Petition of Brown. 99 Mass. 101; and compare the discussion of this and an allied question in 2 Perry Trusts, §§ 544, 545. Entirely consistent with this view, as it seems to us, are the cases of Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542, where a corporation bought in the market shares of its own stock and distributed them as a dividend, and they were held to belong to the life tenant; Heard v. Eldredge, 109 Mass. 258; s. c., 12 Am. Rep. 687, which holds that a cash dividend of money belongs as principal to the remainderman in a case where the money so divided has been received as compensation for part of the real estate of the corporation taken by right of eminent domain; Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478, where a corporation sold out its whole property and paid out the proceeds under the form of a dividend, and the sum so paid out was held to be capital and not income; and Parker v. Mason, 8 R. I. 427, where the bank had reduced the par value of its shares in consequence of certain supposed losses, and on recovery of the sums supposed to have been lost, issued additional stock to the stockholders, and it was held that the new shares were to be treated as capital. There are however cases which decide that surplus profits distributed in the form of new shares of stock issued for that purpose, belong to the tenant for life. Clarkson v. Clarkson, 18 Barb. 646; Van Doren v. Olden, 19 N. J. Eq. 176. But in those cases it does not appear that either party raised the question which we are now required to decide. In those cases the remainderman claimed, on the authority of Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. Jr. 800. and similar cases, that extra dividends, in whatever form declared, were to be taken as part of the principal. Such was apparently the scope of the decision in Brander v. Brander, since in that case it is to be noted that the dividend was to be paid not in stock of the bank but in annuities which were the property of the bank; but the doctrine of that case was doubted by Lord ELDON in Barclay V. Wainewright, 14 Ves. Jr. 66, and overruled in Price v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 473, decided in 1847, and in other English cases since decided, as well as by the above cited cases in New York and New Jersey. In Pennsylvania the doctrine of Brander v. Brander was affirmed in Earp's Appeal, 28 Penn. St. 368, but the court confine themselves to the discussion of that doctrine, and the distinction established by the decision relates solely to the time when the profits were earned. It was not contended that a division of sur Greene v. Keene. plus in the form of new stock could in no event be payable to the life tenant, and the decision therefore affords no aid in determining the question now before us. It is to be observed that there are two further questions intimately connected with this subject, and which were somewhat discussed by counsel in the argument of this case. The first is whether in the case of dividends properly so called, that is in case of distributions of cash or property separated from the remaining property of the corporation, and paid out or transferred to the stockholders for their own use, the court will look into the source from which such money or property has arisen for the purpose of determining whether it is to be considered as income or as principal. The second question is whether, in case of such distributions as are last above described, it is competent for the corporation, by designating the payment as a bonus or extra dividend or otherwise, to determine the disposition of the money or property so distributed as between life tenant and remainderman. We do not think these questions are submitted to us in this case, and we have therefore not decided them. Our conclusion is that the shares in question belong to the administrator on the estate of William Brown. Decree accordingly. GREENE V. KEENE. (14 R. I. 388.) Judgment — reaching choses in action. In the absence of fraud, trust, or other ground of equitable relief, or special statutory jurisdiction, judgment creditors cannot reach choses in action of their debtors by equity proceedings. BILL ILL for discovery, account and satisfaction of judgment. The opinion states the case. On demurrer. John D. Thurston, for complainant. Charles A. Wilson & Thomas A. Jenckes, for respondent. Greene v. Keene. MATTESON, J. This is a bill by which a judgment creditor seeks to subject to the payment of his claim a debt due to his debtor, but made payable by the debtor to his wife. The bill, after alleging that on the 26th of March, 1881, the respondent Samuel D. Keene was indebted to the complainant by promissory notes and otherwise, the suing out by the complainant, on that day, of a writ against Keene, returnable at the ensuing June term of the Court of Common Pleas, and the recovery, by the complainant, of a judgment against Keene, for $3,500 debt and $12.60 costs, at the following September term of that court, the issuing of an execution on the judgment, on the 26th of June, 1883. and the return of the same by the officer charged with its service, nulla bona, avers, on information and belief, that since the accruing of the complainant's debt, the respondent Samuel D. Keene has been the owner of letters patent, No. 229256, for an "Improvement in the Art of Cleaning and Opening Spinners' Staples;" that on, to-wit, the 24th of July, 1882, Keene entered into a contract with the respondents Richmond & Co., whereby they were to engage in the business of cleaning cotton waste, under said letters patent, and whereby Keene was to receive, as compensation, one cent per pound for all waste cleaned by the patented process, and on the 1st of August, 1883, one-half of the net profits realized from the business; the same to be paid over to his wife, the respondent Eglantine D. C. Keene. The bill further avers that the provision in the contract for the payment of the one-half of the net profits of the business to the wife of Keene was entirely without consideration moving from her, and that the arrangement for such payment was made by Keene for the purpose of hindering, obstructing, and defeating the complainant in the collection of his debt. The bill also avers, on information and belief, that the profits accruing from the business amount to a large sum, but to what sum the complainant is ignorant, and prays for a discovery, an account, for a decree that Richmond & Co. pay to him one-half of such profits, or so much thereof as shall be required to satisfy his judgment, for an injunction, and for general relief. The respondent Samuel D. Keene has demurred to the bill. It is not claimed that there was any fraud on the part of Richmond & Co. in the making of the contract, but only that Keene's intent in making his half of the profits payable to his wife was fraudulent. This making of the profits payable to her however if VOL. LI-51 Greene v. Keene. we correctly construe the contract, as alleged in the bill, did not amount to an assignment of the profits to her; nor did it create a trust by which Richmond & Co. became bound to pay them to her. It was merely a direction by Keene for the payment of them to her, revocable by him, before payment, at his pleasure. There was therefore no alienation by Keene of his share of the profits, but it remained subject to his disposition and control and liable to attachment, by trustee process, for his debts. It follows, that the intent of Keene in making his half of the profits payable to his wife was immaterial, since the making it so payable did not hinder, delay, or obstruct this complainant in the collection of his claim. This being so, the question arising on the demurrer is, whether the complainant can, by this proceeding, reach the money due Keene under the contract and apply it to the payment of his claim; or in other words, whether in the absence of fraud, trust, or other ground of equitable jurisdiction, a judgment creditor is entitled to the aid of a court of equity to subject a chose in action of his debtor to the payment of the judgment debt. The right of a judgment creditor to the assistance of equity in reaching those assets of his debtor which are not tangible and which cannot be taken on execution, such as stock, money in the funds, and choses in action, has been much discussed, and has given rise to considerable diversity of opinion. The cases in which it has been most frequently considered have been those in which an insolvent debtor has made a voluntary settlement, or conveyance, or other dispositon of this species of property, alleged to be in fraud of the rights of creditors. Its discussion therefore has been intimately associated with the discussion of the question, whether or not such conveyance or disposition came within the provisions of the statutes against fraudulent conveyances. The early cases in England, in which the courts exercised the jurisdiction in favor of the creditor, were of this character. Smither v. Lewis, 1 Vern. 398; Taylor v. Jones, 2 Atk. 600; King v. Dupine, 2 Atk. 603, note; King v. Marissal, 3 Atk. 192; Edgell v. Haywood, 3 Atk. 352; Horn v. Horn, Amb. 79; Partridge v. Gopp, Amb. 596, 598, also 1 Eden, 163, 168. Subsequently however even in this class of cases, the jurisdiction was denied. Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196, 198; 2 Cox, 240; Caillard v. Estwick, 1 Anstr. 381, 385; Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. Jr. 188, 189 : Greene v. Keene. Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. Jr. 360, 368; Bank of England v. Lunn, 15 Ves. Jr. 569, 577; McCarthy v. Gould, 1 B. & Beatty, 387, 389, 390; Grogan v. Cooke, 2 B. & Beatty, 230, 233; Grey v. Pearkes, 18 Ves. Jr. 197; Otley v. Lines, 7 Price, 274, 276, 277; Cockrane v. Chambers, cited in note to Horn v. Horn, Amb. 79; Mathews v. Feaver, 1 Cox, 278, 280. The reasons which led the courts to deny the jurisdiction were, that the statute of Elizabeth was not intended to enlarge the remedies of creditors, nor to subject to execution any property not already liable thereto; that the kinds of property in question were not liable to execution at law, and equity had no power to grant execution in aid of the infirmity of the law; hence it would be an idle proceeding to set aside a conveyance which when set aside would leave the property in the name and control of the debtor, where it could not be touched. In Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jr. 196, 199, Lord THURLOW asks: "Is there any case where a man having stock in his own name has been sued for the purpose of having it applied to satisfy creditors?" And he proceeds: "These things, such as stock, debts, etc., being choses in action, are not liable. They could not be taken on a levari facias. * If the court was of opinion * * * that there was any lien upon the stock, by which it was capable of being affected, that might be the foundation of it; but if not, it is quite new to me that this court cau touch it. I have never heard of such a thing." In Grogan v. Cooke, 2 B. & Beatty, 230, 233, Lord MANNERS, referring to the case of Dundas v. Dutens, reports Lord THURLOW as having said: "The opinion in Horn v. Horn is so anomalous and unfounded that forty such opinions would not satisfy me. It would be preposterous and absurd to set aside an agreement which if set aside leaves the stock in the name of a person where you could not touch it." Again, in Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. Jr. 188, Lord ELDON says: "In this case the property is only stock, and there is no instance of this court giving execution against stock, eo nomine, upon which there is no lien;" and in Bank of England v. Lunn, 15 Ves. Jr. 569, 577, he held that stock was not liable to the payment of debts during the life-time of the proprietor in any way except under a commission in bankruptcy. In this country, no cases have been more frequently cited in support of the exercise of the jurisdiction than Bayard v. Hoffman, 4 Johns. Ch. 450, and Spader v Davis, 5 Johns. Ch. 280, the lat |