Pashley and Overend, in support of the order of Sessions (2).-The property sought to be rated is occupied by the commissioners for a public (or quasi public) purpose, viz., for supplying the town of Huddersfield with water, and coupled with no interest whatever, as the money received for water-rent is to be applied ultimately to the reduction. of the amount of the rents themselves.

to time, and at all times repair, &c. the said reservoir, and all dams, &c. and other works appertaining thereto. Provided always, that it should be lawful for the owners and occupiers of the said mills and other works from time to time, and at all times as they should think fit, to draw off the water from the said reservoir for the use of the said mills and other works respectively.

The 25th section reserved the right of the inhabitants of Longwood and the adjoining townships to a certain spring called the Head Well, and provided that the commissioners should divert no water from it.

The 67th section of the act empowered the Commissioners appointed under the act to borrow 20,000l. on the credit of the works and water rents on mortgage of the same.

Sect. 73. provided that all money to be raised by the said commissioners, by virtue of this act, shall be laid out and applied in the first place for and towards the payment, discharge, and satisfaction of all costs, charges, and expenses in applying for, obtaining, and passing this act, and all other expenses preparatory and relating thereto; and all the residue and remainder of such money for and towards purchasing lands and grounds, and making, completing, and maintaining the said reservoirs, waterworks, and other works, and other the purposes of this act.

Sect. 74. "That when and so soon as the whole of the principal monies and interest due on any mortgages granted under the authority of this act shall have been paid off and discharged, the said water rents shall then be reduced so that the proceeds thereof and therefrom shall only cover the current expenses attending the execution of the powers of this act."

Sect. 81. "That the said commissioners shall and they are hereby required to supply with water each of the inhabitants or occupiers of any houses, tenements, or premises in any square, street, yard, &c., of the said town and neighbourhood, within the township and parish of Huddersfield aforesaid, in or along which any main pipes of the said commissioners may be laid, as shall be desirous of having the same, and who shall be willing and agree to pay the necessary expenses of providing, laying and affixing service pipes to communicate with such main pipes, together with the necessary valves and cocks, and to pay the water-rents hereinafter mentioned; and it shall be lawful for the said commissioners, or for such person or persons as they shall from time to

(2) June 7, 1848, before Lord Denman, C. J., Patteson, J., Coleridge, J., and Erie, J.

The commissioners, therefore, have no beneficial occupation-The King V. the Commissioners of Salter's Load Sluice (3), The King v. the Inhabitants of Liverpool (4), The King v. the Trustees of the Weaver Navigation (5), The King v. the Churchwardens of Sculcoates (6), The King v. the Commissioners for Lighting Beverley (7), The Queen v. the Mayor of Liverpool (8),

time appoint for that purpose, and they are hereby empowered and directed, to ask, demand, receive, and take of and from every inhabitant or occupier of any house, tenement, or premises of the said town and neighbourhood, who shall choose to have the water laid into their respective houses, tenements, or premises, such sum or sums of money to be paid yearly or otherwise, as and for a water rent, as the said commissioners shall from time to time agree upon, and by writing under their hands assess and appoint; nor shall the said commissioners be at liberty to charge or to receive any greater or higher rent or rents for the supply of such water than as hereinafter mentioned and prescribed, that is to say, where the annual rack-rent or value of the house or building, yard or offices, or premises to be supplied with water, shall not exceed 10%., at and after the rate of 20s. per year (above 10l. and not exceeding 201., 21. per annum-above 100l., 77. per annum); nor shall such commissioners be obliged to furnish such supply to any inhabitant or occupier for less than 12s. in any one year, provided that the whole amount of water rents in any one year do not (after payment of the annual expenses) exceed 71. 10s. per cent. upon the debt which shall be owing by the said commissioners."

By sect. 82. a penalty was imposed on the commissioners in case of refusal (after demand in writing, and tender of the amount of a half-year's water rent at the above rates) to supply any of the inhabitants of the houses, &c. in the town and neighbourhood aforesaid with water for the use of his family, at the aforesaid rates.

By sect. 87. In case of fire happening within the said town and neighbourhood, it shall be lawful for any person or persons whomsoever to open any pipe, waterhouse, reservoir, or cistern belonging to the said commissioners, and to make use of the water in order to extinguish such fire without any satisfaction being made for the same.

By the 8 & 9 Viet. c. lxx. s. 18, the commissioners were empowered to supply water for watering the streets at a certain rate, with a proviso that they should not be bound to do so at any time when the so doing would prevent a full and adequate supply to the inhabitants of the said town and . neighbourhood.

and The Attorney General v. Aspinall (9). Longwood is a township distinct from Huddersfield, but that makes no difference

-The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Exminster (10). On the other side The Queen v. the Wallingford Union (11), The Governors of the Bristol Poor v. Wait (12), and The Queen v. Badcock (13), will be relied on. In the last of those cases there was a surplus applicable to a class, and the occupation was decided to be beneficial, and therefore not distinguishable from The Governors of the Bristol Poor v. Wait. Here the benefit, if any, is derived by the houses and mills in respect of which the water is reserved, and those houses may perhaps be rated higher by reason of such benefit and consequent increased value. The commissioners would be liable to an action for neglecting to supply water-The Mayor of Lyme Regis v. Henley (14).

- The

R. Hall and Pickering, contrà. substantial question is, whether the purposes for which the water was supplied under the act of parliament were wholly and altogether public. It is not sufficient to exempt the works from rateability that the water was supplied for one or more public purposes, such as putting out fires gratuitously. The commissioners are empowered to levy a rate, which depends on the value of the houses. The ultimate purpose is not public, as in The Queen v. the Blackfriars Bridge Company, Manchester (15), where the proprietors were held rateable as long as the tolls were received, though, as was observed by Littledale, J., the liability to be rated would cease when the cessation of tolls took place. Here, there is no provision for the total cessation of water-rates. In The King v. the Commissioners for Lighting Beverley there was a provision in the act of parliament that all the rates levied under it should be applied, first, to defraying the expenses of the works, and, afterwards, if there was any surplus, it was to be

(9) 2 Myl. & Cr. 613; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 51.

(10) 12 Ad. & E. 2; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 108.

(11) 10 Ibid. 259; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 89.

(12) 5 Ibid. 1; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 113.

(13) 6 Q.B. Rep. 787.

(14) 8 Bligh, N.S. 690.

applied, generally, for the purposes of the act, and the case found that all the sums raised had been so applied. In that case Lord Denman, C.J. observed, "The effect of the act is, that either rates producing more than is requisite for the purposes of the act cannot be laid, or that when they produce more they must be lower. The King v. the Inhabitants of Liverpool has shewn that where the act of parliament disposes of the whole that is raised there can be no beneficial occupation." Littledale, J. observed, "that if the Commissioners are rated to the poor for this, they must increase their rate upon the town; it is as broad as it is long;" evidently assuming that the limits of the parish and the district lighted under the act were the

same.

And

But lighting is an object more of a public nature than supplying water, which only benefits the individuals supplied. In The King v. the Trustees of Great Dover Street Road (16), the trustees were expressly exempted from rates. In The Queen v. the Inhabitants of St. George the Martyr, Southwark (17), and in The Queen v. Badcock, the distinction between public purposes and those which are for the partial benefit of particular localities are fully gone into. The only case at all like the present in its circumstances is The Queen v. the Trustees for Lighting Beverley, and that is an authority for the rate. The King v. the Churchwardens of Sculcoates does not apply, since the land here taken is in two parts; one is taken for the purpose of the compensation reservoirs; and that might be a benefit to Longwood, but the other part is occupied for the benefit of the other township; and if that part is rateable, the rate is good. [PATTESON, J.-Who are the beneficial occupiers?]

The mortgagees in possession.

[PATTESON, J.-On that principle you might rate the trustees of a turnpike road.]

Such a rate might be made. The exemption from rateability in The Queen v. the Trustees of Great Dover Street Road was founded on the words of the particular act of parliament.

(15) 9 Ad. & E. 828; s. c.8 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 29.

(16) 5 Ad. & E. 692; s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 25.

(17) 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 129.

[PATTESON, J. referred to The Queen v. the Blackfriars Bridge Company, Manchester.] Cur. adv. vult.

The judgment of the Court was subsequently (Jan. 30, 1849) delivered by

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-The question is, whether the reservoirs and premises occupied in Longwood, for the purpose of supplying water to certain premises in the township of Huddersfield, are exempted from rateability, on the ground that the occupiers are merely trustees for the public. As the statutes from which the Commissioners derive their right of occupation do not allow to them any individual profit or benefit, there is the semblance of a ground for claiming this exemption; but when the purposes are considered for which those statutes were obtained, this semblance disappears, and the property is found to be rateable.

The main purpose is the supply of water to that portion of the inhabitants of a particular township, that will not pay not less than 12s. per annum for it. A further purpose is the prevention of fire in the same township, the benefit of which is confined principally to the owners of combustible property therein. There are no decisions that purposes analogous to these are public, and The King v. Badcock is a decision to the contrary. If private speculators had invested capital for the supply of water at a profit, and had so become the occupiers of the premises in question in Longwood, they would have been rateable-The Queen v. the Churchwardens of Mile End Old Town (18). And the money paid for the rate would be part of the costs of the supply; and would fall on the consumer. The private acts enable a portion of the inhabitants by commissioners to obtain the supply without the intervention of a water company. But as far as respects the rights of other townships, this portion of the inhabitants by their commissioners stand in the position of an ordinary water company, and have no greater right to exempt from rateability a portion of land in Longwood, and so to obtain water at a less cost, than such a company would have had.

(18) 10 Q.B. Rep. 10; s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 184.

One of the reservoirs provides water for the mills that had rights in the water intended to be diverted for the use of the inhabitants, and it is said to yield no profit, as the mill-owners pay nothing; but it is in reality part of the apparatus for obtaining the supply. The mill-owners had rights in the springs which were wanted for the houses, and the purchase of those rights, or compensation for invading them, becomes. part of the cost of the springs themselves. The compensation is made by forming the reservoir in question in Longwood; and that township has that township has a right to rate such reservoir, together with the rest of the apparatus in that township indirectly contributing to produce the value arising from a supply of water at the habitations of the consumers; and the amount of this rate ought also ultimately to come from such consumers in the price they pay for the water. Therefore the order of Sessions must be quashed, and the original rate be confirmed.

Order of Sessions quashed.

Where dates in an indictment are laid under a videlicet, the videlicet may be rejected after verdict, in order to support the indictment.

One count of an indictment for perjury stated that the defendant had retained U, an attorney, who had delivered his bill under 67 Vict. c. 73, to wit, on the 7th of August 1844; and that, after the expiration of one month from such delivery, to wit, upon the 25th day of April 1845, U. had taken out a summons before a Judge to have the bill taxed. The perjury was charged to have been committed in an affidavit made by the defendant prior to the hearing of the summons, as to the retainer of U. There were three other counts in the indictment. The venire was to try whether the defendant was guilty of the perjury and misdemeanour aforesaid, and the entry of the verdict was

that "he is guilty of the perjury and misdemeanour aforesaid, in manner and form,” &c., and a general judgment of imprisonment was given :-Held, upon writ of error, that assuming that the word "month" meant lunar and not calendar month, as the Court of Queen's Bench had decided, and assuming that it was necessarg to shew that a calendar month had expired before the application to tax, the count shewed that that time had expired, for the videlicet might be rejected.

But semble, that it was unnecessary to aver that the calendar month had expired, for that the summons having been issued by a Judge of one of the superior courts, it must be intended that he had jurisdiction to issue such a summons until the contrary was shewn.

Held, also, that perjury and misdemeanour were nomina collectiva, and that the venire and judgment were right.

Error from the Court of Queen's Bench. The defendant was convicted upon an indictment for perjury, tried at the Spring Assizes for the county of York, 1846. A writ of error was subsequently brought in the Court of Queen's Bench to reverse the judgment given thereon; but the Court, after argument, affirmed the judgment-see 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 92; upon which the present writ of error was brought. There were four counts in the indictment, but it is sufficient to state the fourth. That count alleged that one W. Unwin, after the passing of a certain act of parliament, &c., 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, and before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, was an attorney, practising in England, and was duly admitted, and practising as such attorney in her Majesty's Court of Exchequer at Westminster, and had done and transacted business as such attorney in her said Court of Exchequer, for and on behalf of J. N. Ryalls, late of, &c., and of J. Ironsides, and on the retainer and at the request of the said J. N. Ryalls and the said J. Ironsides, who then and there became and were indebted in a large sum of money to the said W. Unwin for fees, charges, and disbursements for the business so done and transacted for the said J. N. Ryalls and the said J. Ironsides by the said W. Unwin as aforesaid, and the said W. Unwin, afterwards and

before the committing of the said offence hereinafter mentioned, to wit, on the 7th of August, A.D. 1844, so being such attorney as aforesaid, did deliver to the said J. N. Ryalls and the said J. Ironsides (they, the said J. N. Ryalls and J. Ironsides then and there being the parties to be charged therewith) a bill for the fees, charges, and disbursements for the said business so done and transacted by the said W. Unwin as such attorney as aforesaid, which said bill was then and there subscribed with the proper handwriting of him the said W. Unwin, so being such attorney as aforesaid; and that afterwards, and after the expiration of one month after the delivery of the said bill as aforesaid, and before the committing of the said offence hereinafter mentioned, to wit, on the 5th day of April 1845, at &c., the said W. Unwin, so being such attorney as aforesaid, (the said bill then and there remaining due, unpaid and unsatisfied to him,) did make application to Sir R. M. Rolfe, Knt., then and there being one of the Judges of the said Court of Exchequer, in which the said business was so done and transacted by the said W. Unwin as aforesaid, in the matter of him, the said W. Unwin, to refer the said bill so delivered as aforesaid, and the demand of him, the said W. Unwin, thereupon to be taxed and settled by the proper officer of the said Court of Exchequer; and thereupon, afterwards, to wit, on the 25th day of April 1845, at &c., the said Sir R. M. Rolfe, so being such Judge of the said Court of Exchequer as aforesaid, issued a summons, in the matter of the said W. Unwin, requiring the said J. Ironsides and J. N. Ryalls, or their attorney or agent, to attend the said Sir R. M. Rolfe, at his chambers in Rolls Gardens, on &c., to shew cause why (amongst other things) the said W. Unwin's bill of costs in the causes and matters delivered to the said J. Ironsides and J. N. Ryalls should not be referred to the Master of the said Court of Exchequer to be taxed (the said bill of costs in the said summons mentioned then and there being the said bill for the fees, charges, and disbursements for the said business so done and transacted by the said W. Unwin, as such attorney as aforesaid, and so delivered by the said W. Unwin as aforesaid). It then alleged that the defendant, before the time of shewing

cause, went before one H. W, a commissioner for taking affidavits duly appointed, and made an affidavit that he did not retain W. Unwin to act for him or J. Ironsides, or either of them. The necessary averments as to materiality and the falsehood of the affidavit were also stated-see them at length, supra, 17 Law J. Rep. M.C. 92. The count concluded, "and so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, did say that the said J. N. Ryalls, on &c., at &c., before the said H. W. &c. did commit wilful perjury against the form of the statute, &c." (1). The entry of the venire was to the defendant to appear at &c., and "answer the premises," &c.

Plea-Not guilty. Joinder.

Venire to the jurors, to try "Whether the said J. N. Ryalls be guilty of the perjury and misdemeanour aforesaid, or not guilty." "And the jurors of the said jury, &c., upon their oath say that the said J. N. Ryalls is guilty of the perjury and misdemeanour aforesaid. Whereupon it is considered that the said J. N. Ryalls be committed to the house of correction at Wakefield, in and for the said county, and there imprisoned, and kept to hard labour for ten calendar months."

Pashley, for the plaintiff in error.-All the counts are open to the same objection as to the meaning of the word "month," upon which mainly the argument turned in the court below; but a fatal objection to the fourth count is, that no jurisdiction is shewn, because it does not negative an application within a month by the party chargeable; and section 37. of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. only empowers the attorney to apply for a taxation, in case the party has not applied within the month. If the jurisdiction arises only upon a certain contingency, that contingency must be shewn to have arisenThe King v. Milnrow (2) and The Queen v. Smith (3).

[CRESSWELL, J.-The statute says the Judge shall not make an order until after the expiration of the month; but why may he not issue a summons?]

[PARKE, B.-After the summons has

issued, whether it has issued in proper time may be afterwards inquired into. It is to be intended that what a Judge of a superior court does is within his jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears. His Lordship referred to Calder v. Halket (4), Taafe v. Downes (5).]

The false oath must be shewn to have been taken in the course of a judicial proceeding-The Queen v. Overton (6).

[PARKE, B.-The Commissioners there only had a limited jurisdiction. A Judge has a general jurisdiction.]

The recent cases establish that the power to tax an attorney's bill depends on statute. He cited also Muskett v. Drummond (7), The King v. Jones (8), The King v. Punshon (9), The Queen v. Ewington (10).

[PARKE, B.-Even if your argument be correct, the record is quite right; the dates are laid under a videlicet, which may be rejected to uphold the conviction. His Lordship referred to Whitaker v. Harrold (11).]

The objection to the venire and the judgment is the same. Neither "perjury” nor "misdemeanour" is nomen collectivum. The King v. Powell (12) decided that "misdemeanour" was nomen collectivum; but that decision is much shaken by O'Connell's case (13).

[PARKE, B.-It was not at all doubted upon this point.]

It has never been acted upon; and in The King v. Salomons (14) "offence" was held not to be nomen collectivum.

[PARKE, B.-In O'Connell's case the difficulty was not as to the use of the word "misdemeanour," but from the sentence of hard labour.]

In Campbell v. the Queen (15) this Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, that the word "felony" is not nomen collectivum.

(4) 3 Moore's P.C. 28. (5) Ibid. 36, n.

(6) 4 Q.B. Rep. 83.

(7) 10 B. & C. 153; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. K.B. 130. (8) 4 B. & Ad. 345; s. c. 2 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 7.

(9) 3 Camp. 96.

(10) 2 Moo. C.C. 223.

(11) 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 343.

(12) 2 B. & Ad. 75; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. M.C. 71.

(13) 11 Cl. & F. 155, 257.

(14) 1 Term Rep. 249.

(15) 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 89.