that he would not return again. To which it was replied, that afterwards the apprentice returned and offered to obey his commands, but the master refused to receive him: Held, that if the apprentice had, under these circumstances, stopped away an unreasonable time, which ought to have been stated in a rejoinder, the master would have been justified in not receiving him; but that he was not at liberty to turn him away, or refuse to admit his apprentice into his house for misconduct, and absenting himself for a few days, but should have sued on his covenant. Winstone v. Linn, 1 Law J. K.B. 126, s. c. 1 B. & C. 460, s. c. 2 D. & R. 465.

A executed an indenture of apprenticeship, (to which was appended a printed notice for the insertion of the premium, &c. under stat. 5 Geo. 3. c. 49.) by which A bound her son apprentice to B, and A paid a premium. The indenture did not contain any statement respecting the premium, and was not stamped. The indenture being invalid for want of such statement, and not having been stamped within the period limited: It was held, that A was not an innocent party, and that A could not recover the apprentice fee from B, although paid without consideration, the indenture being invalid. Stokes v. Twitchen, 8 Taunt. 492, s. c. 2 B. Mo. 538.

A covenant in an indenture of apprenticeship, to instruct and provide for an apprentice, does not make the master answerable for the acts of the apprentice, or render him liable to an action for breach of covenant, in case the apprentice refuses to be taught, absents himself from the service, or disqualifies himself from serving in that capacity. Hughes v. Humphreys, 5 Law J. K.B. 270, s. c. 6 B. & C.

680.

Semble-That where an indenture of apprenticeship is offered in evidence, it may be presumed that the premium stated to have been given, was the sum actually paid; and the Court will not oblige the party producing it on the trial, to prove the payment on oath, as required by the 8 Anne, c. 1. Stewart

v. Lawton, 2 Law J. C.P. 27, s. c. 1 Bing. 374, s. c. 8 B. Mo. 414.

Where an apprentice is bound out of a parish by his father, but part of the expenses is paid from the parochial funds, the indenture will be void ab initio, and not merely voidable, if not approved of under the seals as well as the hands of two justices, pursuant to the provisions of 56 Geo. 3. c. 139. s. 11. Rex v. Stoke Damerel, 6 Law J. M.C. 28, s. c. 7 B. & C. 536, s. c. 1 M. & R. 458.

If a lad goes on liking with a view to his being bound an apprentice, his intended master cannot charge for his board and lodging for the first month, nor perhaps for so long time as he conducts himself properly. But if he stays for many months, behaving ill after complaints to his father of his misconduct, it will be for the jury to say whether there was any contract, either express or implied, that his father should pay for his board and lodging. Earratt v. Burghart, 3 C. & P. 381. [Tenterden]

The Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench will grant a warrant to discharge an apprentice, who has enlisted without his master's consent. Parkins, 2 Ken. 295.

Rex v.

A habeas corpus does not lie where the party does not say that he is detained against his consent. Therefore, on motion for a habeas to discharge an

apprentice impressed, it was refused, his assent not appearing the proper mode being, in the absence of a consent, for the master to procure a warrant from a judge to the commander of the vessel, ordering his discharge. Ex parte Grocot, 5 D. & R. 610.

APPROPRIATION.

[See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, and BANKER.]

A bankrupt, prior to an act of bankruptcy, drew bills upon defendant, undertaking to provide for them, in case remittances to be received by him, due on foreign consignments, should not arrive in time to meet them: Held, that this was conclusive evidence of an agreement between the parties, that the proceeds of such goods should be applied in satisfaction of the bills, and amounted to a specific appropriation prior to the bankruptcy; and the defendant having paid the bills and received the remittances, was entitled to appropriate them towards such payments. Thomas v. Da Costa, 8 Taunt. 345, s. c. 2 B. Mo. 386.

The firm of a country bank gave a bond to their corresponding London bankers, conditioned for the repayment of all sums of money, &c. which the latter persons might advance to them, or any of them, associated or not with other persons.

In

On the death of one of the country bankers, there was a large balance due to the London ones. the following month large sums were remitted to the London bankers, who continued to pay them away, and they were respectively placed to the old accounts; but no monthly statement was sent into the country. At the end of the second month, two accounts were sent from London: the old one, up to the death of the partner, and a new one, which included all the remittances since his death, taken from the old ac count.

If the remittances had remained in the old account, then nothing was due on it; but if the London bankers could alter their books, then the defendants were liable for the balance in the old account: The Court held, that inasmuch as no communication had taken place, the first entries made by the London bankers were not an appropriation of the money, and that they were entitled to put it to the new account. Simson v. Ingham,1 Law J. K.B. 234, s. c. 2 B. & C. 65, s. c. 3 D. & R. 249.

If, where a person has two claims, one recognized by law, the other arising on a matter forbidden by Jaw, an unappropriated payment be made, the law will afterwards appropriate it to the demand which it acknowledges, and not to the one which it prohibits. Wright v. Laing, 3 B. & C. 165, s. c. 4 D. & R. 783.

A, the acceptor of two bills for 251. and 501., both overdue, paid 22l. 10s. to B, the holder, "on account.' B said 'he wished to have the full amount of the 25l. bill." A replied "he had no more money then, but would pay some more soon.' B then indorsed on the 25l. bill," Received 22l. 10s. in part of two bills:" Held, that B might appropriate the payment to the 251. bill, though void for want of a stamp. Biggs v. Dwight, 6 Law J. K.B. 45, s. c. 1 M. & R. 308.

A, for the purpose of sale, consigned a cargo of fish to B, who was a correspondent with the house

24

of C, C having advanced money to A on an engagement from A, that the proceeds of the cargo of fish should be remitted by B to A through the hands of C, in order that they might form a security for the money advanced by C. A afterwards wrote to B telling him that the cargo of fish was not liable to any advances made by C. Notwithstanding this, B, after the receipt of A's letter, remitted the proceeds to C, who retained them to cover his advance, A having become bankrupt, and his assignees having sued B for the proceeds: Held, that a jury was warranted in considering A's engagement as an appropriation of the cargo of fish, which he could not rescind, and not a mere order for payment of money, which could be revoked by a subsequent countermand before payment. Fisher v. Miller, 1 Bing. 150, s. c. 7 B. Mo. 527.

Where A, having certain funds standing to his credit at the bankers, by letter, directed them to carry some parts of such funds to the account of certain persons, as trustees for his wife, and, after her decease, for his son; and other parts thereof to the account of certain persons, as trustees for his son; and such sums were accordingly carried over by the bankers to the account of such persons in their books, and the dividends were from time to time carried to the same accounts; but the testator never communicated the fact to the trustees; and there was some evidence that the testator had directed the transfers under an impression that he should be able, by that means, to evade the legacy duty, and that he had shewn an intention to exercise some acts of ownership over the funds: the Court held, that the appropriations were void, and that the testator might at any time have revoked them. Gaskell v. Gaskell, 2 Y. & J. 502.

ARBITRATION.

(A) SUBMISSION.

(B) ORDER OF REFERENCE.

(C) EFFECT OF THE REFERENCE. (D) REVOCATION.

ARBITRATOR.

(a) Authority.

(b) Privilege.

(F) MODE OF PROCEEDING.

(G) UMPIRE.

(H) AWARD.

(a) Form and construction of.

(b) Effect of, and within what time to be

made.

(I) RULE OF COURT.

(K) REMEDIES.

(L) PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.

(M) OF SETTING ASIDE THE AWARD AND

DIRECTING THE ARBITRATORS TO RE

VIEW.

(N) COSTS.

(A) SUBMISSION.

Where a submission to an award was signed by three of five joint contractors: Held, that it would not bind the five, as it was not an act within the ordinary course of business of a trading firm. Stead v. Salt, 3 Law J. C.P. 175, s. c. 3 Bing. 101.

Where matters in difference are referred to arbitration, by bond or agreement, and one of the parties revokes the authority of the arbitrator, he may be liable to an action; but the submission cannot afterwards be made a rule of court, in order to bring him into contempt.

But where a cause is referred by a judge's order, such order may be made a rule of court, even after revocation, in order to bring the party revoking into contempt.

It therefore seems advisable, and is recommended by the Court, that the submission be made a rule of court, in the first instance, and before any step be taken in the reference. Howard v. Kaye, 5 Law J. K.B. 62.

(B) ORDER OF REFERENCE.

Where a reference is directed at Nisi Prius, but the defendant dies before the order is drawn up, the proper course is to move for leave to enter nominal damages. Wyatt v. Hoste, 1 Law J. C.P. 98.

(C) EFFECT OF THE REFERENCE.

Where one of the parties in a cause is appointed receiver, and afterwards, by a consent order, all the matters in dispute in the cause are referred to arbitration, this order and the pending reference will not be any objection to making such application to the Court, as may be necessary, in order to compel the party who is receiver, to pay in, to the credit of the cause, such sums as the Master shall have reported due from him, in his character of receiver. v. Jarman, 3 Law J. Chanc. 12.

A verdict was taken for the amount of the damages laid in the declaration, subject to the award of a barrister. He proceeded a little way with it, but from motives of delicacy declined finishing it, and one of the defendants refused to appoint another arbitrator. The Court would not stay execution for the amount of the verdict from issuing against that defendant, unless he would consent to appoint another arbitrator. Woolley v. Clark, 1 Law J. K.B. 38, s. c. 1 B. & C. 63, s. c. 2 D. & R. 158.

(D) REVOCATION.

Two parties agreed, by writing, not under seal, to refer their differences to the arbitration of CS, and bound themselves mutually in a penalty for the true and faithful observance and performance of the award to be made by him: Held, that a revocation of the submission was a breach of the agreement, and incurred the penalty. Warburton v. Storr, 3 Law J. K.B. 156, s. c. 4 B. & C. 103, s. c. 6 D. & R. 213.

Until a baron's order directing a reference be made a rule of court, it is revocable. Greenwood v. Misdale, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 276.

A party who has submitted to arbitration under an order of Nisi Prius, may revoke his submission before the order has been made a rule of court, and the Court will set aside the award made after such revocation, even in a case where the party revoking has obtained time from the arbitrator. Clapham v. Hyam, 1 Law J. C.P. 5, s. c. 1 Bing. 87, s. c. 7 B. Mo. 403.

A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the award of an arbitrator, to whom all matters in difference were referred. One of the parties died. The Court set aside an award for being made after

his death, which (although he was a nominal party) put an end to the authority of the arbitrator. Rhodes v. Haigh, 2 Law J. K.B. 40, s. c. 2 B. & C. 345, s. c. 3 D. & R. 608.

The death of either of the parties before an award, is not a revocation of the submission, under an order of Nisi Prius, if the judgment and verdict will embrace all the matters in dispute. Bower v. Taylor, cited Rhodes v. Haigh, 2 Law J. K.B. 40, 8. c. 3 D. & R. 610, s. c. 2 B. & C. 347.

Athough the reference to arbitration is made under an order of the Court, every party may revoke the authority of the arbitrator before the award is made; but it is a high contempt so to do. Haggett v. Welsh, 1 S. & S. 134.

(E) ARBITRATOR.

(a) Authority.

Subsequent to a reference by bond, one of several obligees died, previous to the award being made: Held, that the arbitrators could not award payment by the survivors and executors of the deceased, and direct releases, &c. to be given. Quære, If the award would have been effectual if made on surviving obligees only? Edmunds v. Cox, 2 Chit. 432. Where a cause and all matters in dispute between the parties were referred by a bond, in which no mention was made of the costs: Held, that the arbitrator had power over the costs of the cause, but not those of the reference. Firth v. Robinson, 1 Law J. K.B. 115, s. c. 1 B. & C. 277.

Under a reference to arbitration, authorizing the arbitrators to examine the parties to the suit on oath, it was holden, that the words were sufficiently large to empower the arbitrator to examine the plaintiff in support of his own case. Warne v. Bryant, 3 B. & C. 590, s. c. 5 D. & R. 601.

Two partners, as surgeons, referred all matters in dispute between them, and the terms on which the partnership should be dissolved, to arbitration. The arbitrator having awarded that one of them should not act as such during the life of the other, within thirteen miles of the place wherein they resided: It was holden that the award was good, inasmuch as the arbitrator had power to impose such a condition. Morley v. Newman, 5 D. & R. 317.

If, in an action on a policy of insurance, where a total loss has been sustained, the jury find an average loss, directing the amount to be ascertained by an arbitrator, which necessarily involves the question, whether the expenses of the sale of the damaged cargo should be borne by the underwriters or not: Held to be a question not within the province of a jury, but to be decided by the arbitrator. Hudson v. Marjoribanks, 1 Bing. 393, s. c. 7 B. Mo. 463.

Where the time for making an award was enlarged by the parties altering and re-executing the arbitration bonds,-it was holden, that the arbitrator might award interest beyond the original submission: that is, down to the extended date. Watkins v. Philpots, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 393.

Where a cause was referred by order at Nisi Prius, and the arbitrator awarded that which the plaintiff had claimed in her declaration, but had afterwards abandoned: The Court set aside the award pro tanto, as an excess of jurisdiction. Hooper v. Hooper, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 509. Arbitrators named to fix the value of an estate, DIGEST, 1822-1828.

may adopt the opinion of skilful men, employed by them to survey part of the property. Hopcraft v. Hickman, 3 Law J. Chanc. 43, s. c. 2 S. & S. 130.

Where an arbitrator has a power to examine the parties, such a power includes the liberty of examining witnesses who are interested in the result; and who, at Nisi Prius, would, on that ground, be incompetent. Laird v. Dixon, 6 Law J. K.B. 109.

The authority of an arbitrator under a rule of court, which empowers him to deliver his award to the parties or their executors, does not determine by the death of one of the parties before the award is executed. Clarke v. Crofts, 5 Law J. C.P. 127, s. c. 4 Bing. 143.

Where, after the trustees of an infant had referred matters to arbitration, the latter died before the award was made: Held, that an award against the trustees, as such, could not be enforced. Bristow v. Binns, 3 D. & R. 184.

Where guardians had submitted matters to arbitration, and the infant died, the Court relieved the guardians from the consequences of the award, and set it aside. Burslem v. Burns, 1 Law J. K.B. 155.

An arbitrator, in regulating the future use of a stream of water, the right to which was divided between the parties, interfered with the customary enjoyment by one of them of another stream, which exclusively belonged to him, and was not a matter in difference, and which joined the first: Held, that he had power to do so, incidental to and resulting from his former direct and larger power.

If an arbitrator, after regulating on the subject matter referred to him in its present state, goes on and regulates prospectively on the same subject matter reduced to a different state, and thereby in some degree altered, quære, whether that be a proceeding beyond his authority. Winter v. Lethbridge, 13 Price 533, s. c. 1 M'Clel. 253.

(b) Privilege.

The Court will not direct a barrister to make an affidavit respecting anything which has been done by him as an arbitrator, but the Court will give him the option, either to state to the Court any matters he may think proper, or to make an affidavit. Mansfield v. Partington, 2 Law J. K.B. 153.

(F) MODE OF Proceeding.

The witnesses in an arbitration may, by consent, bo examined without the oath having been administered, provided they take it before the award is made. Mansfield v. Partington, 2 Law J. K.B. 153.

When a cause is referred to arbitration, the mode of conducting it must be left to the arbitrators; and if they, after the first or second meeting, exclude both the parties and their attornies, and examine witnesses privately, at their (the witnesses') houses, it seems that such conduct is no good ground of objection, provided it does not proceed from corrupt motives. At all events, if either party would take advantage of it, he must give notice at the time that he intends to rely on it as an objection; and if he lie by and suffer other meetings to take place, and when the arbitrators are ready to make their award, revoke his submission, he is liable in an action to the other party, who was desirous of having the benefit of the award. Hewlett v. Laycock, 2 C. & P. 574. [Abbott]

E

26

(G) UMPIRE.

A cause was referred to two arbitrators, with liberty for them, if they could not agree, to choose a third, and the award of any two of them was to be good. The two arbitrators, not being able to make an award, agreed that they should cast lots, and that they should each name a person, from whom the winner should choose the third arbitrator; who was so chosen. The Court held that the third arbitrator had been improperly appointed, and set aside the award. Young v. Miller, 3 Law J. K.B. 54, s. c. 3 B. & C. 407, s. c. 5 D. & R. 263.

Two arbitrators were empowered to appoint an umpire under the terms of the reference, prior to entering into consideration of the matters in dispute, and to make their award before a specified day, or such period as they, or any two of them should appoint; the arbitrators, antecedent to appointing the umpire, enlarged the time, and, subsequently, held a meeting at which the parties attended: it was determined, as the parties were aware of these facts, and had afterwards attended, they could not make any objection, on the ground of the enlargement of the time having been made before the appointment of the umpire. In re Hick, 8 Taunt. 694.

If the submission to arbitration leave the costs in the discretion of the arbitrators, who have power to choose an umpire, the award is good if the amount of the costs is settled by the umpire. Taylor v. Dutton, 1 Law J. K.B. 158.

By a reference, all matters in dispute between the parties were submitted to the determination of two arbitrators; and, in case of their not agreeing, to choose an umpire; the latter made an award without the express admission of the arbitrators that they could not agree: the Court refused to set it aside. Hill v. Marshall, 5 Law J. C.P. 161.

A deed of submission authorizing arbitrators to appoint an umpire in, or to concur with them in considering and determining the matters referred, does not bind the parties to an award made by that umpire alone. Beddall v. Page, 5 Law J. K.B. 101. (H) AWARD.

(a) Form and construction of.

In general an award which is bad as to part, is bad as to the whole. Harris v. Curnow, 2 Chit. 594.

Though an award be bad for regulating prospectively on the subject matter referred, yet that does not vitiate those parts which are otherwise unobjectionable; and it may stand in toto, until the particular contingency arise, to which the prospective regulation refers. Winter v. Lethbridge, 13 Price, 533, s. c. 1 M'Clel. 253.

Where an action of ejectment was referred to arbitration, and the reference stated, that if the arbitrator should award that the plaintiff had any cause of action, he should be entitled to costs as in a court of law; and the arbitrator directed the defendant to deliver up the premises, and pay the costs of the action, and pay a sum of money to the plaintiff for the loss of rent during the time the defendant had continued in possession, and that the parties should execute general mutual releases. It was decided, that the award, with respect to the payment of the

money was good, although the arbitrator did not find in terms that the plaintiff had any cause of action; and that if the award were bad, with regard to the directions as to mutual releases, it would not vitiate the whole award. Doe d. Williams v. Richardson, 8 Taunt. 697.

So in every case, if the subject of submission be capable of being separated, the award may be valid in part, and invalid in part; but it is otherwise where all the matters are within the submission, and the award is upon the face of it entire. Auriol v. Smith, 1 Turner, 128.

As the language of an award is immaterial, fram. ing it in the form of an opinion does not invalidate. Matson v. Trower, 1 R. & M. 17. [Abbott]

An award which a man of common understanding can comprehend, is sufficient. Ex parte Aitcheson, 1 Law J. K.B. 48, s. c. 2 D. & R. 222.

When a cause, and all matters in difference between the parties, are referred to arbitration, it is not necessary in the award to specify what part of the sum awarded is given for the differences, independent of the cause of action. Waters v. Pedley, 2 Law J. K.B. 152.

If arbitrators determine upon one point in dispute, and refer the other to an umpire, who makes an award, it is bad in toto, unless the submission gave them an express authority to make their award in such a detached manner. Tollit v. Saunders, 9 Price, 612.

The terms of an award cannot be altered; the Court therefore refused to order the award to be made consistent with the submission. Hall v. Alderson, 2 Bing. 476.

An award by arbitrators named to fix the value of an estate, is not uncertain, by reason of its allowing an augmentation or diminution in the sum fixed, even where the submission to arbitration gave minute directions for the course to be pursued by the arbitrator, as the price, according as the land shall, upon admeasurement, exceed or fall short of a given quantity.

But if the augmentation or diminution in the price is to be at the rate of so much per acre, if the error as to quantity shall be in one part of the estate; and at a different rate per acre, if the error shall be in auother part of the estate; and the award does not express the estimated quantity of either of these parts taken separately; then the award is void for uncertainty. Hopcraft v. Hickman, 3 Law J. Chanc. 43, s. c. 2 S. & S. 130.

An award, that each party shall pay his own costs in a certain action, and that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff a certain sum for making the first breach, is not uncertain. Hawkins v. Colclough, 2 Ken. 553, s. c. 1 Burr. 275.

If a submission be, that the award shall be made by four persons, or any three of them, and it be only executed by three of them, though made by four, it is void. Thomas v. Harrop, 1 S. & S. 524.

An award directing an executor (who had referred matters to arbitration) to pay a certain sum, on a named day, out of the assets in his hands, without stating whether there were assets, is not void for uncertainty. Love v. Honeybourne, 4 D. & R. 814.

All matters in difference between two persons were referred by them to arbitration. The submission recited, that certain actions were depending, in

which they and others were jointly made parties. The arbitrators awarded, that the costs of those actions should be paid by them in certain proportions, and that the sums already paid by either of them should be considered as part payment by them. The Court held the award to be sufficiently certain and final. Cargey v. Aitcheson, 1 Law J. K.B. 252, 8. c. 2 B. & C. 170, s. c. 3 D. & R. 433; affirmed in error 2 Bing. 199, s. c. 9 B. Mo. 38, s. c. M'Clel. 367.

Where several underwriters to a policy, after entering into a consolidation rule, referred the cause; and the arbitrators awarded an aggregate sum to the assured from the underwriters at large, the Court refused to order the arbitrators to separate the sums due from each, and to open the consolidation rule, without the consent of the defendants. Kynaston v. Liddell, 8 B. Mo. 223.

Where the time for making the award is enlarged by a judge's order, the award should state on the face of it, that the enlargement was made by consent; otherwise the Court will not grant an attachment for its non-performance. Halden v. Glasscock, 5 B. & C. 380, s. c. 8 D. & R. 151.

A cause, and all matters in difference between plaintiff and defendant were referred by order of Nisi Prius: the arbitrator awarded, "that there is nothing due to the plaintiff:" Held, that the award was sufficient, and determined the right of action between the parties. Dickins v. Jarvis, 5 B. & C. 528, s. c. 8 D. & R. 285.

An award that A or B, shall do a certain act, is bad for uncertainty. Lawrence v. Hodgson, 1 Y. & J. 16.

Where a question as to the validity of a payment, made by a bankrupt in the ordinary course of trade, was referred to an arbitrator, who found specially a payment under arrest, and other circumstances tending to shew, that it was made to the creditor coguisant of the insolvency, and awarded against the payment being bond fide, without assigning any reasons:-It was bolden, that he must have concluded that the creditor had notice of the insolvency; and, therefore, the award was good on that ground: secondly, that the word insolvency, in the 19 Geo. 2, must, in this instance, be construed not to mean a state of utter and complete insolvency, but must be understood in its popular sense and lastly, that they dissented from those cases which decide, that a payment under an arrest was in the ordinary course of trade-(Hullock B. dissent.) Teale v. Younge, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 497.

An arbitrator gave a shilling damages, which he declared to be in full for the injury which the plaintiff had sustained up to the time of making the award: Held, that although the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in giving damages beyond the commencement of the action; yet, as the damages themselves were (and à fortiori the excess was) merely nominal, and could not affect the costs, the award was good.

On a general reference, by three partners, of all matters in difference, to arbitration, the arbitrators found the partnership capital, on the day of the dissolution, to be, in merchandize and good debts, of a given amount, including a debt due from A, one of the partners, and that there were some dubious debts. They then ascertained the amount of the

27

debts due from the partnership, and found the gross value of the stock, which, including the debt due from A, they awarded to be divisible between the other partners, B and C. They next found the dubious debts to be divisible as received between the three partners; and they awarded that A should give security for the payment of his debt by instalments; and directed B to receive the outstanding debts and effects, and to pay all debts owing by the partnership, of which accounts were to be stated periodically; and of the balance of receipts, special credit was to be given for A's share against his debt, and the remainder was to be divided between B and C; and any balance of payments was to be borne in the same proportions. The award was acted upon by all parties, but B subsequently received some debts which were omitted in the accounts laid before the arbitrators, and on which their award proceeded; and he also received good debts to a larger amount than had been estimated by the arbitrators. On a bill by A against his co-partners: Held, that he was entitled, notwithstanding the reference was of all matters in difference, to an account of the good debts received beyond the amount estimated by the arbitrators, and to an account of the receipts in respect of dubious debts; and that any over-receipt, in respect of good debts, ought to follow the direc tions of the award with respect to the dubious debts. Spencer v. Spencer, 2 Y. & J. 249.

Although an award, which finds the special facts, is in the nature of a special verdict, it is not to be construed with so much strictness; but the award is to be maintained, if it is good in substance.

A plaintiff declared in an action on the case for an injury done to his reversionary interest. The action was referred to an arbitrator, who found for the plaintiff, with nominal damages; but the language be used in finding the special facts appeared to indicate rather a possessory interest: Held, that the award was good, as the Court would not presume that damages had been given in respect of any injury, but that which was the subject of the declaration. Harding v. Harrison, 5 Law J. K.B. 249.

(b) Effect of, and within what time to be made.

A reference to arbitrators contained two provisos -first, that the death of either of the parties before the making of the award, should not be a revocation of their authority; and secondly, giving them power to enlarge the time for making their award: the plaintiff having died, and the arbitrators after his decease baving enlarged the time for making the award: It was holden that the reference gave them incidentally the same power of enlarging the time after that event as before, and that an award made within such enlarged time was good. Tyler v. Jones, 3 B. & C. 144, s. c. 4 D. & R. 740.