Page images
PDF
EPUB

tended is estopped from denying the designation fixed by him.

The prisoner requested that the district attorney be required to elect on which count he would proceed. This request was denied. And he objected to the competency of the evidence of one George Jones, who was jointly indicted with him. He also, objected to the admission

2. The transaction is shown to be the business of the corporation, and on its behalf, and the signature of its proper agent with the name of office attached, is in legal effect, the contract of the corporation, and the acceptance was received of the record of his conviction of petit as the contract of the corporation, and larceny. not of the officer individually. Robertson intended and assumed to contract on behalf of the corporation, and the acceptance was received as the contract of the corporation.

3. The authority of Robertsou to act for the defendant in the premises is sufficiently clear.

Held. 1. That the request to require an election was properly denied. There was but one transaction out of which the indictment grew. The two counts were drawn solely to meet the different aspects in which the evidence might be viewed by the jury.

2.

Wilson was a proper witnees. 4. The corporation had authority to 3. The record of the conviction for make loans on said securities, and the petit larceny was admissible to affect the payment of the loan at a future day was credibility of the prisoner, who was hima mere matter of convenience. The ac-self a witness and denied his guilt. ceptance is binding.

5. The agreement not to use the acceptance except to borrow money on it, does not bind, without notice, third persons who are bona fide holders for value. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Talcott, J.

CRIMINAL LAW.

RAPE-ASSault.

Conviction affirmed.
Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

NEGLECT TO PERFORM A PUBLIC DUTY.
N. Y. SUPREME COURT-GENL. TERM,
SECOND DEPT.

Powell, et al, pltffs in error, v. The
People.

Decided at July Term, 1875.

N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENL. TERM, Panel not drawn fourteen days before hold

SECOND DEPT.

The People, dfdts. in error, v. Satterlee, pltff. in error.

Decided at July Term, 1875. Election of count of indictment. of one party indicted. ency of record of conviction for larceny, to impeach prisoner.

ing the Court. Act under which indictment was drawn, repealed.

Writ of error to review the conviction of the plaintiffs in error,

The plaintiffs in error were tried and Evi- convicted of the violation of the provisions Compet-of a statute at a Special Term of the Court 'petit of Oyer and Terminer.

Writ of error to the Court of Sessions, of the County of Suffolk, to review the conviction of the plaintiff in error of rape. The prisoner was indicted at the Suffolk Sessions. The indictment contained two counts, one for rape, and one for an assault with intent to commit a rape, The jury convicted him of rape.

On the trial they challenged the array of panel, on the ground that the names of the jurors were not drawn fourteen days before the holding of the court. This challenge was overruled.

It was shown on the trial that the act under which they were convicted, or the material part thereof, as affecting the indictment had been repealed.

Held, 1. The challenge should have Defendant had a license to make the been sustained. sale, but he was prohibited from making

2. The plaintiffs in error could not le-a sale of liquors to be drank on the premgally be tried and convicted of the viola-ises. But he is not indicted for that.

tion of a statute which had been re- That is a distinct offence from selling without a license.

pealed,

Conviction reversed.

Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

SELLING LIQUOR WITHOUT A LICENSE.
N. Y. SUPREME COURT-GENL TERM,
FOURTH DEPT.

Hu stater, pliff. in error, v. The People, dfdts. in error.

Decided at June Term, 1875.

Selling

To be drank on

Indictment for another offence.
"without license."
the premises.

Writ of error to the Court of Sessions, in and for the county of Jefferson.

The defendant was indicted, charging him with selling "strong and spirituous liquors and wines, in quantities less than five gallons at a time **** without having a license therefor, as provided by law" etc.

There was no allegation that such sales were made of liquors "to be drank on the premises." Defendant was a store-keeper, and had a license as storekeeper to sell in quantities less than five gallons, but not to be drank on the premises. And it showed further that he had made sales of liquors, by the glass, to be drank in the store.

To make out the offence alleged in the indictment, it must have been proved that the accused not only sold the liquor, but that he sold it to be drank on the premises. It follows that the defendant has been indicted for one offence, and convicted of another.

Conviction reversed, and prisoner discharged.

Opinion by Gilbert, J.

DEED.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Warbrick v. Way.

Decided Nov. 11, 1875.

Restriction in deed against livery stable, or building designed for offensive occupation, does not include club stable.

Appeal by defendant from decree of the Court of Common Pleas, awarding a special injunction against "the erection or occupation of a livery stable or club stable."

This case was argued in the Western District at Pitsburgh, October 29th, 1875, on appeal before the Supreme Court. (PAXSON, J. absent.) The bill was filed by Sally Warbrick v. George G. Way, praying for an injunction to restrain defendDefendants' counsel asked the Court to ant from proceeding with the erection rule 1st. That the indictment was in- and construction of a stable on defendsufficient, in that it should have been ant's premises. On filing the bill an ex under the fourteenth statute of the act parte injunction was granted; the deof 1857, instead of the thirteenth section; fendant answers, and the court (below) and, 2nd; that the license proved was July 3d, continued the special injunction an absolute protection to the defendant in force. for any sales proved. The Court refused so to rule, and defendant objected.

The bill set forth that the plaintiff owns lot on the east side Ontario street, Defendant was convicted, and appealed. 145 feet north of Thompson street, 20th Held. The gist of the offence consist- Ward, Philadelphia, and that defendant ed not in the act of selling, but the pur- owns three contiguous lots adjoining plainpose for which the sale was made. | tiff's premises, that both parties derive

title from the Farmers' and Mechanics' and they determine the amount. Land and Building Association, which 2. The whole damage which can be corporation attached to said lots a certain recovered for a nuisance is that enterrestriction: "Subject to the restriction tained prior to the action.

that no court houses, carpenter, black

Judgment reversed, and new trial or

Opinion by Talcott J.

smith, currier, or machine shops, livery-dered. Costs to abide the event.
stable, slaughter-house, soap or glue-
boiling establishment, or factory of any
kind, where steam power shall be used,
or building for offensive occupation, shall
at
any
time hereafter be erected upon the
said lot of ground."

The answer admitted that defendant was erecting on his property, a building which he designed to use and occupy as a private stable, and on the argument, his counsel admitted that should. the injunction be dissolved, the building would be occupied, it was expected, by a club of gentlemen, as a club stable, wherein to keep their pleasure carriages and driving horses, as was charged in one of plaintiff's injunction affidavits.

Held, Decree must be reserved, and the special injunction dissolved. Costs of the appeal to be paid by plaintiff. Per Curiam opinion.

EVIDENCE.-MEASURE OF
DAMAGES.

INSURANCE

LIFE.

N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS.

Roehner, applt. v. Knickerbocker Life
Insurance Co., respt.

Decided Nov. 9, 1875.
Lapsed Policy.
"without grace."

Promissory note

This action was brought to recover the amount of a policy of insurance issued by defendant upon the life of the plaintiff's husband. The premium was $212, and became due on Dec. 11th, at twelve o'clock, noon, in each year during the life of the insured, and in case of failure to pay at the time specified, the policy by its terms became void without notice to any of the parties interested. The policy was assigned to plaintiff Aug. 8, 1869, and on Dec. 11, 1869, plaintiff paid the premium due that day, by delivering to defendant a note signed by the insured for

N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENL TERM. $120.84 with interest, payable four months

SECOND DEPT.

Present

after date, without grace, the place of of payment being blank, and the policy by the terms of the note was to become void in case the note was not paid. at maturity. Also, an obligation by which a credit was given to the insurer of $212, which was to be deducted from the pol

Whitmore, respt, v. Bischoff, applt. Decided, July Term, 1875. Nuisance. Matter of opinion. Damage. Future Damage. Appeal from verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Complaint for damages arising from an icy when it became a claim, interest on alleged nuisance.

said credit being paid annually in advance. On the trial plaintiff was permitted, The policy was delivered to defendant, against objection, to express his opinion when these obligations were executed. as to the damage to the land by reason April 12, 1870, the insured called at deof the nuisance. And evidence was re- fendant's office and tendered $120, in ceived against objection, diminution of payment of the note which was refused, the value of the premises based on the The insured died Aug. 10, 1870, and on position that the nuisance would be Oct. 10, 1870, plaintiff demanded the repermanent. turn of the policy which defendant reHeld, 1. That the facts bearing upon fused, on the ground that it had been the damage must be shown to the jury forfeited,

Held. That the offer to pay the note for the southern district of Georgia, in a on April 12, 1870, having been made preliminary examination, in a case of the after it was by its terms due and payable, United States against one Nicholas Kinthe policy by its terms became lapsed and ney, arrested on a warrant issued by said void. commissioner, charging Kinney with being guilty of a crime against the laws of the United States-a violation of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, committed in said department, on the 7th of October, 1874.

The agreement, that the omission to pay the premium on the day and by the hour named should avoid the policy, was not illegal, or against public policy, and the insured was bound to a strict performance of it, unless it was legally Upon the petition of the prisoner a writ waived or modified, 3 Hill, 161. The of Habeas Corpus was issued under the taking of the note by defendant did not alter this rule. Defendant was not bound to demand payment of the note, the policy lapsed per se upon failure to pay the note at maturity.

Where a promissory note is payable so many months from date, without days of grace, it becomes due on the same day in the stipulated number of months, with the day of its date, 17 Mass. 94. 2 Vt.

129.

Judgment of General Term, affirming judgment at Trial Term, dismissing the complaint, affirmed.

Opinion by Folger, J.

JURISDICTION.

U. S. CIRCUIT COURT-N. D. OF

GEORGIA.

provisions of the Act of February 5, 1867, directed to Brown, principal keeper of of the State penitentiary, who responded to the writ, producing the body of the prisoner, but declined to surrender him upon the ground that he was in custody under sentence of the Superior Court of Randolph County of the State of Georgia, and that no United States judicial authority had jurisdiction to inquire any further into the cause of his detention.

So much of the return as questioned the jurisdiction of a federal judge, to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment of Bridges was argued, and the objection overruled; and the Marshal was directed to take Bridges into his custody during the pendency of the proceedings. Erskine Dist. J. Decided:

"Throughout this investigation, the Brown, v. The United States, ex rel questions in controversy have been considBridges. ered without any regard whatever to the fact, that the petitioner is of the negro

A crime committed against the United States is not cognizable in the State court. Habeas Corpus will be to discharge a prisoner convicted of such a crime in a State court.

Dock Bridges, a freedman and a citizen of the United States, and the State of Georgia, was arrested, indicted, tried and convicted upon a charge of perjury against the laws of Georgia, and sentenced to eight years confinement in the penitentiary by the Superior Court of Randolph County in that state.

race.

The proceedings came before me under the first section of the amendatory Habeas Corpus Act of 1867; but where in a case like this, the original or secured privileges and immunities of any person within the United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction, are invaded, distinction in races become incommensurable.

The prisoner is deprived of his liberty in 'contravention' of the Constitution and laws of the United States, but I decline The crime alleged was that of perjury to discharge him absolutely, for the while testifying as a witness before a following causes-information from commissioner of the U. S. Circuit Court the United States attorney, that an

The validity of these laws is not questioned.

accusation stands against him, for the States, shall be exclusive of the Courts of identical crime charged in the above in- the several States. dictment, to be investigated by the Grand Jury of the United States, Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia; and, also, because the attorney for the respondent has made application for an appeal to the Circuit Court.

Dock Bridges will therefore be recommitted by the Marshal to the jail of Fulton county, and there remain until further order."

From this order the respondent appealed to the Circuit Court, before which it was argued by Farrow, United States District Attorney, and Homer for petititioner, and N. J. Hammond, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, for the respondent.

Held, Bradley, J.

It is obvious that the crime is against the United States only. It was perjury committed in the course of a judicial investigation under the Acts of Congress, and it is an offence against the public justice of the United States.

By the Revised Statutes of the United States, sec. 5392, every person who having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be taken, wilfully and contrary to said oath, states material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by fine and imprisonment as prescribed by the Act, etc., etc.

Such an offence is exclusively cognizable in the courts of the United States. Section 609 gives the Circuit Court exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except when otherwise provided, and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of crimes and offences cognizable therein. Section 711 declares that the jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United

Perjury in a judicial proceeding is particularly an offence against the system of laws under which the court is organized, and is proceeding. Congress has declared that the courts of the United States shall have cognizance, exclusive of the State courts, of all claims and offences cognizable under its authority.

Here it was clearly in violation of the laws of the United States for the State court to try and imprison the defendant for the crime in question.

The court had no jurisdiction of the case, the proceedings were void.

It is contended however that where a defendant has been regularly indicted, tried and convicted in a State court, his only remedy is to carry the judgment to the court of last resort, and thence by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that it is too late for a habeas corpus to issue from a Federal court in this case. This might be so if the proceedings in the State court were merely erroneous, but where it is void for want of jurisdiction, habeas corpus will lie. Ex parte, Lange 18, Wall. 163.

The want of jurisdiction in the State court in this case, removes any impediment arising from the general rule, which discountenances the use of a habeas corpus where the prisoner has been regularly convicted and sentenced. The order of discharge must be affirmed.

NEGLIGENCE.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Geiselman vs. Scott.

Decided at December Term, 1874. Malpractice. Physician and Surgeon. Contributory negligence. Charging jury.

Motion for leave to file a petition in error in the District Court of Ashland

States, of all crimes and offences cogniza-
ble under the authority of the United County.

« PreviousContinue »