name), is no more than is recognised as legal by the statute 6 Geo. 4; by which statute also exactly the same right of combination, to the same extent, and no further, is given to the masters when met together, if they are of opinion the rate of wages is too high. In the case supposed-that is, a dispute between the masters and the workmen as to the proper amount of wages to be given,-it was probably thought by the Legislature, that if the workmen on the one part refused to work, or the masters on the other refused to employ, as such a state of things could not continue long, it might fairly be expected that the party must ultimately give way whose pretensions were not founded in reason and justice, the masters if they offered too little, the workmen if they demanded too much. But, unfortunately for themselves and others, those who were discontented did not rest here. Not satisfied with the exercise of their own right to withhold their own labour, if they were discontented with the price they received for it, they assumed the power of interfering with the right which others possessed of exercising their discretion upon the same point; and accordingly you will have numerous cases laid before you, in which large bodies of dissatisfied workmen interfered, by personal violence, and by threats and intimidation, to compel others, who were perfectly willing to continue to labour in their callings at the rate of wages then paid, to desist from their work, to leave the mine or manufactory, and, against their own will, to add themselves to the numbers of the discontented party,-than which a more glaring act of tyranny and despotism by one set of men over their fellows cannot be conceived. If there is one right which, beyond all others, the labourer ought to be able to call his own, it is the right of the exertion of his own personal strength and skill in the full enjoyment of his own free will, altogether unshackled by the control or dictates of his fellow-workmen; yet, strange to say, this very right which the discontented workman claims for himself to its fullest extent, he does, by a blind perversity and unaccountable selfishness, entirely refuse to his fellows who differ in opinion from himself. It is unnecessary to say that a course of proceeding so utterly unreasonable in itself, so injurious to society, so detrimental to the interests of trade, and so oppressive against the rights of the poor man, must be a gross and flagrant violation of the law, and must be put down, Reg. V. Conspiracy to dictate to master what workmen he shail em. when the guilt is established, by a proper measure of punishment." And similar principles were laid down, on a recent occasion (i), by Patteson, J., in passing sentence upon some prisoners who had been convicted upon an indictment under the statute of Geo. 4. "The object of the Legislature," said he, “was that all masters and workmen should be left free in the conduct of their business. The masters were at liberty to give what rate of wages they liked, and to agree among themselves what wages they would pay. In like manner, the workmen were at liberty to agree among themselves for what wages they would work, and were not restricted in so doing by the circumstance that they were in the employ of one or other of the masters. The intention of the Legislature was to make them quite free; but seeing that intimidation might be used to carry out such agreements, it was enacted by 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, s. 3 (k), that (&c., the learned Judge here read that section, and added) the offence did not consist in the combination to raise their wages, but in the use of threats, intimidation, molestution, and obstruction." CONSPIRACIES, &c. AMONGST MASTERS AND WORKMEN. Since the above mentioned statute, 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, it has been held (7), that a combination of workmen for the purpose of dictating to masters what workmen they shall employ, is indictable. And an indictment for conspiring to prevent the workmen of J. G. from continuing to work, was held to be supported by evidence of a conBykerdike. spiracy to procure the discharge of any of the workmen, as the indictment did not necessarily lay the intent as to all the workmen (m). ploy. Rey v. (i) Reg. v. Rowlands, Q. B, Mich. T. 1851. See this case 21 L. J., N. S., M. C. 81. (k) See the sect., ante, p. 332. (1) Rex v. Bykerdyke, 1 Moo. & Rob. 179. (m) Ibid.; and see Rex v. Ferguson, 2 Stark. 489, where an indictment against workmen for conspiring to prevent their masters from taking any apprentices, was held to be supported by proof of a conspiracy to prevent their taking more than a certain number,in proportion to the number of journeymen employed. Club fining In the recent case of Reg. v. Hewitt (n), where it ap- men who peared that a club of workmen had been formed, and worked for was empowered to inflict fines upon persons who worked obnoxious for obnoxious masters, and that a person so fined refused master. to pay, whereupon his fellow-workmen would not work with him, and by that means compelled his master to dismiss him: Lord Campbell, C. J., held such conduct of the men to be illegal. Hewitt. to reduce or Moreover, if either masters or servants conspire to Conspiracy effect a reduction or increase of wages by the use of increase violence, threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, rate of they will be guilty of an illegal act, and may be in- wages. dicted for such conspiracy. It is not thought necessary further to advert in this place to the law applicable to the crime of conspiracy, as a discussion of it would lead us beyond the proper limits of this work (0). It may however, perhaps, with propriety be here stated, What is a that a conspiracy has been defined to be "an agreement conspiracy. for an unlawful purpose, or to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means" (p). But Lord Denman, C. J., in one case (g) said, he thought the antithesis not very correct, and, in another (r), said the words, "at least," should accompany the definition. ed work nen to demolish" Where a party of coalwhippers, having a feeling of Discontentill-will to a coallumper, who paid less than the usual riotously wages, created a mob and riotously went to the house "beginning where he kept his pay-table, and cried out that they master's would murder him, and began to throw stones, brick- house. bats, &c., and broke windows, and partitions, and part of Rer v. a wall, and continued after his escape throwing stones Batt. at the house till they were compelled to desist by the (n) 5 Cox Crim. Cas. 162. (o) See further on this subject, 2 Russ. on Crimes, by Greaves. bk. 2, ch. 2, p. 674, and Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49; Reg. v. Button, 11 Q. B. 929, where other authorities upon the subject may also be found. See also a learned note to Mr. Justice Cole. ridge's ed. of Bl. Comm. vol. 4, p. 136, where he explains the confusion which has arisen in many cases from the fallacy of separating the means (p) Rex v. Jones, 4 B. & (q) Rex v. Peck, 9 A. & E. 690. (r) Reg. v. King, 7 Q. B. 788. threats of the police: it was held by Gurney, B., that they might be convicted of beginning to demolish, under the statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, though their princicipal object was to injure the lumper, provided it was also their object to demolish the house, either on account of its being used by him or his men, and though they had not any ill-will against the owner of the house personally (s). (s) Rex v. Batt, 6 C. & P. 329. 343 CHAPTER XI. LEGACIES TO SERVANTS. the testator. Ir is thought convenient to collect into a separate who enChapter the various decisions upon this subject, as the titled to legacies as question whether particular individuals are entitled to "servants." legacies left to a class of persons as "servants" frequently arises; and the answer to it rather depends upon the words of the will and the intention of the testator in each case, than upon the strict legal construction of the Depends on contract into which he has entered with the persons intention of claiming the legacy; for it by no means follows that every person with whom a testator had entered into a contract of hiring and service was an object of his testamentary bounty, although, in many cases, a clue to his intention may be found by ascertaining the exact nature of such contracts. For similar reasons, no rule can be laid down which will be applicable to all cases. Each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances. It is however, of course, necessary that a person claiming to be entitled to a legacy left to each one of a class of per sons should be one of that class to whom the legacy is left,— that a person claiming a legacy as a servant should be a servant, otherwise he cannot be entitled to it. It has, But servant therefore, been held (a), that a person who was not must serve obliged to give up his whole time to his master, although exclusively. in some sense he might be called a servant, was yet not entitled to a legacy left to servants. testator Thus, where (b) the Duke of Bolton by his will de- Townsend vised "unto such of my servants as shall be living with v. Windham. me at the time of my death, one year's wages," the Lord Keeper said, "Stewards of Courts, and such who are not (a) This is in accordance with the decisions on the law of settlement, ante, p. 44. (b) Townsend v. Windham, 2 Vern. 546. |