tion based on alienage." Aliens who have applied for citizenship, or, if not qualified for it, who have filed a statement of intent to apply as soon as they are eligible, are allowed to participate in the assistance programs. Hence, it is said, the statute distinguishes "only within the 'heterogeneous' class of aliens" and "does not distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non." Brief for Appellants 20.10 Only statutory classifications of the latter type, appellants assert, warrant strict scrutiny.

Graham v. Richardson, supra, undermines appellants' position. In that case, the Court considered an Arizona statute. that imposed a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits on aliens but not on citizens. Like the New York statute challenged here, the Arizona statute served to discriminate only within the class of aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled to welfare

9

Appellants also seem to assert that strict scrutiny should not be applied because aid to education does not deny an alien "access to the necessities of life." Brief for Appellants 21. They are joined in this view by THE CHIEF JUSTICE in dissent. Suffice it to say, the statutory statement of purpose for the aid programs reflects the State's contrary position:

"In a world of unmatched scientific progress and technological advance, as well as of unparalleled danger to human freedom, learning has never been more crucial to man's safety, progress and individual fulfillment. In the state and nation higher education no longer is a luxury; it is a necessity for strength, fulfillment and survival." 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § 1(a).

And, in any event, the Court noted in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971), that classifications based on alienage "are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is impaired."

10 The District Court dealt abruptly with appellants' contention: "This argument defies logic. Those aliens who apply, or agree to apply when eligible, for citizenship are relinquishing their alien status. Because some aliens agree under the statute's coercion to change their status does not alter the fact that the classification is based solely on alienage." 406 F. Supp., at 1235.

benefits. The Court nonetheless subjected the statute to strict scrutiny and held it unconstitutional. The important points are that § 661 (3) is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class. Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 504–505, n. 11 (1976); 12 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 169, 172 (1972).

11

Appellants also assert that there are adequate justifications for § 661 (3). First, the section is said to offer an incentive for aliens to become naturalized. Second, the restriction on

11 Our Brother REHNQUIST argues in dissent that strict scrutiny is inappropriate because under § 661 (3) a resident alien can voluntarily withdraw from disfavored status. But this aspect of the statute hardly distinguishes our past decisions. By the logic of the dissenting opinion, the suspect class for alienage would be defined to include at most only those who have resided in this country for less than five years, since after that time, if not before, resident aliens are generally eligible to become citizens. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a). The Court has never suggested, however, that the suspect class is to be defined so narrowly. In fact, the element of voluntariness in a resident alien's retention of alien status is a recognized element in several of the Court's decisions. For example, the Court acknowledged that In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973), involved an appellant who was eligible for citizenship, but who had not filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen, and had "no present intention of doing so." Id., 718 n. 1. And, insofar as the record revealed, nothing precluded the appellees in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), from applying for citizenship. Id., at 650 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST argued in dissent there, just as he does here today, that strict scrutiny was inappropriate in those cases because there was nothing to indicate that the aliens' status "cannot be changed by their affirmative acts." Id., at 657. Nonetheless, the Court applied strict scrutiny in the cases. We see no reason to depart from them now. 12 The footnote reads in part:

"That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate. children."

assistance to only those who are or will become eligible to vote is tailored to the purpose of the assistance program, namely, the enhancement of the educational level of the electorate. Brief for Appellants 22-25. Both justifications are claimed to be related to New York's interest in the preservation of its "political community." See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642-643, 647-649; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 344 (1972).

The first purpose offered by the appellants, directed to what they describe as some "degree of national affinity," Brief for Appellants 18, however, is not a permissible one for a State. Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere. U. S. Const., Art I, § 8, cl. 4. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 84-85 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). But even if we accept, arguendo, the validity of the proffered justifications, we find them inadequate to support the ban.13

13 In support of the justifications offered for § 661 (3), appellants refer to a statement of purpose in legislation adopted in 1961 that substantially amended the State's aid programs. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § 1. But the statement speaks only in general terms of encouraging education so as "to provide the broad range of leadership, inventive genius, and source of economic and cultural growth for oncoming generations," § 1 (a), and of developing fully a "reservoir of talent and future leadership," § 1 (c)— purposes that would be served by extending aid to resident aliens as well as to citizens—and hardly supports appellants in clear and unambiguous terms. Moreover, the statutory discrimination against aliens with regard to certain Regents scholarships dates from long before. 1920 N. Y. Laws, c. 502, § 1. And the very 1961 legislation on which appellants rely abolished the statutory disqualification of aliens in favor of an administrative rule. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 391, §§ 2 and 18. See also §§ 7, 14, and 19. In fact, it appears that the state administrators of the aid programs did not find the purposes in the 1961 legislation that appellants urge, since between 1961 and 1969, when the precursor of § 661 (3) was

14

In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642, the Court recognized that the State's interest "in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political community'" might justify some consideration of alienage. But as Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters, or of "elective or important nonelective" officials "who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy." Id., at 647. See id., at 648. In re Griffiths, decided the same day, reflects the narrowness of the exception. In that case, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys, the Court found invalid a state-court rule limiting the practice of law to citizens. 413 U. S., at 729.

Certainly, the justifications for § 661 (3) offered by appellants sweep far beyond the confines of the exception defined in Sugarman. If the encouragement of naturalization through these programs were seen as adequate, then every discrimination against aliens could be similarly justified. The exception would swallow the rule, Sugarman clearly does not tolerate that result. Nor does the claimed interest in educating the electorate provide a justification; although such education is a laudable objective, it hardly would be frustrated by including resident aliens, as well as citizens, in the State's assistance programs.15

adopted, resident aliens were allowed to receive tuition assistance awards. Brief for Appellants 15.

14 See also Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), summarily aff'd, 426 U. S. 913 (1976).

15 Although the record does not reveal the number of aliens who are disqualified by § 661 (3), there is a suggestion that the number may be exceedingly small. See Brief for Appellee Mauclet 9 n. 4. Indeed, when asked about the cost of including aliens, appellants conceded at oral argument that "we may not be speaking about very much." Tr. of Oral

BURGER, C. J., dissenting

432 U.S.

Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a role—perhaps even a leadership role-in other areas of import to the community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others.

Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees' claim that it also intrudes upon Congress' comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 378; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915).

The judgments of the District Court are affirmed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

It is so ordered.

I join MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's and MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S dissenting opinions, but I add this comment to point out yet other significant differences between this case and our prior cases involving alienage-based classifications.

With one exception, the prior cases upon which the Court purports to rely involved statutes which prohibited aliens from engaging in certain occupations or professions, thereby impairing their ability to earn a livelihood. See, e. g., Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 (1976) (Puerto

Arg. 6. Thus, it appears that the inclusion of resident aliens in the assistance programs will have an insubstantial impact on the cost of the programs. And, in any event, the suggestion that the State can favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of benefits was largely rejected in Graham v. Richardson, supra.