2. Chattel — “deem himself in danger.”"] A chattel mortgagee, authorized
to take possession whenever he may deem himself in danger of losing,"
etc., may do so, acting in good faith and upon facts subsequent to the
mortgage, whenever he deems himself in such danger. Barret v. Hart
(42 Ohio St. 41), 801.
retaining possession.] An insolvent mortgaged his stock of merchan-
dise, worth $6,000, some of it perishable, constituting all his property,
to secure a debt of $3,000. The mortgagee knew he was embarrassed,
but not that he was insolvent. The mortgagor was not expressly author-
ized to sell, but the property was left in his possession, and it appeared to
be the intention that he should retain possession until the mortgage was
due. Held, that the power to sell was implied, and the mortgage was
void as to creditors. Benedict v. Renfro (75 Ala. 121), 429.
1. Coasting in streets.] A city by designating a particular street for coasting
does not render itself liable for an injury inflicted by coasters upon a per-
son passing in the street. Burford v. Grand Rapids (53 Mich. 98), 105.
2. Deed to, on condition — reverter.] Where a town acquires land by a deed
conditioned that the land shall revert unless within a certain time the
town shall erect thereon a certain building proper for municipal purposes,
including a "public hall," the land reverts on breach of the condition.
Clarke v. Inhabitants of Brookfield (81 Mo. 503), 243.
3. Firing cannon in street.] A city is not liable for an injury by the unau-
thorized firing of a cannon in a street by disorderly persons. Robinson v.
Greenville (42 Ohio St. 625), 857.
4. Negligence-notice.] The authorities of the District of Columbia covered
a well in a highway, in which there was a public pump, with a wooden
platform, and laid on that a brick pavement conforming to the sidewalk.
For nine years they made no repairs nor examination. While the plaintiff
was using the pump the platform gave way and he sustained injury. Held,
that the District was liable. Sherwood v. District of Columbia (3 Mackey,
276), 776.
A penal ordinance of
Chicago, pronouncing steamboats emitting dense smoke to be a nuisance,
is reasonable, and not unconstitutional as affecting vessels on the Chicago
river. Harmon v. City of Chicago (110 Ill. 400), 698.
1. Obstructing highway.] A land-owner, engaged in whitewashing a fence
skirting a highway running through his land, used a small barrel, mounted
on wheels. This with a shovel projecting slightly above the top was left
at the side of the highway over Sunday. The plaintiff's horse took fright
at it, and caused personal injuries to him. Held, that the defendant was
not liable unless the vehicle was so unusual and extraordinary as to have
a natural tendency to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness and training,
and was left by the roadside an unreasonable length of time. Piollet v.
Simmers (106 Penn. St 95), 493.
2. Presumption—accident.] In case of injury by the spreading of a fire law.
fully set there is no presumption of negligence. Catron v. Nichols (81 Mo.
80), 222.
3. carrier.] Where a passenger on a street railway car is injured by a
sudden jerk of the car, in transit, there is a presumption of negligence on
the part of the carrier. Dougherty v. Missouri Railroad Company (81
Mo. 325), 239.
See ACTION, 693; CARRIER, 284; EVIDENCE, 45; LANDLORD and Tenant,
154; MASTER AND SERVANT, 194, 269; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 105,
776, 857; RAILROAD, 354, 386, 598, 718, 761.
1. Action for protesting check.] The plaintiff drew his check on a bank where
he had ample funds, in favor of the defendant bank. It was presented at
eleven o'clock for payment, but was not paid, the drawee informing
the payee that it was good and would be paid at the close of banking hours,
the customary time for exchange of checks between the banks. The defendant
thereupon had it protested. Held, that no action would lie therefor in the
absence of allegation of special damage. Wittich v. First National Bank
of Pensacola (20 Fla. 843), 631.
2. Certainty as to amount and time.] The reservation in a note of the right
to pay it before maturity in installments of not less than five per cent of
the principal whenever the semi-annual interest falls due, does not render
it non-negotiable. Riker v. Sprague Manufacturing Company (14 R. I.
402), 413.
3. Coupon bonds.] Corporate coupon bonds payable to bearer are negotiable.
Mason v. Frick (105 Penn. St. 162), 191.
4. Protest-waiver.] Waiver of "protest" may be oral, and dispenses with
demand and notice. Annville National Bank v. Kettering (106 Penn. St.
Carrier-recovery of excessive charges paid to, 820.
Constitutional law-adulteration, 347.
Contract-place of sale- "C. O. D,” 570.
Criminal law - larceny - lucri causa, 312.
intent knowledge, 322.
Election-"device" on ballot, 648.
Evidence-scientific books, 680.
Mandamus to compel transfer of stock, 798.
Marriage- divorce- "extreme cruelty," 736.
Mistake reformation of married woman's deed, 458.
Mortgage-chattel - deem himself in danger," 805.
Municipal corporation — coasting in street, 860.
of traveller at railroad and highway crossing, 360.
premature announcement of railway station, 602.
Negotiable instrument — certainty as to time and amount, 418.
Nuisance-injunction - cotton-gin, 467.
Railroad-duty to travellers on parallel highway near crossing, 721.
Statute" rates of freight," 653.
penal private remedy under, 10.
Trespass-entry by owner to expel occupant of land, 366.
Water and water-course- percolation
cotton-gin.] The erection of a steam cotton-gin in a city,
eighty-eight feet from the complainant's residence, may not be prohibited
unless it is clearly shown that it is not reasonably possible to conduct the
business so that it will not be a nuisance. Rouse v. Martin (75 Ala. 510),
463.
See INJUNCTION, 7; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 698.
See INJUNCTION, 7; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 698; RAILROAD, 386.
After expiation.] A pardon after expiation of the offense is effectual to
restore competency as a witness. Hunnicutt v. State (18 Tex. Ct. App.
498), 330.
1. Sharing profits.] Merely sharing profits does not constitute a partnership.
Parchen v. Anderson (5 Mont. 438), 65.
a Loan for profits.] The loan of money, to be invested in trade, the borrower
to have one-half the net profits therefor, is not a partnership. Culley v.
Edwards (44 Ark. 423), 614.
See CARRIER, 814; MISTAKE, 251.
See WATER AND WATER-COURSE, 542.
PRESUMPTION.
See CARRIER, 483; MARRIAGE, 742.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 536.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.
See DAMAGES, 668, 722.
1. Negligence— conduct of street cars-infant trespasser.] Two street cars
were being drawn by a single horse, in charge of a driver on the front
platform, from the stables to the repair shops, when the plaintiff, a lad six
years old, in play jumped on the rear platform, and fell off or jumped off,
sustaining injury. The driver knew nothing of it. Held, that there was
no negligence on the part of the railroad company. Bishop v. Union R.
R. Co. (14 R. I. 314), 386.
ordinance.] A city ordinance provided that cars driven in the same
direction should not approach each other within three hundred feet except
in case of accident, when it may be necessary to connect two cars, and also
at stations. Held inapplicable. Id.
of traveller at crossing.] A traveller about to cross a railroad is not
relieved from the duty of looking both ways by the omission to give warn-
ing signals, or the fact that the railroad has just made a flying-switch.
Ormsbee v. Boston & Providence Railroad Corporation (14 R. I. 102), 354.
premature announcement of station.] A railway brakeman announced
a station, and shortly after the train stopped, but short of the station, and
in the dark. The plaintiff supposing he had reached his destination, got
off as soon as he could, but after the train had slowly started again, fell,
and was injured. Held, that the company was liable. Memphis & Little
Rock Ry. Co. v. Stringfellow (44 Ark. 322), 598.
5. Warning signals near highway crossing.] The statutory duty imposed on
railroads to give warning signals at and near highway crossings is intended
for the benefit of persons travelling on a parallel highway as well as those
intending to cross the track. Ransom v. Chi,, St. P., Minn. & Omaha
Ry. Co. (62 Wis. 178), 718.
successive trains at highway crossing.] It is negligent in a railroad
company to run trains so near together at a highway crossing as to make
the statutory signals unavailing to warn travellers on the highway. Chi-
cago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co. v. Boggs (101 Ind. 522), 761.
See CARRIER, 489, 584, 661; EJECTMENT, 475; Statute, 650.
REFORMATION.
See MISTAKE, 454.
REGISTRATION.
See DEED, 625.
Deed to Catholic bishop.] Lands were deeded to a Catholic bishop, his suc-
cessors and assigns, for the purpose of "erecting thereon a Roman Catho-
lic church and other buildings pertaining thereto, or to be exchanged
therefor or used in the purchase of other property in the town." Having
built a church on part of the land, held, that he might sell the rest to pay
a debt incurred in the erection. Blanc v. Alsbury (63 Tex. 489), 666.
See WATER AND WATER-COURSE, 542.
1. Conditional — vesting title — waiver.] A sale and delivery of chattels, on
condition that title shall not pass until payment of their purchase-price,
vests no title in the purchaser, or a bona fide purchaser from him, until
performance of the condition, and the condition is not waived by the seller's
merely taking the purchaser's notes for the price. Heinbockle v. Zugbaum
(5 Mont. 344), 59.
2. Vesting of title.] The shipment of goods, pursuant to a contract by which
the consignor was to pay the freight, and the consignee after sale was to
credit the consignor with the proceeds, does not vest title in the consignee,
in the absence of a bill of lading or notice to him of the shipment. First
National Bank of Helena v. McAndrews (5 Mont. 325), 51.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 29.
1. Evidence pecuniary ability- chastity.] In an action for seduction
evidence of what defendant had told the plaintiff he was worth is incom-
petent, and so is evidence of his general reputation for chastity. Watson
v. Watson (53 Mich. 168), 111.
2. "Good repute " — evidence of prior acts.] In a prosecution for seduction
under promise of marriage of an “unmarried female of good repute, under
twenty-one years of age," evidence of prior or subsequent specific acts of
lewdness with third persons is incompetent. State v. Brassfield (81 Mo.
151), 234.
Words not actionable.] Where one falsely reports to third persons that a
clerk in the employ of the government has spoken disrespectfully of his
chief, and this coming to the knowledge of the latter, he discharges the
clerk in consequence, held, that an action of slander will not lie. Knight
v. Blackford (3 Mackey, 177), 772.
1. "Child."] A child" is a boy not above fourteen, or a girl not above
twelve years of age.
Bell v. State (18 Tex. Ct. App. 53), 293.
2. Dower, when barred.] Under a statute barring dower if the wife "vol-
untarily leave her husband and go away and continue with an adulterer,"
dower is not barred where the husband, under the pretense of joining the
Confederate army, abandoned the wife, and she being informed by his
relatives that he was dead, married another man. Payne v. Dotson (81 Mo.
145), 225.
"Owner."]
A statute enacted that the "owners, superintendents or
managers" of factories should provide fire-escapes therein. Held, that the
tenant under lease of a factory, and not the landlord, was the owner."
Schott v. Harvey (105 Penn. St. 222), 201.
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