terminal problems at the Port of New York because "nature has so formed the harbor and the waterfront as to necessitate unusual methods of terminal delivery", methods which have no counterpart in the United States. One result of the extensive use of the waterfront properties by the railroads, it says, has been a constantly increasing difficulty in acquiring suitable space for steamships. In this connection the brief states:

"The Comprehensive Plan provides for the construction of union freight stations on Manhattan Island which would be reached by tunnels from the New Jersey shore, thereby relieving the congestion on both waterfronts and avoiding the expensive service now rendered by the lighters and carfloats. Not only are the present methods of handling freight at the Port cumbersome and expensive, imposing a termendous burden upon the nation's commerce using the Port, but there is an inexcusable lack of coordination. There is no effective contact between the rails and the vessels. The rail terminals are on the New Jersey shore, while the vessels load at piers on Manhattan Island or in Brooklyn. *** Obviously the coordination cannot be effected if each trunk line carrier is to enjoy unmolested domination of its own terminals and is to proceed, as heretofore, in the development of its terminals in its own selfish interest and without regard to the needs of the Port as a whole. ***

"How can the great terminals at New York 'be made practically one' if they are to be awarded severally and without qualification to the respective trunk line systems? How can the deplorable tendency to invest large sums in new terminals for their individual use' be checked if a valuable terminal property like that of the Central Railroad of New Jersey is to be awarded unconditionally to a powerful trunk line seeking it mainly for the purpose of strengthening its competitive rivalry? How can freight tunnels under the North River, which the Commission says 'could be constructed at a cost small in comparison with the resulting benefits', be intelligently planned in the interest of all carriers and in the interest of the Port and of the nation unless they can be planned in contemplation of and in harmony with unified terminals on the New Jersey shore? How can the valuable waterfront property be developed in the public interest if it is awarded to private carrier corporations without restriction as to their development or use?"

"To put these questions is to answer them," the brief adds. "No terminal property must be awarded to any carrier in the Port District without attaching conditions which will safeguard the public interest."

Relation of Jersey Central to Comprehensive Plan

Before naming these conditions the brief stresses the importance of the Central Railroad of New Jersey in relation to the Comprehensive Plan because of the following strategic advantages:

"1. It owns extensive yards and terminals on the New Jersey waterfront almost directly opposite the lower end of Manhattan Island.

"2. It owns practically the only vacant land on the New Jersey waterfront within the Port District available for intensive terminal development.

"3. It is indispensable as a 'bridge' for the handling of interchange traffic with the Baltimore & Ohio, the New York Central and other railroads.

"4. It is one of the principal coal carriers of the east, originating approximately 2,480,000 tons of anthracite coal and handling 6,383,000 tons of anthracite coal and 6,978,000 tons of bituminous coal.

"5. It is a natural terminal property both in connection with the New York Central's proposed Clearfield route and both the present and proposed routes of the Baltimore & Ohio."

Small Percentage of Local Traffic Analyzing the statistics filed in the record, the brief declares that the prime function of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, emphasizes the "importance of holding it open as a joint facility in the public interest," and that function is to serve its connections with other trunk lines. Of its total of 30,625,000 tons of traffic for the year 1922, only 19 percent. was local traffic, the balance, 81 percent. being interchanged with connecting lines. Moreover:

"The number of tons handled does not give as accurate a picture of the interchange as a study of the ton miles. For the year 1922 it appears that the Central Railroad of New Jersey

served the New York Central to the extent of 304,000,000 ton miles and the Baltimore & Ohio to the extent of 221,000,000 ton miles.

"The Central Railroad of New Jersey, although sometimes thought of as a relatively small property, shows a property investment for the year of 1922 of $140,942,633. An analysis of its percentage of net railway operating income to property investment from 1917 to 1922, inclusive, at least raises a doubt whether such an important terminal property is being as intensively and economically used as it should be. The percentages are as follows:

Year 1917

1918

1919

1920 1921 1922

Ratio Net Railway Operating Income to Investment

7.49

5.22

0.77

6.65 (deficit)

3.73

2.40

"It is clear from these figures that if important new streams of traffic can be diverted to the Central Railroad of New Jersey without substantially increasing its investment it would be in the public interest to do so. ***

"It is of the utmost importance, because of the burden imposed upon the public by reason of the enormous value of terminal properties, that they be used to a high degree of efficiency in order that the cost per unit of traffic may be as low as possible. Analyzing the taxes per mile of road operated, we find that the figure for the Central Railroad of New Jersey is $4,513 as compared with $2,072 for the New York, New Haven & Hartford and $1,299 for the Boston & Maine.

"The foregoing figures lead to the conclusion, which is supported by other evidence of record, to the effect that the Central Railroad of New Jersey is primarily and essentially a terminal carrier and that there is quite as much reason for reserving it for separate treatment as for holding the New England lines apart from the trunk lines. ***"

Port's Future Needs Unconsidered Discussing the proposed new routes to New York, the brief says:

The Comprehensive Plan for the development of the Port of New York deals not only with the present, but with the future. It is to anticipate the tremendous growth in the commerce of the Port which is certain to come and the service required for the nine million people there and the many more millions sure to come. It makes provision for a terminal plan by which the facilities, properly coordinated and unified, will be both adequate and efficient, as that growth comes.

"But it is futile to develop the terminals unless rail highways reaching the Port are of sufficient capacity to enable the commerce of the country to reach the Port District. In spite of the large number of railroads now reaching the Port District, the Port has been almost constantly under embargo. The Commission will take judicial notice of the congestion at the Port during the war, and of the inadequacy of the existing routes to handle the war traffic. * * *

"It is clear that the New York Central presents a strong case for its 'Clearfield route.' Its enterprise is commendable. What are the Baltimore & Ohio's needs and how can they be met? What are the Port's needs and how can they be met?***

"It is apparent from the record that the prime need of the Baltimore & Ohio is not so much for additional routes to the Port of New York as for adequate and conveniently located terminals at the port. The present terminals of the Baltimore & Ohio are at St. George, Staten Island, which terminals are inadequate and disadvantageously located. Even these terminals the Baltimore & Ohio is not able to reach with its own rails. It has trackage right over the Philadelphia & Reading from Philadelphia to Bound Brook, where it turns the traffic over to the Central Railroad of New Jersey, which hauls it a distance of fourteen miles to Cranford Junction, N. J., where it is again turned over to the Baltimore & Ohio and hauled over a bridge spanning the Arthur Kill Sound to the westerly side of Staten Island, whence it passes along the west side of the Island to St. George. This constitutes at best an inadequate and inconvenient access to the great Port of New York. Even after reaching the St. George terminals the traffic is still ten or fifteen miles from its ultimate point of delivery on Manhattan or in Brooklyn or to ocean vessels whose customary points of loading are on the west side of Manhattan Island or in Brooklyn.

"There is no escape from the conclusion that the Baltimore & Ohio should have adequate access to terminals on the New Jersey shore. It so happens that the Central Railroad of New

Jersey terminals are practically ideal for the purpose of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, not only because of their adequacy, but because of their convenient location. Furthermore, the waterfront property of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, as hereinbefore indicated, is susceptible of substantial additional development."

Terminals Should Be Considered Separately

Stating that the sole object of the motion by counsel to exclude from consideration in this proceeding the lines of railroad and the terminals embraced in the Comprehensive Plan was to avoid any unnecessary conflict between the consolidation program and the Comprehensive plan, this motion is renewed in the brief, and attention is called to the fact that the joint resolution of Congress adopting and approving the Comprehensive Plan was approved two years later than the Transportation act.

If

"There is a conclusive presumption," the brief says, "that Congress intended the Comprehensive Plan to be effectuated regardless of the disposition of particular lines of railroad pursuant to the general law. *** the Commission should suggest, for example, that the terminals at the Port of New York should be coordinated and unified, and should award them to individual carriers only upon condition that each system would begin forthwith to make effective a scheme of coordination and unification as outlined in the Comprehensive Plan, a great step forward will have been taken.

Would Avoid Conflict With Consolidation Program "The Port Authority's first request, therefore, is that such reservation of the terminal situation at New York be made as will promote the terminal unification which the Commission itself has recommended and which is required by the express terms of the Comprehensive

Plan. ***

"If, however, this motion be denied and the request of the Port Authority be not acceded to, then we are directed to present the following for the consideration of the Commission:

Prefers New York Central Ownership

"After weighing all the arguments and testimony presented by the presidents of the New York Central and the Baltimore & Ohio, it would appear that the New York Central could, of the two, the more readily establish a through trunk line service for efficient operation over the entire proposed line with its own power and its own train crews if the Catawissa Branch of the Reading and the Jersey Central were assigned to it. The New York Central now reaches Newberry Junction (Williamsport) and for a short distance (stated by Mr. Smith to be about fifty miles) which it does not now itself own between Ashtabula and Newberry Junction it owns a right of way upon which it purposes to lay its own rails. By comparison, the Baltimore & Ohio in its present ownership reaches only to Butler; it must secure trackage rights over to the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh to DuBois, which it states it can secure, but then has a long stretch from DuBois to Williamsport, where it owns neither trackage rights nor right of way, cannot get trackage rights over the Pennsylvania, but must rely on rates and divisions.

"This, according to the testimony of both Mr. Smith and Mr. Willard, is not a basis for an operating plan as efficient as one providing for through traffic, with engines and train crews operating clear through under one direction and one management. Nor does Mr. Willard in his testimony indicate that he regards this route as an imminently pressing one. For a long time to come the existing routes of the Baltimore & Ohio will be adequate to carry its traffic to New York.

"It is certain, however, as we have already indicated, that the Baltimore & Ohio cannot serve its shippers with service to New York as efficiently and economically if the only route over which it can secure trackage rights over the Reading and Jersey Central is via Philadelphia to Bound Brook, thence to Jersey City, as it could over the Reading by way of Allentown into Jersey City. Besides, there is no argument left with which to answer Mr. Willard's plea for passenger and freight terminal facilities in Jersey City. They are as imperative for Baltimore & Ohio service as the new Clearfield route is for the New York Central. If anything, the Baltimore & Ohio needs here are greater and more urgent.

"The Port Authority is interested not alone in improving the terminal service. The law requires it to secure the best and most efficient and economical connections between the Port and the rest of the country. Its jurisdiction to regulate, and to create facilities, to invest moneys, is limited, perhaps, to the Port District territory. But its jurisdiction to recommend, if necessary to appeal, to Federal agencies for assistance in improvements of transportation service into the Port District is as broad as the country itself. It feels no hesitancy, therefore, in freely expressing its views to the Interstate Commerce Commission, recognizing, of course, that in this Federal field the opinions of the Commission, in harmony with the law, are controlling. "If, however, the Commission should see fit to accept the view of the Port Authority that the New York Central proposed route is the more logical and natural of the two, nevertheless it is, in the judgment of the Port Authority Commissioners, imperative that the needs and equities of the Baltimore & Ohio should be recognized-which, in principle', Mr. Smith concedes-by definite reservations, and that reservations should also be made sufficiently adequate and definite as at all future times to permit of the carrying out, without delay or litigation, of the Comprehensive Plan, following in this respect the clear precedent in the Chicago Junction Case."

Conditions Port Authority Wishes Attached to Con

solidation

The brief names the following conditions which the Port Authority would attach to the consolidation of the Central Railroad of New Jersey with the New York Central Railroad:

"The Port Authority accordingly urges that in the event the Central Railroad of New Jersey be grouped with the New York Central System, the following conditions be imposed with a view to assuring the Baltimore & Ohio unrestricted access to the Port of New York and adequate terminal facilities at the port, and with a view to the operation of those valuable terminals in the public interest:

"1. The New York Central shall at all times give adequate trackage rights to the Baltimore & Ohio from Allentown to JerBrook to Jersey City. sey City, this to include adequate trackage rights from Bound

"2. The Butler-Williamsport route shall be protected by the establishment of through rates.

"3. No development, enlargement, expansion or improvement of terminals or waterfront property within the Port District shall be made without first obtaining from the Port Authority a certificate that the said development, enlargement, expansion or improvement is in harmony with the Comprehensive Plan and in the public interest.

"4. The New York Central shall provide for the adequate and non-discriminatory yarding, handling and delivery of all Baltimore & Ohio cars.

"5. The New York Central shall open all freight stations, pier stations, industrial tracks and team tacks of the Central Railroad of New Jersey in the Port District to the Baltimore & Ohio so that the same are fully available to the Baltimore & Ohio for its solicitation, receipt and delivery of freight.

"6. No greater charge for any service whatever shall be made against the Baltimore & Ohio than the New York Central contemporaneously makes on its own traffic or the traffic of any other railroad, and all rates, fares and charges applicable on Baltimore & Ohio traffic to or from the said Centeral Railroad of New Jersey treminals within the Port District shall be no higher than the corresponding rates, fares and charges applicable on New York Central traffic between competitive points.

". The New York Central shall not deny to the Baltimore & Ohio any right or privilege with respect to the use or enjoyment of the said Central Railroad properties within the Port District or any part thereof which is contemporaneously accorded to any other railroad, or make a greater charge therefor against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad than is contemporaneously made against any other railroad.

"8. The Baltimore & Ohio and the New York Central must agree to co-operate with other carriers in the Port District in the general establishment of reciprocal switching.

"9. It appearing that some of the properties of the Central Railroad within the Port District are embraced in the Comprehensive Plan adopted by the States of New York and New Jersey and by the Congress of the United States, the disposition of the Central Railroad shall be expressly conditioned upon the co-operation of the New York Central and the Baltimore & Ohio in the carrying out and effectuation of the said Plan in so far as it relates to the said properties of the said Central Railroad of New Jersey.

(Continued on Page 12)

TH!

on

in its application to the Interstate Commerce Commission to award to that railroad control of the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Catawissa Branch of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad so that the New York Central could establish a new trunk railroad to Ashtabula and further west in place of the facilities it now enjoys in connection with other railroads in reaching the west, via Jersey City, Tamanend, Williamsport and other centers in northern Pennsylvania, thence by its own rails to destination, was field at the public hearing in Washington, January 4. This is in connection with the proposed consolidation of railroads under the provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920, the grouping of which is placed in the hands of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Group No. 1, as tentatively proposed by the commission, gives the New York Central Railroad control of a number of other railroad lines, and Group No. 3 gives to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad other railroad properties, including the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Catawissa Branch of the Philadelphia & Reading.

The brief starts out by reviewing the eastern groups of railroads proposed, it being the ostensible aim of the I. C. C. to preserve so far as possible the competitive conditions under which the different railroads now operate and yet maintain uniformity of rates in the movement of competitive traffic. The brief states:

What the New York Central Proposes

"The proposals of the management of the New York Centrol with respect to System No. 1, are as follows:

"1. That the system should include the existing New York Central Lines, now assigned to that system, and also the Ohio Central Lines (the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway, the Zanesville & Western Railroad, and the Kanawha & Michigan Railway and Kanawha & West Virginia unassigned) assigned to System No. 9, the Chicago Junction Railway, the Chicago River & Indiana Railroad, and the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad to the extent of the system's present interest in that property.

665 That the system should include the Central Railroad of New Jersey, and the Catawissa Branch of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway, with terminal and interchange facilities at Tamanend; also in the event of the consolidation of the Baltimore & Ohio and Philadelphia & Reading, System No. 1 should secure trackage from Tamanend to Philadelphia together with suitable participation in the terminal facilities of the Philadelphia & Reading at Philadelphia in order to protect the through traffic moving via Newberry Junction.

"3. That the system should include the Rutland Railroad and Western Maryland Railway, both assigned to System No. 1.

"4. That the property jointly owned by the Pennsylvania System, and assigned to both System No. 1 and System No. 2, namely the Cherry Tree & Dixonville Railroad. and the Monongahela Railroad, the Pittsburgh, Chartiers & Youghiogheny Railway, the Chartiers Southern Railway, the Lake Erie & Pittsburgh Railway, should be continued in their existing relationship to the two systems. Also that the Kankakee & Seneca assigned to System No. 1 should be continued in the present joint ownership with the Rock Island or the system in which it may be included.

"5. In the event that the Baltimore & Ohio and Philadelphia & Reading are consolidated, it is proposed that the Central Railroad of New Jersey should grant to that system trackage rights for overhead or through business between Bound Brook and Jersey City, together with suitable partici

pation in the Jersey City terminal facilities. In the event that the Baltimore & Ohio, Philadelphia & Reading, Lehigh & New England, Lehigh & Hudson River, and the New York, New Haven & Hartford railroads are consolidated, it is proposed that trackage rights over the Central Railroad of New Jersey should also include trackage rights between Allentown and Easton for through or overhead business."

The brief then gives a historical review of the origin and development of the New York Central Lines, beginning with the completion of the Albany & Schenectady Railroad in 1831.

New York Central Control System's Present Service "The system as it now exists," says the brief, "serves such important points as New York, Boston, Springfield, Albany, Montreal, Syracuse, Utica, Rochester, Buffalo, Ashtabula, Youngstown, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Toledo, Columbus, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago. Between New York and Buffalo the backbone of the system consists of the New York Central main line and the West Shore Railroad, which have been consolidated for unified operation, traffic being crossed from one line to the other to avoid grades and points of congestion, and to reach the Manhattan terminals and the Weehawken terminals as required. Between Buffalo and Chicago the system consists of the old Lake Shore Line and the Michigan Central, both being indispensable to complement the great through route east of Buffalo. The system handles approximately onefourth of the 43 percent. of foreign commerce of the United States passing through the Port of New York. The New York Central Lines own 4,984 road freight and switching locomotives, and 263,334 freight train cars, and during the year 1922 the system transported 200,671,000 tons of freight. The system has approximately 5 percent. of the country's mileage and carries more than 10 percent, of its freight traffic. "The territory in which the New York Central Lines are located has nearly one-half of the population of the United States largely served by these lines. The N. Y. Central Lines pass through 174 cities having a population of over 10,000. In Canada the New York Central Lines have access to the two richest provinces of the Dominion, Ontario and Quebec, which contain about 60 percent. of the total population of Canada.

"The New York Central Lines own 1,334 passenger locomotives and 4,821 cars for passenger and allied service. The Lines carried in 1920 a total of 103,009,924 revenue passengers and in 1922 a total of 80,934,814 with total passenger miles in 1920 of 5,184,455,000 and in 1922 of 4,415,624,000.

"The property investment of the New York Central Lines at the end of 1922 was $1,717,000,000, and the rate of return 5.60."

In Violation of the Anti-Trust Act

The brief presents the status of the Central Railroad of New Jersey under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of United States vs. Reading Company, 253 U. S., 26, and the decree of the district court carrying out this decision, and says: "The decision of the Supreme Court was that the Philadelphia and Reading and Central Railroad of New Jersey coal transporting and producing combination, which had existed for about twenty years, was a 'flagrant violation of the first and second sections of the Anti-Trust Act.' The court held not only that the coal companies should be separated from the two railroad companies, but that the two railroad companies should be separated from each other." It is the fixed policy of the New York Central Railread not to suppress any competition nor disturb any existing routes and channels of trade and commerce in operating its system, a policy that President Smith is quoted as stating will be continued. The brief discusses certain of the railroads in which the New York

Central has interests, either direct or through certain of its subsidiaries.

The brief quotes the decision named, a consequence of which being that the Central Railroad of New Jersey's stock should be placed in the hands of a trustee, providing for its disposition as follows (quoting from the court decision):

"b. The Jersey Central Trustee shall hold said right, title and interest in said shares of stock transferred to it as hereinabove provided, subject to the order of this Court. The final disposition of said stock shall be deferred in view of the possible groupings of railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Transportation Act of 1920, until ordered by this Court. The Court may in its discretion upon its own initiative or upon motion of the United States or the Reading Company without waiting such action by the Interstate Commerce Commission enter an order for the sale of such stock, if and when it shall appear that the facts require it, or the situation makes it possible."

"There is nothing in the record in this proceeding," says the brief, "to show that the competitive relation between the Philadelphia & Reading and the Central Railroad of New Jersey is any different from that which brought about the condemnation of the Supreme Court as a violation of the Anti Trust Act." Says the brief:

"It appears from Mr. Dice's testimony (pp. 7510,7511) that three of the four carriers assigned to System No. 3, the Philadelphia & Reading Railway, the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Lehigh & New England Railroad, originated

in 1921 22,000,000 tons of anthracite coal out of a total of 67,000,000 tons, or approximately 33 percent. of the total tonnage originated by the principal anthracite carriers. These three railroads are now independently operated companies, since under the decree of the District Court the Central Railroad of New Jersey has, since June 11,1921, been free from dominion and control of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway. It must be obvious that to consolidate these railroads into a single system with the Baltimore & Ohio, or into a separate combination would suppress substantially all competition in service and whatever competition exists in rates. It must be equally obvious that the assignment of the Central Railroad of New Jersey to the New York Central, which is not an originating anthracite carrier, would preserve all the existing competition and would through the entrance of that system into the anthracite regions create additional competition in service. The New York Central although not originating carrier of anthracite coal is one of the largest distributing carriers of that commodity, serving many important points of consumption. It has no control of car supply at the mines it serves and in times of congestion all the relief it can offer is to hold its junctions open awaiting delivery to it. This is a situation which in the public interest, apart from any interest of the New York Central, should be corrected. To afford to New York Central direct access into the anthracite producing fields would enable it to provide a more satisfactory and expeditious service than it is now able to provide to its own patrons, and it would add to the competition now existing.

an

"If the disposition of the Central Railroad of New Jersey were to be made in literal compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Reading case, the New York Central is the only trunk line carrier which could legally acquire the property. Obviously it could not be acquired by the Pennsylvania. It is equally obvious that it could not be acquired by the Lehigh Valley, the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, or the Erie, which are parallel, contiguous and competing lines originating anthracite coal, and delivering it at the same destinations and traversing the same territory originating and delivering other competitive traffic. It could not be acquired by the Delaware & Hudson which competes through the Albany gateway with the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the West Shore route. The New York Central is the only trunk line which from the geographical and traffic standpoint would be in a position to acquire the Central Railroad of New Jersey under the decision of the Supreme Court in the Reading case....

"It may be that the New York Central would have to divest itself of its present ownership of Reading Company stock in order to make the acquisition under the decision of the Supreme Court, and that divestment is practically what is involved in the New York Central's proposals."

The facilities for handling coal in New York harbor by the Baltimore & Ohio, the Philadelphia & Reading and the Jersey Central railroads are then described, and it is pointed out that the New York Central possesses no facilities of like kind, the Central Railroad of New Jersey distributing the New York Central's coal in New York harbor. The facilities of the companies named for handling coal constitute 52 percent. of the total capacity of the port, while at Phialdelphia this system would have more than one-half the capacity, and at Baltimore it would exceed that of any other carrier. Says the brief:

"If there is competition between anthracite and bituminous coal in markets of destination, the suppression of competition made by combining the Baltimore & Ohio, the Philadelphia & Reading and the Central Railroad of New Jersey would evidently be greater than the separate combination of the Philadelphia & Reading and the Central Railroad of New Jersey."

Port Differentials

The subject of railroad port differentials is discussed in the brief at some length and refers to the efforts of New York civic organizations in the past to have those differentials abolished. A case having that end in view brought by the Maritime Exchange of Boston is now pending before the Interstate Commerce Commission. "By virtue of its geographical location," says the brief, "the interest of System No. 3 in import and export traffic through the ports of New York and Baltimore would be in the inverse ratio to the magnitude of its immense facilities at those ports."

And, says the brief further, "It would have every economic incentive to postpone the use and development of those facilities by comparison with its use and development of its facilities at the Port of Baltimore."

The brief makes clear that it would not pay the railroads included in Group No. 3 to bring traffic to the Port of New York, while it would be much more advantageous for them to deliver it at Baltimore, instead.

Baltimore's Incomparable Future Pier Faciltics "This was emphasized," says the brief, "by the testimony of Mr. Byers, President of the Western Maryland Railway, who stated that the State of Maryland has authorized an appropriation of $50,000,000 for the improvement of port facilities at Baltimore and that comprehensive plans for port development approved by the Port Development Commission provide for the establishment of pier facilities which will be the largest of any port in the United States...... Mr. Byers also stated that prior to the war there were 12 boat lines at Baltimore and that there are now 52 boat lines operating in and out of that port...... Mr. Byers also stated that the present Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, which connects Chesapeake Bay with Delaware River at Delaware city, will be increased in capacity so as to handle large vessels and permit a saving of 700 miles on the round trip between Baltimore and European ports."

The brief points out that the new route the Baltimore & Ohio would create if Group No. 3 should become a reality would be 105 miles longer than the distance between Chicago and Baltimore by the Baltimore & Ohio, today, and naturally the brief questions the probability of the development of the new trunk line, considering how well the old one, to Baltimore, better serves its purpose. Why should the B. & O. incur the extra port charges at New York when it can avoid them at Baltimore and save 105 miles of haulage at rates too low to pay operating expenses? Says the brief:

"If it be said that the shipper controls the routing and could

require the Baltimore & Ohio, Philadelphia & Reading and Central Railroad of New Jersey consolidated system to bring the traffic to the Port of New York, that is of course correct, but the point is that such a system would always be interested in the solicitation of traffic for the Port of Baltimore and in providing at that port superior facilities which would make such solicitation effective."

The continuation of through routes and joint rates is discussed in the brief, as is reciprocal switching, the New York Central being disposed to do everything its competitors may do in the matter of interchanges and giving access to its competing lines. Existing traffic relationships are explained in the brief in respect to anthracite and bituminous coal, and as to merchandise traffic.

A chart presenting the seven sections of the new proposed trunk line, beginning at Haucks (Tamanend) and ending at Jersey City, so as to show the density of traffic, shows that the New York Central greatly exceeds the B. & O. in ton miles-almost 50 percent. N. Y. C. tonnage over certain portions of the line also exceeds the combined traffic of the B. & O. and Philadelphia & Reading. The brief develops the extent to which the new trunk line of the New York Central would be established if given control of the Central Railroad of New Jersey and the Catawissa Branch of the Philadelphia & Reading, the traffic area upon which it would draw, and the incentive the New York Central would have to develop it because of the increasing traffic of its main lines, the density of population of the cities along their routes. in New York State, and the expense and difficulty of securing greater trackage and terminal facilities in these centers. Showing that the Central Railroad of New Jersey did not earn its fixed charges from the income of its transportation property in 1922, the brief predicted that it would barely earn them in 1923.

The intervention of the Port of New York Authority

in the consolidation matter is adverted to in the

brief. It also makes plain that the acquisition of the Catawissa Branch of the Philadelphia & Reading by the New York Central would not be a serious matter to the Philadelphia & Reading, considered in its entirety.

The Butler-Du Bois-Williamsport Route The brief discusses the suggestion made by President Willard in his testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission, in which he located the new trunk line he would establish, it being necessary to acquire that part of the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh extending from Butler, Pa., a junction point with the Baltimore & Ohio, to DuBois, Pa., or at least trackage over that part of the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh, and from Du Bois to Williamsport over the Pennsylvania under joint rates and through rates which the Pennsylvania Railroad stood ready to facilitate, and concludes that the Pennsylvania would doubtless prefer to accommodate the least active and competitive rival rather than facilitate the competition of a more formidable rival. Says the brief, after showing how greatly the New York Central has developed the traffic over the route of the proposed new trunk line, even to the extent of shorthauling its own system:

"The proposed Butler-DuBois-Williamsport route is evidently an afterthought, a makeshift proposal suggested for the purpose of and intended to parry the well considered plan of the New York Central for the establishment of a real railroad under a single management through northern Pennsylvania."

The Philadelphia & Reading's Proposal The brief takes up the proposal of the President of the Philadelphia & Reading to effect a smaller consolidation, comprising the Philadelphia & Reading, the New Jersey Central, the Lehigh & New England and the Lehigh & Hudson River railroads, and lays bare the objections to

such a plan, one being that the merging of the Philadelphia & Reading and the Central Railroad of New Jersey would be in direct defiance of the Supreme Court decision in the Reading case. It also points out that 80 percent. of the proposed system would be in southeastern Pennsylvania, would have more than 50 percent. of Philadelphia's terminal facilities "and would possess in that city what are asserted to be the largest most modern and most efficient facilities for handling rail and water traffic in the United States." Add to that the Jersey Central's terminals at Jersey City, which would be a part of the acquisition of the proposed smaller combination, and it is the New York Central Line's conclusion that "no system so narrowly localized should possess such extensive terminal facilities in two of the largest cities of the United States." And, after all, the brief shows, "its relation to the Port of New York would be one of absentee landlordism."

Other Railroads Proposed For Group No. 1 "The New York Central management," says the brief, "is willing to accept the inclusion of this property in system No. 1," referring to the Western Maryland Railway, and gives the reasons therefor, its present relation to the New York Central Lines, declaring that "No similarly close relation exists between the New York Central Lines and any other carrier outside the system," and states that the assignment of the Western Maryland to the New York Central system is amply sustained by the traffic and operating conditions surrounding that property. It further declares that competitive conditions will not only be preserved but increased as well as developing existing

routes and channels of trade and commerce. The management of the New York Central Lines thinks the Rutland Railroad also should be assigned to System No. 1, where it logically belongs, and the brief explains why, the President of the New York Central Railroad being also President of the Rutland, dating back as far as 1911, except for the period of Federal control, the New York Central at one time owning a majority of the Rutland's stock, subsequently, however, transferring onehalf of its stock ownership to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.

The Cherry Tree & Dixonville Railroad, Monongahela Railway, Pittsburgh, Chartiers & Youghiogheny Railway, now jointly owned by the New York Central and the Pennsylvania railroads, it was agreed by the presidents of each should be so continued, and the same was suggested respecting the Kankakee & Seneca Railroad, if agreeable to the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific. No recommendation is made as to the assignment of the Boston & Maine, the Maine Central and the Bangor & Aroostook railways to Group No. 1, and, owing to "the diversity of opinion throughout New England as to what should be done with these railroads as well as with the New Haven," the matter is left for the Interstate Commerce Commission to decide, New York Central believing it could not make a recommendation that would be helpful to the Commission in making the assignment of these properties.

Conclusion

The brief closes with the following statement: "The consolidation of System No. 1 should include the existing New York Central Lines, including the Ohio Central Lines, the Rutland Railroad, the Western Maryland Railway, the Catawissa Branch of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway, and the Central Railroad of New Jersey, subject to trackage rights between Bound Brook and Jersey City in favor of the Baltimore & Ohio and Philadelphia & Reading in case those railroads are con

solidated. The through route between points on the New York Central Lines and points on the Philadelphia & Reading, via Newberry Junction, should be preserved by appropriate conditions."