and concupiscible, placed the former in the heart, the latter in the belly, while he thought the rational was seated in the head". § 10. Schol. 1. It must still be matter of controversy, in what part of the brain the soul is seated. There is no reason to think, as some have imagined, that it is in the meninges; but, whether it be in the pineal gland, as DES-CARTES supposes; or as Dr. MORE thinks, among the animal spirits in the fourth ventricle, or in the corpora striata, as has been lately maintained in France, or in some part different from any of these, we cannot certainly say *b § 11. 2. The constitution of some animals may perhaps be different from that of men in this respect. It is certain, the phænomena mentioned § 3. are not always to be found in them; for wasps will live a long time after their heads are cut off; eels are soonest killed by striking them on the tail; and vipers will live some hours after their heads are cut off, and their bowels taken out. LECT. VI. § 1. Def. ANY idea or proposition is said to be innate, when it is not acquired by the use of the faculties, but so implanted in the mind from its original, as to be common to the whole species, independently upon any circumstances in which individuals may be placed +. § 2. Prop. There are no innate ideas in the human mind. § 3. Dem. 1. There can no SIMPLE idea be assigned, but may be traced up to sensation or reflection, or both: v. g. ta one sense alone; as seeing green, hearing the sound of an organ, smelling a rose, tasting a peach, feeling solidity, &c. or more; as extension, motion, rest: to reflection only, as percep a VITRINGA ubi supra, ? 4. sub fin. MORE, ibid. 1. ii. c. vii. 5-10. DES-CARTES de Pass. 38. COLLIB. on the Soul, Ess. i. 3. b DES CARTES de Pass? 32. MORE, ibid. 1. ii. c. vii. 12-18. c. viii. per tot, Who knows * Dr. GALL pretends to find the seat of the faculty of observation immediately behind the forehead; and the organ of courage a little above the ear. but the time will come, when we shall have exact representations, exhibited to the eye, of the residence of each faculty of the mind in the human body, even as now our dwellings are seen in a full map!-W. †There is a wide difference between an innate proposition, and an innate idea, according to our author's definition of "Idea." While the former is denied the latter may be allowed, since consciousness is included in it.-W. tion, volition, duration: or sensation and reflection both, as existence and various kinds of pleasure and pain. Vid. Lect. 1. § 13. $4. 2. We see that simple ideas are acquired gradually, and the furniture of various persons differs according to their various circumstances in life". § 5. 3. When the organs of sensation are destroyed, simple ideas proper to them are no more acquired; and those, who from their birth, want proper organs, want correspondent ideas, even though they be ever so important to the comfort and usefulness of life. Therefore, § 6. 4. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose, that any simple ideas are innate. $7. 5. COMPOUND ideas are made up of simple ones, nor can we, by any operation of the mind, produce any idea how chimerical soever, the materials of which we are not already possessed of. Hence, § 8. 6. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose any of our ideas innate. Q. E. D*. a LOCKE, 1. ii. c. iii, v-vii. Ibid. c. i. 2, 7-9. d Locke, l. ii. c. ii. 2. Ibid. c. xii. 18. *The force of this demonstration, it may be objected, depends on a petitio principii, that every simple idea may be traced to either sensation or reflection. If we admit this principle, it must be in favour of a definition of "idea" different from what our author has given. According to that, consciousness is an idea; but to say that all consciousness is derived from either sensation or reflection, in the proper sense of these words, is inadmissible. If by innate be understood any whatever source of ideas which is not included in sensation or reflection, then it may be urged, that our notion of positive infinity, or of God, is innate; for our idea of growing infinity which is derived from sensation and reflection, is essentially different. Besides, that notion which is itself the measure of compatibility or incompatibility actually presides over all sensations and reflections, and therefore cannot be the offspring of either. The chief question at issue is, and which is of greater moment in religion than is commonly imagined, is our just notion of the divine essence derived from either sensation, or reflection, or both? Many, no doubt, have their ideas of what they call God from thence; but they will, probably, be found false and dangerous. That notion which is attained by magnifying finites ad infinitum has an object essentially and infinitely different from the divine essence; but the only idea we can have of infinity from sensation and reflection is that of a FINITE EVER-GROWING. If our notion of God have not a more innate origin than this, it concerns us to know whether we have any notion of him at all but what is idolatrous. A mind properly disposed may, by a just comparison of ideas, attain to a certainty that there is a God; but this certainty implies that there is an adequate ground for it in one of the ideas compared, yet this cannot be, if positive infinity, existence, independance, &c. be not perceived (though not comprehended) as implied in one of the ideas. It follows therefore, that though every man do not clearly per § 9. Schol. 1. Dr. WATTS supposes, there are three sources of our ideas, viz. sensation, reflection, and abstraction; but since he grants that the materials of the last are derived from the two former, this cannot be reckoned a third primary source, any more than compounding". § 10. 2. BROWN, in his Procedure of the Understanding, maintains that we have all our ideas originally from sensation: but his proof depends entirely upon his definition of the word idea, which he takes for a picture or representation of some sensible object laid up in the imagination; which is different from our definition of it. Vid. Lect. 1. § 2. § 11. 3. Most of those ideas which arise from reflection, come into the mind later than those which arise from sensation c. § 12. 4. Many errors in our ideas of sensation are rectified by reflection". LECT. VII. Of Innate Propositions. § 1. Prop. THERE mind. HERE are no innate propositions in the human § 2. Dem. 1. All propositions consist of ideas: therefore innate propositions would imply innate ideas, contrary to Lect. 6. § 2o. § 3. 2. If any propositions could be supposed innate, it must be those that are intuitively discerned; but these, though assented to as soon as proposed, are not known before such proposal, even by those whose minds are least corrupted by education and custom: which shews, by the way, that they cannot be the principles of all our knowledge, not being themselves first known f. § 4. 3. All propositions relating to identity and diversity of ideas may be intuitively discerned, and consequently must be a WATTS's Phil. Ess. iii. ? 16. p. 93-97. b Proced. of Underst. p. 55, 63-66. PRICE's Rev. of Mor. c. i. § 2. MONBOD. on the Orig. and Progr. of Lang. vol. i. p. 1-184. C LOCKE's Ess. 1. ii. c. i. § 8. d LOCKE's Ess. 1. ii. c. ix. 8, 9. SMITH'S Optics, vol. ii. Append. p. 27, 28. e LOCKE's Ess. 1. i. c. iv. ? 19. f LOCKE's Ess. 1. i. c. ii. § 4, 16, 21—27. ceive a being absolutely great and excellent, yet every man who perceives this conclusion with certainty, "that there is such a being," must perceive, or have such an idea of him, as is included in the premises of that conclusion. To which may be added, that every man may, if it be not his own fault, have that idea of God's absolute existence, as implied in the consistent belief of the true God.-W. innate, if intuitive discerning were the mark of an innate proposition. But this would imply, that all our ideas were innate, which is evidently absurd1. § 5. 4. Propositions supposed innate cannot be distinguished from others, so that a complete catalogue of them should be made: yet this might reasonably be expected, if any were so, and would be necessary to render them useful. § 6. 5. Several of those propositions which are of greatest importance in morality, and seem most evident, and are therefore most likely to be innate, are unknown to some, and expressly contradicted by others, and all need proof. Valet propositio. §7. Schol. 1. It may be granted, that there are certain circumstances, in which it is impossible for the mind to avoid receiving certain ideas, and assenting to certain propositions, and even taking them for granted in all its reasonings: and this is the necessary consequence of its constitution. It may also be granted, that there is something in natural temper disposing to gratitude, compassion, &c. as effectually, as if propositions recommending them were inscribed upon the soul. But this is by no means inconsistent with what has been said above: and in this sense Mr. LOCKE Owns innate practical principles, as the desire of happiness d. § 8. 2. The dream of innate ideas seems to have arisen on the one hand, from the desire of teachers to impose their own sentiments upon their disciples, as sacred truths stampt on their minds by the author of nature; and on the other, from the ease with which such principles have been early received, and the assurance with which they have been assented to, so that people cannot remember, that they have ever doubted of theme *. a LOCKE's Ess. 1. i. c. iv. 14, 5. Ibid. 1. iv. c. vii. 14 b LOCKE's Ess. 1. i. c. iii. 14. Ibid. c. iv. 21. C LOCKE's Ess. 1. i. c. iv. 4-13. SALE'S Pref. to the Koran, p. 131, 132. BAXTER'S Works, vol. ii. p. 381. d LOCKES's Ess. 1. i. c. iii. 3. WATTS's Ess. iv. § 2-4. p. 100-102, 104-107. SHAFTSB. Lett. to a Stud. viii. e LOCKE's Ess. 1. i. c. iii. § 21-26. Ibid. c. iv. 24 * On this important subject Mr. LOCKE was not guarded; and some of his many admirers have but too naturally drawn consequences from his doctrine not a little prejudicial to the interests of true piety. He did well to expose monkish ignorance, and the arbitrary imposition of dogmas on the Human Mind, to the exclusion of appropriate evidence; but in so doing he should not have opened a door for a greater evil, a species of refined idolatry. From the advocates of Mr. LoCKE in this view of the subject, we fain would learn, whether the conclusion of a syllogism that teaches knowledge or certainty can legitimately contain more than both the premises? and whether, on his principles, it LECT VIII. Of Different Ideas excited-Memory. § 1. Prop. THE same external qualities in objects may ex cite different ideas in different persons. § 2. Dem. 1. If the organs of sensation be at all different, the ideas of the same object must be proportionably so, while the same laws of nature prevail. § 3. 2. It is probable, there may be some degree of dif ference in the organs of different persons; v. g. in the distance of the retina and chrystalline humour of the eye; in the degree of extension in the tympanum of the ear, in the acrimony of the saliva, &c. And the variety, which is observable in the faces, the voices, and the bones of men, and almost through the whole face of nature, would lead us to suspect, that the same variety might take place here. 4. 3. Those things which are very pleasing to one, are extremely disagreeable to another. § 5. 4. Those things which are at one time very agreeable, are at another very disagreeable to the same person, when the organs of his body are indisposed, or when other disagreeable ideas are associated with those that had once been grateful.— Valet propositio2. §6. Schol. Though the causes mentioned above may probably produce ideas which differ in degree in the minds of different persons, there is no apparent reason to suppose they differ in their kind; v. g. that what appears green to one, should constantly appear red to another, and vice versâ". §7. Prop. To survey the phænomena of the HUMAN MEMORY, with the solutions that have been given of some of them. Lect. 2. § 19. a LOCKE's Ess. 1. ii. c. xxxii. 15. Ars Cogit. par. i. c. i. LE CLERC's Log. par. 1. c. i. § 15. b MALEBRANCHE's Research. I. i. c. xiii. Į 5, 6. ROHAU T's Phys. par. i. c. xxvii. 16. vol. i. p. 197. Philos. Trans. vol. Ixviii. par. ii. 1778. is possible to come at a certainty that there is absolute infinity, independence, power, &c. in a word, that there is a God? The principles of LOCKE are, 1. That we have no idea or notion at all, from whence to reason with certainty, but what is derived from sensation or reflection; and, 2. That we have no idea of infinity, existence, power, wisdom, &c. but what we derive from finite objects.—But if so, the premises, or ideas of these finite objects, are but finite ideas ever-growing; how then can the conclusion assert absolute infinity, absolute existence? Or must we say that absolute infinity is included in that which is not so, in order to render the conclusion valid?-W. |