parties. Macdougal v. Robertson (in error), 4 Bing. 435, s. c. 1 M. & P. 147, s. c. 2 Y. & J. 11.

(I) RULE OF Court.

Upon a reference under a consent order in a cause, the award may be enforced without being made previously a rule of court.

Semble-That the interference of the Court to enforce an award made under a consent order by summary process, is not excluded by the circumstance, that the parties executed bonds for the performance of the award, which bonds, in pursuance of the order of reference, the Master had settled.

If the award, the performance of which is so secured by bond, is not made within the period limited for it, and the time is by subsequent consent orders enlarged, and no other bonds are executed, the award is a proceeding entirely under the authority of the Court, and will be enforced by its process. Ormonde v. Kynnersley, 2 Law J. Chanc. 178, 8. c. 2 S. & S. 15.

Where it has been agreed, that a submission to an award shall be made a rule of the Court of Common Pleas, a court of equity will not interfere by granting one of the parties relief inconsistent with the award, although the submission has not been made a rule of court. Davis v. Getty, 1 Law J. Chanc. 209, s. c. 1 S. & S. 411.

Where there is a submission of matters in dispute to arbitration, under the statute of William 3, and the submission is to be made a rule, either of the Court of Chancery, or of the King's Bench, if the submission is, by one of the parties, made a rule of the Court of King's Bench within due time, the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction to set the award aside, or to restrain acting upon it, even though a bill be filed for that purpose, before the submission is made a rule of the court of law. Dawson v. Sadler, 2 Law J. Chanc. 80, s. c. 1 S. & S. 537.

It is the submission that must be made a rule of court, and not the award. Lewis v. Healing, 1 Law J. Chanc. 154.

The order of reference must be made a rule of court, where a verdict is found for the plaintiff at Nisi Prius, subject to a reference. Kirkus v. Hodgson, 8 Taunt. 783, s. c. 3 B. Mo. 64.

It is too late, in answer to an application for an attachment for not performing an award, to say that the submission and bond which have been made a rule of court are irregular. There should have been a motion to discharge the rule. Taylor v. Dutton, 1 Law J. K.B. 158.

(J) REMEDIES.

[See ATTACHMENT.]

When the Court can clearly see that a person has full knowledge of the contents of an award, they will not require personal service before they grant an attachment for non-performance of it. King v. Bower, 1 Law J. K.B. 110, s. c. 1 B. & C. 264.

If there be a doubt whether an award be certain and final, the court will not grant an attachment upon it, but will put the party to his remedy by action. Ex parte Aitcheson, 1 Law J. K.B. 48.

If, under an award, the act complained of be done before the submission to arbitration was made a rule of court, this Court will not grant an attachment for

a contempt for doing that act. Jemmett v. Latimer, 2 Law J. K.B. 78.

An attachment may be issued for the non-performance of an award, although the defendant be not resident within the jurisdiction of the court. Hopcraft v. Fermor, 2 Law J. C.P. 29, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 421, s. c. 1 Bing. 378.

A person was directed by an award to sign a release to the opposite party. The solicitor for the opposite party tendered a release to him, but he refused to sign it. The Court would not grant an attachment for a contempt, because the solicitor had not a power of attorney to do that specific act. Humphries's case, 2 Law J. K.B. 78.

Where a submission to arbitration contains a power of enlarging the time for making the award, and the enlargement is made by rule of court, that rule of court is a sufficient foundation for an attachment, without an affidavit of due enlargement. Dickins v. Jarvis, 5 B. & C. 528, s. c. 8 D. & R. 285.

Where the time for making an award is enlarged by a judge's order, the Court will not grant an attachment, unless the award state that the enlargement was made by consent. Halden v. Glasscock, 5 B. & C. 390, s. c. 8 D. & R. 151.

The validity of awards will not be tried on the last day of term. Watkins v. Philpots, 1 M'Clel. & Y.393.

An application for an attachment for non-performance of an award, is not answered by shewing corruption in the arbitrators. Brazier v. Bryant, 3 Bing. 167.

To an action of debt on bond, conditioned for the performance of an award, the defendant cannot plead that he revoked the submission, though he state circumstances which shew misconduct in the course of the reference, either in the arbitrator or the plaintiff himself.

It seems that in such a case the remedy is to be obtained by application to the Court to set aside the award. Grazebrook v. Davis, 4 Law J. K.B. 321, s. c. 5 B. & C. 534, s. c. 8 D. & R. 295.

Where, by the terms of the submission, an award is to be made under the hand and seal of the arbitrator, and an award is made under his hand only, -the Court will not grant an attachment for contempt. But neither will the Court set aside the award. Anon. 5 Law J. K.B. 16.

An arbitrator found that a party was indebted, but no time for payment was stated, nor any mode pointed out by which such payment was to be made: -The Court would not grant an attachment, but left the party, to whom the payment was to be made, to his remedy by action, for non-performance of the award. Edgell v. Dallimore, 4 Law J. C.P. 193, s. c. 3 Bing. 634.

Where, on motion for an attachment for non-pay. ment of money pursuant to an award, it was objected that the arbitrator had directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff, for damages which, as the reference had been made by rule of court, after issue, he had no authority to order; it was holden that they could not grant an attachment, inasmuch as the arbitrator should merely have awarded the money to be paid. Jackson v. Clarke, 13 Price, 208, s. c. M'Clel. 72.

When a parol submission has been entered into by an infant plaintiff before trial, and the arbitrator has awarded in favour of defendant, and plaintiff

refuses to perform the award, defendant may proceed to trial by proviso. Godfrey v. Wade, 6 B. Mo. 488. The renewal of a lease upon the terms of an award, which had been twice enforced by the Court, was again enforced; but the jurisdiction to give effect to an award, confirmed by the decree of the Court, in the case of a charity, is doubtful. The Attorney General v. Clements, 1 Turner, 58.

Where, upon a reference of actions in the Court of Common Pleas, a sum of money was awarded to be paid by each party, and the party entitled to the larger amount brought an action in the Court of King's Bench, in order to compel the defendants to set off subject to the lien of his attorney for his costs ; the Court of Common Pleas refused to inter. fere to enforce the set-off, and would not order the award to be delivered up. Symonds v. Mills, 8 Taunt. 526.

Where the parties to a bond conditioned for the performance of an award, agreed by deed for further time, the Court held, that an action might be brought upon the original bond, as the deed must be taken to incorporate all the antecedent terms contained in the condition of the bond. Greig v. Talbot, 2 B. & C. 179, s. c. 3 D. & R. 446.

The venue cannot be changed in an action on an award. Stanway v. Heslop, 2 Law J. K.B. 209, s. c. 3 B. & C. 9, s. c. 4 D. & R. 635.

A revocation of a submission to arbitration not under seal, before award made, is in effect, a breach of an agreement to stand to, obey, abide, perform, &c. an award, for which assumpsit will lie; and the plaintiff may declare that the defendant undertook to perform the agreement, and not to revoke the submission, and lay the revocation as a breach. Brown v. Tanner, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 464, s. c. 1 C. & P. 655.

If the parties to an arbitration by a rule of court, which gives no power to enlarge the authority of the arbitrator, consent to the enlargement of that authority, such consent will constitute a sufficient agreement to maintain an action for the non-performance of an award made pursuant to the enlarged authority. Anon. 5 Law J. K.B. 247.

(K) PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.

If the declaration upon an arbitration bond sets forth so much of the award as supports the plaintiff's claim, it is sufficient. In debt on an award, the declaration stated, a release of the particular suit referred to be awarded, but the award in evidence shewed general releases: Held, good. Perry v. Nicholson, 2 Ken. 557, s. c. 1 Burr. 278.

Arbitrament without performance is a good plea, where the parties have mutual remedies. Gascoyne v. Edwards, 1 Y. & J. 19.

Where the plaintiff declared in assumpsit, that certain differences had arisen, and a certain suit was then depending in Chancery, in which the plaintiff, and divers other persons, including infants, were plaintiffs, and P K, T B (since deceased), and JR, defendants; and that, by an order of the Vice Chancellor, it was ordered, with the consent of the attornies of the parties in the suit, that the several matters in question in the suit, and all disputes and differences then subsisting between certain of the plaintiffs and P K and T B (since deceased), should be referred to the arbitrament of an arbitrator, who

was to be at liberty to make one or more award or awards, as he should think fit; and that in case either of the parties should happen to die before the making of the award, the reference was not to abate; but that the executors and administrators of the parties so dying, were to be taken as parties to the order in like manner as their testator or intestate; -that before the making of the award T B died; and that the arbitrator afterwards awarded that the defendants, executors of T B, should pay the plaintiff a certain sum out of the assets of the said T B, on a particular day mentioned in the award, by reason of which the defendants, as executors, became liable to pay, and being so liable, they, as executor and executrix as aforesaid, promised to pay: Held, on a special demurrer, that the action was well brought against the executors, although it was objected, first, that the promise alleged to have been made by the defendant was a personal promise, for which there was no consideration; secondly, that the arbitrator was not properly constituted as to some of the parties; and that a sufficient authority to refer was not shewn; and, lastly, that the authority to refer was revoked by the death of T B. Dowse v. Coxe, 3 Law J. C.P. 127, s. c. 2 Bing. 20.

In an action upon an award, where the declaration averred a mutual submission of several persons by bond, it was held necessary that the execution by all should be proved, though the action was against one only.

But it would be otherwise if the action were upon the bond, and the bond were joint and several. There, though the submission might be joint, the plaintiffs might declare upon the several bond, and the declaration would then be satisfied by proof of the execution by the defendant alone. Ferrer v. Oven, 6 Law J. K.B. 28, S. c. 7 . & C. 427, S. c. 1 M. & R. 222.

An award, made under an agreement of reference, cannot be pleaded to a bill filed to impeach a certain deed, or a part of it, and to carry the trusts of a former deed, and of the impeached deed, (so far as valid) into effect, where all the persons interested in the trusts of those deeds are not parties to the agreement of reference. Dyer v. Dawson, 4 Law J. Chanc. 167.

Where, after bill filed, an agreement was entered into to refer the whole subject-matter of the suit to arbitration,-it was holden, that the award might be pleaded in bar to the bill: but where all the parties to the suit were not parties to the award, and where part of the prayer of the bill was for the execution of the trusts of a deed, under which some of the parties to the suit were interested, who were not parties to the award, a plea of the award was ordered to stand for an answer, with liberty to except. Dryden v. Robinson, 2 S. & S. 529.

(L) of setting aside the awarD, AND DIRECTING

THE ARBITRATORS TO REVIEW.

The acceptance of the costs of reference and award precludes the party from moving to set it aside. Kennard v. Harris, 2 B. & C. 801, S. c. 4 D & R.

272.

A rule nisi, to set aside an award, on the plea side of the Court of Exchequer, should specify the grounds of objection; and the same rule seems to hold on the equity side. Watkins v. Philpots, 1

M'Clel. & Y. 394: s. P. Smith v. Briscoe, 11 Price, 57.

An award cannot be set aside after the time limited by the 9 & 10 W. 3. c. 15. Anon. 1 Ken. 118.

In a rule nisi to set aside an award, it is not necessary to specify in detail the objections to the award, provided the objections are so specified in the affidavit upon which the rule is obtained.

Where the rule is made "in a cause," the regulations of the 9 and 10 Wil. 3. c. 15. do not apply. But the Court will not listen to an application to set aside an award, which is not made within the time allowed to move for a new trial, unless adequate grounds for indulgence be shewn. Rawsthorne v. Arnold, 5 Law J. K.B. 270, s. c. 6 B. & C. 629.

Where a reference has been made, under the 9 & 10 Wil. 3, the power of setting aside or enforcing the award is vested in the court in which the submission was made a rule, and the time within which an application to set it aside must be made is regulated by the statute; nor does a case of fraud appear to constitute an exception to this rule. Auriol v. Smith, 1 Turner, 126.

Where trustee and cestui que trust refer accounts to arbitration, and the award is made a rule of court, under the 9 & 10 Wil. 3, notwithstanding it be proved that there was a fraudulent misrepresentation by the trustees to the arbitrators as to particular items of the account, a bill in equity by the cestui que trust cannot be supported after the period limited by the statute for setting aside awards has expired. Auriol v. Smith, 1 Turner, 121.

The Court will not set aside an award after the period limited by the statute has expired, although there is a palpable defect on the face of it, but may refuse to enforce it. Auriol v. Smith, 1 Turner, 125.

Where an award is made in vacation, on a verdict taken nominally, subject to a reference, or under an order of Nisi Prius, an application to set it aside must be made within the first four days of the next ensuing term. Thompson v. Jennings, 3 Law J. C.P. 80.

An award having been made in vacation, a rule to set it aside was obtained, on the last day of the next term, but the agreement of reference had not then been made a rule of court. This case is within the 9 & 10 Wil. 3. c. 15. s. 2, which provides, that application to set aside an award must be made before the last day of the next term after the award is made. A rule to make the articles of reference a rule of court was obtained in the vacation, as of the last day of the term in which the rule for setting aside the award had been granted-but was held too late to support the latter rule. In re Hughes v. Emett, 3 Law J. K.B. 175.

An award made after the essoign day of a term, is to be taken as made in that term; so that a party who seeks to impeach the award shall be allowed the following term to make his application. In re Burt, 4 Law J. K.B. 276, s. c. 5 B. & C. 668, s. c. 8 D. & R. 421.

An award will not be set aside on any ground, which in truth is a question upon the merits between the parties. Winter v. Lethbridge, 13 Price, 533,

s. c. M'Clel. 253.

A second rule will not be granted to set aside an award, when one rule for that purpose has already

been discharged. In re Hellyer and Snook, 2 Chit. 266.

To support an application to set aside an award on the ground of recently-discovered fraud, it must be shewn that it is a new discovery, and could not with due diligence have been ascertained before. Auriol v. Smith, 1 Turner, 127.

The Court will grant a rule nisi to set aside an award, where the award does not recite the bond of reference. Dodsley v. Dodsley, 1 Law J. K.B. 7.

Where an award is made in consequence of a submission under the statute of 9 & 10 Wil. 3. c. 15, a bill to set aside the award cannot be sustained, even though it charge fraud and corruption in the arbitrator. Dawson v. Sadler, 2 Law J. Chanc. 172.

The Court will not set aside an award, in the absence of proof of the arbitrator's partiality or misbehaviour, on the ground that he has given more costs than by calculation they would amount to. Turner v. Rose, 1 Ken. 393.

Where one party to a reference has notice of a meeting to take instructions for an award, but does not attend, and the other party attends, is examined privately as a witness, and upon his evidence an award is given in his favour, it will be set aside. In re Hick, 8 Taunt. 694.

The Court will not direct an award to be referred back to the arbitrator, on the ground that he had allowed an apothecary his charges for attendances, which could not be recovered at law. Gensham v. Germain, 4 Law J. C.P. 37.

The Court will not set aside a void award, which cannot be enforced without suit, because such suit must fail: but if it direct that which can be done without suit, as that a verdict be entered for the defendant, the Court will set it aside, inasmuch as otherwise, the party in whose favour it is made will have judgment without any new proceeding to enforce the award. Doe d. Turnbull v. Brown, 5 B. & C. 384, s. c. 8 D. & R. 102.

An objection that the time for making an award has not been duly enlarged, is waived by proceeding in the reference, with a knowledge of that fact. Lawrence v. Hodgson, 1 Y. & J. 16.

Two objections were made to an award-first, that the arbitrators had appointed an umpire, which they had no authority to do; and second, that the award was untenable, in consequence of the umpire having examined the parties in the absence of each other Held, that the first objection was waived, by the parties having recognized the authority of the umpire, by submitting to be examined by him; and second, that, in a mercantile reference, the defendant, not having expressed a desire to be present at the examination of the plaintiffs, he could not object to the award having been made in his absence. Matson v. Trower, 1 R. & M. 17.

The Court, upon an affidavit, stating that the arbitrator made his award, after he had told the defendant that he should not do so until his witnesses returned, set it aside. Dodington v. Hudson, 1 Bing. 384.

Where it was supposed, that the arbitrator had made a mistake in calculating the sum awarded, the Court refused to send the award back to the arbitrator without the adverse parties' consent. Er parte Cuerton, 7 D. & R. 774.

A cause was referred to arbitration by a judge's

order, containing the usual conditions, that the arbitrator might examine the parties, and that neither of them should file a bill in equity. The arbitrator awarded that a sum of money was due from the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff objected, that the defendant had not supported his claim by any witness, and wished to be permitted to file a bill in equity. The Court would do nothing more than refer it back to the same arbitrator. Henson v. Heckle, 3 Law J. K.B. 56.

Where indigo, after being shipped, was, by the vessel upsetting, materially damaged, and bond fide sold at the port of lading, but was afterwards washed, dried, and repaired by the purchasers, and sent to London, where it eventually obtained almost the same price as sound indigo,-and, on an action on the policy, which was referred, the arbitrator calculated the loss as a total one, without benefit of salvage, instead of an average loss only, calculated upon the invoice charges of drying, &c. and forwarding to London :-The Court refused to set aside the award. Hardy v. Innes, 6 B. Mo. 574.

Upon reference of three actions to arbitration, and a subsequent taxation, by the Master, of the costs of the causes and of the reference, the affidavits being contradictory, the Court, trusting to his discretion, refused to direct him to review. Utting v. Evans, M'Clel. 12.

Where, on a reference of an action of debt on bond, the arbitrators directed a verdict to be entered generally for the plaintiff, the Court refused to set it aside, on the ground that the arbitrators had not specifically directed in what sum judgment should be taken, there being no affidavit that there were other matters in difference. Cayme v. Watts, 3 D. & R. 224.

The Court will not set aside an award on the ground of a mistake by the arbitrator on a point of law, unless the illegality be apparent on the face of the award. Pain v. Massey, 3 Law J. C.P. 34.

Or unless the award shew the principles upon which the arbitrator decided. Delves v. Fry, 5 Law J. C.P. 17.

Or that the reference having been of a matter, not of fact, but of pure law, the decision was against law, unless the reasons for the award be stated. Anon. 3 Law J. K.B. 174.

And where matter of law alone, and not matter of fact, is referred to a barrister, the Court will not set aside an award made by him, on the ground that it is contrary to law, unless the illegality appear on the face of the award. Crump v. Symons, 1 Bing. 104, s. c. as Grant v. Summers, 1 Law J. C.P. 4.

No objection can be taken to an award upon the ground of a mistake in point of law, unless the grounds of the objection appear upon the award, or in some authentic shape before the Court. Price v. Jones, 2 Y. & J. 114.

The arbitrator to whom an action on the case for a fraudulent representation of the circumstances of A was referred, found that the defendant, knowing, the object of the plaintiffs' inquiries, omitted to state certain material facts concerning A's credit, and, although he did not mean to hold out any inducement to plaintiffs to trust A, thereby misled and created in them a false confidence in the circumstances of A. The arbitrator acquitted the defendant of all collusion with A, and of all fraud at the

31

time of making the representation, but feeling himself compelled by adjudged cases, which he mentioned, to decide that the knowledge of the falsehood of the thing asserted was in itself fraud and deceit, he awarded in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court set aside the award, on the ground that the arbitrator had, on the face of it, acquitted the defendant of fraud and deceit. Ames v. Milward, 8 Taunt. 637, s. c. 2 B. Mo. 713.

The Court of King's Bench will not interfere to set aside an award, founded upon an indictment at the assizes. Rex v. the Inhabitants of Cotesbatch, 2 D. & R. 265.

An indictment for a conspiracy was removed from the Chester Court into the King's Bench, and sent to Chester to be tried. A juror was there withdrawn, and all matters in difference referred to arbitration. The Court of King's Bench said, that they had no authority to set aside the award. Rer v. Corbishley, 2 Law J. K.B. 150.

(M) COSTS.

Where the award of an arbitrator, under an order of Nisi Prius, was directed to be equivalent to a verdict, and the arbitrator was silent as to the costs attending the reference: Held, that the costs should follow the verdict. Mackintosh v. Blyth, 1 Law J. C.P.99, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 211, s. c. 1 Bing. 269.

Judgment having been suffered by default, and, on the execution of the writ of inquiry, the jury having given the plaintiff more damages than he was entitled to, the defendant moved to set aside the inquisition, for excess,-when the Court recommended, that the amount of damages should be referred; but nothing being said about the costs of moving to set aside the writ of inquiry, and the arbitrator having reduced the damages: Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the costs of the rule for setting aside the inquisition. Lewis v. Harris, 2 B. & C. 620, s. c. 4 D. & R. 129.

A defendant was arrested for 281.: he paid 21. into court. The cause and all matters in difference were, before trial, referred to an arbitrator, who had power to examine the parties, and the costs were to abide the event. The arbitrator awarded 17. 19s. to the plaintiff. The defendant moved for costs under 43 Geo. 3. c. 46. s. 3. The Court held, that the case was not within that statute. Keene v. Deeble, 3 Law J. K.B. 75, s. c. 3 B. & C. 491, s. c. 5 D. & R. 383.

The

The plaintiff having arrested the defendant for 1791. at the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the award of an arbitrator &c., and the costs of the cause to abide the event of the award. arbitrator found a debt of 451. only due by defendant at the commencement of the action, and that there was no reasonable or probable cause for the arrest for 1791., and, as damages of such arrest, awarded to the defendant the sum of 201.; but ordered the verdict to be finally entered for the plaintiff for 25l. 18s, the balance due after deducting the sum so awarded to the defendant as damages. The Court held, that the defendant was not entitled to costs under the statute 43 Geo. 3. c. 46, as the event of the award was in favour of the plaintiff. Thompson v. Atkinson, 5 Law J. K.B. 101, s. c. 6 B. & C. 192. Where an action of assumpsit was referred to arbitration, the costs to abide the "event," and

32

the arbitrator ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff 12., "by reason of the detention of the plaintiff's debt," but without specifying any debt, the Court held this to be an "event" of the arbitration in the plaintiff's favour, sufficient to entitle him to costs. Green v. Richards, 6 Law J. K.B. 130.

By order of Nisi Prius, a cause was referred to arbitration; the costs were to abide the event: there were two defendants; one attended before the arbitrator, the other never interfered. The Master taxed the whole of the costs of the cause and the reference in one sum:-Semble, that the Master had not power to tax the costs for the defendants separately. Dickins v. Jarvis, 5 B. & C. 528, s. c. 8 D. & R. 285.

Where an arbitrator orders one of the parties to pay the costs of the cause, those costs will be understood to be such as that party would have had to pay in case there had been a judgment in the ordi

nary course.

Accordingly, where a defendant had obtained a verdict on the trial; and, pending a rule for a new trial, obtained by the plaintiff, the cause was referred; "the costs" being in the discretion of the arbitrator, and he found for the plaintiffs, and ordered the defendants to pay the "costs of the cause," it was held, that this did not include the costs of the trial. Rigby v. O'Rell, 5 Law J. K.B. 357, s. c. 7 B. & C. 57.

the debit of the paymaster, giving him notice of that fact; and of the proceedings in and state of the action against the colonel. The former judgment, on representation, was reversed; and it was held, by the Court of Session, and by the House of Lords, on appeal, that the agents were entitled, in an action against the paymaster, to recover the sum in dispute, and the costs of the action against the colonel. M'Donald v. Ross, 2 Bligh, 547.

ARSON.

A challenge on an indictment for arson cannot be sustained, unless the party making the challenge be prepared to prove the requisites required by the 9 Geo. 1. Rex v. Savage, i R. & M. C.C.R. 51.

An indictment for arson must state the ownership-but, where the ownership was laid in an insolvent, who had assigned the premises under the Insolvent Act, and who continued in possession, it was holden sufficient. Rex v. Ball, 1 R. & M. C.C.R. 30.

ARTICLES OF THE PEACE.

The Court of King's Bench will not direct articles of the peace to be entered into at Westminster, upon a fact arising in the country. R. v. A. B., 2 Ken. 511, s. c. as Rex v. Waite, 2 Burr. 780.

ARMY.

An officer cannot pledge or mortgage his commission. Collyer v. Fallon, 3 Law J. Chanc. 23. Where A applied to two soldiers, a drummer and a private, to enlist him, which they at first refused, but afterwards the drummer gave him a shilling for that purpose, and, on A's wanting to go away, they detained him: Held, that they had no authority to enlist, and therefore no right to detain him. Rex v. Longden, R. & R. C.C.R. 228.

ARMY AGENTS.

[See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, and SET-OFF.] Army agents having distinct accounts with the ecionel and paymaster of a regiment, upon the asearance of the paymaster, that he was authorized by the colonel, and on his account, to provide certain arties for the regiment, transfer to the debit of the commel a mum standing in their books, originally Gated to the paymaster; and having settled wakula with, and the balance due from, the payMbales, eum the colonel for the balance claimed by Belle, intruding the sum upon the debit transferred. Vending time setion, the paymaster, on the requisitood the gents, furnishes them with a letter from Kim has me the authority for the charge against him. The agents being fully satisfied as to the plaça, and meaning of this authority, in the course

tylings maintain strenuously the right of Rady that to set under it, and judgment in the kie instanta in given in their favour. After they kah (PAWINKA Kina jedyment, apprehending the posĐến với xưởng kết nối thông tin ĐC TRd, they re transfer

be the hapete from the debit of the colonel to

ARREST.

(A) FOR WHAT CAUSE OF ACTION ALLOWED. (B) WHO ARE PRIVILEGED FROM.

(a) Married Woman, see BARON AND FEME. (b) Attorney, see ATTORNEY AND SOLI

CITOR.

(C) IRREGULARITIES.

(D) WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ARREST. (E) RE-ARREST, WHEN ALLOWED. (F) ARREST IN CRIMINAL CASES. [And see BAIL.]

(A) FOR WHAT CAUSE OF ACTION ALLOWED. [See 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 71. s. 1, 5 Law J. Abr. Stat. 123.]

A party cannot be holden to bail, upon a subsequent promise to pay a debt, as to which he has been discharged upon an insolvent act. Butt v. Vane, 4 D. & R. 154.

Unsettled accounts do not prevent the party, in whose favour the balance appears to be, from holding the other to bail. Turlington v. Erasmus, 1

Ken. 424.

A party may be arrested on a guarantee to pay for goods furnished to a third person, on the common affidavit for goods sold and delivered. Cope v. Joseph, 9 Price, 155.

A submission was made to two arbitrators, with power to name an umpire, who was to make his award on or before a further day. The arbitrators named an umpire, who made an award for the plaintiff, but (as was sworn by the defendant,) after the further time had elapsed. The plaintiff was held entitled to hold the defendant to bail, without