These two clauses are taken from the 7 Geo. 4, ch. 64, sec. 13, of the Imperial Statutes.

This enactment is not confined in its operation to the carriages of common carriers or to public conveyances, but if property is stolen from any carriage employed on any journey, the offender may, by virtue of the above section, be tried in any county through any part whereof such carriage shall have passed in the course of the journey during which such offence shall have been committed: Reg. vs. Sharpe, Dears. 415.

As to the effect of the words "in or upon" in this section, see Rex vs. Sharpe, 2 Lewin, 233.

Where the evidence is consistent with the fact of an article having been abstracted from a railway carriage, either in the course of the journey through the County of A., or after its arrival at its ultimate destination in the County of B., and the prisoner is indicted under the above section, the case must go to the jury, who are to say whether they are satisfied that the larceny was committed in the course of the journey or afterwards Reg. vs. Pierce, 6 Cox, 117.

CHANGE OF VENUE.

Sec. 11.-Whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge hereinafter mentioned, that it is expedient to the ends of justice that the trial of any person charged with felony or misdemeanor should be held in some district, county or place other than that in which the offence is supposed to have been committed, or would otherwise be triable, the Court at which

such person is or is liable to be indicted, may at any term or sitting thereof, and any Judge who might hold or sit in such Court may at any other time, order, either before or after the presentation of a bill of indictment, that the trial shall be proceeded with in some other district, county or place within the same Province, to be named by the Court or Judge in such order; but such order shall be made upon such conditions as to the payment of any additional expense thereby caused to the accused, as the Court or Judge may think proper to prescribe;

2.-Forthwith upon the order of removal being made by the Court or Judge, the indictment, if any has been found against the prisoner, and all inquisitions, informations, depositions, recognizances and other documents whatsoever relating to the prosecution against him, shall be transmitted by the officer having the custody thereof to the proper officer of the court at the place where the trial is to be had, and all proceedings in the case shall be had, or, if previously commenced, shall be continued in such district, county or place as if the case had arisen or the offence had been committed therein;

3. The order of the Court or of the Judge, made under the first sub-section of this section, shall be a sufficient warrant, justification and authority to all sheriffs, gaolers, and peace officers for the removal, disposal and reception of he prisoner in conformity with the terms of such order; and the sheriff may appoint and empower any constable to convey the prisoner to the gaol in the district, county or place in which the trial is ordered to be had;

4-Every recognizance which may have been entered into or shall be entered into for the prosecution of any person, and every recognizance, as well of any witness to give evidence, as of any person for any offence, shall in case any such order, as provided by sub-section number one of this section, is made, be obligatory on each of the parties bound by such recog nizance as to all things therein mentioned with refer ence to the said trial, at the place where such trial is so ordered to be had, in like manner as if such recogni zance had been originally entered into for the doing of such things at such last mentioned place: provided that notice in writing shall be given either personally or by leaving the same at the place of residence of the parties bound by such recognizance as therein described, to appear before the Court, at the place where such trial is ordered to be had.

By this section the Court or Judge has a discretionary power of a wide extent : "Provided that it appears

to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge" says the Statute, and when the Court or Judge declares that it so appears the matter quoad hoc is at an end, the venue is changed and the trial must take place in the district, county or place designated in the order. But in the exercise of this discretionary power, the Judge is not to be governed by arbitrary motives. "Discretion, when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law: it must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular": per Lord Mansfield, in Rex vs. Wilkes, 4 Burr, 2539. If not guided by these rules

"the law of discretion is the law of the tyrant, and a judge who relies on that law, is a tyrant on the bench": per Lord Denman, and repeated by Chief Justice Duval, 11 L. C. Jurist, 167.

The words of the Statute require that the Court or Judge be satisfied that the change of venue is expedient to the ends of justice. It is obvious that it would be impossible to foresee all the cases in which such expediency could be said to be satisfactorily established. The judge must be governed by the special facts and circumstances of each case, remembering, as said by Mr. Justice Sanborn: In re ex parte Brydges, 18 L. C. Jurist, 141, that "the common law discourages change of venue, and it is only to be granted with caution and upon strong grounds."

The following cases decided in England under the old law may be usefully noticed here:

Where there was a prospect of a fair trial the Court refused to change the venue, though the witnesses resided in another county: Reg. vs. Dunn, 11 Jur. 287 -B. C.-Patteson.

The Court will not permit the venue in an indictment to be changed for any other cause than the inability to obtain a fair trial in the original jurisdiction: Reg. vs. Patent Eureka and Sanitary Manure Company, 13 L. T., N. S. 365, Q. B.

The Court has no power to change the venue in a criminal case, nor will they order a suggestion to be entered on the roll to change the place of trial in an information for libel, on the ground of inconvenience and difficulty, in securing the attendance of the de

fendant's witnesses: Reg. vs. Cavendish, 2 Cox, C. C. 176.

The Court will remove an indictment for a misdemeanor from one county to another, if there is reasonable cause to apprehend or suspect that justice will not be impartially administered in the former county: Rex vs. Hunt, 3 B. & A. 444; 2 Chit. 130.

The Court has a discretionary power of ordering a suggestion to be entered on the record of an indictment for felony, removed thither by certiorari, for the purpose of awarding the jury process into a foreign county; but this power will not be exercised unless it is absolutely necessary for the purpose of securing an impartial trial: Rex vs. Holden, 2 N. & M. 167; 5 B. & Ad. 347.

In the case of Rex vs. Harris et al., 3 Burr., 1330, the private prosecutors, in their affidavit on an application made by them for a change of the venue, went no further than to swear generally "that they verily believed that there could not be a fair and impartial trial had by a jury of the City of Gloucester," without giving any particular reasons or grounds for entertaining such a belief. The case to be tried was an information against the defendants, as aldermen of Gloucester, for a misdemeanor in refusing to admit several persons to their freedom of the city, who demanded their admission, and were entitled to it, and, in consequence, to vote at the then approaching election of members of Parliament for that city, and whom the defendants did admit after the election was over; but would not admit them till after the election, and thereby deprived them of their right of voting at it. The prosecutors had moved for this rule, on a supposition