cluded, and the other excluded, and the appeal would have been in time (v).

The Poor Law Act, 4 & 5 Wm. IV. c. 76, s. 81, has the words "fourteen days at least" in a clause which requires a statement of the grounds of appeal to be given under such a limitation. Here, again, the Court laid down the rule, that where an act is required to be done before a given event so many days" at least," both the day of the act and of the event must be excluded; and they applied the rule to the case then before them. So that the fourteen days were construed to mean fourteen clear days, and thus exclusive both of the day on which the statement was sent and the first day of the sessions. So that where the grounds of appeal were served on the 19th of December, 1836, and the sessions were on the 2nd of January, 1837, the appeal was dismissed, and the rule to enter continuances discharged, although in that particular case Lord Denman regretted the decision, but stated his opinion that it was better not to shake former decisions (w).

Again, the stat. 4 & 5 Wm. IV. c. 51, s. 19, prescribes, that in informations before commissioners of excise or justices a summons shall previously have been served ten days at the least before the time appointed in such summons. A summons under the act issued on the twentieth day of a particular month to appear on the thirtieth. In order to make ten clear days either the twentieth or thirtieth must be included. If both should be shut out, there would be only nine clear days. The defendant did not appear, and, in default, was convicted. It was held, that the justices had no jurisdiction, because both the twentieth day (that of serving the summons), as well as the thirtieth (that of convicting the defendant), should have been omitted in the calculation (a). So, under a local act, an appeal

(v) 4 B. & Adol. 685. 1 Nev. & M. 426, R. v. West Riding Justices. 4 Nev. & M. 378, R. v. Cumberland Justices, ante, p. 146.

(w) 8 Ad. & El, 173. 2 Nev. & P. 286, R. v. Shropshire Justices. (x) 12 Ad. & El. 472. 4 Per. & D. 150. 9 D. P. C. 527, Mitchell v. Foster.

was allowed, provided that a notice of seven days at least should previously be given. Notice was served at half-past nine a. M. on the 31st of December. The sessions began at ten A. M. on the 7th of January. The hearing of the appeals was then, as usual, adjourned till the 31st of January. The Court held this notice of appeal too late, inasmuch as the words, "at least," had the effect of excluding not only the day of giving the notice, but the first day of the sessions likewise. And the fraction of a day could not be entertained in order to make the service of the notice good (y). A notice, likewise, on Sunday, appointing a vestry meeting for the Wednesday following was held insufficient to satisfy the stat. 58 Geo. III. c. 69, s. 1, which requires a notice of three days at the least (z). So again a notice was to be given at least sixteen days before such meeting, and no act, &c. of commissioners should be valid unless made or done at a meeting held in pursuance of the act.-Notice was given on the 27th of January for a meeting to be held on the 12th of February. Here were only fifteen days. It was said that the newspaper, although dated on the 27th, was, in reality, in circulation on the 26th; but the Court would not entertain this suggestion, for the day of the newspaper's date was the day of its general circulation (a).

Sometimes a power is given to the Court to decide whether a reasonable time has been allowed, notwithstanding the allowance of ten days at the least (b).

"Forthwith." "Immediately."

If an act of Parliament requires that a recognizance shall, after notice of appeal, to be entered into "forthwith;" a period

(y) 2 New Sess. Ca. 75, Rex v. Middlesex Justices. 3 Dowl. & L. 109. 14 L. J., M. C. 139, S. C.

(2) 2 B. & C. Rep. 90, R. v. Best, or Surrey Justices. S. C. 2 New Sess. Ca. 65. 5 Dowl. & L. 40.

(a) 19 L. J., Q. B. 250. 257, R. v. Aberdare Canal Company, and R. v. Shropshire Justices was cited by the Court.

(b) As under 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 64, Registration of Voters. 6 C. B. 51, Palmer, App., Allen, Resp. 18 L. J., C. P. 257, where the Court decided that reasonable time had not been given within the proviso.

of nine days, without cause assigned for the delay, is too long. "Forthwith” means a reasonable time (c). A fortiori, twentyeight days are beyond the term "forthwith" (d). In a case of bastardy, seventeen days have been considered to preclude the right of appeal (e). But if the respondent's attorney admits due service of the notice, it becomes then too late to enter an objection. So that where the Quarter Sessions overruled an objection that the notice* was too late, the Court refused a rule for a certiorari to bring up the order of sessions to be quashed, because of the admission which had been made (ƒ).

Whether a notice has been given in a reasonable time so as to satisfy the word "forthwith," in a statute, is a question for the jury. The Judge should not express his opinion on this point, but should leave it entirely with the jury (g). On the other hand, where it is evident that under the word "forthwith," no reasonable time at all has been allowed, the Judge should then interfere and direct a nonsuit (h). As where an overseer was required to shew a rate-book. The Court held, that a reasonable time and place were necessary for the purpose (i).

Immediate notice, means "prompt and expeditious notice" (k).

So the giving of a certificate immediately after the verdict, means "within a reasonable time afterwards" (1). So it is in the case of a certificate to be given immediately after the trial. This means "before any extraneous matter, presented subse

(c) 7 D. P. C. 789, R. v. Worcestershire Justices.

12 Ad. & El. 672,

R. v. Robinson. 4 Per. & D. 391, S. C. See 16 L. J., M. C. 57, R. v. Gloucestershire Justices.

(d) 11 Jur. 170, R. v. Cheshire Justices.

(e) 3 Dowl. & L. 737, Ex parte Lowe.

The order for maintenance under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, s. 3, was made on

the 13th June. The notice was delivered on the 22nd.

(f) 16 L. J., M. C. 57, R. v. Gloucestershire Justices.

(g) 9 Q. B. 684, Tennant v. Bell. S. C. 16 L. J., M. C. 31. 2 Car. &

K. 641, Nelson v. Patrick, per Wilde, C. J.

(h) 3 B. & C. 662, Abbott, C. J.

(i) Id. 658, Spenceley v. Robinson.

(k) 5 Dowl. & R. 588, R. v. Hunts. Justices.

(1) 10 Mees. & W. 688, Christie v. Richardson.

quently to the award of the Judge could operate to influence his mind (m).

But "immediately after the verdict," has been held not to be satisfied by a certificate given some weeks afterwards. A certificate for a special jury was promised under 6 Geo. IV. c. 51, s. 34, by the Judge before the verdict was delivered. The verdict was given whilst the Judge was trying another cause, and his signature to the indorsement was not then applied for, and some weeks elapsed before it was obtained. The Court set aside the certificate, for this could not be called a certifying immediately after the verdict (n).

Again, upon a conviction at petty sessions under 6 Geo. IV. c. 129, which gives a power of appeal if recognizances are immediately entered into, the Court held, that the sureties need not appear at the time of the conviction. A conviction took place on the 2nd of May, and on Monday the 6th, the defendant applied to be allowed to make his appeal. But the justices thought it too late, upon which a rule was moved for, and the Court made it absolute. It appeared, however, that on the Saturday, the defendant had been prepared with sureties, but that there was no meeting of justices on that day, and, prior to that, the defendant, being in prison, could not take any step. The Court, therefore, made this rule absolute upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case (o). "It was suggested, however," said Mr. Justice Wightman, "that a difficulty would arise from this construction, as the act says, that the execution of the judgment shall be suspended;' and that, in case of the judgment being affirmed on appeal, the party shall be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, according to such conviction, for the space of time therein' mentioned. It was said, that that

must intend that the bail should be tendered before the sentence is executed; but, I think, that upon the same reasonable construction before adopted, the words,--' shall be committed for

(m) 8 Mees. & W. 211, Thompson v. Gibson. S. P. 9 D. P. C. 815, Ross v. Pearce.

(n) 4 Q. B. 606, Grace v. Clinch. S. C. 3 Gale & D. 591. (0) 19 L. J., M. C. 236, R. v. Aston. S. C. 1 Pr. R. 491.

the space of time therein mentioned'-may mean such portion of it as is unexecuted, and not the entirety" (p).

"Next ensuing."

Where the words, "next ensuing," are used, it sometimes became a question whether the day or the month should be referred to as the measure of reckoning. The better opinion is, that the month, and not the day, should have the preference. This, however, was not always the law. Debt was brought upon an obligation, and the condition was to pay 1407., on the 15th of May, next ensuing. The date of the bond was the 1st of May. It was discussed, whether this meant the month of May next following that 1st of May, and, consequently, a year afterwards, or the month in which the bond was made. The Court, probably swayed by the idea that the day of the date was immaterial, held, that reference should be made to the 15th day of the same month, i. e., fourteen days after the date. A writ of error was brought notwithstanding, but the matter was arranged (q).

But in 5 Geo. II., a bond was produced dated the 12th of May, and the condition was to pay so much money on the 13th of May "next following." And here the Court held, that the month and not the day should be regarded, and, therefore, they considered the month to be May in the ensuing year (r).

An exception to this rule, as to the month, would be, as of necessity, where leap year intervenes. As where a bond was made in a leap year to pay so much money on the "29th of February next ensuing." In order to give effect to this expression of time, the Court held, that it meant the 29th of February in the next leap year, and they said that the 29th should be referred not to the month, but to the day (s).

(p) 19 L. J., M. C. 240, per Wightman, J.

(q) Cro. Jac. 646, Prescot v.

(r) 3 Bac. Abr. 711.

(s) 3 Gale & D. 71, Chapman v. Beecham.