1. Against the company; general principles.-It is a general principle that, forasmuch as railroads operated by corporations as common carriers are of a quasi public nature, therefore courts are reluctant to grant injunctions which may have the effect to stop their regular operations, as such a result must always seriously and injuriously affect the commerce and interest of the public, and greatly inconvenience the people.' Therefore such relief will only be given where the injury is great and irreparable, and no adequate remedy is given at law. The case made must be an urgent one, to justify such extraordinary interference and consequences." These seem to be the ruling principles asserted by the courts upon this subject, in reference to railroads, where the matter remains as at common law, and on the broad principles of equity jurisprudence. But whilst these ancient landmarks are still the judicial guides in some of the states, as to the granting or denial of injunctions against railroad corporations, in others there has been more or less of special legislation on the subject, and sometimes awarding this remedy where it were otherwise, as upon general principles of equity practice, not attainable. Upon the filing of an answer, verified by affidavit, denying the matters alleged in the bill or complaint upon which a temporary injunction is granted, it should be dissolved. An order granting a preliminary injunction upon complaint, answer and affidavits of the parties, is so far a matter of discretion, that it will not be reversed unless such discretion is abused, even if most of the allegations of the complaint and plaintiff's affidavits are denied by the answer and defendant's affidavits.* If the court ordering an injunction has jurisdiction to grant it, and to judge whether the case before him is one demanding it, then, whether he judge erroneously or not, when granted it is valid, and until dissolved must be obeyed." An injunction should never be granted because of the mere apprehension of the petitioner that a wrong may be done. There should be substantial ground for the apprehension, and that the injury will be serious, and practically irreparable. Thus a 1 Torrey v. The Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 3 C. E. Green's New Jersey Ch. Reps. 293. 2 Whittlesey v. The Hartford, Provdence & Fishkill Railroad Company, 23 Conn. 421; Hackensack Imp't Commission v. New Jersey Midland Ry. Co., 7 C. E. Green (N. J. Ch. Reps.), 94; Mocanaqua Coal Co. v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 4 Brewster, 158; Cook v. North & South R. R. Co., 46 Ga. 618, 11 Am. Ry. Rep. 424. stockholder can not obtain an injunction restraining the officers of the company from granting passes to state officers and legislators, without proof that the act is actually in contemplation.' Nor should an injunction be granted which, while injurious to the defendant, is of no special benefit to the plaintiff.2 3 2. Against the company, at the suit of a private party, for injury common to the whole public. It is a well settled principle that an injunction will not lie, at the suit of a private person, to restrain or prevent a public nuisance, merely as such. Therefore a railroad company will not be restrained by injunction, on the application of a private individual, from committing an act or doing that which will amount to a public nuisance-as interfering with common right-where the applicant fails to show any special damage or peculiar injury to himself, distinct from that which is suffered by the public at large. If the act sought to be restrained is in derogation of a right or privilege which is common to the people generally, as well as to the plaintiff or complainant-as for the obstruction of a public way, watercourse or public inlet of water-it matters not that the petitioner be affected thereby more seriously than others, by reason of his residence or business requiring a more frequent use of the priv ilege; yet the injury being of the same character with that suffered in common with him by all others, the remedy by injunc tion will not be granted on such individual application.* to The case cited from 62 Penn. St. was instituted by private parties, shippers on the road, to restrain the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company from a violation of its public franchise, in respect charges of freights for transportation, and tolls for use of the road, by complainant's own cars, and for discrimination therein. appeared from the evidence that the two persons complaining were separately engaged in diverse business-one a dealer in grain, plaster and salt, and the other a dealer in coal and lum It ber; and that there was no community of interest between them. The court held that the bill was not subject to the objection of multifariousness. But the court further held, upon the merits, that an injunction will not be granted for "an injury common to the whole public-a violation of a public franchise"; and said: "The rule is well settled, that where the injury is no greater to a plaintiff than to the inhabitants at large, the reinedy to redress the subject of complaint is with the public"; and the bill was accordingly dismissed.' The case of Black v. The Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, supra, was a bill in equity to restrain the erection and use of a railway in the street opposite complainant's property; and the ground alleged was that of not only a public nuisance, by obstruction of the street, but also a private nuisance to complainant's premises, and the causing of special damage to his adjoining property, not incurred by the public generally. The court, in disposing of the case, say: "The track complained of is in certain public streets, and not upon any property of the plaintiff's, and, if a nuisance, is a public one, which could be the subject of a public prosecution, which the Commonwealth have not deemed proper to institute. The plaintiffs are therefore bound to make out two things: 1st, that this is a public nuisance; and, 2d, that the plaintiffs have sustained special damage, which if they do not prove, renders the first question immaterial. We do not think that the plaintiffs have, by the single witness examined by them, established that they have suf fered an injury quite distinct from that of the public in general, and of course upon that ground the decree (of dismissal) below should be affirmed." * * * 992 So in Wisconsin it is held that an injunction will not lie, at 1 Cumberland Valley Railroad Co's Appeal, 62 Penn. St. 218, 226. To the same point, see also, Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565; Sparhawk v. The Union Passenger R. W. Co., 54 Penn. St. 401. 258 Penn. St. 252. And see Denver & Swansea Ry. Co. v. Denver City Ry. Co., supra. This was a bill by a horse railway company, having an exclusive franchise in a city, against a steam railway company, constructed in a street not occupied by the complainant. It was held not such a special injury to complainant as equity would enjoin. But if there had been an unauthorized interference with lines in actual operation, and one complainant was building for the purposes of a steam railway, it would afford ground for an injunction: Ibid. |