1. An order of justices upon the
stewards of a friendly society, un-
der 49 Geo. 3, c. 125, requiring
them to pay money due to him for
relief, must adjudicate that they
are stewards, that the claimant is
a member, and that the money is
due to him.

The direction of such an order
to certain persons, as stewards of
the society, does not amount to an
adjudication that they are such
stewards; nor does the order, by
reciting the complaint on oath of
the applicant, wherein he states
that he is a member, and that mo-
ney is due to him, and by adjudg-
ing that "the sum so due as afore-
said to him" be paid, amount to
an adjudication that he was a
member, and that the money was
due.

Justices issuing a warrant, on
an order omitting to adjudicate
upon the above facts, were held
liable in trespass. Day v. King.
845
2. The Court will make the same
intendment in favour of an order
of justices as in favour of a con-
viction. Rex v. Marquis of Down-
shire.

92

3. An act, incorporating a Gas Com-
pany, enacts, that in case any party
who shall contract with the Com-
pany for gas, shall neglect, after
ten days after demand made, to
pay the gas rents, such rents may
be recovered by the Company by
warrant under the hand and seal
of a justice of the peace, and that
it shall be lawful for the Company,
with such warrant, to levy the
sums so due and owing as afore-
said by distress and sale.

Held,-first, that the granting
of the warrant was a judicial, and
not merely a ministerial act; and
that therefore a magistrate could
not issue a warrant without a pre-
vious summons.

Secondly, that although an officer
executing such a warrant might
justify under it, yet that the Com-
pany who procured the warrant,
and interfered in the execution of
it, could not.

Semble, that in no case can a
magistrate issue a warrant of dis-
tress in the nature of an execution,
without previously summoning the
party whose goods are to be dis-
trained, in order that he may have
an opportunity of being heard.

Semble, that the 22 Geo. 2, c.
223, s. 1,-which enacts, that in
all cases where any justice of the
peace shall be required, by any
act of parliament, to issue a war-
rant of distress for levying any
penalty or sum, the justice may
by such warrant order the goods
so to be distrained to be sold within
a time therein limited, so as such
time be not less than four or more
than eight days,-applies only
where the granting of the warrant
is a judicial act. Painter v. Liver-
pool Gas Company.

LAND.

736

The right to take water from a well
is an interest in land.-Tyler v.
Bennett.
826

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

See COSTS, 3.-USE AND OCCUPATION.
1. Where a lessee covenants to yield
up the premises at the end of the
term in as good condition as they
were in when the lease was granted,
and after the expiration of the
term holds over as tenant from
year to year, no implied promise
arises to yield up the premises
at the expiration of the new te-
nancy, in the state in which they
were when the original lease was
granted. Johnson v. Churchwar-
dens &c. of St. Peter, Hereford. 106
2. A. lets to B. a furnished house,

at a certain rent payable in ad-
vance, from a certain future day,
and agrees that it shall be furnished
suitably for a school:-The suit-
able furnishing of the house is a
condition precedent to the right to
demand the rent.

If B. enters, and the house is
not so furnished, A. cannot dis-
trein for the rent.

Whether a verbal representation
that the house will be suitably fur-
nished, forms part of the contract
or not, is a question for the jury.
Mechelen v. Wallace.

316
3. To a declaration for rent of a coal
mine, the defendant pleaded a de-
termination of the tenancy by no-
tice, and the plaintiff replied a
waiver of such notice, which was
denied:-Held, that it was pro-
perly left to the jury to say whe-
ther a continuance to work the
mine for a short time after the ex-
piration of the notice, was intended
by the defendants as a waiver of
the notice.

No continuance of the tenancy
is necessarily implied from the
mere fact of a tenant's continuing
in possession after the expiration
of a notice to quit given by such

tenant.

A. and B., partners, carrying on
business under the name of the L.
Coal Company, and lessees of a

coal mine, give notice to quit, and
after the expiration of the notice
continue for a short time to work
the mine. Afterwards A. and C.
carry on the same general business
under the same name, and without
any public notification of the change
in the firm. In an action against
A. and B. for rent subsequent to
the expiration of the notice, a letter
from the agent of A. and C., re-
specting the subsequent working,
is not admissible to shew that A.
and B. intended, in so doing, to
waive the notice and continue the
tenancy. Jones v. Sheares. 428
4. Land and a house were respec-
tively let from year to year, the
land from February to February,
and the house from May to May.
In October, 1833, notice was
"served to quit at the expiration
of half a year from the delivery of
this notice, or at such other time
or times as your present year's
holding of or in the said premises,
or any part or parts thereof re-
spectively, shall expire after the
expiration of half a year from the
delivery of this notice:"-Held,
that the notice, so far as regarded
the lands, was to be applied to
February, 1835, and that the word
"present" might be rejected as
insensible. Doe d. Williams v.
Smith.
829

LIEN.

See ATTORNEY, 4.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See STAMP.

An action of assumpsit for unliqui-
dated damages is within the saving
clause (sect. 7) of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16.

And therefore such an action
accruing whilst the plaintiff is in
prison, may be brought at any time.
within six years from the first time
of his being at large.

Or it may be commenced whilst
the plaintiff continues in prison, or

2. So also a custom of the same city,
that, whenever the inhabitants of
any ward should three times return
to the court of mayor and alder-
men the same person to be an al-
derman of such ward, who should,
according to the former custom,
be adjudged and determined not a
fit person to be an alderman, upon
three such several returns, the
court of mayor and aldermen may
elect a fit person, being a freeman
of the said city, out of the whole
body of the citizens, to be an al-
derman of such ward so made des-
titute of an alderman, is a good
custom.
Ibid.
3. The latter custom is abolished
neither by the 11 Geo. 1, c. 18,
s. 7, nor by the by-law of the city,
the 13 Anne, which recites, that
by the ancient custom of the city,
when any ward became vacant of
an alderman, the inhabitants of
that ward, having a right to vote,
were wont to choose one person
only, being a citizen and freeman,
to be alderman of the ward; and
then enacts, for the reviving of
that custom, that there shall from
thenceforth, in all elections of al-
dermen of the city, at a wardmote
to be holden for that purpose, be
elected only one citizen and free-
man to be returned to the court of

mayor and aldermen, which person
so elected shall be by them ad-
Ibid.
mitted and sworn.
4. Where on issue joined in a quo
warranto, the jury found in favour
of the two customs above men-
tioned-Held, that an issue joined
as to the fitness of the relator, was
immaterial.
Ibid.
5. Where an issue is immaterial, the
judge may, without consent of the
parties to the cause, discharge the
jury from giving any verdict upon
it.
Ibid.

LUNACY.

See EVIDENCE, 9-INSOLVENT, 2.

MAGISTRATES.
See JUSTICES.

MANDAMUS.

See CONVICTION, 1- HALF-PAY
RATE-BOOKS.

1. In a patent for an invention, it is
stipulated that the patentee shall
supply for His Majesty's service
so much of the invented article as
shall be required, at such reason-
able prices and terms as shall be
settled for that purpose by the
Admiralty. The patentee allows
the article to be made at the royal
dock yards, and at the request of
the Navy Board gives instructions
for the guidance of the smiths
there, without stipulating for any
recompence for the use of the pa-
tent: Held, that a mandamus does
not lie to the Admiralty to fix a
price to be paid to the patentee.
Ex parte Pering.

472

2. Mandamus does not lie to the
Commissioners of Customs to com-
pel them to deliver up goods
wrongfully detained by them after
payment of the duty. Rex v. The
Commissioners and Collectors of Cus-

toms.

MANOR.

828

See CONTRIBUTION.-COPYHOLD.

MARKET.

The holding of a market upon a
particular spot within a manor, by
the lords of that manor, for a long
series of years, raises the presump-
tion of a grant of a market to hold
in any part of the manor, and not
of a grant limited to the particular
spot. Baron de Rützen v. Lloyd.
776

MEETING

Of Public Bodies.

1. A corporate meeting of a corpo-
ration, in which two bailiffs and
twelve assistants are by the char-
ter of incorporation constituted the
governing body, is not valid with-
out the presence of the two bailiffs
and of seven of the assistants. Rex
v. Langhorne.
203
2. A public body entrusted with the
performance of a public duty can-
not hold an extraordinary meet-
ing, unless all the members be
summoned who can be summoned,
or the unsummoned members are
actually present at such meeting.

A custom to hold such a meet-
ing upon summons of all the mem-
bers, subject to a qualification that
the accidental omission of service
of the summons should not vitiate
the meeting, is bad in law.

A general dispensation, by one
of the body, with service upon
himself, is void.

The proceedings at a meeting
at which any individual is not pre-
sent, who might have been sum-
moned and was not summoned,
are void, though the omission be
accidental, or though the indivi-
dual has given a general notice
that he wishes not to be sum-
moned.
Ibid.

MISDEMEANOR.

See NUISANCE.

MONEY HAD AND RE-

CEIVED.

1. Where a party makes a claim
upon another, which he knows to
be unfounded, and arrests him for
the amount of such claim, and the
party arrested pays a portion of
the amount absolutely in order to
obtain his discharge, and engages
to put in bail for the remainder,
the sum so paid may be recovered
back in an action for money had
and received. Duke de Cadaval
v. Collins.
324
2. Money had and received does not
lie against the bailee of a bill of
exchange not due at the time
of action brought, which he has
wrongfully deposited with his own
bankers, although he has obtained
money upon the joint credit of that
and other bills. Atkins and Short,
v. Owen.
309

MORTGAGOR AND MORT-
GAGEE.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION-BILLS OF
EXCHANGE, 1.

In ejectment by mortgagee the Court
will not interfere under 7 Geo. 2,
c. 20, s. 1, to direct a re-convey-
ance to the mortgagee on payment
of the mortgage money and costs,
unless he has himself appeared and
become defendant in the action :
it is not sufficient that the actual
defendant, when application to the
Court is made, is authorized agent
of the mortgagor, and was, at the
trial of the ejectment, held to be
his tenant, and so identified in in-
terest with him, that he (the defen-
dant) could not set up a prior
mortgage deed as an answer to the
plaintiff's title. Doe d. Orchard
v. R. Stubbs. Doe d. the same v.
Clifton.
857

NECESSARIES.
See CHILDREN, 2.

NEGLIGENCE. See ATTORNEY, 3.

NEW TRIAL.

See SIMILITER.

1. The Court will not grant a new trial, after a verdict for the defendant, against evidence, where the subject-matter of the action is less than 201. A new trial was granted without payment of costs where the judge had misdirected the jury upon an important matter of fact. Haine v. Davey.

356 2. Where evidence tendered at the trial of a cause is formally objected to and received, and the party by whom the evidence is tendered obtains a verdict, the Court will, upon the application of the opposite party, grant a new trial, if the evidence appears to them to have been inadmissible, without entering into any inquiry as to the materiality of such evidence. Doe d. Tatham v. Wright.

132

3. Upon payment of costs, the Court set aside a nonsuit founded upon the non-production of a material document, which, being out of the jurisdiction of the Court, had been sent for in due time, but had not arrived until after the trial. Atkins and Short v. Owen.

NOTICE To Quit.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Of Dishonor of Bill.
See BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

Service of.

229

See CHURCHWArdens. 1. Where notice of an appeal against an order of two justices is required to be given to such justices, service of notice upon one only is sufficient.

Semble, That the Court of Quar

ter Sessions has no right to require that notice of intention to try an appeal against an order for the payment of church rates, made by two justices under 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, shall be given to such justices. Rex v. Justices of Staffordshire. 477

2. Where an appeal to the quarter sessions is given by a statute against any conviction under it, to any person aggrieved by such conviction, provided he give to the respondent a notice in writing of such appeal, and of the cause and matter thereof, and the Court of Quarter Sessions are directed to hear and determine the matter of the appeal, that court can adjudicate only on the matter stated in the notice.

And therefore where, in the appellant's notice, grounds of appeal relating to the merits only are stated, the sessions cannot quash the conviction for defect of form. Rex v. Boultbee.

NUISANCE.

26

The erection of any building in a port or navigable river, which of itself is such a hindrance to the navigation thereof as to amount to a nuisance, is an indictable misdemeanor, although such building is productive of collateral public benefit, sufficient, in the opinion of the jury, to counterbalance the injury done to the navigation.

Therefore the erection, by an individual, of an embankment projecting into a public navigable river, and causing the navigation to be less free, is indictable as a nuisance, although it be shewn that a greater public advantage is produced by facilitating the landing of passengers and goods, the launching of boats in foul weather, and the affording protection to small boats in certain states of the wind. Rex v. Ward. 38