that the defendants were employed by the plaintiff in any particular character, e. g. as attornies, so as to make them responsible for want of skill, in taking a bad security, though not guilty of neglect or dishonesty; nor, secondly, did it state that any reward was to be paid to them on such retainer. Dartnall v. Howard, 3 Law J. K.B. 246, s. c. 4 B. & C. 345, s. c. 6 D. & R. 438.

The plaintiff must declare specially where there is a special agreement, and it is conditional; but if he affirms that the agreement was cancelled, he must prove that it was acquiesced in by all the parties. Davis v. Nicholls, 2 Chit. 320.

In an action of assumpsit, the declaration alleged that the plaintiffs, as assignees, had been possessed of certain terms in leases and stock in trade, and that the same were put up to auction on certain conditions, and the defendant became purchaser, and afterwards the leases were set out; it was determined, that it was not necessary to set out the nature of the terms, and the precise days on which they commenced, and, therefore, a variance was immaterial; but it might have been otherwise, if such an inaccurate allegation had been used in an action for the price of the lands.-Semble, it would not be a misdescription of a lease, stating the lease as commencing on the 15th day of February, when the habendum was from that date. Welch v. Fisher, & Taunt. 338, s. c. 2 B. Mo. 378.

Where, in assumpsit, the plaintiff declared that he had bargained with J E for the purchase of three houses for a certain sum; and that the defendant agreed to give him 401. for his bargain, if he would permit him to be the purchaser instead of the plaintiff, and averred that he had become such purchaser:

The Court of Common Pleas held, that such declaration might be supported, although there was no written contract for the purchase of the houses between the plaintiff and J E, as the latter allowed the defendant to become the purchaser; and he was in fact let into possession of the premises. Seaman v. Price, 2 Bing. 437, s. c. 1 C. & P. 589.

The Court of King's Bench, on a writ of error, affirmed that judgment. Price v. Seaman, 4 Law J. K.B. 3, s. c. 4 B. & C. 525, s. c. 7 D. & R. 14.

An averment, on a promise by the defendant to pay, if the plaintiff would suspend the proceedings on a cognovit against A, that the plaintiff did suspend the proceedings, without stating for how long: Held to be sufficient after verdict, because it must be taken to mean, that the forbearance was until the day of payment appointed by the defendant, and that such, forbearance must have been proved on the trisi, Payne v. Wilson, 6 Law J. K.B. 107, s. c. 7 1, & C, 423.

A plan of an account stated to an action of asBumpsit in bed. Adderley v. Evans, 1 Ken. 250.

A though the defendant to an action of assumpsit jade that he did not undertake," omitting the worde," or promise in manner and form," &c. it Goes not sutionize the plaintiff to sign judgment for want of a plem. Amith v. Jones, 3 D. & R. 621.

To so sction of assumpsit on several promises, the defendant pleaded that a pipe of wine was given i estistert of the cause of action; on special Exmmer, the Court held that the plea was bad. Hophanson 9. Tabourdin, 2 Chit. 303,

Held, that a plea, that the defendants' undertaking was for the default of another, without writing, and without consideration, might be pleaded, although the facts might have been given in evidence under the general issue.

So, a plea that the person for whom the defendants' undertaking was given, was a feme covert. Maggs v. Ames, 6 Law J. C.P. 75, 4 Bing. 470, s. c. 1 M. & P. 294.

Where a plea stated that the defendants were executors, and made a promissory note as executors, and plene administravit præter;-special demurrer thereto, that they had thereby made themselves personally liable, and admitted that they had assets for the note; that it might have been given for their own debt; and that, they having promised to pay with interest, they could not become liable for it in their representative character:-the Court held, that such plea was insufficient, and afforded no answer to the action. Childs v. Monins, 5 B. Mo. 282, s. c. 2 B. & B. 460.

Declaration in assumpsit by the assignee of a bankrupt, containing eight counts,-the first six of which stated, that the defendant was indebted to the bankrupt before his bankruptcy for goods sold, &c.; and, in each of these counts, the defendant was stated to be indebted to the bankrupt in the sum of 50.; and the declaration concluded by stating the damage to be that sum. Plea to these first six counts that before the bankruptcy, an account was stated between the bankrupt and defendant, of and concerning the several sums in those counts specified, and upon that occasion, the defendant was found to be indebted to the bankrupt in the sum of 141. 10s. 2d., for which sum the bankrupt drew a bill upon the defendant, which he accepted for and on account of the said several promises in those six counts mentioned; and, by reason thereof, the defendant became and was, and still is liable to pay the bill: Held, that such plea was bad on general demurrer, as it was pleaded to the whole of the plaintiff's demand in the first six counts, and did not state that the defendant was indebted no more than the amount for which the bill was drawn and accepted; and that the giving a bill for a less sum was not a satisfaction for the amount of the debt claimed. Rolt v. Watson, 5 Law J. C.P. 18.

(M) EVIDENCE.

A declaration in assumpsit stated, that in consideration that the plaintiff bad delivered a watch to the defendant to be repaired, the latter undertook to return it to the plaintiff; and assigned for breach, that he did not return it ;-proof that the defendant having repaired the watch, tendered it to the plaintiff, who requested him to take it to his uncle, who would pay him for it; but the defendant being unable to find the plaintiff's uncle, delivered it to his brother, from whom it was afterwards stolen: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the watch; although it was objected, that there was a variance between the declaration and evidence, as the former ought to have been founded on the new contract to deliver to the plaintiff's uncle. Wilson v. Powis, 4 Law J. C.P. 192.

If, in an action of assumpsit, on the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, it appears that there is a written contract, the plaintiff cannot in

such case recover under the quantum meruit: but if the plaintiff has proved a quantum meruit, and the fact of the existence of such contract comes out in the progress of the defendant's case, the cause may proceed, provided the plaintiff does not require its production. Damer v. Langton, 1 C. & P. 168. [Abbott]

Counts in indebitatus assumpsit for houses bargained and sold, and for carcasses bargained and sold, can only be supported by proof of a written assignment to the defendant, within the Statute of Frauds. Quære, if assumpsit is the right form of action. Pennington v. Statman, 3 Law J. K.B. 220.

Where a plaintiff declared in assumpsit generally for tolls of fish, and it appeared in evidence, that he was entitled to certain fish, when selected, as toll: It was held, that the evidence did not support the declaration, which should have averred, that the selection had been made; and thence charged the indebitatus assumpsit. Lord Falmouth v. Penrose, 5 Law J. K.B. 156, s. c. 6 B. & C. 385.

An averment, that, in consideration that the plaintiff would consent to suspend proceedings on a cognovit against A, the defendant promised to pay, is proved by evidence of a contract, which stated, that in consideration of the plaintiff having consented to suspend proceedings, the defendant promised to pay. Payne v. Wilson, 6 Law J. K.B. 107, s. c. 7 B. & C. 423, s. c. 1 M. & R. 708.

A receipt acknowledging the receipt of money, and promising to be accountable for it, will support an indebitatus assumpsit. Harris v. Huntbach, 2 Ken. 28, s. c. 1 Burr. 373.

ATTACHMENT.

1. AT LAW.

[See ARBITRATION, and ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR.]

(A) WHEN AND UPON WHAT GROUNDS

GRANTED.

(B) FOR NON-PAYMENT OF MONEY AND COSTS. (C) FOR NOT OBEYING A SUBPŒNA.-See WITNESS.

(D) FOR A RESCUE.

(E) AGAINST Sheriffs.

(a) For not returning writs.

(b) For not bringing in the body.

(F) RULE FOR, WHEN AND HOW served.

2. IN EQUITY.

(A) WHERE GRANTED OR Refused. (B) EXECUTION AND RETURN of. (C) IRREGULARITY IN; AND WHEN SET ASIDE.

1. AT LAW.

(A) WHEN AND UPON WHAT GROUNDS GRANTED. A contempt of court consists in a wilful disobedience of its orders. Hence, to entitle a party to an attachment against a defendant for not complying with an order, directing him forthwith to reinstate premises which he had injured by alterations, a demand of performance must be shewn, as well as

39

the service of the order. Dodington v. Hudson, 2 Law J. C.P. 58, s. c. 1 Bing. 410, s. c. 8 B. Mo.

510.

An attachment, and not an information, lies against a party for executing process by undue means. Anon. 2 Ken. 372.

The Court will not grant an attachment against an attorney for not performing his undertaking to refund money, upon his bill being taxed. The usual course is, to make the order for taxing it a rule of court. Morling v. Tongue, 1 Law J. K.B. 108.

The Court refused to grant an attachment against a person who had practised as an attorney, without having [been admitted as an attorney; but left the party to sue for the penalty given by the 2 Geo. 2. c. 23. s. 24. Matthews v. Royle, 6 B. Mo. 70.

An attorney gave an undertaking in a cause in the Court of Common Pleas. He was not an attorney of that court, and the Court of King's Bench refused to entertain a motion for an attachment. Anon. 1 Law J. K.B. 188.

Where an act, directed to be done by an order, will take three weeks for the completion of it, an attachment may be granted, at the expiration of four days, against the defendant, for not commencing it before the expiration of the latter period. Dodington v. Hudson, 2 Law J. C.P. 58, s. c. 1 Bing. 464, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 510.

An attachment lies against a party for disobeying an habeas corpus at common law. Rex v. Barber, 2 Ken. 289.

An attachment lies against a mayor for not obeying a peremptory mandamus, though there was no personal service. Rex v. the Mayor of Fowey, 5 D. & R. 614.

(B) FOR NON-PAYMENT OF MONEY AND COSTS.

[See COSTS.]

An attachment for non-payment of money pursuant to an order of court, is absolute in the first instance; and a misnomer of the party in the order (being an attorney of the Court of King's Bench), by calling him John instead of James, is not an objection to the application, when made against him by his right name, if he has attended and consented to summonses when wrongfully designated. Stevenson v. Power, 9 Price, 384.

A person cannot be attached by process out of the Court of the Sheriff of London, where he has money in his hands, and is about to pay it, pursuant to an award made under an order of court. Caila v. Elgood, 1 Law J. K.B. 33, s. c. 2 D. & R. 193.

On motion for an attachment, for not paying money pursuant to the Master's allocatur, the affidavit must state, that, at the time of serving the office copy, the original order was shewn to the defendant. Reid v. Deer, 7 D. & R. 612.

The Court will grant a rule to shew cause why an attachment issued on a Master's allocatur should not be set aside, if it appear that it issued for more than was the exact amount. Daniel v. Bishop, 13 Price, 129, s. c. 1 M'Clel. 61.

(D) FOR A RESCUE.

The Court will, in the first instance, grant an attachment against persons named in the sheriff's return as being guilty of a rescue. Bernard v. Taylor, 6 Law J. K.B. 324.

40

(E) AGAINST SHZ2:775.

[See SHERIFF.)])

For not bringing in the body.
[See BALL]

If the notice of render mit the defendant's name, though the party was not misied, the Court will set aside the attachment against the sherif for not bringing in the body. The King v. the Sherif of Surrey, 1 Law J. K.B. 58.

A party has a strict legal right to an attachment against the sherif for not bringing in the body, after he has been served with a rule for that purpose; therefore, where the sherif had recarned cent corpus to a cu. sa., and that the defendant remained in his custody, the defendant having escaped, and the plaintif served a ruje upon the sherif to brag in the body, and socated an attachment against him: It was beid, that the proceedings were regular, and the Court recised to leave the party to his action for the escape. Thorson v. Tinadi, 1 Law J. C.P.31, s. e. 1 Bing, 136.

Where a decendant was arrested, and the sherif's oficer wok money from him instead of a ball-send, and then wrote to the plainf that he could not and the defendant, and in avans writ was issued, to which cape orgus was returned, the defendant being then in custody upon other process, and pending a body rule, the officer put in ball, and then brought up the defendant by habeas corpus, to be surrendered in discharge of his bail: The Court refused to rehere the sherif, and granted an attachment. For der havien v. Briam, & D. & R. 135.

Ou motion for an attachment against a sherif, for not bringing in the body pursuant to a rule for that purpose; the advarit scion that the sherif had gives gotice of putting in ball, but that the wat beh, or that ther

dad deen pericard: lieid, that though the form was not correct, the notice could not be treated as a mulbty, so as to entitie the plaintiff to an attachM. Ewery, 4D., & RA

Where the plainted's attorney, in Trinity term, consented that the proceedings against the defendant about be stayed, en parte it of the debt and costs within a mout), and an order was obtained accordingly, on which the defendant's attorney signed his mame in the judge's book, but the rule to bring in the body did not expire until the d day of the following Michaelmas term; and the defendant not Daving complied with the order or justified bail, the plaintiff's attorney, on the 9th day of that term, sued out an attachment against the sheriff, and notice of render wax served two dys atlerwards:

The Court ordered the attachment to be set aside el payment of costs, although it was objected that the order wax conditional only, and that the plainful could take no stop to compel payment from the dereundant till the expiration of the rule for bringing The body. de V. Merry pl Racewort, S. Law J. **6# Rogg. See

Where an order for an attachment against the sherif far not bringing in the body had been obtained in the last day of term, on a rule which expired the day before, the Court would not, where there had been delay, and a trial had been lost, set ande that order on the ground of the bail having justified since it was obtained, even on payment of costs. Empson v. Brati, 13 Price, 262, s. c. M-CeL 83.

Where the defendant Las had a week's time to put in ball by a judge's order, an attachment cannot be moved against the sheriff for not bringing in the body, until such crder be discharged. Rowe v. H. 5 Law J. C.P. 56.

An application to set aside an attachment, for not bringing in the body, should be grounded on an affidavit, that it is made at the expense of the bail. Rev. the Sherif of London, in Wilson v. Goldsun, 4 Bing, 427.

F. RELI FOR, WHEN AND HOW SERVED.

The rule for an attachment against a sheriff for not bringing in the body, may be served on the day of the Pandication. Phipson v. Bevir, 13 Price, 208.

Rales for an attachment must be served personally. The Court refused to order that service at the dwelEng-house should be deemed good service of a rule for an attachment, upon an affidavit, that the defendants were shy and difficult to be met with," and that the deponent had tried all the means in his power, for two months, before he could serve the defendant's personally with the award, for the nonperformance of which the attachment was sought to be enforced. Garland v. Goulden, 1 Y. & J. 89.

2. IN EQUITY.

(A) WHERE GRANTED OR REFUSED.

An undertaking of the defendant's solicitor who has received a subpoena to appear to a bill for an injunction, is not sufficient to bring the party into contempt for not appearing and to obtain an attachmeat. Pemberton v. Gülby, 9 Price, 146.

An attachment cannot be obtained for want of an answer to an amended bill, until the amendments bave been entered in the Six Clerks' Book; and it makes no difference whether the original bill has been answered or not. Adamson v. Blackstock, 1 S. & S. 118.

Attachment granted for non-appearance to a subporna served abroad. Nichol v. Gwyn, 1 Sim. 389.

Where husband and wife were co-defendants, and the husband was abroad, and the subpœna against husband and wife was served upon the wife alone, an attachment against her, for want of appearance, was ordered upon motion. Bushell v. Bushell, 1 S. & S. 164.

An order for time to answer, unless drawn up and served, will not stop an attachment. Gayler v. Fits John, 1 Sim. 386.

After exceptions are filed, and the order for setting them down is served, all further process for a better answer is stayed ipso facto; nor is it necessary to come to the Court for an order to stay proceedings. Knowles v. —, 3 Law J. Chanc. 7.

An answer must be filed on the evening before the seal day, in order to prevent an attachment. Whitehouse v. Hickman, 1 S. & S. 102.

And though an answer was sworn the day before the seal day, but was not actually on the file till the earliest moment of the seal day, it was held to be too late. Ibbotson v. Booth, 1 S. & S. 103, n.

Where an order is made for the payment of money forthwith, and a short order is afterwards obtained; in order to ground an attachment for non-payment, a demand must be made under the short order; and a demand under the first or general order is not sufficient, no time for payment being fixed by it. Lamb v. Withers, 1 Y. & J. 453.

Upon the execution of a decree in a cause of possession, the Court of Admiralty declined to interfere further by attachment. John of London, 1 Hag. 342.

(B) EXECUTION AND RETURN OF.

It is altogether irregular to execute an attachment, for want of appearance, against an infant. Ranken v. ——, 3 Law J. Chanc. 88.

If, whilst the defendant is in custody in the King's Bench prison, an attachment issue against him, it is to be lodged with the Marshal, and an habeas corpus may then be moved for before the return of the attachment. Trotter v. Trotter, 1 Jac. 533.

Where an attachment is sealed for want of a dedimus, and an order for a dedimus has been obtained previously, but notice of it is given to the plaintiff before the attachment is executed, though not till after it is sealed, the plaintiff ought not to execute the attachment, unless payment of the costs is refused. Anon. 4 Law J. Chanc. 142.

(C) IRREGULARITY IN; AND WHERE SET ASIDE. The defendant being in default for want of answer, one of the co-plaintiffs dies; before the suit is revived, an attachment is issued against the defendant: Held, that the attachment is irregular. Gibson v. Cheston, 3 Law J. Chanc. 3.

The Master having reported the answer of a defendant insufficient, the plaintiff served a subpœna to put in a better answer: exceptions to the report were taken, and the order for setting them down to be argued was served, before the defendant was brought into contempt, but not till eight days from the service of the subpoena had elapsed: Held, that an attachment subsequently issued, for want of a better answer, was irregular. Knowles v. 3 Law J. Chanc. 7.

Where a defendant, after notice of the plaintiff's intention to issue an attachment, unless an order for time is obtained, procures the order, but is unable, on account of the press of business, to get it drawn up, and omits to give the defendant notice of the order until an attachment is sealed, he cannot set aside the attachment. Kirkpatrick v. Meers, 2 Sim. 16.

It is irregular to seal an attachment, before the affidavit, which is the ground for issuing it, is filed. Gardner v. Rowe, 6 Law J. Chanc. 175.

Exceptions to an answer having been allowed, plaintiff obtained an order to amend, and for defendant to answer the exceptions and amendments at the same time: defendant put in an answer to the amended bill only. The plaintiff then issued an attachment: Held, that it was irregular, and that plaintiff ought to have moved to take the second answer off the file. De Tastet v. Lopez, 1 S. & S. 11. DIGEST, 1822-1828.

ATTACHMENT OF PRIVILEGE.

41

An irregularity in the return of an attachment of privilege, in being returnable after the essoign day, and before the quarto die post, instead of a day certain in full term, may be permitted to be amended on payment of costs, and costs of the rule. Adams v. Luck, 6 B. Mo. 113, s. c. 3 B. & B. 25.

ATTAINDER.

[See COPYHOLD.]

The income of certain personal property is given to A for life; and, after his decease, to B: A is convicted of a capital felony; and receives sentence of death, which is commuted into transportation for life: Held, that B's interest does not take effect by the forfeiture of A, and that the Crown is entitled to the income during the life of A. Hiett v. the Attorney General, 5 Law J. Chanc. 69.

ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR.

(A) QUALIFICATIONS OF.
(B) OF THE CERTIFICATE.

(C) PRIVILEGES AND DISABILITIES.
(D) DUTIES AND LIABILITIES.
(E) APPOINTMENT OF.

(F) CONNEXION BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND

CLIENT.

(G) SUMMARY JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

OVER.

(H) LIEN OF.

(I) REMEDY FOR COSTS.

(K) STRIKING OFF THE ROLL. (L) RE-ADMISSION.

(A) QUALIFICATIONS OF.

A young man served three years in the office of an attorney, under the impression that he had been bound an articled clerk to him. It appeared, that the articles had been made out with the consent of his father in the name of another attorney, who was not a partner with his master, and almost unknown to him. The Court would not interfere, and said, that the act 22 Geo. 2. was imperative, and that they could not, by any possibility, make the three years' service available. Sandy's case, 1 Law J. K.B. 152.

An articled clerk to an attorney must serve under the articles for five years continuously, and be sui juris to contract to serve, and to serve during all that time. Thus, where a surveyor of assessed taxes served a nominal clerkship for five years, though the duties of his office only occupied one-eighth of his time, he was struck off the roll. Having lost his office, he served near three years under other articles, and was again admitted on affidavit, that for different periods during the first five years, amounting in all to three years, he had served his first masters: but he was again struck off the roll, on the ground that his service for the first five years was broken, and not continuous; and that he was not sui juris to

G

42

contract for that service. In re Taylor, 3 Law J. K.B. 242, s. c. 4 B. & C. 341, s. c. 6 D. & R. 428.

Where articles of clerkship were duly stamped and executed, and transmitted to an agent in London, for the purpose of being inrolled with the proper officer of the court; and although it appeared in the agent's book that there was an entry in the handwriting of a clerk, who had left England, of having attended the inrolment, and paid a fee on that occasion, but there being no such entry of an inrolment in the book kept at the Master's office; the Court would not permit a counterpart of the articles to be registered nunc pro tune, or order the party to be admitted an attorney. Ex parte Pilgrim, 1 Law J. K.B. 114, s. c. 1 B. & C. 264, s. c. 2 D. & R. 429.

(B) OF THE CERTIFICATE.

Where an attorney's certificate was filed, by his agent's mistake, in the Court of King's Bench, instead of the Court of Common Pleas, and he had not been admitted in the former court, and the plaintiff sued him for a debt in an inferior court, on which he sued out his writ of privilege, the Court ordered the writ to be quashed, and a procedendo to issue. Nixon v. Hewitt, 3 Law J. C.P. 125, s. c. 10 B. Mo.

270.

Although an attorney, who omits for a year to take out his certificate, is forbidden under a penalty to practise as an attorney until he be re-admitted; yet proof of a certificate, though irregularly obtained, is sufficient prima facie evidence of his being lawfully authorized to practise.

And, to get rid of this presumption, it is not sufficient to shew that he has not been re-admitted of the Court in which he was originally admitted; because it will be presumed that he has been properly admitted in some court; and the party who attempts to shew he was not authorized to practise, must shew that he had no authority in any court. Pearce v. Whale, 4 Law J. K.B. 86, s. c. 5 B. & C. 38, s. c. 7 D. & R. 512.

The year within which an attorney must take out his certificate begins to run from the time of his admission, and not merely from the time of his beginning to practise.

And therefore, an attorney who did not practise until a year after his admission, and not even then until he bad taken out his certificate, and who continued in the following years to take out his certificate, was held incapable of maintaining any action for business done, while he had a certificate. Nothing could remove the difficulty but re-admission. But quare-whether this objection is not now removed by the Indemnity Act, 7 Geo. 4. c. 44. gent. one &c. v. Hulkes, 5 Law J. K.B. 99.

(C) PRIVILEGES AND DISABILITIES. Attornies and clerks of the Court of Exchequer, may sue and arrest attornies of the other courts by capias of privilege. Bowyer v. Hoskins, 1 Y. & J. 199: s. P. Walker v. Rushbury, 9 Price, 16.

And, semble, that attornies of the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster have the same right to arrest attornies of the Courts at Westminster. Hopkins v. Ferrand, 1 Y. & J. 204, n.

A sworn clerk of the Court of Chancery, may arrest a practising solicitor and attorney on an attachment of privilege, and hold him to special

bail.

Wainwright v. Smith, 5 Law J. Chanc. 20, s. c. 2 Russ. 568.

If the plaintiff, an attorney of the Court of King's Bench, sue by bailable process a person who is an attorney of the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of King's Bench will not require him to plead his privilege, but will order him to be discharged, or the bail bond to be cancelled, and make the plaintiff pay the costs. Pearson v. Henson, 2 Law J. K.B. 91, s. c. 4 D. & R. 73.

But the practice in the Court of Common Pleas is, that an attorney of that Court who has been arrested at the suit of an attorney of the Court of King's Bench, must plead his privilege, and cannot be discharged on motion. Adams v. Bugby, 5 Law J. C.P.

76.

A defendant who is an attorney, and also a Member of Parliament, may be sued as an attorney, without noticing his parliamentary privilege, except by forbearing to issue process against his person. Gray v. Wilks, 5 Law J. K.B. 291.

An attorney suing as plaintiff is not bound to indorse his name on the writ, according to the 2 Geo. 2. c. 23. s. 22, whether he sue by attachment of privilege, as an attorney, or by latitat, or other process, as a common person. Duncan v. Etches, 6 Law J.

K.B. 270.

The statutes relative to attornies do not, it would seem, prevent them giving to persons not attornies a share in the profits of their business. Candler v. Candler, 1 Jacob, 225.

The words in the 12 Geo. 2. c. 13. s. 4, that any attorney or solicitor commencing or prosecuting any action or suit shall, &c., do not prevent a solicitor, whilst in prison, from attesting a petition in bankruptcy, it being, strictly speaking, neither a proceeding at law nor in equity. Ex parte Thompson, 1 G. & J. 308.

If, on an action by an attorney for a libel, relative to his profession and business, it be objected, that the action cannot be supported, as the plaintiff had omitted to take out a certificate, as directed by the 37 Geo. 3, for more than one year, during the time of the grievances mentioned in the declaration, it is unavailable, as he may sue for a libel reflecting on his character in that capacity, notwithstanding such an omission. Jones v. Stevens, 11 Price, 235.

An unqualified person, having practised as an attorney, being a prisoner for debt, was, upon being sentenced to three months' imprisonment, brought before the Court by a special order, it appearing that he was not able to pay the expense of a dayrule. In re Clark and others, 3 D. & R. 260.

The defendant's attorney entered into the usual undertaking under a judge's order, to pay the plaintiff the amount of his debt and costs; and the defendant died before taxation: Held, that the attorney was still bound to perform his engagement. Hellings v. Jones, 3 Bing. 70, s. c. 10 B. Mo. 360.

Where an attorney has become bail to the sheriff, and the bail-bond has been assigned, the Court of Exchequer will, upon the usual affidavit, stay proceedings upon the bail-bond upon payment of costs. Mann v. Nottage, 1 Y. & J. 367.

Although communications made to an attorney for the purpose of bringing or defending an action are privileged, yet he is bound to divulge that which is disclosed to him previous to the commencement