Clarendon & others v. The Rector, &c., of St. James's, Westminster. In Purvis v. Traill, the meaning of the decision seems to be that the poor rates are not to be deprived of contributions when the premises are occupied for purposes which pervert the intention of the legislature. JERVIS, C. J. I trust that this society may long flourish and be able to pay its poor rates. I am of opinion that the respondents are entitled to the judgment of the court. The case is governed by express authority. The question is, whether the society rated is within the act of Parliament. Whatever we might be inclined to think as to the question whether this is a society supported by voluntary contributions, we seem to be concluded by the Birmingham Case, the decision of which was adopted in the Manchester Case, that an association like this, to which the members contributed an annual subscription, is within the statute. It is better to decide according to those authorities than to speculate as to the construction of the act. With respect to the second point, the case comes within the authority of Purvis v. Traill, where Parke, B., said that the occupation must be exclusively for the purposes or business of the society. We are met, therefore, by authority on both points, and it would be sufficient to stop there but for the question of amendment. Now, we are not entitled to examine into the objects of the occupying societies. The whole of the house must be taken to be occupied by the London Library, and they must make out their exemption. In order to claim the exemption, they must occupy the premises for the transaction of the business of that society which is liable as occupying. It is urged that this is a hardship on the society; but the answer is, that if they wish to be exempt, they should leave unoccupied that part which they now let, or get more rent for it, so as to cover the rates. CRESSWELL, J. I also think that the respondents are entitled to judgment. According to the decided cases, this is a society established for the purposes of literature, and supported, in part at least, by annual voluntary contributions. But it appears that the society occupies a house, a portion of which is occupied by other societies. It may be that those are societies for literary or scientific purposes, but the purposes of those societies are not the purposes of this one. WILLIAMS, J. I am of the same opinion. It appears the appellants claim exemption from the rates on the ground that they are a society established for literary purposes under the statute. Assuming that they are so, it remains to be inquired whether the premises are occupied for the transaction of the business of the society. The facts show that they do not occupy solely for that purpose. The case in the 3 Exch. Rep., appears to be completely in point; but this case does not want any authority for its decision. TALFOURD, J. I am entirely of the same opinion. Whatever might have been my opinion as to this society being within the act, I feel myself bound by the authorities. Therefore, the appellants have ful Cross v. Seaman. filled the first condition for claiming exemption, but have failed in fulfilling the second. We must take the case as if the other societies occupied, not for the transaction of the business of this society, but for the purpose of gaining it the rent. Decision for the respondents. Channell, Serj., prayed for a decision as to the costs. The Court of Queen's Bench has, in such cases, given full costs, to be taxed by the officer. Coleridge, J., said, in a case in that court, that they should be indemnifying costs. JERVIS, C. J. Let the officer inquire in the other courts, as it is important to have conformity in the practice. There will also be judgment to amend the rate. Judgment accordingly. CROSS V. SEAMAN.1 Easter Term, May 2, 1851. Costs Suggestion- London County Court Act, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 71, Claim for more than 201. ·Tender to Part duced under 201. s. 115. Verdict re The London Small Debts Act, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 71, s. 113, deprives the plaintiff of costs where he does not recover more than 20l.: Held, not to deprive the plaintiff of costs where the verdict is reduced to a sum under 201. only by a tender, but which, with the amount tendered, is not less than 201. In this action, which was tried, before Maule, J., at the London sittings, in Easter term, 1851, the plaintiff claimed 261. The defendant pleaded as to 7l. 15s. a tender of that amount, and other pleas as to the rest. The plaintiff had a verdict for 181. 6s. Brewer now moved for a rule to enter a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of his costs under the city of London County Court Act, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 71, s. 115. [Jervis, C. J. This is an action to recover 181. 6s., plus 7l. 15s., and is like the case of Turner v. Berry, 1 L. M. & P. 744; s. c. 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 89; 1 Eng. Rep. 501. Cresswell, J. Could not the plaintiff sue for the whole 267., though there had been a tender of part? Was he not entitled to recover 261. ?]. He cannot be said to have been entitled to recover 261. If the whole sum of 261. had been tendered, he could not have succeeded in the action at all. JERVIS, C. J. A verdict has been found for the plaintiff for less 1 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) C. P. 177. 15 Jur. 512. Doe d. Richards v. Lewis, and Richards v. Lewis. than 20., but this action is not one in which a plaint might have been brought in the county court. If the plaintiff had abandoned all his claim but 201., the defendant might have applied his tender to a portion of that amount. I think, therefore, the rule ought to be refused. Rule refused. DOE d. RICHARDS v. LEWIS, and RICHARDS v. LEWIS.1 Deed-Voluntary Conveyance-27 Eliz. c. 4- Search - Declarations of Contents - Fraud. A deed executed by S., in contemplation of marriage, without the knowledge of the future husband, by which S. gave herself an estate for life in certain leaseholds, with remainder to R. M., a son by a former marriage, and remainder over to an illegitimate son, is not avoided by the marriage, under the 27 Eliz. c. 4, the husband not taking as a purchaser. Quare, whether the deed would have been bad, if it had been found as a fact that it was intended as a fraud upon the marital rights of the husband. The deed was delivered to T., with instructions not to give it up to any one but S. and R. M. together, and it was given up by T. to S. and R. M. many years after. P. and B. were the trustees named in it. At S.'s death the deed was not found on her premises, but no proper search in the repositories of the trustees was proved : Held, that the deed was intended to be operative, but that the search was insufficient to let in secondary evidence: Held, also, that declarations made by S. as to the contents of the deed were not admissible as cutting down her title: Held, also, that a voluntary deed, not actually fraudulent, by which husband and wife settled the wife's chattel interest on R. M., is not avoided, under the 27 Eliz. c. 4, by a mortgage made by the widow surviving her husband, - commenting on Burrel's Case, 6 Rep. 72. THESE were two actions brought to try the title to certain leasehold property in Glamorganshire. The first was an action of ejectment, tried at the Monmouthshire Spring assizes, 1851, before Talfourd, J., in which there was a verdict for the lessor of the plaintiff, with leave for the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for the defendant. The second case was an action of detinue for deeds relating to the same property, and was tried, at the Glamorganshire Spring assizes, 1851, held at Swansea, before Williams, J., and in this action, also, the plaintiff had a verdict. The following facts, among others, were established by evidence at the trials: The property in question was the remainder of a term bequeathed by Mr. Joseph to his wife Catherine at his decease, in 1826. Catherine Joseph had previously been married to a person named Morgan, by whom she had a son named Rhys Morgan. She had also had an illegitimate son, named Llewellyn Jenkins, before her marriage with Morgan. 1 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) C. P. 177. 15 Jur. 512. Doe d. Richards v. Lewis, and Richards v. Lewis. In the month of May, 1829, after the decease of Mr. Joseph, Catherine, his widow, in contemplation of marriage with the Rev. D. Saunders, went, without his knowledge, from Merthyr Tydvil, where she resided, to a Mr. Williams, an attorney at Swansea, and there executed a deed, by which she conveyed the property to Rhys Morgan for life, with remainder over to Llewellyn Jenkins. Mrs. Joseph delivered the deed to Mr. Thomas, with instructions to give it up only to herself and Rhys Morgan together, and she married Saunders a few days afterwards, but he never was aware of the existence of the deed. On the 20th of March, 1837, Mr. Saunders and his wife made a settlement, by which the residue of the terms was conveyed to Howard in trust for Saunders and his wife and the survivor for life, with remainder for Rhys Morgan absolutely. By a deed of the 4th of November. 1837. Rhys Morgan directed Howard to stand possessed of the leaseholds in trust for himself for life, with remainder unto Emma, his wife; and in case Morgan should leave his wife surviving without issue, (which events happened,) the trustee was to assign to such persons as Emma should by deed appoint. In March, 1841, Rhys Morgan died, and in the same year his widow, Emma, married T. Richards, the lessor of the plaintiff in the ejectment, and plaintiff in the action of detinue. On the 18th of December, 1840, Catherine Saunders mortgaged the premises to the defendant Lewis. By her will, Mrs. Saunders left her real and personal property in equal moieties to her son Llewellyn Jenkins and to Rees Williams, and they, by a deed of the 22d of July, 1843, assigned the premises in question to the defendant Lewis. Mrs. Saunders died in May, 1841. At the trial of the ejectment, Mrs. Williams was called to prove that she had some conversation with Mrs. Saunders about going to Swansea before her marriage to execute the deed. The evidence was objected to, but admitted by the learned judge, and the witness stated that Mrs. Saunders had told her that she had been to Swansea settling with her son Rhys Morgan, and showed something like a deed with two seals. Mr. Thomas was examined as a witness, and said that he had had the deed of 1829 in his possession from 1829 to 1841, when he gave it up to Mr. Saunders in the presence of Rhys Morgan. No trace of the deed was discovered, though the premises of Mrs. Saunders were duly searched for it. It appeared that Mr. Rees Williams and Mr. Bruce Pryce were the trustees named in the deed of 1829. Mr. Pryce stated that he had never heard of the deed till a short time before the trial, but no sufficient search was shown on the premises of the other trustee who was dead. The draft of the deed, which was found in the office of Williams the attorney at Swansea, was offered in evidence, but withdrawn. At the trial of the action of detinue, the declarations of Mrs. Saunders to Mrs. Williams were offered in evidence for the defendant, but the learned judge rejected them as not being declarations cutting Doe d. Richards v. Lewis, and Richards v. Lewis. down Mr. Saunders's title. Mrs. Williams, however, proved the existence of the deed. Mr. Thomas proved giving it back to Mrs. Saunders, and that Bruce Pryce and Rees Williams were the trustees. A sufficient search in the house of Mrs. Saunders was proved. Bruce Pryce stated that he had never heard of the deed till a short time before the trial. It was shown that Rees Williams, the other trustee, was dead; and a son of his was called, but as he was not executor of his father, and had not lived with him in his latter years, the learned judge refused to take his evidence, and declared himself not satisfied as to the searches. He, however, proceeded to take secondary evidence of the deed, to be used in case it should be held that he was wrong in holding the searches to be insufficient. The draft of the deed found in the office of Williams, the attorney at Swansea, was produced and proved to be in the handwriting of a person who was in the habit of drawing drafts for Williams. learned judge refused to admit it. The The attorney's bill book was produced, and there was found in it an entry of the charges for drawing the deed and for attending at the execution of it. The handwriting of the receipt at the foot of the bill was proved to be that of the attorney. The learned judge admitted that evidence. Keating (April 23, 1851) obtained a rule nisi in the ejectment case, calling on the lessor of the plaintiff to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a nonsuit or verdict for the defendant entered, and a similar rule nisi in the action of detinue or for a new trial. An affidavit was made on behalf of the defendant, by his attorney, to the effect that the fact of the deed of 1829 having been made had only come to his knowledge a few days before the trial, and that he was not aware who were the trustees under that deed till the assizes had commenced, and that he was taken by surprise on finding the necessity for proving the search. The court directed that both rules should be argued before they gave judgment. Alexander and J. Gray (May 9) showed cause for the lessor of the plaintiff in the ejectment. The deed of 1829 was a voluntary conveyance, and a fraud upon the marital rights of Saunders, and he was a purchaser, against whom such conveyance was void. The circumstances of the case show also that it was never intended to operate as a deed. In consequence of the marriage, after the making of the deed, nothing passed by it, and, moreover, it was never delivered at all. Then the deed of 1837 was not a voluntary deed under the 27 Eliz. c. 4. In the first place, the deed of 1829 having been executed before and in contemplation of marriage, and without the privity of the husband, was void as against him. The authorities establishing this point, of which the chief one is Howard v. Hooker, 2 Rep. Ch. 81, are collected in Powell on Mortgages, p. 719. [Talfourd, J. Is there any case in which such a deed has been held void at law?] |