the title, where the owner of the title is not under disability. Weber v. Anderson, 73 Ill. 440; Hubbard v. Stearns, 86 Ill. 35; Schneider v. Botsch, 90 Ill. 577; James v. Railroad Co., 91 Ill. 554." It is, however, claimed in the argument that from the death of Schildknecht, in 1873, until the lease was made by the widow to Wheelor, in 1876, the evidence fails to show that the possession of the land was held by her. Weinacht, who married the widow, testified that, after the death of Schildknecht, she claimed the land to the line fence, as her husband did. Upon being asked how long the widow had the land, the witness said: "She had it quite a while. She had it, and leased it out, and then afterwards she sold it to Mr. Raum. I believe in 1877 or 1878. Q. Did she own it up to the time she sold it to Mr. Raum? A. Yes, sir. Q. The land was in her possession all the time until she sold it? A. Yes, sir. Q. She claimed to be the owner? A. Yes, sir." In the absence of any evidence whatever that any other person was in possession of the land from 1873 to 1876, we regard the evidence to establish the possession of the widow ample to sustain the verdict. Upon the death of Schildknecht, whatever interest he had in the land, including his possession, would descend to his widow and heirs; and the possession would remain in them until it was abandoned, or until they were dispossessed by process of law. The possession was never abandoned, nor was any action brought to recover it; but, on the other hand, the widow held it until 1876, when she leased to Wheelor for three years, and he cultivated the land until it was transferred by the widow to Raum. The jury find that the possession of the land was held adversely to the plaintiff for more than 20 years, and we are of opinion the evidence sustains the finding. The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed. Affirmed. 1. Irregularities in the notice of a special tax are waived by appearing and filing objections to its confirmation. 2. A clause, in an ordinance ordering a local improvement, to the effect that upon the filing of the report of the commissioners, and its approval by the city council, the corporation counsel shall file the proper petition in the county court, is a sufficient order for filing a petition for confirmation, since such order may be made as well before as after the commissioners have reported. 3. Where an ordinance providing for paving certain streets declares that such paving shall conform to the grades as established by ordinance, the petition for confirmation of a spe 1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar. cial tax to pay for such paving need not recite the ordinances establishing such grades. 4. Where a single ordinance provides for the paving of three streets of different widths, and the commissioners make a separate estimate for each street according to its width, the assessment on property abutting on the different streets should not be at the same rate per front foot, but should be proportioned to the width of the respective streets. 5. After the court has passed on all the objections to a special tax except those that should be submitted to a jury, and has set those for hearing, it is too late to move for a change of venue. 6. The failure to do the work according to the terms of the contract is no ground for objecting to the confirmation of a special tax to pay therefor. Appeal from Madison county court; W. H. Krome, Judge. Petition by the city of Alton for confirmation of a special tax. Mary Haley and others filed objections, which were overruled and judgment of confirmation entered. Objectors appeal. Affirmed. Alex. W. Hope, for appellants. John F. McGinnis, for appellee BAKER, C. J. This was a proceeding in the county court of Madison county to confirm a special tax for the improvement of Belle, Third, and State streets in the city of Alton. Objections filed by the appellants were overruled, and judgment entered confirming the assessment roll returned by the commissioners, and objectors appeal. A great many grounds of reversal are urged. We shall notice only those which we regard of substantial importance. The objection to the notice by the commissioners of the assessment, and that certain property was not listed on the assessment roll in the proper name of the owners, is, we 'think, without merit, especially after appearance. Murphy v. City of Peoria, 119 Ill. 509, 9 N. E. 895; Walters v. Town of Lake, 129 Ill. 23, 21 N. E. 556; Quick v. Village of River Forest, 130 Ill. 323, 22 N. E. 816; White v. City of Alton (Ill. Sup.) 37 N. E. 96. The second point made is that the city council, after the passage of the ordinance, did not order a petition filed in the county court of Madison county, as required by statute. Section 5 of the ordinance provides: "Upon the filing of the report of said C. A. Herb, D. Ryan and William Armstrong (commissioners appointed to estimate the cost of the improvements) as hereinbefore required, and the approval thereof by the city council, the corporation counsel is hereby directed to file the proper petition in the county court of Madison county." There was, therefore, an order to file the petition. But it is contended that section 5 should not have been in the ordinance, and that the order to file the petition should have been made after the report of the commissioners estimating the cost, and that, being made before that report, the county court had no jurisdiction to order the tax levied. The time when the order was made is not, that we can see, of controlling importance. The ordinance ordered the petition should be filed after the report of the estimate had been filed and approved; and, even if such an order was necessary to give the court jurisdiction, we think that the order here given should be regarded as sufficient. The next point made is that the petition does not recite the whole ordinance; that is, that it should set out the ordinance fixing the grade of the streets to be improved. The orainance authorizing this improvement provides that it shall "conform to the respective established grades of said streets, as now established by ordinance of said city of Alton." And the claim, as we understand, is that the ordinances fixing the grades of the streets involved should have been set out in the petition. In support of this claim the case of Ogden v. Town of Lake View, 121 III. 422, 13 N. E. 159, is cited. An examination of that case will disclose that the ordinance there in question was for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a connected system of sewers in and along certain streets; and the ordinance set out in the original record did not sufficiently describe the manholes and catch basins. In reference to the question presented in this case we used the following language: "In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question whether an ordinance providing for the construction of a local improvement like the present will be sufficient which merely refers to some other ordinance for a description of the na ture and character of the improvement, for, conceding that would be a substantial compliance with section 135, above referred to, still we do not think the judgment in the present case can be sustained upon that theory." The object of requiring a description of the improvement is that an intelligent estimate of the cost may be made, and we have frequently held that if the ordinance so specifies the location, character, and description of the work that a committee can make such an estimate, it is sufficient. Where the grade or city datum is fixed by ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to the grade or city datum, without setting forth the or dinance establishing it. White v. City of Alton, supra. The commissioners or committee estimating the cost of the improve ment will in such case take notice of that established grade, as they would of streets or intersections established by other ordinances. We think the ordinance as set out in the petition fully complies with the requirement of the statute. The nature of the improvement is permanent, the material to be used brick, and the locality-the streets-named, with a perfect description as to how the work is to be done. By reference to a grade already established, it also shows just what the grade of the pavement is to be. The improvement contemplates three streets, viz. Belle street, the paving on which is 30 feet in width; Third street, 581⁄2 feet in width; and State street, 56 feet in width. Counsel contend that the three streets are by the ordinance thrown into one improvement, and make one continuous frontage, and for that reason a property owner having 25 feet frontage on Third street, the paving on which is 58% feet wide, can only be charged the same amount as the property owners owning 25 feet frontage on Belle street, the paving on which is 30 feet wide, because Belle, Third, and State streets are made one whole and continuous frontage, and the property owners on each must be assessed per front foot the same. We do not agree with this view of the case. The ordinance described the width of each street, and the committee made a separate estimate for each, and that estimate was according to the width of the respective streets. The improvement is one and the same, but it does not follow that each piece of property fronting on the different streets should pay the same amount per foot. It is competent for a city to include more than one street in a local improvement of this kind, and the fact that the streets are of different widths does not affect that right. City of Springfield v. Green, 120 Ill. 269, 11 N. E. 261; Adams County v. City of Quincy, 130 Ill. 566, 22 N. E. 624. In Wilbur v. City of Springfield, 123 Ill. 395, 14 N. E. 871, this court held that it was not necessary to state the width of the street in the ordinance, as that could be easily ascertained. The cost of the improvement of Belle street will be less than the cost of the improvement of Third street, for the reason that the paving on Belle street is only 30 feet wide and the paving on Third street is 581⁄2 feet wide; and all of the lots on Belle street are assessed lower than the lots on Third street, which is fair and just to all parties. We think this objection is without force. It appears that on the 22d day of February, 1892, appellants filed their objections in the county court to the assessment roll, and on that day the same were heard by the court, and taken under advisement. On the 12th of March all of the objections (some 13 in number) except such as it was proper to submit to a jury were overruled; and the further hearing as to those objections that were to be submitted to a jury was set for trial on March 31, 1892. On the 29th of March the objectors, by their attorneys, served on counsel for the city a notice for a change of venue. On the 31st of March the said objectors made an application to the court for a change of venue, which was refused. It is contended by counsel for appellants that the refusal of the application is ground for reversing the judgment below. The position is not tenable. After the court had heard all the case, and decided most of the objections, it was too late to demand a change of venue, even if the case is one in which a change could be taken. Hudson v. Hanson, 75 Ill. 198. It is also contended that the county court erred because it would not permit objectors to prove that the improvement had not been done as required by the ordinance. The law provides how the contracts shall be let, the manner of payment, and who shall be the judge as to whether the contract is complied with. In this case the work had been accepted by the city council. Who shall be the judge of whether the contract is complied with? Certainly not each individual property owner, because to so hold would not only be a violent construction of the statute, but render the making of all local improvements impracticable. The law has invested the city authorities with that power, and unless there is a fraudulent abuse of it their action is conclusive upon the property owners. If their action is to be reviewed for fraud, it must be done by bill in equity. On this question this court, in the case of Ricketts v. Village of Hyde Park, 85 Ill. 110, said: "The objections, if tenable, should have been brought forward by bill for injunction before the work was completed. It is not admissible now, when the work has been completed in that way without objection on the part of appellant." In Cooley, Tax'n, 468, it is said: "It is no defense to an assessment that the contract for the work was not performed according to its terms. The proper authorities must decide upon this, and, if they accept the work, the acceptance, in the absence of frauds, is conclusive." And in State v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 29 N. J. Law, 441, it is said: "The pretext that the taxpayer shall avoid the payment of his assessment because the funds are injudiciously applied is the worst form of repudiation." We have reached the conclusion that there is no reversible error in the rulings of the county court. Its judg ment will therefore be affirmed. Affirmed. Rehearing denied. PEOPLE ex rel. STEVENS v. FIDELITY & NESS-MULTIFORM INSURANCE. 1. In the absence of an express prohibitory statute, a corporation legally organized under the laws of another state to do a multiform insurance business may do such business in Illinois, although such a corporation could not be organized under the laws of Illinois. 2. Under Act May 31, 1879, which requires every foreign insurance company to comply with "the general insurance laws of this state gov erning fire, marine, and inland navigation insurance companies doing business in the state of Illinois before it shall be lawful for such company to take risks or transact any kind of insurance business in this state other than that of life insurance," a company incorporated in New 1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar. York to do fidelity, life, accident, employer's liability, steam-boiler, and plate-glass insurance may, on complying with the provisions of such act, carry on its different kinds of business in Illinois. Appeal from circuit court, Peoria county; N. E. Worthington, Judge. Information in the nature of quo warranto by the people of the state of Illinois, on the relation of John S. Stevens, against the Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company of New York. Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. J. N. Jewett and Stevens & Horton, for appellant. S. S. Page, for appellee. BAKER, J. Some 16 days after the commencement of the term, and a week or more after this cause had been submitted to the court for decision upon the merits, a motion to dismiss the appeal was entered therein, and 17 reasons assigned and elaborately argued in a printed brief, as the grounds of such motion. That motion was reserved until the final disposition of the case. In disposing of it, we do not deem it expedient to pass in detail upon the several grounds urged for the proposed action of the court. It is sufficient to say that some of the grounds insisted upon are not based on the record, and some are trivial; that some have no substantial merit, and some were not suggested in apt time, so as to afford opportunity for amendment. The motion to dismiss is denied. The proceeding at bar is an information in the nature of a quo warranto, filed, by leave of the Peoria circuit court, by the state's attorney of Peoria county, on the relation of John S. Stevens. Its object is to test the right of appellee, the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, to exercise in this state the franchises of doing a life accident insurance business, a steam-boiler insurance business, a plate-glass insurance business, an employer's liability insurance business, and a fidelity insurance business. In the court below, appellee filed a plea or answer to the information. A demurrer to said plea or answer was overruled, and thereupon the plaintiffs abided by their demurrer, and a judgment was rendered that the plaintiffs take nothing by their writ, and against the relator for costs. The appellee company was incorporated and organized in the year 1875 in the state of New York, under the provisions of chapter 463 of the Laws of 1853 of that state and the amendments thereto, and was authorized to do a fidelity business, a life accident business, an employer's liability business, a steam-boiler business, and a plate-glass business. It has complied with all the requirements of the insurance laws of the state of New York, and is, and for many years has been, duly licensed to do said several kinds of insurance business in that state. It has a paid-up capital of $250,000, and, in addition thereto, a reinsurance reserve fund of $881,985.17, being 50 per cent. of the gross premium in each of the branches of business done by said company, and a net surplus over and above all liabilities, including total unearned premiums, of $78,602.48; and it has on deposit, with the superintendent of insurance of the state of New York, securities of the kind required by the laws of that state, duly assigned to said officer in trust, for the benefit of all its policy holders in each branch of its said business, in the sum and of the market value of $200,000, which securities so assigned are now held by said superintendent of insurance in trust for the policy holders of the company. In 1879 said chapter 463 of the Laws of 1853 was amended. See Laws N. Y. 1879, c. 485. Section 1 of said chapter 463 was amended so as to read as follows: "Section 1. Any number of persons, not less than thirteen in number, may be associated and form an incorporation or a company for any of the purposes specified in either of the following departments: First department: To make insurance upon the lives of persons and every insurance pertaining thereto or connected therewith, and to grant, purchase, and dispose of annuities. Second department: To make any of the following kinds of insurance: 1st. Upon the health of persons. 2nd. Against injury, disability or death of persons resulting from traveling or general accidents by land or water. 3rd. Guaranteeing the fidelity of persons holding places of public or private trust. 4th. Upon the lives of horses, cattle and other live stock. 5th. Upon plate glass against breakage. 6th. Upon steam boilers against explosion, and against loss or damage to life or property resulting therefrom. 7th. Against loss by burglary or theft, or both." And section 2 was amended so as to read as follows: "Sec. 2. No company organized under this act for the purposes named in the first department shall undertake either of the risks mentioned in the second department, and no company organized under this act for either of the purposes in the second department shall undertake any business mentioned in the first department; nor shall any such company hereafter organized undertake or do more than one of the several kinds of insurance mentioned in said second department, and no company organized under this act shall undertake any business or risk, except as herein provided; provided that noth. ing herein contained shall affect the business of any company heretofore duly organized under the second department of this act.” Thereafter, the auditor of public accounts of the state of Illinois executed and delivered to the appellee company a license and certificate, authorizing it to do business in its several lines of insurance in the state of Illinois during the year 1880; and in each and every year since that time said auditor has issued to said company a like license and authority. When the company first procured a license to transact insurance business in v.88N.E.no. 14-48 this state, it in all things complied with the requirements of the insurance laws of this state in regard to foreign insurance companies doing business in this state, unless it be in respect to the matters which are at issue in this suit, and which are hereinafter stated; and annually since, and up to and including the present time, the company has filed its statements, paid its taxes, and in all things (unless it be as is above excepted) complied with all the requirements of the insurance laws of Illinois relating to insurance companies organized under the laws of other states and doing business in this state. We may here briefly refer to some of the provisions of our statute law that seem to have a bearing upon the questions at issue in the case at bar. It is provided in section 6 of an act to incorporate and to govern fire, marine, and inland navigation insurance companies doing business in the state of Illinois, approved March 11, 1869 (Laws 1869, p. 209), that no joint-stock company shall be incorporated under said act in the city of Chicago, nor shall any company incorporated under the act establish any agency for the transaction of business in said city with a smaller capital than $150,000, actually paid in, in cash; nor in any other county in the state with a smaller capital then $100,000, actually paid in, in cash. And it is provided in section 22 of said act that it shall not be lawful for any insurance company incorporated by or organized under the laws of any other state of the United States or any foreign government, for any of the purposes specified in the act, to take risks or transact any business of insurance in this state unless possessed of the amount of actual capital required of similar companies formed under the provisions of the act; and that any company incorporated by or organized under any foreign government should, in addition, deposit with the auditor of public accounts, for the benefit and security of policy holders residing in the United States, a sum not less than $200,000, in certain specified stocks, or in certain specified bonds and mortgages. And afterwards, by section 1 of an act approved and in force March 19, 1872 (Laws 1871-72, p. 503), it is provided that when any fire or fire and marine insurance company, organized under the laws of any foreign government, should file with the auditor of public accounts a certificate of the insurance department of any other state, stating that a deposit of $200,000, or the equivalent of that amount, for the protection of the policy holders in the United States, had been made by said company, in that state, in accordance with the existing laws thereof, said company should not be required to make a deposit in this state, so long as said deposit should remain intact with the superintendent of the insurance department or treasurer of that state. By an act in force July 1, 1879 (Laws 1879, p. 180), it is provided as follows: "That every insurance com pany or association incorporated by or or ganized under the laws of any other state or any foreign government must comply with the requirements of the general insurance laws of this state governing fire, marine, and inland navigation insurance companies doing business in the state of Illinois, before it shall be lawful for such company or association to take risks or transact any kind of insurance business in this state, other than that of life insurance, and such companies or associations, and all persons acting as agents thereof shall be subject to the same penalties prescribed therein for violation of any of the provisions thereof. Provided, that no plate glass, accident or steam boiler insurance company shall be required to have a larger capital than one hundred thousand dollars actually paid up; nor shall any such company be authorized to transact business in this state without having previously deposited with the state treasurer of this state, or with the agent or financial officer, or commission. er of insurance of the state where such company is organized, securities duly assigned to such officers in trust for the benefit of all its policy holders, the market value of which shall, at all times, be equal to one hundred thousand dollars; said deposit shall consist of such like securities as fire insurance companies are by the general insurance laws of this state authorized to invest in." By an act in force July 1, 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 143), it is provided that any company with a paidup capital of not less than $250,000, incorporated and organized under the laws of this or any state of the United States, for the purpose of transacting business as surety on obligations of persons or corporations, and which has complied with all the requirements of the law regulating the admission of insurance companies to transact business in this state, may transact such surety business in this state. By an act in force July 1, 1889 (Laws 1889, p. 169), provision is made for the incorporation and government, in this state, of accident life insurance companies. By section 1 of the act such companies are authorized to insure persons against loss of life or personal injury resulting from accident. By section 2 it is required that the capital stock of such a company shall be at least $200,000, fully paid up in cash. It is provided in section 4 that such company shall deposit with the auditor of public accounts at least $100,000, in specified stocks, estimated at their market value, or in mortgages, being first liens, etc. Section 7 provides that any company organized under the act shall form a reinsurance reserve, which shall be 50 per cent. of the gross premiums of all outstanding policies. And section 8 is as follows: "Sec. 8. It shall not be lawful for any company, association, individual or individuals organized or doing business under the laws of this state, or of any other state government, to transact the business of accident life insurance in this state or to aid in the transaction of the same unless such company, association, individual or individuals has or have conformed to such other state, or in this state, with the same requirements in regard to capital and reserve that are imposed by sections four (4) and seven (7) of this act upon companies in this state." It is to be noted that the capital stock of the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, appellee herein, is paid up in full, and is $250,000, which is $50,000 more than the capital stock required for doing an accident life insurance business in this state, and $150,000 more than the amount of capital stock required for doing either a plate-glass insurance business or a steam-boiler insurance business, and the same amount of capital stock that is required for doing a fidelity insurance or surety business. An employer's liability insurance business, as we understand it, is a species of guaranty insurance (9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 65), and falls within the category of "any kind of insurance business in this state other than life insurance" that is mentioned in the act of May 31, 1879, quoted supra; and, as we interpret it, that act requires a capital of $150,000 if it transact business in the city of Chicago, and a capital of $100,000 if it does business only elsewhere in this state. In either event, the actual paid-up capital stock of appellee is far in excess of that required for transacting such employer's liability insurance business in this state. It is also to be noted that the company has on deposit with the superintendent of insurance of the state of New York securities in the sum and of the market value of $200,000, which is an amount and value of deposit that is manifestly equal to, if not largely in excess of, the amount of deposit required to be made in order to transact an insurance business in this state of any of the kinds that are done by appellee. And it is further to be noted that it has a reinsurance reserve fund equal to that required by our statute for doing a life accident insurance business. It seems to be one of the contentions of appellant that, since a company cannot be organized under the laws of this state to do the different classes of insurance business done by appellee, therefore there is an implied prohibition that forbids the transacting of a multiform insurance business by one and the same company within the limits of the state; in other words, that the doing of such multiform insurance business is in violation of the spirit of its laws. We are not satisfied of the soundness of this position. It is admitted that our statutes do not in express terms prohibit a company from doing more than one kind of insurance. The rule is that, where there is no positive prohibitive statute, the presumption, under the law of comity that prevails between the states of the union, is that the state permits a corporation organized in a sister state to do any act authorized by its charter or the law |