still accompanies the instrument, but allows it to be rebutted in the answer. 10 Cal. 463, 464.

Contracts against Public Policy.

SEC. 20. If the purchaser of a steamboat, at the time of the purchase, covenants with the seller that he will not run or employ or suffer to run or be employed, the said boat for ten years, upon any of the routes of travel of the waters of a state, the covenant, being in restraint of trade and commerce, is void, as against public policy. 36 Cal. 342.

SEC. 21. A verbal agreement to indemnify a sheriff for seizing certain property, under an execution in favor of the obligor, is valid, especially where the sheriff appears to have acted in good faith, and with no other view than that of obtaining satisfaction of the execution out of the property of the judgment debtor; and the act committed amounted simply to an unintentional wrong. In the case of a willful trespass, an agreement of this character would be in contravention of public policy, and ought not to be enforced; but where there is nothing willful in the trespass, there is no reason why effect should not be given to the agreement. The rule is, that where the intention is to commit a trespass, the agreement will be void, but that where the object is to enforce a legal right, and the parties are actuated by no improper motive, the agreement will be valid "If," said the court of appeals of South Carolina, in Jameison vs. Calhoun (2 Speers, 19), "one man promise another to indemnify him for committing a crime, a misdemeanor, or a willful trespass, such promise is void; but this has never been supposed to extend to cases where the alleged trespass has been committed in prosecution of a legal right, unless the legal right be merely pretensive." See, also, Crocker on Sheriffs, 319..

Neither is the agreement invalid for want of a compliance with the statute of frauds. It was not a "special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another,' within the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff was not acting for himself, but as the agent of the defendant, and the promise was to be responsible for the consequences of his acts in that capacity.

The plaintiff was entitled to recover the costs incurred by him in defending the suit brought for the value of the property. His claim to indemnity extended to the entire damages to which he had been subjected on account of the seizure. 18 Cal. 624, 625.

SEC. 22. Any agreement respecting government contracts to be awarded to the lowest bidder, which tends to deprive the government of the advantage of competition in the bidding, is unlawful and void. 20 Cal. 182.

An agreement not to bid upon a contract which is to be awarded to the lowest bidder, and an agreement to withdraw a bid already made, are obnoxious to the same legal objections. 20 Cal. 182.

SEC. 23. S having put in a bid for carrying the mails over a certain route, agreed with C to withdraw his bid, and use his influence to induce the government to give to C a contract for a longer route, including the one bid upon, on consideration that if C obtained the contract, S should have an interest in it, or be paid an equivalent pecuniary compensation: Held, that the contract was void as against public policy. 20 Cal. 182.

SEC. 24. Any contract by a public officer, which interferes with the unbiased discharge of his duty to the public in the exercise of his office, is against public policy and void. 22 Cal. 336.

SEC. 25. A postmaster is a public officer, and in the discharge of his trust is bound to exercise his judgment for the public benefit in fixing the location of his office; and any contract by which this exercise of his judgment is sold for his private emolument, interferes with the discharge of his official duties, and is therefore void. 22 Cal. 336.

The question of the validity of a contract of a public officer, does not depend upon the circumstance whether it can be shown that the public has in fact suffered any detriment, but whether the contract is such in its nature as might have been injurious to the public interest. 22 Cal. 336.

The plaintiff, in expectation of receiving a commission as postmaster, entered into an agreement with defendants, whereby they leased to him certain premises for the term of one year, with the right on his part to extend the terms so

long as he should remain postmaster, not exceeding four years, in consideration of the sum of one dollar per year, and a covenant on his part, that as soon as he received his commission, he would remove the post-office to the leased premises, and continue the same there for all the time that he should hold the office: Held, that in an action for the breach of this contract by defendant, it contravened public policy and was void. 22 Cal. 336, 337.

If, in order to secure a fit location for an office, it should be necessary for a postmaster to agree to locate and continue it at a particular place, a contract to that effect might be valid, but to maintain an action thereon, such necessity would be required to be affirmatively shown. 22 Cal. 337. SEC. 26. "Public policy" is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its application may not be disputed. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts (Sec. 546), says: "It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition, in the same manner as fraud. This rule may, however, be safely laid down, that wherever any contract conflicts with the morals of the time and contravenes any established interest of society, it is void, as being against public policy." In illustration of this rule, he says (Sec. 576): "Where, therefore, a person occupying a public office agrees, for a reward, to exercise his official influence in questions affecting both public and private rights so as to bring about the private advantage of persons interested, the contract would be void. For every public officer is bound to be disinterested in the consideration of all public questions, and any contract which interferes with the free and unbiased exercise of his judgment in relation to a question of trust and confidence reposed in him, is against public policy and good morals." "Again (Sec. 577): Contracts for the sale of public offices come under the class of contracts in violation of public duty, and are void. And this rule obtains upon the ground that they tend to destroy the responsibilities of the office, and to betray the interests of the public." "So, also, the profits and emoluments of a public office of trust are not a good subject of sale. Thus, it has been held that the prize money of a sailor, or the full pay or half pay of an officer is not assignable at law, nor in

equity, upon the ground that any salary paid for the performance of a public duty ought not to be perverted to other uses than those for which it was intended." These citations are made, not as referring to cases of the same exact character as the one before us, but as illustrating the general principle-which is, that any contract by a public officer which interferes with the unbiased discharge of his duty to the public in the exercise of his office, is against public policy, and is void.

The case of Fuller vs. Dame (18 Pick. 472), is pertinent. In this case it appears that Fuller was a stockholder in the Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation, and for a consideration he agreed to use his influence in procuring that corporation to locate its depot at a particular place in Boston, it being expressed in the agreement that Fuller was of opinion that the road ought, from a view to the public good and the good of the stockholders, to locate its depot at that place. The contract was held to be void on the ground that the road was established for the public accommodation, although a private corporation, and that the public had an interest in the question of the location of the depot, and though the contract was not made to induce a party to do an unlawful act, it put him under an influence to do that which might injuriously affect the interests of the public, and the court say: "Nor is it any satisfactory answer to say, that when the agreement was entered into he had come to the opinion that the location in question was the best for the interests of the public and for the interests of the corporation. That opinion might be changed by new views and new offers; and besides, the terms upon which this boon was to be obtained was still an open question. But upon all these questions the influence of the promise of separate and distinct advantage deprived him of the power of exercising a free, disinterested and unbiased, judgment." 22 Cal. 340–342.

SEC. 27. If any part of the consideration of an agreement be void as against public policy, the whole contract fails. This is well settled. See 1 Parsons on Contracts, 380. that courts of equity will never Comyns on Contracts, 53.

It is equally well settled enforce any such contract.

So, if A promise B money in consideration that he will not give evidence in a suit pending, such promise cannot be enforced, it being unlawful for any man to suppress evidence in any case. Comyns on Contracts, 63.

The ground upon which courts proceed in cases of this sort is well stated by Mr. Justice Baldwin in the case of Bartle vs. Coleman (4 Peters, 184).

The strong language of this case is but an elaboration of the principle asserted in the case of Holman vs. Johnson, (3 Cowp. 343).

Lord Mansfield there says: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may say so. The principle of public policy is this, ex

dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise, ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes, not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault, potior est conditio defendentis."

The authorities and the reason of the rule leave no question as to the right of a court and its duty to dismiss from its consideration a case based upon a consideration which contravenes public policy. Courts do not sit to give effect to such illegal contracts. The law is not to be subsidized to overthrow itself, though the parties to the litigation may not object to such a meretricious exercise of power. If the public time and the authority of the law were thus at the mercy of litigants, the sense of dignity and obligation to the laws from which the court derives its powers would con