Acraman & another v. Herniman. officer acting as clerk of the dockets and judgments in the Court of Queen's Bench, but no affidavit of the time of the execution of such warrant of attorney or other affidavit was filed together with such copy, or at any other time. The instalment of 75l., stipulated to be paid on the 4th of May following, not having been paid, execution issued on the said judgment on the 11th of May, and the goods and chattels of the bankrupt, being the goods and chattels in the declaration mentioned, were seized and detained under such execution until the 15th of May, when they were sold under the execution, and realized, after deducting expenses, the sum of 1201. 4s. 6d. On the 25th of May, 1850, the bankrupt committed an act of bankruptcy, and on the 27th of the same month, a petition in bankruptcy was duly filed against him, under which the plaintiffs became the assignees. The plaintiffs contended that the above warrant of attorney, by reason of the omission to file an affidavit of the time of the execution, together with the copy of the warrant of attorney, was void. and could not sustain the judgment and execution by virtue of the 136th section of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, which statute refers to the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, s. 1. If the court should be of opinion that the objection to the warrant of attorney above referred to was valid, then judgment was to be entered for the plaintiffs for 1201. 4s. 6d., by confession; but if the court should be of a contrary opinion, then judgment of nolle prosequi was to be entered, or otherwise, as the court might think fit. pro Montague Smith, for the plaintiffs. Under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 136, this warrant of attorney is null and void, because no affidavit of the time of its execution was filed. That section requires the warrant of attorney to be filed within twenty-one days, in manner and form vided by the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, and that act expressly requires an affidavit of the time of the execution as a part of the filing. Dillon v. Edwards, 2 Moo. & P. 550; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. C. P. 110. But it will be said that, because judgment was signed within twenty-one days, the warrant of attorney is rendered valid according to the 3 Geo. 4. c. 39, s. 2. The 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 136, however, does not introduce any such qualification, but avoids the security absolutely if it be not properly filed within twenty-one days. Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. Rep. 178; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 217, and Bryan v. Child, 5 Exch. Rep. 368; s. c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 264, were referred to Barstow, contra. There is no intention in the recent act to alter the existing law as enacted by the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, and therefore, if judgment be signed upon a warrant of attorney within twenty-one days, it supplies the place of filing. Green v. Wood. If a creditor signs judgment and issues execution within the twenty-one days, he ceases to be a creditor, and cannot afterwards be required to file an affidavit of the execution of the warrant of attorney. It is quite plain that sect. 136 of the Bankrupt Consolidation Act is dealing only with unregistered warrants of attorney, upon which no judgment has been Acraman & another v. Herniman. entered up. The words "in manner and form" take in the whole mode of proceeding under 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, which is not repealed. It is plain that the words of the recent act cannot be taken literally, otherwise it would be sufficient to file a copy in any case. The Irish Bankrupt Act, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 107, s. 111, which is part of the same legislation, provides that all pleas of confession, cognovit actionem, &c., which are put on the same footing as warrants of attorney, are to be deemed void, unless filed within twenty-one days from the execution thereof, or unless within the said twenty-one days judgment shall have been entered therein. That clause shows that the meaning of the legisla ture in sect. 136, of the present act, was to render the warrant of attorney valid if judgment has been signed within twenty-one days. [Erle, J. In Ireland there is a special office for registering the judgments, which there is not in England, and the act you refer to speaks of a judgment duly registered in that office.] It is plain that this warrant of attorney would be valid against the assignees of an insolvent under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, s. 20, and it would be an absurdity to hold that there is any difference in this respect, whether the party is a bankrupt or an insolvent. M. Smith was not called upon to reply. LORD CAMPBELL. The language of this enactment is very plain, and we cannot put any forced construction upon it. The legislature has said that where a warrant of attorney, or a true copy thereof, has not been filed with the officer acting as clerk of the dockets and judgments in the Court of Queen's Bench within twenty-one days next after the execution thereof, in manner and form provided by the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, every such warrant of attorney shall be deemed fraudulent, null, and void to all intents and purposes. Now, the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, requires that the warrant of attorney shall, within twenty-one days after the execution thereof, be filed, together with an affidavit of the time of the execution thereof, with the clerk of the dockets and judgments in this court. Here we have judgment signed within twenty-one days on a warrant of attorney given by a trader, but no affidavit of the time of its execution has ever been filed. According to the literal words it is, therefore, to be deemed fraudulent and void. Mr. Barstow relies on the words "in manner and form provided by the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39." as incorporating the whole of the provisions of that statute. But I think they refer only to the mode in which the act is to be done, viz., that the warrant of attorney is to be filed, together with an affidavit of the time of its execution; they do not refer to any other act to be done, which signing judgment is. Then, we are asked to import an exception into the words of this clause, because the object of the legislature will be as well carried out by making the signing judgment equivalent to filing the instrument. But I see no reason for making the exception, and the creditor may easily file his warrant of attorney when he signs judgment. PATTESON, J. The words of the 12 & 13 Vict, c. 106, s. 136, are so Phillips v. Higgins. clear and stringent, that in respect of transactions with a bankrupt, if a warrant of attorney is not filed within twenty-one days, the judg ment and execution cannot be supported. Therefore the question is, whether there has been a filing in this case, where no affidavit of the time of the execution of the warrant of attorney has been filed. Such an affidavit is really of importance, for if it be not filed it is impossible for any body searching for judgments to find out whether the warrant of attorney was filed within due time or not. How far a filing after judgment signed, and within the twenty-one days, would be sufficient, it is not necessary for us to say, because here there has been no filing at all. WIGHTMAN, J. The effect of the defendant's argument would be to defeat the beneficial object of the clause, the meaning of which is clear, and the words of which are very strong. ERLE, J. The 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, says, that the filing is to be accompanied by proof that the instrument was filed within twenty-one days. The New Bankrupt Act says, that the filing is to be in manner and form provided by the 3 Geo. 4, c. 39, that is, accompanied by proof of its being filed within the twenty-one days, but it does not incorporate the alternative of judgment being signed within the twentyone days. The Irish act most strongly confirms this view, because the words used there are very different, showing that the question was not absent from the mind of the legislature, and that a different provision in this respect was intended for the two countries. In England, signing judgment within twenty-one days is to be no longer of avail; but in Ireland, if the judgment is within twenty-one days registered in a special office, it may supply the want of filing. The existence of such a special office affords good reason for the distinction. Judgment for the plaintiffs. Arbitration PHILLIPS V. HIGGINS.1 Bail Court, Easter Vacation, May 12, 1851. Award- Finding on all the Issues - Reciting Clause in Submission, no objection to be made for want of Stamp. An action of assumpsit was referred, the costs to abide the event of the award. The declaration contained two counts. There were several pleas to the first count, one of which set up that a new agreement was substituted for the agreement in the declaration. There were also pleas to the second count. The award was that "the plaintiff had a good cause of action against the defendant, as stated in the declaration," and then assessed damages to the plaintiff: Held, that the award sufficiently decided all the issues in favor of the plaintiff. 1 20 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 357. Phillips v. Higgins. It is no objection to an award that it recites a clause in the submission which provides that documents shall be admitted in evidence without a stamp, it not appearing that the arbitrator admitted in evidence any unstamped documents. THIS was a rule calling on the defendant to pay two sums of 2201. and 51., pursuant to a rule of court, the master's allocatur thereon, and an award between the parties. The action was in assumpsit. The declaration contained two counts one alleging a breach of the defendant's promise to procure sufficient security for money lent by the plaintiff at defendant's request to a third party; the other alleging a breach of the defendant's promise that certain indentures given as a security for such a loan were a sufficient security. Pleas First, non assumpsit to the whole declaration; second, to the first count, that the defendant did produce sufficient security; third, to the first count, a rescinding of the agreement by consent before breach; fourth, to the first count, that another agreement which it set out was substituted by consent. The fifth and sixth pleas were to the second count, and were traverses of allegations in the second count. Issues were joined on these pleas before the order of reference was made. By a judge's order, made on the 27th of July, 1849, it was by consent ordered that "all matters in difference in this cause " should be referred to arbitration; that "the costs of the cause and of the reference and award shall abide the event of the said award," and "that all letters written to or for or by or on behalf of either party upon the subject matter of and relating to this action, and all deeds or documents signed by them or either of them, or forming part of the assurance, shall be admitted as evidence without reference to or requiring stamps." The award, after reciting the submission, and setting out the lastmentioned clause of the submission in full, proceeded thus: "I, &c., having examined upon oath all such witnesses as were produced before me by the said parties respectively, and having read all the letters and documents produced before me by or on behalf of the said parties, &c., do award, find, and adjudge that the said Walter Phillips had good cause of action against the said William Higgins, as stated in the declaration of the said action so referred to me as aforesaid, and I assess and award the damages to be paid by the said defendant to the said plaintiff on the said action at the sum of 2007. Skinner showed cause. First, the clause in the submission that unstamped documents shall be received in evidence, is illegal and void as contrary to public policy. It is recited in the award, and the award, therefore, is void also. It must be presumed that the arbitrator acted upon it. The award recites that he read the letters and documents put in evidence. Secondly, the award does not sufficiently decide all the issues. The award says that the plaintiff had a good cause of action against the defendant. It does not say when. It Phillips v. Higgins. may be before the time when the substituted agreement, as mentioned in the fourth plea, was entered into. [Wightman, J. Surely the award must be held to mean that the plaintiff had good cause of action at the time of action brought.] The costs of the action, reference, and award are to abide the event. It is necessary, therefore, that each issue be, if not specifically, at least substantially decided. Here the award simply is, that the plaintiff has a good cause of action against the defendant. That is in effect an award that on one or other of the counts the plaintiff has a good cause of action, it is uncertain on which. It is, therefore, uncertain how the issues have been decided. The reference of a " cause," and of "all matters in the cause," amounts to the same thing. Hobson v. Stewart, 4 Dowl. & L. P. C. 589; s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 145. The cases show that the award is insufficient. Bourke v. Lloyd, 10 Mee. & W. 550; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 4. Pearson v. Archbold, 11 Id. 477; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 308. Kilburn v. Kilburn, 13 Mee. & W. 671; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 160. Stonehewer v. Farrar, 6 Q. B. Rep. 730; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Q. B. 122. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 4 Exch. Rep. 500; s. c. 19 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Exch. 27. Creswick v. Harrison, 1 L. M. & P. 721; s. c. 1 Eng. Rep. 384. If the award is doubtful, the court will refuse the rule. W. H. Cooke, (T. Jones with him,) in support of the rule as to the second point. The award is sufficient. The true rule is laid down in Wilcox v. Wilcox, by Parke, B. A verdict for the plaintiff means on all the issues for which a jury can find for the plaintiff. The award that the plaintiff has good cause of action against the defendant, as stated in the declaration, must mean an award in the plaintiff's favor on both counts. There has been no difficulty felt here. The master has taxed the costs. (He was here stopped by the court.) case. WIGHTMAN, J. I do not entertain any reasonable doubt in this Two objections have been made. One, that the recital in the award of the clause of the submission respecting the admission in evidence of unstamped documents renders the award void. Assuming that the objection to that clause of the submission be good, there is here no ground for the making any objection to the award on this account, as it does not appear that any unstamped document was admitted in evidence. The second objection is, that the award does not decide the issues in the action. When the costs of the action are to abide the event of the award, it is no doubt the duty of the arbitrator to determine on each issue. But there are several cases which determine that it is not necessary for an arbitrator to award specifically on each issue, if the award, by necessary intendment, decides on each issue. The question then here is, whether by necessary intendment the arbitrator has not found on all the issues in favor of the plaintiff. If the arbitrator had awarded simply that the plaintiff had a good cause of action against the defendant, it might |