559; 5 B. & A. 894; but the commitment must be for a time certain, and if by a Justice of the Peace, for contempt of himself in his office, it must be by warrant in writing: Mayhew vs. Locke, 2 Marsh, 377; 7 Taunt. 63; and the jurisdiction with regard to contempt, which belongs to inferior courts, and in particular to the County Court, is confined to contempts committed in the court itself: Ex parte Joliffe, 42 L. J. Q. B. 121. This last case rests principally on the 9-10 Vic. ch. 95 (Imp), which gives to County Courts power to commit for contempt committed in face of the Court, but is silent as to contempt committed out of Court: see 4 Stephen's Com. 341. Time, place and manner of arrest.-A person charged on a criminal account may be apprehended at any time in the day or night. The 29 Car. 2, ch. 7, sec. 6 prohibited arrests on Sundays, except in cases of treasons, felonies and breaches of the peace, but now, by the 32-33 Vic., ch. 30, An Act respecting the duties of Justices of the Peace,out of Sessions, in relation to persons charged with indictable offences, it seems that an arrest in any indictable offence may be executed on a Sunday. See 4 Stephen's Com., 347; 1 Chitty, 16; Rawlins vs. Ellis, 10 Jur. 1039. No place affords protection to offenders against the criminal law, and they may be arrested anywhere, and wherever they may be: Bacon's Abr. Verb. Trespass. As to the manner of arresting without warrant by a private person, he is bound, previously to the arrest, to notify to the party the cause for which he arrests, and to require him to submit ; but such notification is not necessary where the party is in the actual commis sion of the offence, or where fresh pursuit is made after any such offender, who, being disturbed, makes his escape; so a constable arresting, without warrant, is bound to notify his authority for such arrest, unless the offender be otherwise acquainted with it, except, as in the case of private individuals, where the offender is arrested in the actual commission of the offence, or on fresh pursuit: R. v. Howarth, 1 Mood. 207. If a felony be committed, or a felon fly from justice. or a dangerous wound be given, it is the duty of every man to use his best endeavours for preventing an escape, and if, in the pursuit, the felon be killed where he cannot be otherwise overtaken, the homicide is justifiable. This rule is not confined to those who are present so as to have ocular proof of the fact, or to those who first come to the knowledge of it, for if in these cases fresh pursuit be made, the persons who join in aid of those who began the pursuit are under the same protection of the law. But if he may be taken in any case without such severity, it is, at least, manslaughter in him who kills, and the jury ought to enquire whether it were done of necessity or not: 1 East, P. C. 298; but this is not extended to cases of misdemeanor or arrests in civil proceedings, though in a case of riot or affray, if a person interposing to part the combatants, giving notice to them of his friendly intention, should be assaulted by them or either of them and in the struggle should happen to kill, this will be justifiable homicide: Foster, 272. However, supposing a felony to have been actually committed, but not by the person suspected and pursued, the law does not afford the same indemnity to such as of their own accord, or upon mistaken information that a felony had been committed, engage in the pursuit, how probable soever the suspicion may be; but constables acting on reasonable suspicion of felony are justified in proceeding to such extremities when a private per son may not be: 2 East, P. C., 300; but the constable must know, or at least have reasonable ground for suspecting, that a felony has been committed; for a constable was convicted of shooting at a man, with intent to do him some grievous bodily harm, whom he saw carrying wood out of a copse which he had been employed to watch, and who, by running away,would have escaped if he had not fired, for unless the man had been previously summarily convicted for the same offence he had not committed a felony and, though he had been so previously convicted, the constable was not aware of it. And the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Crown Cases reserved," We all think the conviction right," said Pollock, C. B., "the prisoner was not justified in firing at Waters, because the fact that Waters was committing a felony was not known to the prisoner at the time": Reg. vs. Dadson, 2 Den. 35. PERSONS TO WHOM PROPERTY IS OFFERED MAY AP- Sec. 3.-If any person to whom any property is offered to be sold, pawned or delivered, has reasonable cause to suspect that any such offence has been committed on or with respect to such property, he may, and, if in his power, he shall apprehend and forthwith carry before a Justice of the Peace, the party offering the same, together with such property, to be dealt with according to law. This clause does not apply only to cases of stolen goods, as the marginal summary, in the Statute, states it. The case of stolen goods is provided for by sec. 117 of the Larceny Act. The words any such offence in this clause refer to the preceding section, and mean any offence punishable either upon indictment, whether a felony or a misdemeanor, or upon summary conviction. So that by this clause, if goods are offered to a person, which this person has reasonable cause to suspect to have been smuggled, he may, and, if possible, he must, apprehend the party offering them. So of game killed within the close season, and, in fact, of every offence whatsoever. As to what constitutes a reasonable cause, in such cases, depends very much on the particular facts and circumstances in each instance; the general rule being that the grounds must be such that any reasonable person, acting without passion or prejudice, would fairly have suspected the party arrested of being the person who committed the offence, though the words of the statute seem to authorize the apprehension of the person offering, whether he be suspected or not: Allen vs. Wright, 8 C. & P. 522. A bare surmise or suspicion is plainly insufficient: Leete vs. Hart, 37 L. J. C. P. 157; Davies vs. Russell, 5 Bing. 364. If the conduct of the person arresting is impugned in an action for false imprisonment, a question arises as to whom does it belong to decide whether the defendant had reasonable cause of suspecting the plaintiff. The authorities conflict upon the point. In Davis vs. Russell, 5 Bing 354, and in Stonehouse vs. Elliott 6 T. R. 315, the Court of Common Pleas held it to be the judge's province to decide whether the facts alleged constituted such reasonable cause, and for the jury to say whether the facts stated' really existed, and the defendant acted upon their existence. But in Wedge vs. Berkeley, 6 A. &. E. 663, the Court of Queen's Bench considered the question of reasonable and probable cause, a question purely for the jury. In the later case, however, of Broughton vs. Jackson, 18 Q. B. 378, 21 L. J. Q. B. 263, it was treated as a question of law; and in the modern case of Hailes vs. Marks, 7 H. & N. 56; 30 L. J. Ex. 389, see also Hogg vs. Ward, 3 H. & N. 417; 27 L. J. Ex. 443, the Court of Exchequer held the question of reasonable cause to be purely one of law for the judge. It is to be observed, however, that Bramwell, B., grounds his decision upon the case of Panton vs. Williams, 2 Q. B. 169, without adverting to the fact that that was an action for malicious prosecution. It is submitted, however, that there is a clear distinction between the two cases, for whilst only judges or lawyers are competent to form an opinion upon what facts an action or an indictment would lie, and are thus the only persons competent to decide whether there was reasonable cause for instituting a prosecution, yet laymen are quite as competent as lawyers to say what affords a reasonable ground of suspicion against a particular person of having committed a |