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at all, therefore infinite. Each particular space is the continuation. of another particular space; therefore, being continuous, it is infinite. The ground here taken for the infinitude of space is the continuation of the environment; but environment is the coextended series of innumerable particular objects, and hence cannot ascend into the sphere of the infinite. How, then, can the finite be the basis of the infinite? A concrete example will make this clearer. One table is ranged alongside another, a third alongside the second, a fourth alongside the third, etc. In the series we have table limited by table, or self-limited, and therefore infinite! Paragraph 9, page 5, Concord says:
“If any limited space has space for its environment, it is not limited by it, but continued by it. Any possible limited or finite space is continued by an environment of space, and the whole of space is infinite."
Let us here substitute the word table for the word space:
“ If any limited table has table for its environment, it is not limited by it, but continued by it. Any possible limited or finite table is continued by an environment of table, and the whole of table is infinite."
This is what the Concord School calls an “insight into the constitution of space," at the same time assuring us that it is not a “ mental image or picture of space." By mental image or picture, Concord means what the Scholastics call the phantasm of the imagination. “Conception (of space) in that sense,” says Concord, " would contradict the infinitude of space, for an image or picture (phantasm) necessarily has limits or environment.” With all due deference to the reputation of Concord, it must be said that it is this very image or picture which Concord has been all along talking about. This self-limiting space is nothing more than one phantasm projecting beyond and continuing another. Each time Concord has pictured any one portion of space an accompanying and contiguous phantasm has risen up in its imagination. Every phantasm so awakened has limits, and alongside of it have arisen the contiguous limits of other phantasms; these limits have been fancifully eliminated by blending this series of images into one. In this way, Concord has conjured up what it terms self-limiting or infinite space. One might as truly say that an indefinite number of frameless portraits in an endless picture-gallery are infinite because they are hung alongside each other. It is out of this continuous series of indefinitely projected phantasms that Concord has woven its self-limiting space. A fancy precisely similar, indeed identical, is that imaginary process of picturing the limits of the universe. When we arrive at the extreme end of the world, what is beyond? Why-let us see—air, or ether, or something of a like subtle nature. But ether, or air, or that other something, is
in space, and so continues the universe—we haven't come to the end of the world after all. Try as hard as we may, after this fashion, we never will; for, we are simply imagining a limit to the universe, and in so doing inevitably project an imaginary picture of something beyond. As often as we attempt to picture limits, just so often will we continue them by pushing another picture into a possible space beyond. Concord has permitted itself to be deceived in this way into confounding a phantasm with a pure concept. Space consists of the dimensions of the body containing relative to the body contained. The intellectual concept of space is an abstract and universal idea, applicable to any and all parts of space, complete in itself, and equally predicable of this book, or this room, or of the sum total of bodies in the universe. It has no more infinitude about it than any other universal. Concord has mistaken a phantasm for a pure abstraction. We may conjure up phantasms innumerable, until the imagination grows weary with the effort, and never come to the end of them; but this process will no more make an infinite than the reduplication of images in a mirror would.
Time shares the same fate as space in the hands of Concord. One part of time limits another part; therefore, time is self-limited or infinite. Here, as before, we have one phantasm chasing another in endless pursuit, from which Concord conceives its abortion of the infinite. To-day is limited by yesterday, and will be limited by to-morrow; therefore, all to-days, yesterdays, and to-morrows make an infinite time. By way of parenthesis, we might ask if the first day that ever dawned throughout this universe of mutable creatures had a predecessor ? Concord would, of course, answer that there was no first day, which is simply begging the question. It is one thing to assume that there was no first day, and quite another to show that a first day was an impossibility.
Summing up its chapter on Space and Time, Concord says:
“ Experience is thus a complex affair, made up of two elements -one element being furnished by the senses, and the other by the mind itself. Time and space, as conditions of all existence in the world, and of all experience, cannot be learned from experience. We cannot obtain a knowledge of what is universal and necessary from experience, because experience can inform us only that something is, but not that it must be. We actually know time and space as infinites, and this knowledge is positive or affirmative, and not negative. Just as surely as an object is made finite by its limit, just so surely is there a ground or condition underlying the object and its limit, and making both possible; this ground is infinite." (Page 6, § 14.)
It will not do to ask for the logical warrant of the conclusion that experience furnishes us with no element that goes to make up our notions of space and time, for that would be violating the canons of Concord. But, at least, we have the temerity to dispute the grounds of the assumption. Concord presupposes time and space. They are a priori logical conditions, necessary, universal and infinite, which the mind possesses prior to all experience These notions are a sort of infinite moulds, into which all the dimensions and successions of the objective world are poured. As they are pure forms of the intellect, there is no reality corresponding to them in the outside world. Why, then, there should be any reason for them in the human intellect at all, we are left to conjecture. Concord may refer us to Kant. But Kant laid them down. arbitrarily. We cannot know objects without recognizing them under these forms, is his argument. But these forms have no corresponding reality in the object itself. The objective furnishes us with nothing of them. What, then, have time and space to do with the objective world? Nothing. The forms of time and space, therefore, afford us no knowledge of the objective world. They are only as frames to a picture, if they are even that much. Knowledge is intellectual seeing; an object, to be seen, must be visible; to be visible, it must have a capacity of its own to be seen. It can be known only in so far as it has that capacity, and it can only make visible what it possesses. But if it has in itself nothing of space and time, it cannot make itself visible in space and time, and to cognize it under these purely subjective forms is not to reach any knowledge of the object at all. It is simply to have intuition of the presuppositions of space and time already in the mind, and leave the object where it was-in darkness. This may seem grandiloquent under the title of transcendentalism, but even the flickering flame of a rush is more serviceable than the utter night of a thousand burned-out suns. Certainly, we may be pardoned if we turn to the common place dictates of reason, after the stupendous nothingness of the transcendental. It may sound very like discord in the cultured ear of Concord, to hear that space and time have a very finite reality in the objective world; that they are (we trust it will not be too distressing to hear) accidents of the finite creature: of this universe; that our ideas of space and time have a foundation in things themselves; that just as much of an objective reality corresponds to these universals as to any other; and, to lay on the last straw, that experience does furnish us with our notions of time and space, not formally, it is true, but with the material from which the intellect abstracts its concepts. It is very obvious to common sense that, when we see an object in space and time, our reason for so seeing is that the object is as we see it; it is evident that there could be no possible reason for seeing an object in space and time, unless it were there. It is also obvious that if the intellectual vision alone furnished space and time to the objective world,
we would only be denying the objective by transferring it to the subjective world; in other words, we would have no objective world at all. At the same time we would be the victims of a very radical illusion. We would first imagine that we perceived an objective reality; this we would speculatively correct, when we should have gained that transcendental insight into space and time, which Concord reveals to the initiated. But, then, in practical life we would be forced to readjust our speculative conviction, and act after all as if the objective world were a reality. We would have to tolerate the illusion, and regulate our lives upon a conscious deception, as if it were truth impregnable. But to Concord nothing is impossible.
The most interesting feature of Concord philosophy is its doctrine of what it has labeled Causa sui. It is not only abstruse and seriously complicated, but partakes of the charm of novelty. Space and time have already been catalogued as infinites; but, strange to say, they are not absolute infinites; they have, as their presupposition, Causa sui.
The great end and aim of Concord is to establish the absolute unity of the universe. This it effects by identifying all things in its Causa sui. After having precised space as the mutual exclusion of parts, and time as the mutual exclusion of successive moments, both of which are infinites composed of innumerable finites, Concord proceeds to gauge causality :
“ We may look upon an object as the recipient of influences from its environment, or as itself imparting influences to its environment. This is Causality.”—(P. 9, § 22 (3). )
And, again (p. 10, $ 26):
“ If we examine causality, we shall see that it again presupposes a ground deeper than itself-deeper than itself as realized in a cause, and an effect separated into independent objects. This is the most essential insight to obtain in all philosophy.
“(1) In order that a cause shall send a stream of infuence over to an effect, it must first separate that portion of influence from itself.
“(2) Self-separation is, then, the fundamental presupposition of the action of causality. Unless the cause is a self-separating energy, it cannot be conceived as acting on another. The action of causality is based on self-activity.
“(3) Self-activity is called Causa sui, to express the fact of its relation to causality. It is the infinite form of causality in which the cause is its own environment, just as space is the infinite condition underlying extended things, and time, the infinite condition underlying events. Self-activity, as Causa sui, has the form of self-relation, and it is self-relation that characterizes the affirmative form
of the infinite. Self-relation is independence, while relation-toothers is dependence.'
Here self-separation is declared to be the true principle of causality. Self-separation is translated into self-activity, and self-activity into Causa sui, “the spontaneous origination of activity.” In all this there is something mystical. This is a typical species of transcendental logic in these tremendous leaps from self-separation to Causa sui. That “a cause may send a stream of influence over to an effect, it must first separate that portion of influence from itself.” We will take it for granted that Concord is speaking of an efficient cause, although no mention is made of the various kinds of causes. A cause, then, has, or is, an influence in separable portions. The exercise of causality lies in this active separation of self-influence, and transmitting it to another. This constitutes self-separation. Is this self-separation the separation of the substance of the cause itself, or not? From the use of the term self-separation, we find room to draw the inference that it does mean an emanation of substance from the cause to the effect. As we will see further on, we shall find ample warrant for this construction of the term in the light of Concord's idea of God. It is clear that the notion of cause as a self-separating substance is an easily paved way to the rankest pantheism, especially when the ultimate analysis of cause is to end in a Causa sui, which, in the words of Concord, is "the principle of life, of thought, of mind-the idea of a creative activity, and hence also the basis of theology as well as philosophy.”—(P. 11, § 27.)
That we may gather a yet clearer notion of causality within the meaning of Concord, let us examine into its application to the Concordian notion of Deity :
"Self-cause, or eternal energy, is the ultimate presupposition of all things and events. Here is the necessary ground of the idea of God. It is the presupposition of all experience and of all possible existence. By the study of the presupposition of experience, one becomes certain of the existence of one eternal energy which creates and governs the world.”—(P. 13, $ 33.)
But what is Causa sui ? We will let Concord explain in its own words:
“(1) It is clear that all beings are dependent or independent, or else have, in some way, phases, to which both predicates may apply.
“(2) The dependent being is clearly not a whole or totality ; it implies something else, some other being on which it depends. It cannot depend on a dependent being, although it may stand in relation to another dependent being as another link of its depend
All dependence implies the independent being as the source