Page images
PDF
EPUB

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE MORAL INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.

SECTION I.

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MORAL PARTS OF SCRIPTURE.

HAVING discussed the interpretation of the figurative, spiritual, typical, prophetical, and doctrinal parts of the sacred writings, it now remains that we consider the moral parts of scripture. These, indeed, are to be interpreted precisely in the same manner as all other moral writings; regard being had to the peculiar circumstances of the sacred writers, viz. the age in which they wrote, the nation to which they belonged, their style, genius, &c. For, being natives of the East, they treat moral topics, after the oriental manner, in a highly-figurative style, and with similitudes and figures considerably more far-fetched than is usual among Greek and Latin authors, or even among the moderns. Again, being for the most part persons in the common walks of life, they generally deliver their precepts in a popular manner, adapted to the capacities of those to whom they were addressed. In the examination of the moral parts of Scripture, the following more particular rules will be found useful:1

I. Moral propositions or discourses are not to be urged too far. but must be understood with a certain degree of latitude, and with various limitations.

For want of attending to this canon, many moral truths have been pushed to an extent, which causes them altogether to fail of the effect they were designed to produce. It is not to be denied that universal propositions may be offered: such are frequent in the scriptures as well as in profane writers, and also in common life; but it is in explaining the expressions by which they are conveyed, that just limits ought to be applied, to prevent them from being urged too far. The nature of the thing, and various other circumstances, will always afford a criterion by which to understand moral propositions with the requisite limitations. This, however, is indefinite language; and, therefore, that this subject may be better understood, and applied to the scriptures, we will state a few of these limitations, and illustrate them by examples.

1. Universal or indefinite moral propositions often denote nothing more than the natural aptitude or tendency of a thing to produce a certain effect, even although that effect should not actually take place.

Thus, when Solomon says that a soft answer turneth away wrath (Prov. xv. 1.), the best method of mitigating anger is pointed out, although the obstinacy or wickedness of man may produce a different result. In like manner, when St. Peter says (1 Pet. iii. 13.), Who is he that will harm you, if ye be followers of that which is good? this expression is not to be understood as implying that good men shall never be ill-treated; but it simply denotes the natural effect which a virtuous life will probably produce; viz. many occasions of irritating men will be avoided, and, on the other hand, their friendship and favour will be conciliated.

2. Universal or indefinite propositions denote only what generally or often takes place.

As in Prov. xxii. 6., Train up a child in the way he should go; and when he is old he will not depart from it. Here the wise monarch intimates not what always takes place, but

See Turretin, De Sacr. Script. Interp. pars ii. cap. viii. vol. ii. pp. 121–127.

what is the frequent consequence of judicious education. To this rule are to be referred all those propositions which treat of the manners, virtues, or vices of particular nations, conditions, or ages. Thus St. Paul says, that the Cretans are alway liars (Tit. i 12.). Again, when the same apostle, portraying the struggles of an enlightened but unregenerate person, says, I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing (Rom. vii. 18.), he does not mean to say that there is nothing morally good in man; but that no man is by nature spiritually good, or good in the sight of God.'

3. Universal or indefinite propositions frequently denote duty, or what ought to be done, not what always does actually take place.

"It is the way of the Scriptures," says a late writer, "to speak to and of the visible members of the church of Christ, under such appellations and expressions as may seem, at first hearing, to imply that they are all of thema truly righteous and holy persons. Thus the apostles style those to whom they write, in general, saints; they speak of them as sanctified in Christ Jesus, chosen of God, buried with Christ in baptism, risen again with him from the dead, sitting with him in heavenly places;' and particularly St. Paul (Tit. iii. 5.) says that they were 'saved by the washing of regeneration,' &c. The reason of which is, that they were visibly, by obligation, and by profession, all this; which was thus represented to them, the more effectually to stir them up, and engage them to live according to their profession and obligation."

By this rule also we may explain Mal. ii. 7., The priest's lips should keep knowledge; which passage the advocates of the church of Rome urge, as asserting the infallibility of the priesthood. A simple inspection, however, of the following verse is sufficient to refute this assertion, and to show that the prophet's words denote only the duty of the Jewish priesthood, not what the priests really did perform. The application of this rule will likewise explain Prov. xvi. 10, 13.

4. Many precepts are delivered generally and absolutely, concerning moral duties, which are only to be taken with certain limitations.

For instance, when we are commanded not to be angry, we must understand, without a cause, and not beyond measure: when we are forbidden to avenge ourselves, it is to be understood of privately taking revenge; for the magistrate beareth not the sword in vain, but is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil (Rom. xiii. 4.). Public vengeance, or punishment, therefore, is clearly not prohibited. Once more, though we are commanded in the scriptures to swear not at all (as in Matt. v. 34, and James v. 12.), yet they do not forbid the use of oaths in cases where they can be made subservient to the support of truth and the interests of justice. Moses says, Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name (Deut. vi. 13.). Thou shalt swear, says the prophet Jeremiah, The Lord liveth, in truth, in judgment, and in righteousness (Jer. iv. 2.). Our Saviour himself, when adjured by the high priest, in the name of the living God, to declare whether he was the Christ the Son of God (Matt. xxvi. 63, 64.; Mark xiv. 61, 62.), did not refuse to answer the question, thus judicially proposed to him; but he certainly would have remained silent if he had disapproved of all asseverations upon oath, or all such solemn invocations of, and appeals to, the name of God, in cases where the truth is doubtful or the testimony is suspected. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews says that an oath for confirmation is an end of all strife (Heb. vi. 16.).3

II. Many things in morals, which are not spoken comparatively, are nevertheless to be thus understood.

1. In Matt. ix. 13. and xii. 7., Jesus Christ, citing Hos. vi. 6., says that God desired mercy and not sacrifice. Yet he had prescribed that victims should be offered. This, therefore, must be understood comparatively, sacrifice being compared with mercy, or with acts of humanity and bene

1 Similar to this is the language of the liturgy of the Anglican church: "O God,..... because, through the weakness of our mortal nature, we can do no good thing without thee, grant us the help of thy grace.' (Collect for the first Sunday after Trinity.)

2 Bishop Bradford, Discourse concerning Baptismal and Spiritual Regeneration, p. 37 sixth edit. See also some excellent observations to the same effect in Dr. Macknight, Commentary on 1 John ii. 29.

The reader will find some additional observations illustrative of the canon above given, in Archbp. Tillotson's Works, vol. ii. pp. 62, 158. (London, 1820.)

volence; which, the context shows, are here intended. The sense of the passage in question is this: I require mercy rather than sacrifice; in other words, I prefer acts of charity to matters of positive institution, when, in any instance, they interfere with each other.

2. In 1 Tim. vi. 8., we read, Having food and raiment, let us be therewith content. Is no one then to desire a house, or a competence of wealth? These things, therefore, are compared with what are called the luxuries of life.'

III. Principals include their accessaries, that is, whatever approaches or comes near to them, or has any tendency to them.

Thus, where any sin is forbidden, we must be careful not only to avoid it, but also every thing of a similar nature, and whatever may prove an occasion of it, or imply our consent to it in others; and we must endeavour to dissuade or restrain others from it.

Compare Matt. v. 21-30.; 1 Thess. v. 22.; Jude 23.; Ephes. v. 11.; 1 Cor. viii. 13.; Levit. xix. 17.; James v. 19, 20. So, where any duty is enjoined, all means and facilities, enabling either ourselves or others to discharge it, according to our respective places, capacities, or opportunities, are likewise enjoined. See Gen. xviii. 19.; Deut. vi. 7.; Heb. x. 23-25. Upon this ground our Lord makes the law and the prophets to depend upon a sincere affectionate love to God and man (Mark xii. 30, 31.; Luke x. 27.); because, where this prevails, we shall not knowingly be deficient in any duty or office which lies within our power; neither shall we willingly do any thing that may either directly or indirectly offend, or tend to the prejudice of mankind. See Rom. xii. 17, 18. This observation will leave little room for the "evangelical counsels," or "counsels of perfection," as they are called by the papists, who ground upon them their erroneous doctrine of supererogation. Again, in whatever commandment we are forbidden to do any thing in our persons, as sinful, it equally restrains us from being partakers of other men's guilt, who do commit what we know is thereby forbidden. We must not, therefore, be either advising, assisting, encouraging, or in any shape a party with them in it: nay, we must not so much as give any countenance to the evil which they do, by excusing or making light of the crime, or by hiding their wickedness, lest by so doing we incur part of the blame and punishment, and thus deserve the character given by the psalmist, When thou sawest a thief, then thou consentedst unto him, and hast been partaker with the adulterers (Psal. 1. 18.).

IV. Negatives include affirmatives, and affirmatives include negatives: in other words, where any duty is enjoined, the contrary sin is forbidden; and, where any sin is forbidden, the contrary duty is enjoined.

Thus, in Deut. vi. 13., where we are commanded to serve God, we are forbidden to serve any other. Therefore, in Matt. iv. 10., it is said, "Him

1 Morus, Acroases Hermeneuticæ, tom. i. pp. 257, 258.

* "These counsels of perfection' are rules which do not bind under the penalty of sin, but are only useful in carrying men to a greater degree of perfection than is necessary to salvation. There is not the slightest authority in scripture for these counsels of perfection: all the rules there prescribed for our conduct are given in the form of positive commands, as absolutely necessary, wherever they are applicable, to the attainment of eternal life; and the violation of every one of these commands is declared to be sin. We are commanded to be perfect even as our Father which is in heaven is perfect' (Matt. v. 48.); and, so far from being able to exceed what is required for our salvation, the gospel assures us that, after our utmost care and best endeavours, we shall still fall short of our whole duty; and that our deficiencies must be supplied by the abundant merits of our blessed Redeemer. We are directed to trust to the mercy of God, and to the mediation of Christ; and to ⚫ work out our salvation with fear and trembling' (Phil. ii. 12.), that is, with anxiety, lest we should not fulfil the conditions upon which it is offered. Upon these grounds we may pronounce that works of supererogation are inconsistent with the nature of man, irreconcilable with the whole tenor and general principles of our religion, and contrary to the express declarations of Scripture." Bishop Tomline, Elements of Christian Theology, part iii. art. xiv. vol. ii. pp. 281, 282. (8th. edit.).

only shalt thou serve; and, as honouring parents is required in the fifth commandment (Exod. xx. 12.), so cursing them is forbidden (Matt. xv. 4.). Stealing being prohibited in the eighth commandment (Exod. xx. 15.), diligence in our calling is enjoined in Eph. iv. 28.

V. Negatives are binding at all times, but not affirmatives; that is, we must never do that which is forbidden, though good may ultimately come from it (Rom. iii. 8.). We must not speak wickedly for God (Job xiii. 7.).

Such things, however, as are required of us, though they never cease to be our duty, are yet not to be done at all times: for instance, prayer, public worship, reproving others, visiting the sick, and other works of charity and mercy, will be our duty as long as we live; but, as we cannot perform these at all times, we must do sometimes one thing, sometimes another, as opportunity offers. Hence, Christian courage and Christian prudence are equally necessary; the former, that we may never, upon any occasion or pretence, do that which in positive precepts is pronounced to be evil; the latter, that we may discern the fittest times and seasons for doing every thing.

VI. When an action is either required or commended, or any promise is annexed to its performance, such action is supposed to be done from proper motives and in a proper manner.

The giving of alms may be mentioned as an instance; which, if done from ostentatious motives, we are assured, is displeasing in the sight of God. Compare Matt. vi. 1-4.

VII. When the favour of God or salvation is promised to any deed or duty, all the other duties of religion are supposed to be rightly performed.

The giving of alms, as well as visiting the fatherless and widows in their affliction (James i. 27.), may be noticed as examples: such promise, therefore, is not to be so understood, as if but one single Christian virtue were necessary to salvation; but that the particular virtue in question is one of several necessary and momentous virtues. The application of this rule will illustrate our Lord's declaration concerning a future judgment (Matt. xxv. 34—36.); where, though charitable actions only are mentioned, yet we know, from other passages of scripture, that every idle word, as well as the secret thoughts of men, besides their actions, will be brought into judgment.

VIII. When a certain state or condition is pronounced blessed, or any promise is annexed to it, a suitable disposition of mind is supposed to prevail.

Thus, when the poor or afflicted are pronounced to be blessed, it is because such persons, being poor and afflicted, are free from the sins usually attendant on unsanctified prosperity, and because they are, on the contrary, more humble and more obedient to God. If, however, they be not the characters described (as unquestionably there are many to whom the characters do not apply), the promise in that case does not belong to them. Vice versa, when any state is pronounced to be wretched, it is on account of the sins or vices which generally attend it.

IX. Some precepts of moral prudence are given in the Scriptures,

which nevertheless admit of exceptions, on account of some duties of benevolence or piety that ought to predominate.

We may illustrate this rule by the often-repeated counsels of Solomon respecting becoming surety for another (See Prov. vi. 1, 2., xi. 15., xvii. 18., and xx. 16.). In these passages he does not condemn suretiship, which, in many cases, is not only lawful, but, in some instances, even an act of justice, prudence, and charity; but Solomon forbids his disciple to become surety rashly, without considering for whom, or how far he binds himself, or how he could discharge the debt if occasion should require it.

X. A change of circumstances changes moral things; therefore, contrary things may be spoken together in moral things, on account of the difference of circumstances.

Thus, in Prov. xxvi. 4, 5., we meet with two precepts that seem to be diametrically opposite to each other, Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him; and, Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit. But, if we attend carefully to the reason which the sacred writer subjoins to each precept, we shall be enabled satisfactorily to account for the apparent repugnancy; and it will be evident that they form not inconsistent but distinct rules of conduct, which are respectively to be observed according to the difference of circumstances. The following observations on the two verses just cited will materially illustrate their meaning.

A fool, in the sense of scripture, means a wicked man, or one who acts contrary to the wisdom that is from above, and who is supposed to utter his foolishness in speech or writing. Doubtless there are different descriptions of these characters; and some may require to be answered, while others are best treated with silence. But the cases here seem to be one; both have respect to the same character, and both require to be answered. The whole difference lies in the manner in which the answer should be given.

"In the first instance, the term, according to his folly,' means in a foolish manner; as is manifest from the reason given, 'lest thou also be like unto him.' But in the second instance the words mean in the manner in which his foolishness requires. This also is plain from the reason given, 'lest he be wise in his own conceit.' A foolish speech is not a rule for our imitation; nevertheless our answer must be so framed by it, as to meet and repel it. Both these proverbs caution us against evils to which we are not a little addicted; the first, that of saying and doing to others as they say and do to us, rather than as we would they should say and do; the last, that of suffering the cause of truth or justice to be run down, while we, from a love of ease, stand by as unconcerned spectators. The first of these proverbs is exemplified in the answer of Moses to the rebellious Israelites; the last in that of Job to his wife. It was a foolish speech which was addressed to the former, Would to God, that we had died when our brethren died before the Lord! And why have ye brought up the congregation of the Lord into this wilderness, that we and our cattle should die there?' Unhappily, this provoked Moses to speak unadvisedly with his lips; saying, 'Hear now, ye rebels, must we fetch you water out of this rock?' This was answering folly in a foolish manner, which he should not have done; and by which the servant of God became too much like them whom he opposed. It was also a foolish saying of Job's wife, in the day of his distress, Curse God and die!' Job answered this speech, not in the manner of it, but in the manner which it required, What, shall we receive good at the hand of God; and shall we not receive evil?' In all

[ocr errors]
« PreviousContinue »