Coe v. Platt. construction of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15, intituled "An Act to amend the Laws relating to Labor in Factories." Having in the earlier sections made several provisions for regulating labor in them, the 21st section enacts that "every fly wheel directly connected with the steam engine or water wheel or other mechanical power, whether in the engine-house or not, and every part of a steam engine and water wheel, and every hoist or teagle, near to which children or young persons are liable to pass or be employed, and all parts of the mill gearing in a factory shall be securely fenced; and every wheel race not otherwise, secured shall be fenced close to the edge of the wheel race; and the said protection to each part shall not be removed while the parts required to be fenced are in motion by the action of the steam engine, water wheel, or other mechanical power for any manufacturing process." Now, there are two objections to the plaintiff's right to maintain this action. First, the statute does not render the leaving mill gearing unfenced an unlawful act generally, but only quoad a particular class of persons, i. e., children and young persons, defined by sect. 73 to mean respectively persons under the age of thirteen years, and between the ages of thirteen and eighteen years, within neither of which is the plaintiff shown to come. Secondly, and it will be more convenient to argue this first, supposing the enactment to be general as to all persons, it does not appear on the face of this declaration that the statute has been violated, for the illegality consists in leaving the mill gearing unfenced while the machinery is in motion for some manufacturing process. Not only does this appear from the language of the section, but it is in accordance with good sense; for if the prohibition were absolute under all circumstances the machinery could not be put in motion with the view of seeing whether it required to be cleaned, repaired, or was in working order, facts which, from its construction, often could not be ascertained with. a fencing concealing its parts. The rule to be observed in the construction of statutes is, to consider the old law, the mischief intended to be prevented, and the remedy meant to be applied to it; Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. 7; and the principle for determining the sufficiency of a declaration framed on a statute is, to see if the matters alleged in it are consistent with any state of facts not within the statute. The Attorney General v. Shillibeer, 3 Exch. 71. Then, with respect to the other point. Not only is this a penal statute, and as such to be construed strictly, but wherever a statute is avowedly passed for the benefit of a particular class of persons, its merely using general words in some part will not extend its operation to all the world. When the legislature enacts or prohibits any thing for the advantage of a person, it impliedly gives him a right of action for any thing done in derogation of that advantage. Bac. Ab. "Statute," K.; 6 Mod. 26-7, per Holt, C. J. Now this present statute, in several sections, viz., sects. 22-25 and 42, points out the remedy when accidents occur in factories, i. c., a report is to be made by an inspector to the secretary of state, who may direct an action to be brought. But the duties of the inspector are limited to children and young persons, and no proceedings can be taken except through him. Sects. 45, 46, 59, 60. Coe v. Platt. Atherton, contra, (having been directed by the court to confine himself to the first point argued.) The meaning of the statute is simply this that the engines of which it speaks must be provided with a secure permanent fencing, for use at all times when fencing is required, i. e., when the machine is in motion for a manufacturing purpose, and the removing which at any other time is no violation of the statute. Now the allegation in this declaration, that the defendants did not keep this machinery securely fenced, must be taken to mean that it was not kept fenced in the manner required by the statute; and, reading the whole count together, it avers, in substance, that the machinery at the time of the accident was in motion by steam power for a manufacturing purpose. Besides, if the defence be that the defendants removed the fence in some exceptional state of things allowed by the statute, they ought to have pleaded specially. PARKE, B. We are all agreed that the first objection insisted on by Mr. Hill must prevail. One of the objections taken by him was, that this statute applies solely to the protection of children and young persons working in factories; that it merely meant to enact a certain protection for their benefit; and that such as they only could sue for any violations of its provisions. On that subject we need not hear Mr. Atherton, because, as at present advised, (although it will not be necessary for us to give an opinion on the point,) we think the meaning of the statute is, that in these factories there shall be on all occasions, a protection for machinery when in motion for the purposes there described; and although the main object of it may have been to secure children and young persons, who, as such, are more liable than others to sustain accidents in the absence of such protection, yet, in order to insure security to them, there is a positive enactment by the statute that the various parts of the machinery contemplated by the act, and which are enumerated in the interpretation clause, sect. 73, i. e., every thing included under the denomination of "mill gearing," shall be securely fenced while in motion for certain purposes; and if any person using reasonable care sustain any injury in consequence of the violation of this enactment, he has a right of action against the owner of the mill. We think that duty is clearly imposed on the owner, although the motive of the legislature in the enactment was the protection of little children and young persons employed in these factories; and if there even were a factory without such being employed in it, (a thing which practically never takes place,) still the same obligation is imposed by this statute. The only question, however, which we have to decide is, whether, taking for granted that the defendants, being owners of such a factory, are bound to keep every part of the mill gearing while in operation securely fenced, a violation of that duty is sufficiently stated on the face of this declaration. Now the 21st section of the act requires that "every fly wheel directly connected with the steam engine or water wheel or other mechanical power, whether in the engine-house or not, and every part of a steam engine and water wheel, and every hoist or teagle, near to which children or young persons are liable to Coe v. Platt. pass or be employed," (that qualifies only the last expression,) "and all parts of the mill gearing in a factory shall be securely fenced." It then goes on," And the said protection," i. e., fencing, "to each part shall not be removed while parts required to be fenced are in motion by the action of the steam engine, water wheel, or other mechanical power for any manufacturing process." That, I think, means that the owner shall keep those things securely fenced by some contrivance, permanent or temporary, while the steam engine or other power which moves the mill is being used for any manufacturing purpose. But that does not apply to cases when it is used for other purposes; as, for instance, when put in motion to ascertain if the machinery is out of repair, &c.; and the question is, therefore, reduced to this: Does this declaration show that this mill gearing was not fenced at a time when it was propelled by steam, and in motion for a manufacturing purpose? If you look at the declaration you will find no such averment, or any thing equivalent to it. It begins by stating there was a building in the joint occupation of the defendants, "in which said building steam power was used to work machinery employed in manufacturing cotton," thus bringing this mill within the description of the term "factory," in the interpretation clause, by showing that it was a cotton mill, "in part of which said building there was before and at the time, &c., a certain mill gearing, being a shaft, which before and at the time, &c., was worked and put in motion by the said steam power." It is not averred that the shaft here spoken of was put in motion by steam power to carry on any process for the manufacture of cotton; "and which said part of the said building was not before or at the time, &c., used solely for the purpose of a dwelling-house, &c.," i. e., in order to exclude the exception in the interpretation clause. It then goes on to aver that the plaintiff was lawfully in the mill, and the breach of duty charged is, that on the occasion in question, while the mill gearing was in motion, not stated for any manufacturing purpose, "the shaft was not securely fenced, contrary to the form of the statute, &c." That is the only breach of duty relied on; and the declaration, therefore, does not state the violation of duty contemplated in the statute, namely, that the machinery was left unfenced while in use for a manufacturing purpose. The plaintiff has, however, lost nothing by any supposed defect in the declaration, for on the facts, as they appeared in evidence at the trial, when this unfortunate child received the injuries complained of, the mill was not in use for any manufacturing purpose. I am sorry for it, but we must do our duty; and as we cannot say that the defendants have violated the statute, the judgment must be arrested. ALDERSON, B. I am of the same opinion, and am sorry it must be so. But my regret is the less, because the objection taken goes to the action itself; for it goes to show that, in point of law, the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action, and, therefore, does not fail through any defect in the declaration, seeing that the facts would not warrant her in making the averment which the court thinks necessary to render the declaration good. It is an objection on the merits, and I am Coc v. Platt. glad for the plaintiff's sake that it has been taken in such a form as not to fix her with costs. I was at first disposed to think that the latter words of this 21st section might be got over and read as a mere description of the mechanical power used-not to be taken as descriptive of machinery being in motion for a manufacturing purpose, but of machinery put in motion by the action of a power ordinarily used for manufacturing purposes. But that construction cannot be supported, for in the 20th section, the legislature, speaking of selfacting machines, enacts that "no child or young person shall be allowed to clean any part of the mill gearing in a factory while the same is in motion, for the purpose of propelling any part of the manufacturing machinery; and no child or young person shall be allowed to work between the fixed and traversing part of any self-acting machine while the latter is in motion by the action of the steam engine, water wheel, or other mechanical power." Here the legislature use the latter words alone, whereas the 21st section subjoins "for any manufacturing process," clearly pointing out that the words "for any manufacturing process" are applied to machinery in motion for any manufacturing purpose. I cannot find that this machinery was, at the time of the accident, in motion for any such a purpose, it only appears that the mill was ordinarily used for such, and even supposing that the mill gearing was put in motion by a steam engine, which was usually in motion for a manufacturing process, it does not at all follow that it was in motion at that time for that purpose. There is no such averment in the declaration, and the facts would not warrant it if there were. - PLATT, B. The 21st section appears to me clearly to apply to a general duty in the owner of the building as regards that portion of mankind who may be brought to factories for the purpose of being employed there. The language is very remarkable; for if the part of the section in question is to be understood as limited to the mere duty of manufacturers with respect to young persons and children, why should not the same words be introduced following the mill gearing as are used in the next previous portion of the section? Its language is, "every hoist or teagle," qualified by the words, "near to which children or young persons are liable to pass or be employed;" and it then goes on to say, "all the parts of the mill gearing shall be securely fenced." It therefore seems to me that that portion of the section was advisedly couched in this form in order to point to a distinction between those two things. Now the duty imposed is to fence; but it is not limited to that, for the fencing is to be kept unremoved. That must surely be during the time the machinery is in motion in the course of manufacturing; for suppose the section had been that the fencing was to remain unremoved during the action of the steam engine, and not limited to those occasions, it never could be moved unless a fence were upon it. That could not be contemplated, and consequently the words "for any manufacturing process" do not apply as descriptive of a mechanical power, but of the time during which the fence is to be retained. By no interpretation, therefore, Williams v. The Chester and Holyhead Railway Company. can it be said that this shaft was improperly left unfenced; and that being the case, the defendants have been guilty of no breach of duty whatever. PARKE, B. This enactment, I take it, applies to all factories, for it is well known that there is no factory in which young persons or children are not employed. If this be not so, there would be an objection to the declaration on another ground, namely, that it contains no averment that young persons or children were employed in this building. There can be no doubt that the intention of the legislature was to protect them. PLATT, B. That is quite clear from the 32d section, which enacts that "no female above the age of eighteen years shall be employed in any factory save for the time and in the same manner as young persons may be employed in factories." This section evidently contemplates the employment of females of any age. ALDERSON, B. I said nothing on the first point stated by Mr. Hill, and merely agree with the rest of the court, that there must be judg ment for the defendants on this declaration. Rule absolute to arrest the judgment. WILLIAMS V. THE CHESTER AND HOLYHEAD RAILWAY COMPANY.1 Trinity Term, July 10, 1851. Contracts with public Companies. Persons dealing with railway or other similar companies should always bear in mind that such companies are essentially different from an ordinary partnership or firm, for all purposes of contracts, and especially in respect of evidence against them on legal trials; and should insist upon all contracts with them being by deed under the seal of the company, or signed by directors, or otherwise executed in the manner prescribed by the act of Parliament regulating the company - there is no safety or security for any one dealing with such a body upon any other footing. The same observation also applies in respect of any variation or alteration in a contract which has been made. The secretary of such a company has, of himself, no independent authority to bind the company by letters or documents signed by him. THIS was a special case, which was argued during the term by Phipson, for the plaintiff; and Bros, for the defendants. Its nature, and the important principle involved in it, fully appear 1 15 Jur. 828. |