whisky, viz., their liability for any loss on the bond. Held, that this was as much an insurable interest as freights at sea, or profits in an adventure.

Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Powell, 13 B. Mon., 321; Gordon vs. Mass. Ins. Co., 2 Pick., 249; Rohrback vs. Germania Ins. Co., 62 N. Y., 53.

Held, that Walston was not relieved from this liability by any sale of his interest, and the liability of the company was not affected by the policy clause, prohibiting a transfer of interest. Held, that the replevin bond was a satisfaction of the judgment in Kentucky, which answered the objection that the tax had not been paid, and the judgment itself, together with the refusal of the company to defend, answered the objection that the government could not collect the tax.

Germania Fire Ins. Co. et al. vs. Thompson & Co.
Rep'd Jour'l, p. 13.

U. S. S. C.

PLACE OF PAYMENT.

§ 5. LIFE.-Construction of Policy. - Tender of Premium.— An indorsement on the margin of the policy, that "all receipts for premiums paid at agencies are to be signed by the president and actuary," is simply a notice to the insured not to pay without production of a receipt so signed; it is not an agreement to make any particular agency the legal place of payment. Where such agency had been terminated by war, and the policy by its terms made the home office the legal place of payment, a tender of premium to the former agent, which was refused, was not binding on the company.

N. Y. Life Ins. Co. vs. Davis
Rep'd Jour'l, p. 70.

U. S. S. C.

POLICY."

§ 6. ACCIDENT.-Construction of.-Visible Injury.-Sole Cause of Death. The policy provided "that the insurance shall not extend to any injury of which there shall be no external and visible sign, nor to any case except where the injury aforesaid is the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death." Also, "Provided that the accident shall be the sole cause of death." Held, that in order to recover under the policy there must be

some visible external sign of the injury. Held, that a nose-bleed might be such a sign, but a complaint of pain or soreness would not. Held, that the accident must have been the direct and sole cause of death, independently of any other cause; if death resulted wholly or in part from the supervening of any other cause, as typhoid fever, the company would not be liable.

Whitehouse vs. Travelers Ins. Co.

§ 7.

- §2.

LIFE.-Assignment of. Mortgage.-Title.-Redemption. -K. procured a policy upon his life, which was immediately assigned to defendant by an assignment absolute in form, under an arrangement between them that defendant was to pay the premiums and have the benefit of the policy, with the understanding that K. might at any time redeem the policy if he desired, by repaying the premiums with interest. The defendant subsequently refused a tender from K. and continued to pay the premiums until K.'s death, when he received the amount of the policy. Held, that the procuring of the policy by K., and its assignment to the defendant on the conditions named, was a sufficient consideration for the arrangement. Held, that the legal effect of the transaction was to make the defendant mortgagee of the policy to secure him for the premiums, and he could not claim absolute title, except upon the failure of K. to exercise his option. It was not a conditional re-sale with absolute title in defendant. which in the absence of writing or part payment would be void under the statute of frauds. The right of redemption at all times affected the title. Such an agreement may be shown by parol, though the assignment be absolute in form.

Hodges vs. T. M. & T. F. Ins. Co., 8 N. Y., 416; Despard vs. Walbridge, 15 N. Y., 374; Horn vs. Keteltas, 46 N. Y., 605; Hope vs. Bolen, 58 N. Y., 380.

The fact that K. was not personally obligated to pay the defendant the amount of premiums is not absolutely controlling as to the question of mortgage or conditional re-sale; the construction will depend upon the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the instrument and all the circumstances, and in doubtful cases the mortgage construction will be favored, to avoid a forfeiture.

Longuet vs. Scawen, 1 Ves. Sen., 402; Glover vs. Payn, 19 Wend., 518; Conway's Ex'rs vs. Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218; Edington vs. Harper, 3 J. J.

Marshall, 354; Floyer vs. Lavington, 1 P. W'ms, 268; Chapman's Adm'r vs. Turner, 1 Call's R., 280; Wharf vs. Howell, 5 Binney, 499; Brown vs. Dewey, Sanf'd Chy. R., 56; Holmes vs. Grant, 8 Paige, 243, 257; Flagg vs. Mann, 14 Pick., 467; Kerr vs. Gilmore, 6 Watts, 405; Brown vs. Dewey, 2 Barb., 28.

Held, that the same reasoning will apply whether the transaction be regarded as a mortgage or a pledge. Held, that the administratrix of K. was entitled to recover from the defendant the amount of the policy less premiums paid and interest.

Matthews vs. Sheehan.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 36.

N. Y. C. A.

PREMIUM.

§ 8.

FIRE. Non-payment of Note for.-Waiver.-The policy provided that if a note were given for the cash premium, it should be considered a payment, provided it was paid at or before maturity. But should any loss occur, and the note or any portion of it remain unpaid and past due at the time, the policy should be void. The note for $20 was due April 1st. A payment of $10 was made on it in June following, when the insured delivered the policy for cancellation on account of an increase of risk, but the company elected to continue the contract in force, retained the note, and returned the policy uncanceled. A tender of the balance due on the note was not made until after a loss had occurred, when it was refused. Held, that the insured had a right to pay the balance due at any time, and by such payment the policy would become operative. Held, that the return of the policy by the company was a waiver of forfeiture from the increase of risk, but did not waive the forfeiture for non-payment of the note. Held, that a portion of the note remaining unpaid at the time of loss, the plaintiff could not recover.

Watrous vs. Miss. Valley Ins. Co., 35 Iowa, 582; Williams vs. City of Albany Ins. Co., 19 Mich., 451; Schmidt vs. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 295.

Nedrow vs. Farmers Ins. Co.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 77.

IOWA S. C.

PREMIUM NOTE.

89.

LIFE.-Non-payment of Interest.-Effect of.-Construc

tion of Policy.-Payment of Premium.-The policy was issued in

consideration of the annual premium note of $110, and of the annual cash premium of $148.10. It provided that the balance of the year's premium, and all notes given for premium, should first be deducted in the settlement of the claim; also that in case of default in the payment of any premium, the company would pay as many tenths of the sum insured as complete annual premiums had been paid; also that if the premiums, or interest on any note given for premiums, should not be paid when due, the company should only be liable for such part of the sum insured, as is stipulated above; also that in every case where the policy should become void for other reason than the non-pay⚫ment of premiums, all premiums should be forfeited. The notes provided that they should be a lien upon the policy, and that the interest on them should be paid annually or the policy be forfeited. Held, that the policy and all the papers connected with it must be construed together to determine the intention of the parties. Held, that the scheme of the policy is opposed to an entire forfeiture for default in the payment of premium, and the forfeiture mentioned in the notes cannot be applied to the paidup premiums, but must be limited to the future benefits to be received from the policy. Held, that the premium notes are not strictly promissory notes, and the rule that the latter do not operate as the payment of a debt does not apply; they are of the nature of receipts for money loaned. Held, that the prior payment of the notes or of interest was not necessary in order to secure a paid-up policy; the payment of the cash portion, together with the execution of the note, constituted the payment of complete annual premiums within the meaning of the policy, which entitled the beneficiary to recover a corresponding proportion of the sum insured, subject to a deduction of the sums due on the notes.

Ohde vs. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 40 Iowa, 357; Hall, adm'r, vs. Same, 5 Ins. L. J., 828; Bonner vs. Same, 3 Cent. L. J., 605; Kirkpatrick vs. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 6 Ins. L. J., 368; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Grigsby, 4 Big., 633; Dutcher et al. vs. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 4 Big., 663.

Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Little.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 50.

IND. S. C.

$10. LIFE. A Valid Payment of Premium.-Lien on the Policy. The policy was upon the ten-payment life plan, in consideration of the annual premium of $615.40. All indebtedness to the company was to be deducted from the amount of insurance when due. In case of non-payment of premium, or of any note given in part payment of premium, when due, the policy was to become void. Dividends were to be applied to the payment of the note. If the policy became void, the insured was to be liable to pay all notes taken for premiums remaining unpaid, except the balance unpaid on the note taken for part premium and made payable twelve months from date, which was to be canceled upon surrender of the policy. After two annual payments, if desired, a paid-up policy would be issued for as many tenths of the original amount as there had been " annual premiums paid in cash." It was agreed at the time of executing the policy, that the annual premium should be paid, $369.24 in money and $246.16 in a promissory note at twelve months with interest, the amount of the note to be a permanent loan until canceled by dividends, and that a new note was to be executed each year at the maturity of the old, and including the amount of the prior note. The premium note was described in the receipt as the "amount of premium loaned this year." Four annual payments had been made. Held, that the execution of the note was in effect a payment in cash, which was loaned back by the company. Held, that the amount of the note with accrued interest, less dividends, was a lien upon the policy to be deducted when it became a claim. Held, that the case was not affected by a change in the company's practice, subsequent to the issue of the policy, insisting upon the payment of the note as a condition of the issue of the paid-up policy.

Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. vs. Dutcher et al.
Rep'd Jour'l, p. 18.

U. S. 8.0.

SUICIDE.

$11. LIFE.-Question for Jury.-Suicide is a question of intention, to be inferred from the circumstances where there is no direct evidence. The intention is a question for the jury.

Shanks vs. U. B. Mutual Aid Society.

Rep. next number.

PA. S. C.