vacated, and set aside the order. This appeal is from the last-named order.

Respondents have interposed several motions to strike the statement of facts and dismiss the appeal. There is no merit in any of the motions. The order appealed from, in effect, determines the action brought by the appellant against the executors of the estate, because if the order permitting him to sue is vacated, he has no right to further maintain the action. The order is therefore appealable. The only ground upon which the court could have vacated the order granting the foreign guardian leave to sue in this state was that the court had no jurisdiction to make the order. This is apparently the main contention of respondents. Certainly none of the others are well founded. We think the court had jurisdiction, upon the principle of comity, to make the order allowing the foreign guardian to maintain the action, because we have no statute prohibiting the same. Wharton on Conflict of Laws (volume 1; 3d Ed.), at page 592, § 265a, says: "Many of the state Legislatures have, upon principles of comity, relaxed the rule, as stated by Judge Story, requiring an ancillary appointment; and have recognized the authority of foreign guardians who make due proof of their foreign appointment and authorization, and comply with such conditions as may be imposed. Thus, by local statutes in many states, foreign guardians of nonresident wards are authorized to receive and remove from the state, personal property of their wards in the hands of local guardians and others; and to this end they have been authorized to maintain suits within the state. Even in the absence of such a statute, it seems to be competent for a court possessing chancery powers to order funds belonging to the ward in the hands of a resident guardian to be transmitted to, and paid over to, the domiciliary guardian. It is discretionary, however, with the local courts, even under such statutes, to refuse permission to the foreign guardian to remove the property from the state if it is for the best interests of the ward that the property should be administered within the state." Upon the principle of comity the Legislature of this state enacted section 6419, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. which provides as follows: "When the guardian and ward are both nonresidents, and the ward is entitled to property in this state, which may be removed to another state or territory, without conflict to any restriction or limitation thereupon, or impairing the right of the ward thereto, such property may be removed to the state or territory in which such ward may reside, upon the application of the guardian to the judge of the superior court of the county in which the estate of the ward, or the principal part thereof, may be, in the manner following: The guardian so applying must produce a transcript from the records of a

court of competent jurisdiction, certified according to the laws of this state, showing his appointment as guardian of the ward in the state or territory in which he and the said ward reside; that he has qualified as such according to the laws thereof, and given bond, with sureties, for the performance of his trust; and must also give thirty days' notice to the resident executor, administrator, guardian, agent, or trustee, if there be such, of the applications. Thereupon, if no objection be made, or if no good cause be shown to the contrary, the judge of the court shall make an order granting such guardian leave to remove the property of said ward to the state or territory in which he or she may reside; which order shall be full and complete authority to said guardian to sue for and receive the same in his own name, for the use and benefit of said ward."

It is argued by respondents that this section does not apply to this case, because there is no tangible property involved here; that at most the property sought in this case is a disputed, unliquidated demand, a mere chose in action. The statute, however, uses the word "property" in its comprehensive sense, and evidently includes choses in action, because the last part of the section recites that the "order shall be full and complete authority to said guardian to sue for and receive the same in his own name for the use and benefit of said ward." This provision seems to make it clear that choses in action are included within the meaning of the word "property," as well as tangible property. It follows, therefore, that, under the statute, the court had jurisdiction to make the order. We see no good reason why it should be vacated. In fact, we are convinced that the court properly made the order permitting the foreign guardian to maintain the action in this state. If the estate of Benjamin B. Healy is indebted to the estate of the nonresident wards, there ought to be a recovery.

The judgment of the trial court vacating the order is therefore reversed.

DUNBAR, HADLEY, FULLERTON, and CROW, JJ., concur.

(42 Wash. 364) WEBSTER v. SEATTLE, R. & S. RY. CO. (Supreme Court of Washington. March 19, 1906.)

DAMAGES INJURIES-MEDICAL ATTENDANCEEVIDENCE.

Where, in an action for injuries to a passenger, there was evidence that plaintiff had employed physicians; that he had been severely injured, and had not recovered at the time of the trial, and certain physicians testified that, while he would probably improve, it was problematical whether he would ever recover, two of them testifying that the injury was permanent, and that he would suffer as long as he lived, such evidence justified the recovery of the amount it was reasonably probable plaintiff