be valid as against the assignees of a bankrupt. A warrant executed on the 9th, was accordingly held to have been filed in time on the 30th of the month (y).

Where a statute allowed seven days for the payment of a penalty before it became lawful to issue a distress warrant, the Court held that one day should be reckoned exclusively and the other inclusively. This was a decision under the Beer Act, 1 Wm. IV. c. 64. The words "full days," or "clear days," are not employed, but merely "seven days." And it was held to be no objection that the warrant of distress bore too early a date, upon proof being given that it had not been issued too soon (z).

In Courts of law also, it is not unusual to find one day reckoned inclusively, and the other exclusively. As in the case of the assignment of a bail bond (a). So in the case of perfecting bail after exception taken, the first of the four days is reckoned exclusively, and the second inclusively. An exception on Wednesday, the 2nd of May, therefore, would not exhaust the time for perfecting bail till Tuesday, the 8th of May. Wednesday being exclusive, and Sunday no day (b). So the sheriff, when ruled to bring in the body, has four days, exclusive of the day when the rule issues, and is served on him (c).

By Reg. Gen. 2 Wm. IV. (66), judgment for want of a plea after demand may, in all cases, be signed at the opening of the office in the afternoon of the day after that in which the demand was made, but not before; and (67), after the return of a writ of inquiry, judgment may be signed at the expiration of four days from such return, and, after a verdict or nonsuit, on the day

(y) 9 D. P. C. 544. 12 Ad. & El. 635. 4 Per. & D. 443, Williams v. Burgess.

(z) 8 Ad. & El. 124, Newman v. Lord Hardwicke. S. C. 3 Nev. & P. 368. See 10 Mod. 212, R. v. Green. An act of Parliament gave three days for prosecuting the offence. The information was in the 8th day of the month for an offence done on the 5th. The point was not decided. (a) 2 Str. 914, Bullock r. Lincoln. See 1 Str. 86, Anon.

Studly v. Sturt.

(b) 2 H. Bl. 35, North v. Evans. (c) Lofft. 631, Anon.

2 Str 782,

Both days

exclusive; instances

of.

after the appearance day of the return of the distringas, or habeas corpora, without any rule for judgment (c).

So in cases of hiring and service, a hiring from the day after Old Martinmas Day until the Old Martinmas Day following, has been deemed to include the second feast of Martinmas, and thus, coupled with the service, has been held to confer a settlement (d).

So it is where a term's notice of trial is required, no proceeding having been taken for four terms after issue joined. The fourth term, exclusive of the term of notice, is inclusive of that in which issue was joined (e).

A week's order to examine is said not to be exclusive of the day sen'night in Irish Courts. But here it would be otherwise (ƒ).

There are several instances, both at common law and by statute, in which both days are reckoned exclusively, as in the case of notice to plead, upon which occasion, both days are exclusive (g). So (not to mention all the numerous instances) the notice to the Master of three days, according to the rule of Hil. Term, 6 Wm. IV. of an application to be admitted an attorney, must be exclusive of both the day of notice and of the first day of the term (h).

The plaintiff demanded oyer and a copy of a certain deed on Sunday evening. On Monday, the demand not having been complied with, he signed judgment, but the Court said, that the defendant had two days for this purpose, and both were to be reckoned exclusively. Sunday was not a day to be considered in this matter, and, therefore, judgment had

(c) See 6 Mod. 241, Reignots v. Tipping. 3 Salk. 212. Id. 215, Standfast v. Chamberlaine.

(d) Cald. Ca. 19, R. v. Syderstone. 1 T. R. 490, R. v. Skiplam; and post, under the word "Until."

(e) 6 Mod. 18, Anon.

(f) 2 Moll. Ir. Rep. 337, Donovan v. Keatinge.

(g) Tidd. Pr. Imparlance, 478.

(h) 4 Ad. & El. 781, Ex parte Prangley.

been signed before the expiration of two days, and the rule for setting aside the interlocutory judgment for irregularity was made absolute (k).

By 2 Geo. II. c. 23, s. 23, no attorney or solicitor shall bring any action or suit until the expiration of one month or more after the delivery of his bill. It became necessary to determine how the time should be computed, i. e. whether the day of the delivery of the bill should be excluded from the month, and whether the day of bringing the action should also be omitted, so as to leave one month clear for the client to pay the money. The month mentioned would, of course, be a lunar month according to the rule in such cases. And the Court of Queen's Bench held, that the time allowed should be twenty-eight days, exclusively of both the day of delivering the bill and of commencing the action: twenty-eight days and so many hours over, as there may happen to be of the day when the act takes place after it is performed (1).

So under the statute 24 Geo. II. c. 44, which requires that a justice shall have a calendar month's notice before an action is brought against him for any thing done by him in his office, it is the rule, that the day upon which the notice is given, and the day of suing out the writ, are to be excluded from the month. Notice of action was given on the 26th of March, to the magistrate. Here he had the whole of the 26th of April, wherein he might tender amends (m).

It used formerly to be the rule to reckon one of the five days between a distress and sale of goods as inclusive and the other exclusive. As where goods were distrained on the 12th of May in this case the sale proceeded on the 17th, thus making the day of distress inclusive, and excluding the day of sale, or

(k) 2 T. R. 40, Page v. Divine and others.

(1) 8 Ad. & El. 577, Blunt, Gent. v. Heslop. S. C. 3 Nev. & P. 553. 9 D. P. C. 982.

(m) 6 Mees. & W. 49. 8 D. P. C. 212, Young v. Higgon. In this case Castle v. Burditt, 3 T. R. 623, was mentioned as wanting in authority; and Morley v. Vaughan, 4 Burr. 2525, was referred to. As to scire facias, see Rule, H. T. 2 Wm. 4, No. 81, 7 Ad. & El. 261. 2 Nev. & P. 84, Saunderson v. Brown. S. C. 6 D. P. C. 9. 5 Ad. & El. 76, Armitage v. Rigbye.

vice versâ. An action being brought, it was objected, that the distrainee should have had five full* days in which he might make replevin, and that both the days of the distress and sale should have been excluded. But the Court said, that on the afternoon of the 17th, five days from the time of the distress had completely expired, upon which the counsel for the plaintiff proceeded to another point. There was ultimately judgment of nonsuit (n). It is observable, in the decision just cited, that the Court evidently contemplated the fraction of a day, by speaking of the Thursday afternoon, or afternoon of the 17th of May. In conformity with this doctrine, where a distress was made on Friday, at two P. M., and the sale ensued on the Wednesday following, at eleven A. M., the Court held, that the sale was wrongful, because the distrainee had not waited five whole days, i. e. five times twenty-four hours. This was a distress for rent (o).

But the rule is now changed and made to agree with the principle of excluding both days. The plaintiff was tenant to T. On the 25th of September a distress was made upon his goods; on the 30th of the month they were sold in the afternoon. The verdict was for the defendant. But upon a motion to have a new trial, Lord Denman observed, that the Court very reluctantly yielded to later authorities,† which appeared to have produced a revolution in the state of the law on this point. And the rule for a new trial was made absolute (p).

There must likewise be fifteen clear days between the test and return of a writ of distringas (9).

"At Least." "Clear Days."

There are likewise other cases where both days are to be

* The stat. 2 W. & M. c. 5, s. 2, uses the word "five days.”

(n) 1 H. Bl. 13, Wallace v. King.

(0) 6 C. & P. 166, Harper v. Taswell.

+ Wallace v. King, Harper v. Taswell had been cited.

(p) 18 L. J., Q. B. 250, Robinson v. Waddington.

(q) 12 Mees. & W. 2, Chambers v. Smith, under the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Wm. 4, c. 39, s. 3; and see 4 B. & Ald. 522, Zouch v. Empsey, post.

reckoned exclusively. The modern rule is to exclude both days when the expressions "at least" or "clear days" are found in statutes. The words "full days" are liable to the same interpretation. Four clear days are four days exclusive of the first and last (r). As where bail in error was allowed to be put in within four clear days: here judgment signed on a Monday, and execution issued on Friday, were considered incongruous, for four clear days had not elapsed; and the execution was, therefore, set aside (s).

Under the Lord's Act, 32 Geo. II. c. 28, notice to the creditor of fourteen days at least is directed before the presentation of the petition for discharge. A notice having been served on the creditor, it was contended for the prisoner that the fourteen days might be reckoned inclusive of the day of service, or of that on which the petition was presented. But the Court said, that fourteen days at least must mean fourteen clear days, and they refused the rule to bring up the prisoner (t).

By 49 Geo. III. c. 68, s. 5, ten clear days' notice of an intention to appeal is required. Notice of appeal was served on the 9th of October, in the morning. The sessions were holden on the 19th, and the Court held the notice insufficient. A rule having been obtained for a mandamus, it was contended that the word "clear" meant only complete days; but the Court said, that ten clear days meant ten perfect intervening days between the act done and the day of the sessions, so that the notice was defective; and the rule was discharged (u). Had the word "clear" been omitted, one day would have been in

(r) 4 T. R. 121, Bennet v. Nichols.

(s) 13 East, 21. See 9 Price, 88, Reg. Gen. Ex.

(t) 4 B. & Ald. 522, Zouch v. Empsey. In Morley v. Vaughan, 4 Burr. 2525, Yates, J., in construing this act, said, he thought that the Court might, in favour of liberty, make the computation so as to include one of the days. But he added, that he would lay hold of a circumstance which offered, namely, that above fourteen days' notice had been given in a former term, although nothing had been done upon it in consequence of an objection which now proved invalid. Nevertheless, as to the computation of time, Zouch v. Empsey, must be considered as overruling the opinion of Mr. Justice Yates.

(u) 3 B. & Ald. 581, R. v. Herefordshire Justices. The Court referred to Roberts v. Stacey, 13 East, 21, ante, p. 96.