It is probable that the mere fact of an indictment being signed "B. W., Attorney-General, by J. O. duly authorized," would be held not to be a sufficient direction, under this clause; this power must be exercised by the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General in person, and cannot be delegated. It is, in this respect, on the same footing as a nolle prosequi or the fiat for a writ of error: see Reg. vs. Dunlop, 11 L. C. Jur. 271, and Archbold, 105, 106. A prosecutor who has required the magistrates to take his recognizances to prosecute, under section 29, ante, of the Procedure Act of 1869, when the magistrates have refused to commit or to bail for trial the person charged, must either go on with the prosecution or have his recognizances forfeited, as it would defeat the object of the statute if he was allowed to move to have his recognizances discharged: Reg. vs. Hargreaves, 2 F. &. F. 790. And under this section 29, a magistrate, if he refuses to commit or bails the person charged, is bound to take the recognizance of the prosecutor, if the information discloses any of the offences mentioned in the statute; but he has a discretion to refuse, if no indictable offence is disclosed: where, therefore, the offence charged is that of conspiracy, by three persons, two of whom are members of the House of Lords to deceive the House and so to prevent the due course of justice and injure and prejudice a third person by making statements in the House which they knew to be false, the magistrate is right in refusing to take any proceedings as members of either House of Parliament are not civilly or criminally liable for any statements made in the House, nor for a conspiracy to make such statements: Ex parte Wason, 38 L. J. Q. B. 302. In England, the corresponding statute 22-23 Vic., is amended by secs. 1 and 2 of 30-31 Vic., ch. 35, which provide for the payment of the costs of the accused by the prosecutor, in certain cases where the accused is acquitted by the grand jury, and extend the provisions of the first Act by enacting that it will be sufficient, for the purposes of the act, if the offence charged in the indictment is substantially the same as the one gone into before the magistrates, though not in the same form. Of course, this amendment is not law in Canada; but, it is as well not to lose sight of it in reference to the cases decided in England on the "Vexatious Indictments Act" since 1867. See Reg. v. Bell, 12 Cox, 37. ON TRAVERSE AND POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL. Sec. 30.-No person prosecuted shall be entitled as of right to traverse or postpone the trial of any indictment preferred against him in any court, or to imparl or to have time allowed him to plead or demur to any such indictment: provided always that if the court, before which any person is so indicted, upon the application of such person, or otherwise, is of opinion that he ought to be allowed a further time to plead or demur or to prepare for his defence, or otherwise, such court may grant such further time to plead or demur, or may adjourn the receiving or taking of the plea or demurrer, and the trial or (as the case may be) the trial of such person to some future time of the sittings of the court, or to the next or any subsequent session or sittings of the court, and upon such terms as to bail or otherwise, as to the court seems meet, and may, in the case of adjournment to another session or sitting, respite the recognizances of the prosecutor and wit nesses accordingly, in which case the prosecutor and witnesses shall be bound to attend to prosecute and give evidence at such subsequent session or sittings, without entering into any fresh recognizances for that purpose. Formerly, it was always the practice in felonies to try the defendant at the same assizes: 1 Chitty, C. L. 483, but it was not customary nor agreeable to the general course of proceedings, unless by consent of the parties, or where the defendant was in gaol, to try persons indicted for misdemeanors during the same term in which they had pleaded not guilty or traversed the indictment: 4 Blackstone, 351. Traverse took its name from the French de travers, which is no other than de transverso in Latin signifying on the other side; because as the indictment on the one side chargeth the party, so he, on the other side, cometh in to discharge himself: Lambard, 540. The word traverse is only applied to an issue taken an indictment for a misdemeanor; and it upon L should rather seem applicable to the fact of putting off the trial till a following sessions or assizes, than to the joining of the issue; and, therefore, perhaps, the derivation is from the meaning of the word transverto, which, in barbarous Latin, is to go over, i.e., to go from one sessions, &c., to another, and thus it is that the officer of the court asks the party whether he be ready to try then, or will traverse over to the next sessions, &c., but the issue is joined immediately by pleading not guilty: 5 Burn's Justice, 1019. To traverse properly signifies the general issue or plea of not guilty: 4 Stephen's Comm., 419. To imparl is to have licence to settle a litigation amicably, to obtain delay for adjustment: Wharton's Law Lexicon, verb. " imparl." The above section of our Procedure Act is taken from the 60 Geo. III. & 1 Geo. IV,, ch. 4, secs. 1 and 2, and the 14-15 Vic., ch, 100, sec. 27, and abolishes all these distinctions in the practice between felonies and misdemeanors. On the 14-15 Vic., ch. 100, sec. 27, Greaves says:"This section is intended wholly to do away with traverses, which were found to occasion much injustice. A malicious prosecutor could formerly get a bill for any frivolous assault found by the grand jury, and cause the defendant to be apprehended during the sitting of the Court; and then he was obliged to traverse till the next session or assizes, as he could not compel the prosecutor to try the case at the sessions or assizes at which the bill was found. This led to the expense of the traverse-book and sundry fees, which operated as a great hardship on the defendant, not unfrequently an innocent person. Again, the defendant, in many instances, has been able to turn his right to traverse into a means of improperly putting the prosecutor to expense and inconvenience. The intention of the section is to abolish traverses altogether, and to put misdemeanors precisely on the same footing in this respect as felonies. In felonies, the prisoner has no right to postpone his trial, but the Court, on proper grounds, will always postpone the trial. Under this section, therefore, no defendant in a case of misdemeanor can insist on postponing his trial; but the Court in any case, upon proper grounds being adduced, not only may, but ought to, order the trial to be postponed. If, therefore, a witness be absent, or ill, or there has not been reasonably sufficient time for the defendant to prepare for his defence, or there exist any other ground for believing that the ends of justice will be better answered by the trial taking place at a future period, the Court would exercise a very sound discretion in postponing the trial accordingly." There are several cases in which, upon a proper application, the Court will put off the trial. And it has been laid down that no crime is so great, and no proceedings so instantaneous, but the trial may be put off, if sufficient reasons are adduced to support the application; but to grant a postponement of a trial on the |