But denial to a creditor calling on Sunday for payment by the debtor's appointment was not deemed an act of bankruptcy under the old law (p).

If a person is illegally in custody under a process executed on a Sunday, it seems that he will, in general, be discharged (q). But, at one time, the Courts did not afford this summary relief, but left the party to his action for false imprisonment (r); and we have seen, that attachments have been granted for arresting a person on Sunday (s).

Thus far of the statute 29 Car. II.

However, Sunday is to be taken into consideration with reference to legal proceedings, independently of that statute.* The calculation of day rules throughout the progress of a suit at law affords an ample illustration of this observation, or, to use the words of the Court, "We reckon [holidays and Sundays] not juridici as to matters to be transacted in Court, and therefore Sundays and holidays are no days to move in arrest of judgment. But as to business done out of Court, as rules to plead within four days, &c., Sundays are reckoned the same with the other days," except the first or last day happen on a Sunday (t). And the distinction is between cases where the defendant or other party must have done something on the Sunday, if the Sunday has been allowed to count, and those where the Sunday is reckoned silently with other days, no business or act being required on that day. So that if the defendant even appeared to an original writ dated on Sunday, the irregularity would not be helped (u).

(p) 2 Rosc. 21, Ex parte Preston. S. C. 2 Ves. & B. 311.

(q) 1 Antr. 85, Lyford v. Tyrrell. 2 H. Bl. 29, Loveridge v. Plaistow. 5 T. R. 25, Atkinson v. Jameson. 8 B. & C. 769, Wells v. Gurney. (r) 5 Mod. 95, Wilson v. Guttery, 6 Mod. 96, Lidford v. Thomas. (s) Ante, p. 82.

As under the old law of recovery, where the writ of summons to warranty was returnable on Sunday, and the vouchee died on that day, the recovery was held void. 6 Bro. P. Č. 333, Broome v. Swan, (in error). 3 Burr. 1595, Swan v. Broome. 1 Sir Wm. Bl. 496. 526, S. C.

(t) 2 Salk. 625.

(u) 1 Ventr. 7, in Vaughan v. Loyd.

It was indeed held, in Lord Coningsby's case, that in the case of a rule on Thursday to plead in four days, a plea filed in the office on the following Tuesday should be received, Sunday being excluded (v); but this case is not sanctioned by subsequent practice and authorities (w).

So, as the matter is one which must be transacted in Court, a motion in arrest of judgment is allowed to exclude the Sunday. The defendant has four juridical days (x).

Thus in an action on the case brought against the custos brevium, the declaration was delivered on Friday morning, and rules given to plead within four days, whereas holidays and Sundays were not juridical days, but the Court considered that the Sunday should be counted (y).

So in the case of a bail bond, where the writ was returnable on the 30th of January, and a Sunday intervened between that day and the end of the four days: in such a case the bail bond was held to have been well assigned on the 4th of February (2). Whereas had the 4th of February been Sunday, the bond would not have been assignable until the Monday (a). So a plea in abatement was received on the fifth day, because the fourth day happened to be Sunday (b). Lord Coningsby's case, therefore, cited above, seems scarcely to be supported. If the offices of the Court are open, as on the 2nd of February, a rule to plead or other rule may take effect (c); but on Sunday the offices are not open, it not being a day of business (d). Therefore, the expiry of time on a Sunday

v) 8 Mod. 46; and also in West v. West, 1 Lord Raym. 674.

(w) See post.

(x) 2 Saĺk. 625, Hales v. Owen. 13 East, 21, Roberts v. Stacey. 1 Ch. Rep. 562, Bromley v. Foster, and post.

(y) 2 Salk. 624, Ashmole v. Goodwin. Id. 517, Pasmore v. Goodwin.

(2) 1 Str. 86, Anon., i. e. " If the rule be given upon a Sunday it goes for nothing, but if it expires upon a Sunday, the defendant has all the next day to plead in." Ibid. 2 Str. 782, Studley v. Sturt. Id. 924, Bullock v. Lincoln. (a) 2 Str. 782, Studley v. Sturt. S. C. 1 Barnard. K. B. 21. 2 Str. 914, Bullock v. Lincoln. S. P. 2 H. Bl. 617.

(b) 3 T. R. 642, Lee v. Carlton. See 5 T. R. 210, Harbord v. Perigal. (c) 2 H. Bl. 616, Mesure v. Britten.

(d) Id. 617, by the L. C. J.

naturally throws over the matter in question till the next or a subsequent day. But this does not prevent the Sunday from counting silently where nothing is to be done on that day. As where the writ was returnable in eight days from St. Hilary, and the notice was to appear on Sunday the 20th of January, the Court said that the Sunday was the true day of the return, and that it was right (ƒ); and, moreover, where the notice upon a like occasion was for Monday the 21st of January, the Court held it bad, for Sunday was the true day of the return (g). The defendant would not have appeared till Monday, and, therefore, nothing was done on the Sunday. So when Sunday happened to be the quarto die post, the holding of the Term of necessity went over to Monday. And so if Sunday be the essoin day, the time is postponed (h). So where a plea in abatement, as to the jurisdiction, might be pleaded within the first four days inclusive of the subsequent Term, Sunday was ruled to be one of those days (i). It was not the last day, and so fell silently within the rule. So on a clausum fregit, returnable on Sunday the 20th of April, the defendant did not appear on the Wednesday following, and the plaintiff, on Thursday, sued out a distringas: on that day the defendant entered an appearance on Friday the plaintiff's attorney levied 40s. on the goods of the defendant. It was moved that the money should be returned because of Sunday, the defendant having until Thursday to appear. But it was argued that the defendant was bound to appear within four days after the return of the writ, which are inclusive both of the return day and the quarto die post, and that Sunday was to be considered like any other return day. The Court then consulted the secondaries as to the practice, and discharged the rule, being of opinion

(f) 20 Vin. Ab. Jenner v. Oatridge. Beeston.

(Sunday) (C. 4), citing Notes in C. B. 205, Id. C. 5, citing Notes in C. B. 207, Lloyd v.

(g) Id. C. 4, Note in Marg. Beeston.

(h) 2 Salk. 626, per Holt, C. J.

Citing Notes in C. B. 207, Lloyd v.

And this note was

(i) 1 T. R. 278, note, cited in Jennings v. Webb. distinguished in Lee v. Carlton, where it was cited and relied on for the plaintiff, because in Lee v. Carlton the time expired on the Sunday, and thus the defendant had one day more, which was not the case in the note above mentioned.

against the defendant (k). So where a plea was delivered on Saturday, Sunday was reckoned in the computation of the days for pleading (), and in three days' notice of an order for the examination of witnesses de bene esse (m).

So in commercial matters, as in the case of days of demurrage, Sunday is to be calculated in the reckoning, unless there be a custom to the contrary. In the absence of such custom, therefore, running days will include Sundays (n).

So a notice of objection sent by the post under the act for the Registration of Voters (6 Vict. c. 18), and which has been delivered by the post on a Sunday, in the ordinary course, is valid (0). By the same statute (sect. 4), notice of a claim to be inserted in the registration list, must be sent to the overseers on or before the 20th of July, in writing. A notice which reached the officer on the 20th of July, but on a Sunday, was held legal (p). No act was to be done on that day, no process served; there was merely the reception of a letter unconnected with work, and the letter would have lost none of its validity as a notice had it even not been opened on that day.

On the other hand, if any thing is to be done by the defendant or other person which would happen on the Sunday, the Sunday must then be excluded. The defendant has four law days, when the Court is actually sitting, in which to do it (g). As where a party has four days on which he may move to arrest that judgment. These days must be dies juridici, and as he cannot move on a Sunday, that day must be not reckoned (r). So that if the first day were Friday, the defendant would have until the rising of the Court on the ensuing Tuesday. Otherwise there would not be four juridical days. There must be an

interval of four days between the rule to sign judgment and the

(k) 1 H. Bl. 9, Fano v. Cocken.

(1) 6 D. P. C. 125, Shoebridge v. Irwin.

(m) 6 Jur. 454, Mackintosh v. Great Western Railway Company.

(1) Car. & M. 440. 10 Mees. & W. 331, Brown v. Johnson. 2 New

Rep. 267, by Chambre, J.; and see post.

(0) 1 Bar. & Arn. 608. 2 C. B. 60, Colville, App., Lewis, Resp.

(p) 2 C. B. 72. 15 L. J., C. P. 70, Rawlings, App., West Derby, Resp. (q) 3 T. R. 642, per Buller, J.

(r) 2 Salk. 625, Hales v. Owen.

signature of such judgment, because the party should have that time to bring a writ of error if he think fit (s). Consequently, where judgment was given on the 6th and signed on the 11th, and a Sunday intervened, the rule for setting aside the judgment, &c. and for discharging the defendant out of custody was made absolute (t). So, again, the four days must be calculated exclusively of the first and last day of Sunday, and also of Midsummer day (u). So where a plea was demanded on Saturday night at six o'clock, it was impossible for the defendant to file a plea on Sunday, and therefore he had until Monday at six to plead. At two o'clock on Monday he pleaded the general issue, and the Court said he had twenty-four hours clear after the demand of the plea exclusive of Sunday, and they made the rule absolute to set aside the judgment for irregularity (v).

A countermand of notice of trial must not be on Sunday (w).

So, in Chancery, where the eighth day after the service of an order nisi for confirming a report happens to be Sunday, that day is not to be reckoned (x).

So where notice of a motion is to be made on Monday, it was held, that it ought to be served on Friday, inasmuch as for that purpose Sunday is no day (y).

An appointment of overseers on a Sunday has been held good (z). But where collusion was discovered, a mandamus was granted by the Court to set aside such an appointment, and to make a new appointment (a).

(s) 3 Salk. 212.

(t) 13 East, 21, Roberts v. Stacey. Imp. Pr 420.

(u) 1 Ch. Rep. 562, Bromley v. Foster; and sembl. of other dies non.

Marginal Note of Reporter.

(v) 4 T. R. 557, Solomons v. Freeman.

(w) Ca. Pr. C. B. 15, Deighton v. Dalton.

(x) 5 Sim. 565, Milburn v. Lyster.

See

(y) 6 Vin. Ab. Supp., Sunday (B.), Maxwell v. Phillips. Quare, whether an affidavit, which appears by the jurat to have been sworn on a Sunday in Court, is void. 3 Dowl. & L. 328.

Roe.

(2) 1 Bott P. L. 29, R. v. Merchant.

15 L. J., Q. B. 39, Williamson v.

(a) Cowp. 139, R. v. Overseers of Bridgwater. S. C. Lofft, 618.