INSURANCE.
against capture from belligerents.
Murray v. Harmony Fire and Marine
9. If the assured, before abandonment, either recovers the subject insured,
or receives an indemnity for its loss, he cannot elect afterwards to abandon.
Id.
10. A policy of insurance containing a clause that if the "title of the pro-
perty is transferred or changed," or "if the policy is assigned," the policy
shall be void, not avoided by the bankruptcy of the assured and the assign-
ment of his estate to an assignee in bankruptcy, and the assignee may recover
on it in case of a loss. Starkweather v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 333.
11. Where insurance company pays the loss occasioned by the fault of a
railroad, if the assured afterwards recovers damages from the railroad, he
holds them in trust for the insurers. Monmouth Co. v. Hutchinson, 348.
12. If the railroad company pays the damages, knowing the insured has
received them from the insurers, it is liable to a suit by the insurance com-
pany, and a release by the insured would be no defence. Id.
13. In a valued policy, every shipment is a distinct insurance, to be deter-
mined by the endorsement made at the time of application as to its terms.
Schaefer v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 410.
14. Words are to be construed in a maritime policy in their ordinary and
popular sense, unless by the usage of trade they have a different meaning.
Cobb v. Lime Rock Ins. Co., 604.
15. The construction of particular words in Boston will not affect a policy
upon a vessel made at Rockland, Maine. Id.
16. In a suit by the receiver of an insurance company, to recover assess-
ments on a premium-note, a transcript of the appointment need not accom-
pany the complaint. Boland v. Whitman, 666.
17. By agreement between the insured and the directors of a mutual
insurance company, the risk may be terminated before the time mentioned in
the policy.
18. It is no defence to a suit on a premium-note, that assessments are
made more frequently than was represented. Id.
19. Fraudulent representations as to the solvency of a company,
the time a note was given, is a defence. Id.
20. The insured is not liable to be assessed on his note, for losses occurring
to property after he has sold and conveyed it.
21. THE LIABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES IN CASES OF
SUICIDE, 673.
22. One Moore was the general agent of the United Life, Fire, and Marine
Insurance Company, and of the Kenton Insurance Company, in Louisville.
On the 15th of November 1867, S. & O. obtained, through him, a policy of
insurance on stock and fixtures from the former company; and on the day
following they obtained, also through him, a policy of insurance of the same
property from the latter company. A considerable portion of the goods was
lost. The first policy contained, inter alia, the following clauses: "If there
is or hereafter shall be made any further insurance on the property hereby
insured, or any part thereof, without being notified to this company, and its
consent thereto written hereon, then and in that case this policy shall be of
no binding force on this company.'
to change or modify the terms, conditions, and requirements of this policy
"No agent of this company has power
*** without express written authority from the principal office at Coving-
ton," Moore had at the dates named no such written authority; and the con-
sent of the insurers to the second insurance was not written on the policy
as required; nor was it directly or indirectly solicited; nor was formal notice
given to any of the company's officers or agents, either of the application for,
or the procuring of, the second insurance. Van Bories v. United Life Ins.
23. Held: (1). That the United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Com-
pany had, through Moore, constructive, if not actual, notice of the double
insurance; that by the second insurance the first policy was not rendered
absolutely void, but only voidable at the option of the company; and that
good conscience required that it should cancel the policy (by returning a
proper proportion of the premiums paid), within a reasonable time if a for-
feiture was to be insisted on. Van Bories v. United Life Ins. Co., 680.
24. (2). That it was Moore's duty, when he obtained the second insurance
for O. & S., to notify them that a compliance with their request might work
a forfeiture of the policy he had issued to them the day before, unless they
obtained the consent of the first company in the manner prescribed; that
although they might be assumed to have known this themselves from their
policy, every principle of fair and open dealing demanded that he should call
their attention to it; and that his inaction under the circumstances was cal-
culated to mislead and deceive them. Id.
25. (3). That O. & S. had the right to expect that, if the company disap-
proved of the conduct of its trusted agent in granting them the second
insurance, it would take steps to cancel the policy, or at least, notify them
of such disapproval; that, because the company did not cancel the policy,
and because, in the absence of such notification, the assured were permitted
to rely upon the validity of the same until after the fire, the former had
waived the forfeiture, and were estopped from setting it up. And it was not
an answer to these positions to say, what was the fact, that the company had
actually no notice whatever in the premises, since notice to their general
agent was notice to them, and accordingly, his conduct and default were
theirs. Id.
26. (4). That the clause limiting the power of the agent to change or modify
the contract did not affect the conclusion, 1st. Because it was not pretended
that Moore attempted so to do; and, 2d. Because the estoppel which pre-
vented the company's escaping its liability on the policy, did not depend
upon whether or not any such change or modification had been made. Id.
27. (5). That for these reasons the company was liable for the insurance. Id.
28. Where the insured in a policy issued by a mutual insurance company
is discharged by a bankrupt or insolvent law from all his debts and contracts,
and among them his premium-note, the consideration for the policy fails, and
the company is not liable to make good a subsequent loss. Reynolds v. In-
surance Co., 715.
29. The receipt by the company of interest upon his premium-note, after
the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, but without actual notice thereof, is
not a waiver of its right to treat the policy as at an end. Id.
30. Where a condition in a policy is, that notice of a fire should be given
to the "secretary forthwith," it will be a compliance, if the insured calls
with the agent the morning after a fire on the premises, and the next day his
statement is sent to the secretary. Beatty v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 745.
31. A condition requiring "a particular account of a loss," is not com
plied with, by a notice of "household furniture $367, groceries $233," the
same as in the policy. Id.
32. To constitute a waiver of notice, there must be some official act, mere
silence is not enough. Id.
33. Where it is agreed in a policy that the aggregate amount insured in
this and other companies shall not exceed two-thirds of the estimated cash
value, it is taken to mean the value at the time of the insurance. Elliott v.
Lycoming Ins. Co., 745.
34. After receiving notice of over-insurance if a company makes and col-
lects assessments it is estopped from setting up a forfeiture. Id.
35. Where an insurance is on a house and stable and an over-insurance is
made on the house, and both are burned, the company tendering payment for
the stable, are not estopped from setting up a forfeiture as to the house. Id.
36. A marine policy excepting loss from bursting of boilers, but covering
those occurring subsequent to and in consequence thereof, does not cover
loss of a vessel, where the bursting tore out the side of the vessel so that she
sank in five or ten minutes. Evans v. Columbian Ins. Co., 798.
37. Owners of goods insured against perils of the seas, "free of particular
average," may recover as for a total loss, if there is an abandonment, though
some of the goods are brought into port. Wallerstein v. Columbian Ins. Co.,
INTEREST. See ATTACHMENT, 3; BILLS AND NOTES, 21, 22; CORPORATION,
11; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 3, 5; USURY, 4.
1. Interest is allowable on the whole of a judgment even where costs are
included in it. Wetherill v. Stillman, 537.
2. The interest law of Indiana of 1867, authorizing ten per cent., governs
contracts made before the law took effect.
Pattison v.
Jenkins, 667.
1. To maintain assumpsit for goods sold and delivered against two defend-
ants, plaintiff must show a joint promise. Fuller v. Miller, 130.
2. In an action against two persons on a special agreement, plaintiff can-
not recover unless he avers and proves a joint undertaking. Lee v. Bolles,
1. An estate made to husband and wife during coverture, does not consti-
tute a joint tenancy or tenancy in common, both are seised of the entirety.
McCurdy v. Canning, 347.
2. Neither can dispose of any part without the other's consent.
3. A purchaser at sheriff's sale under judgment against the husband, can-
not recover possession during the wife's life. Id.
JUDGMENT. See INTEREST, 1.
1. Where there is a valid writ and levy, the judgment of a court in attach-
ment suits, cannot be held void collaterally in other suits. Cooper v. Rey-
nolds, 62.
2. In favor of or against a dead man is not a nullity. Carr v.
Executors, 201.
3. In a scire facias on a judgment, the defendant cannot go behind the ori-
ginal judgment. Id.
4. The judgment of a court of another state, if properly authenticated, has
the same conclusiveness in a foreign state as at home. Wetherill v. Stillman,
5. A judgment insufficiently authenticated cannot be read in evidence. Id.
6. A judgment obtained by wilful perjury may be vacated. Laithe v.
McDonald, 538.
7. An erroneous judgment or execution is not void.
8. No one but the defendant can take advantage of an irregular execu-
tion. Id.
9. A judgment by default on a service of a summons on the return-day is
not void. Armstrong v. Grant, 604.
10. A judgment in favor of a trustee, in an action by the principal defend-
ant in another action previously begun by trustee process, is not conclusive
upon the question of trustee's discharge. Webster v. Adams, 604.
11. An auditor cannot declare a judgment on an amicable scire facias void
and no lien, for want of a stamp. Edwards's Appeal, 746.
12. An irregular judgment may be reversed on error but is good until then,
and an auditor cannot disregard it. Id.
13. A confession of judgment "by defendants" in a suit against two,
where only one is served, is valid. Hatch v. Stitt, 799.
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1. The expression of the opinion that the defendants "ought to have
received the votes of all registered persons," does not disqualify one as a
juror in an action against such defendants, as judges of an election, for re-
fusing a vote. Elbin v. Wilson, 407.
2. A grand juror cannot be required to state what efforts he made to pro-
cure an indictment, what opinions were expressed, or what was the action of
any juror. Id.
The granting of an appeal by a justice is a judicial act, and he is not
liable for refusing. Jordan v. Hanson, 201.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See ESTOPPEL, 5; TITLE, 7.
1. Attornment is unnecessary in Pennsylvania. Tilford v. Fleming, 410.
2. An alienee may proceed in his own name to recover possession of pre-
mises let by his alienor. Id.
3. An executed lease of land is inoperative if the lessor's wife refuses to
acknowledge it, and it may be destroyed by the lessor or refused by the lessee.
Tatham v. Lewis, 539.
4. An attachment on order of court of tenant's goods is not an execution
within the meaning of the statute of 8 Anne, ch. 14, sect. 1, but landlord is
entitled to his rent out of the proceeds of the sale. Thomson v. Baltimore
Steam Co., 539.
5. A tenancy under a written lease may be proved by parol. Raynor v.
Lee, 605.
6. Where the lessee under a lease for the term of one year, with the option
three, continues in possession after the first year, he elects to hold for the full
term. Delashman v. Berry, 667.
7. The Act of December 14th 1863 of Pennsylvania is a complete system
for obtaining possession by a landlord. Brown's Appeal, 797.
A gift of the interest of a sum during life, and at the death of tenant for
life, of the principal to another, is a vested legacy in the latter.
Ex'rs. v. Anderson's Ex'rs., 349.
LIEN. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20; SHIPPING, 7; VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER, 4.
A judgment-creditor who advances money on the faith of an unencumbered
title by the record, and without notice, has priority of lien to the vendor for
unpaid purchase-money. Hulett v. Whipple, 349.
LIMITATIONS. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 21; MORTGAGE, 14.
1. The operation of the Statute of Limitations by a cause not mentioned
in the statute, will not be prevented for a longer time than such suspension
is an enforced one. Braun v. Saurwein, 69.
2. Mutual accounts to save the running of the statute, must be open and
current, and show a reciprocity of dealing. Webster v. Byrnes, 130.
3. A defence complete under the Statute of Limitations cannot be taken
away by statute, ordinance, or constitutional amendment. Girdner v. Heis-
4. A suit to recover for the death of a person under section 784 of the
Code of Indiana must be commenced within two years. Hanna v. Jefferson-
ville R. Co., 201.
5. An agreement not to plead the statute, cannot be given in evidence,
upon a replication to a plea that there was no promise within six years.
Cowart v. Perrine, 202.
6. The promise should be alleged in the bill, and if omitted by inadvertence,
the complainant may amend. Id.
7. The statute is a good plea to a bill for account of trust funds, where the
trust arises only by implication. McClane's Adm'x v. Shepherd's Ex., 279.
8. A payment on account of an existing debt is an unequivocal acknowl-
edgment and will take it out of the Statute of Limitations. Barclay's Appeal,
349.
9. The statutes of limitations of the state of Georgia passed during the
war, however defective they may have been in point of original authority,
were ratified by the Constitution of 1868, and are valid. Davis v. Hatcher.
10. The death of a creditor does not suspend the running of the statute.
Green Adm'x v. Goble, 539.
11. The acknowledgment must be in writing to take a claim out of the
statute. Id.
12. The effect of evidence of continuous possession as the basis of a claim
of title, is not diminished by proof of occasional interruptions. Raynor v.
Lee, 604.
13. Where a sheriff's vendee refuses to comply with a sale, and the land
is subsequently sold, the statute begins to run from the time of refusal.
Funk v. Smith, 749.
14. The failure to pay was the breach from which the cause of action
arose, the promise to pay being the bid. Id.
15. In an action against an attorney for neglect to collect, the statute be-
gins to run from the time the attorney first became liable. Rhines's Adm'rs
v. Evans, 794.
16. Suit for neglect in not commencing proceedings was brought against
an attorney seven years and five months after a note had been placed in his
hands for collection. Held, as matter of law, that the statute was a bar. Id.
17. The statute runs against a county or other municipal corporation.
"Nullum tempus occurrit reipublicæ, applies to the sovereign only. Evans v.
Erie, 799.
1. Purchaser of land during suit takes subject to plaintiff's rights.
Haughwout v. Murphy, 202.
2. Lis pendens only takes effect from service of the subpæna. Id.
3. A subsequent purchaser of land is only protected as to money actually
paid before notice. Id.
1. Will lie to reinstate a city attorney, wrongfully removed from office.
City of Madison v. Korbly, 70.
2. The writ cannot be properly granted to one who has previously institu-
ted proceedings in equity for the same cause of complaint. Hardcastle v.
Maryland R. Co., 130.
3. Will lie by a volunteer to compel the officers of a town to pay a bounty.
People ex rel. Vanderlin v. Martin, 411.
4. Will not lie where a statute has provided an adequate remedy at law.
State ex rel. Wheeler v. McAuliff, 605.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. An agreement to pay an agent "$3000 in equal quarterly payments,"
creates a hiring for a year. Kirk v. Hartman, 69.
2. One hired for no definite time, is a hiring at the will of both parties,
and the servant may be discharged without notice. Id.
3. Debt will lie on a contract for service for a determinate time and fixed
compensation, when the servant is dismissed before its expiration. Id.
4. A railroad employee having knowledge of the unfitness of a co-em-
ployee, and who does not give notice to his employer, takes the risk of
injury from such unfitness. Davis v. D. and M. Railroad Co., 477.
5. Where employer and employee have equal knowledge, and the latter
continues the service, each party takes the risk, unless the employer gives
special directions. Id.
6. Principal is liable for his servant's incompetency or negligence, and
also for his careless performance of his employment. Lannen v. Albany Gas
Co., 799.
Misnomer of one of the partners is unimportant, if the name of the firm
is correct. Rushton v. Rowe, 344.
MONEY. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2.
MORTGAGE. See ACTION, 1; ATTACHMENT, 2; CONFEDERATE STATES, 3;
CORPORATION, 13; DEBTOR And Creditor, 8, 10; FRAUDS OF STATUTE,
8; PARTNERSHIP, 11; SHIPPING, 3.
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