl v. Killorin, 190 Mass. 493, M. Woodbury Co., 215 Mass. 194, 197, 102 77 N. E. 382. [2] While parol evidence is admissible to identify the subject-matter to which a written contract relates (Swett v. Shumway, 102 Mass. 365, 3 Am. Rep. 471; Keller v. Webb, 125 Mass. 88, 28 Am. Rep. 209), the evidence of the cost of the equipment was not offered for this purpose. It was offered to show an additional warranty not contained in the written bill of sale, and was therefore inadmissible. Exceptions overruled. (230 Mass. 577) AINSLEE v. BOSCKETTI. STATUTES 265 - NEW STATUTE-PROSPEC- For the purpose of enforcing a mechanic's lien, which came into existence by the furnishing of labor or materials before January 1, 1916, the old mechanic's lien statute (Rev. Laws, c. 197, § 10), giving jurisdiction to the superior and the inferior courts specified, was not repealed by the new mechanic's lien act (St. 1915, c. 292, § 13), which went into effect January 1, 1916. Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; Hugo A. Dubuque, Judge. Petition to enforce a mechanic's lien by James W. Ainslee against Mary Boscketti. From judgment for petitioner, respondent appealed to the superior court, which affirmed, and respondent excepts. Exceptions overruled. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Walter T. Rochefort, of Lawrence, for petitioner. John A. O'Mahoney, of Lawrence, for respondent. rence. The contention of the respondents is that the jurisdiction of the court had come to an end on January 1, 1916, because of the repeal of R. L. c. 197, § 10 (on which its jurisdiction rested), by St. 1915, c. 292, § 13, which (by force of section 14 of that act) took effect on January 1, 1916. the statute must be construed as intended to have a prospective and not a retroactive effect where, as in the case at bar, retrospective construction will interfere with a vested right. That such was the intention of the Legislature. See St. 1916, c. 163; St. 1917, c. 213." LORING, J. On October 30, 1915, the petitioner "completed his labor" under a contract for the alteration of a building situate within By enacting St. 1915, c. 292, the Legislature the jurisdiction of the district court of Law-adopted a new mechanic's lien law. The On November 24, 1915, he duly filed mechanic's lien law described in St. 1915, c. in the registry of deeds the certificate called 292, differed essentially from that theretofore for by R. L. c. 197, § 6, and on January 25, in effect and was in no sense an amendment 1916, he brought a petition in the district of the mechanic's lien law theretofore existcourt of Lawrence to enforce the lien to ing. For example the lien for labor performwhich he had thus become entitled. Judg- ed in the absence of a notice was different ment in his favor was rendered by the dis- from that in the old law (compare St. 1915, c. trict court and by the superior court on ap- 292, § 1, with R. L. c. 197, § 2) and the new peal. The case is here on exceptions which act contained the novel provision that if a raise the question of the jurisdiction of the written notice there specified was given and district court and of the superior court on recorded in the registry of deeds by the conappeal to entertain the petition and render tractor all persons furnishing labor and matethe judgments rendered by them. rials under it or under any subcontract pursuant to it should have a lien to be enforced by a bill in equity to be brought in the superior court in behalf of all persons interested. See St. 1915, c. 292, §§ 2-4. The new act (St. 1915, c. 292, § 13) in terms repealed those sections of R. L. c. 197, which dealt with the creation of a mechanic's lien under the former law (namely sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of R. L. c. 197) and it also repealed section 10 of R. L. c. 197, which gave to the In that case two petitions to enforce superior court and to the inferior courts mechanics' liens were brought before January there specified concurrent jurisdiction to 1, 1916, but they were not disposed of until enforce the lien provided for in these earlier after that day. The contention in that case sections of R. L. c. 197. It was provided by was that the jurisdiction of the superior section 14 of St. 1915, c. 292, that the new court over these petitions came to an end act should go into effect on January 1, 1916. on January 1, 1916, by force of St. 1915, c. But nowhere in the new act was a provision 292, §§ 13, 14. It was decided that it did not. inserted dealing with cases where (by reason That conclusion was not reached on the of work done or materials furnished under ground that by a general statutory provision R. L. c. 197) a vested right to a lien had come there is a saving clause in case of the repeal into existence before January 1, 1916. Under of a statute as far as pending causes are these circumstances it was decided in See v. concerned. There is no such statute in civil Kolodny that the repeal of those sections of cases. Nor was the decision in See v. Kolod-R. L. c. 197 which are repealed by St. 1915, ny put upon the ground that since the su- c. 292, § 13 (including section 10, which gave perior court had jurisdiction under the new jurisdiction to the superior and to the inferiact (St. 1915, c. 292, § 4) it was not of consequence that its jurisdiction under R. L. c. 197, § 10, had come to an end. In See v. Kolodny it was decided that the superior court had jurisdiction because: The contention is disposed of by the decision of this court in See v. Kolodny, 227 Mass. 446, 116 N. E. 888. or courts there specified) applied to future liens which should come into existence under the new act and did not (as matter of construction of section 13 of St. 1915, c. 292) apply to cases where by force of R. L. c. 197, "In this Commonwealth a mechanic's lien is mechanics had acquired a vested right to a not created upon the filing of a certificate and lien before January 1, 1916. That is to say a petition, but is created as soon as labor or material, or both, is performed or furnished on for the purpose of enforcing a lien which real estate. The lien is an interest in the came into existence before January 1, 1916 property, stands as security for the payment of (when the new act went into effect), R. L. c. the debt, is a vested right and is not an ad- 197, § 10, was not repealed by St. 1915, c. 292, ditional and extraordinary remedy which the Legislature may discontinue at pleasure. § 13. In accordance with the general rule Exceptions overruled. (284 III. 221) TIFF. PEARCE v. WRIGHT et al. (No. 12015.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 20, 1918.) 1. QUIETING TITLE ~10(4)—TITLE OF PLAINTitle by adverse possession is a sufficient basis for suit to quiet title. 2. ADVERSE POSSESSION 27-EVIDENCE. Evidence held to show title by adverse possession through tenant. 3. ADVERSE POSSESSION 25-BY TENANT -WRITTEN OR VERBAL LEASE. On the issue of adverse possession through a tenant holding the land under leases, it is immaterial whether leases were written or verbal. 4. ADVERSE POSSESSION 100(5)-COLOR OF TITLE-EXTENT OF POSSESSION. A party entering into possession of land under a conveyance, even from a party having no title to convey, is presumed to enter according to the description in the conveyance, and his occupancy of part claiming the whole is construed as a possession of all not in the adverse possession of another. 5. JUDGMENT 682(1) — CONCLUSIVENESS PERSONS NOT PARTIES. Where neither grantee in quitclaim deed to premises nor his tenant in possession of the premises was made party to partition suit, a subsequent grantee of the quitclaim grantee was not bound or affected by it. premises under a written lease to a tenant, who before May 1, 1892, entered thereon and continued. to farm and cultivate the premises under said lease and under the claim of title in the appellee and his grantors, and continued to use the premises continuously until the filing of the bill on April 17, 1914, and he and those under whom he derived his title had been in the actual, adverse, hostile, and uninterrupted possession of the premises continuously since the actual entry on September 1, 1891. The prayer was that the appellee's chain of title from the United States and the facts recited as to possession should be established and his title quieted. The appellant, Charles H. Moody, one of the defendants, answered, denying that the appellee acquired any title to lots 12 to 16, both inclusive, in block 14 of Phillips' subdivision, deducible of record from the United States or otherwise, or that he or those through whom he claimed title had been in possession or had any title or interest in them by possession or otherwise. He claimed title in himself to the lots by a deed of conveyance vesting title in Alexander Moody, a suit in partition in the superior court of Cook county between the heirs of Appeal from Superior Court, Cook Coun- Alexander Moody, a purchase of the premty; Denis E. Sullivan, Judge. Suit by Robert T. Pearce against George C. Wright and others. From decree for complainant, defendant Charles H. Moody appeals. Affirmed. John R. McCabe and Adolph L. Benner, both of Chicago, for appellant. Everett M. Swain and Bertram H. Montgomery, both of Chicago, for appellee. CARTWRIGHT, J. This suit was begun by the appellee, Robert T. Pearce, by filing his bill in the superior court of Cook county against the appellant Charles H. Moody and others, alleging that he was the owner in fee simple and in actual possession of that part of the north half of the northeast quarter lying south and west of the Calumet river and north and west of the South Chicago & Southern Railroad, of section 6, township 36, range 15, embraced within the limits of and identical with purported lots 1, 2, 14, and 15 of block 11, and lots 6 and 12 to 16, both inclusive, of block 14, of the purported Phillips' subdivision of the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter and the north half of the northeast quarter, both lying south and west of the river, in section 6. He claimed title in fee simple by a chain of conveyances deducible of record from the United States, and also alleged that prior to October 1, 1891, the parties through whom he claimed title entered into the actual possession of the premises and constructed a continuous post and wire fence inclosing the land, and immediately thereafter leased the ises by him and a master's deed made and For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |