cause, plaintiff defendant fined Sect. 19. "That in case the mayor or justice to whom the seizure of 11 & 12 VICT. any sheep, lambs, or cattle supposed to be infected as aforesaid, or of any c. 107. meat supposed to be unfit for human food, may have been reported, shall If suit brought upon inquiry order the same to be restored, and in case it appear to such on account of mayor or justice that there was a probable cause of seizure, then and in seizure, and the such case such mayor or justice shall grant a certificate to the party certify that there judge shall making the seizure that there was such probable cause, and in such case was probable the person or persons who made such seizure, being a person or persons to have 2d. acting under the authority of this act, or of any order made in pursuance damages, and hereof, shall not be liable to any action, indictment, or other suit or pro- detentore than 1s. secution on account of such seizure; and in case any action, indictment, or other suit or prosecution shall be commenced and brought to trial against any person or persons, being a person or persons acting under such authority as aforesaid, on account of the seizure of any animals, parts of animals, hay, straw, fodder, or other articles seized as forfeited under the provisions of this act, or of any order or orders made under the authority of the same, wherein a verdict shall be given against the defendant or defendants, if the court or judge before whom such information or suit shall have been tried shall have certified on the said record that there was a probable cause for such seizure, then the plaintiff, besides the things seized or the value thereof, shall not be entitled to above twopence damages, nor to any costs of suit, nor shall the defendant or defendants in such prosecution be fined above one shilling." Sect. 20. "That this act shall continue in force until the first day of Act to continue September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty, in force for two and if Parliament be then sitting then further until the end of the then session." years. the rights, &c. London. Sect. 21. "That nothing in this act contained shall prejudice or dero- Act not to affect gate from the estates, rights, interests, privileges, franchises, jurisdiction, of the city of or authority of the mayor and commonalty and citizens of the city of London or their successors, or the lord mayor of the said city for the time being, nor prohibit, defeat, alter, or diminish any power, authority, or jurisdiction which at the time of passing this act the said mayor and commonalty and citizens, or the said lord mayor for the time being, possess, by custom, charter, or otherwise, for the regulation, management, and control of markets, or the sale of infected meat, hides, skins, horns, hoofs, or other part of any infected animal, or infected hay, straw, fodder, or other article, or the lord mayor and court of aldermen, or the lord mayor, aldermen, and commons of the city of London, in common council assembled, under or by virtue of any act of Parliament, did or might lawfully claim, use, or exercise." Appeal. See titles "Assessed Taxes," " Bastardy," "Licence," " Poor," &c. Assault and Battery. See "Children." missal of com WHERE a party, on being summoned to appear before two justices for Certificate of an assault, appeared and pleaded "not guilty," and the prosecutor then hearing and diswithdrew his complaint, and the defendant was accordingly discharged, plaint for an it was held that this was a hearing and dismissal, which entitled the assault. What amounts to a dismissal. Conviction for a assault upon an indictment for robbery. defendant to a certificate that the charge had been dismissed, as not proved under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 27, and that a plea stating those facts, and that the certificate had been granted, set forth a good defence, under the 28th section, to an action of trespass for the same assault. (Tunnicliffe v. Tedd, 17 L. J., 176, C. P.; 10 Law T. 347; see 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 14; ante, p. 42.) A., B., and C. were indicted for having robbed and beaten one D. A. knocked D. down, and it was imputed that B. and C. stole his property from his pockets. It was held by Cresswell, J., that if B. and C. stole the property, and A. did not participate in the robbery, A. could not be convicted of an assault, as the assault committed by him was an independent assault unconnected with the robbery; but that if the jury thought that D. was not robbed by any of the prisoners, but had been assaulted by all of them, they might find all guilty of the assault. (Reg. v. Barnett and others, 2 Car. & Kir. 594.) lie upon a dis tress for assessed taxes. Assessed Taxes. See "Parliamentary Voters.” Replevin will not A PERSON who has been improperly assessed by the assessor of his district for a tax to which he is not legally liable, should appeal to the commissioners against it; and, if he pleases, afterwards require a case for the opinion of the judges upon it. Whether he appeals or not, if he allows a distress to be taken upon his goods for the amount of such tax, he cannot replevy, as the judgment of the commissioners or the judges is final and conclusive. (Allen v. Sharpe, 11 Law T. 155, Ex.) Order of affiliation-Abandonment of order tion to make a second order. Bastardy. THE mother of a bastard child appeared before two justices of the peace in petty sessions on the 14th of April, and was sworn and examined reCosts Jurisdic- specting the father. The case was adjourned to the next petty sessions on the 17th, when the court was differently constituted. She prayed for an order. The putative father required that she should be resworn, which she objected to, and the court made an order on the examination taken at the former court. Notice of appeal was given, and before the quarter sessions the attorney for the mother gave notice of abandoning his order, and tendered 17. 10s. for costs, which was accepted by the attorney for the putative father, but for the costs of the adjournment only. The attorney for the mother then applied to the two first-mentioned justices to hear the case a second time, but they refused, on the ground that the order first made was still in force; upon these facts, it was held, that the justices could not be required to hear the case a second time, because the costs of the order sought to be abandoned had not been paid, and it was doubted whether or not the order so made could be abandoned, and the justices be required to hear the case a second time. (Reg. v. Hinchliff and another, 16 L. J. 76 M. C.; 11 Jur. 514, Q. B.) Omission of an order of affiliation when the father When the person against whom a summons is obtained under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, appears at the hearing, it is necessary that the order attended, to state made upon him should state that the evidence was given in his presence that the evidence and hearing, or the special circumstances should be stated, showing how it was that the evidence was not so given. In The Queen v. The Duke was given in his presence and hearing of Grafton and others, 2 Bail Ct. Rep. 242; 3 New Sess. Cas. 157; 3 New Mag. Cas. 1; 17 Law J. 125 M. C., an order of affiliation stated the appearance of the putative father, but the words "in the presence and hearing of the said " (as provided for by the schedule to the 8 Vict. c. 10) were struck out, and it was held on a motion for a certiorari to bring up the order to quash it, that it was bad for this omission. the appellant to Upon an appeal against an order of affiliation the mother of the bastard The mother a child is a competent witness under the 8 Vict. c. 10, s. 6, to prove that good witness for she received due notice of appeal, under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 4, "the prove due service trial of the appeal" commencing the instant the appeal is called on for of the notice of hearing. Reg. v. The Justices of Middlesex, 2 Bail Ct. Rep. 271; 3 New Sess. Cas. 152; 3 New Mag. Cas. 2; 17 Law J. 111, M. C. appeal. In the above case it was also held that the notice of appeal is "process" Notice of appeal is "process within the meaning of the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, and that, therefore, where the within the adjudication upon an order of affiliation was made upon a Saturday, the 29 Car. 2, c. 7, Sunday following was held to be excluded from the computation of the and is not good twenty-four hours within which the notice of appeal is to be given. if served on a Sunday. In Reg. v. Collingwood and another, 3 New Sess. Cas. 252; 3 New Order of affiliaMag. Cas. 53; 17 L. J. 168, M. C., it was held, that under the 7 & 8 tion in respect of Vict. c. 101, justices have jurisdiction to make an order in bastardy on child born of a an illegitimate the putative father of an illegitimate child born of a married woman, married woman. although the statute only uses the words "single woman," and that such order is not bad for being made defeasible on her husband again living and cohabiting with her. Beer (see "Alehouse," "Licence.") Bridges. A BOROUGH, incorporated by charter with a non intromitant clause, was Liability to enlarged under stats. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 64, s. 35, and 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, repair. s. 7, by the addition of a parish in the same county containing a bridge, which until that time the county had repaired. There was no evidence that the borough had been used to maintain any bridges, and it was therefore held that the transfer of the new district did not render the borough liable to repair the bridge. (Reg. v. The Inhabitants of New Sarum, 7 Q. B. 941.) Burglary. night time. AN indictment for burglary stated the offence to have been committed on Sufficiency of the the 15th of November, "about the hour of eleven in the night of the allegation of the same day" on which the offence was committed, which, in fact, was committed at about one o'clock in the morning; and on its being objected for the prisoners that by stat. 1 Vict. c. 86, s. 4, the night was defined to commence at nine o'clock in the evening, and to conclude at six o'clock in the morning of next succeeding day, and that the offence ought to have been alleged to have been committed between those hours; or that, if the prosecution chose to introduce an allegation as to time into the indictment, they ought to prove it as laid: Patteson, J. held the indictment to be sufficient, saying, "I think it is immaterial whether the time be mentioned or not. The night' is the material allegation, and even if the word "mighs' were not mentioned. I think it would perhaps be Reg. v. lie. Cattle (see “Animals,” ante ; ~ Evidence.” “Larceny,” Certiorari. When it will not A certiorari will not lie to bring up a resolution of a vestry for the appointment of paid constables under the 5 & 6 Vict. e. 109, s. 18, nor the copy of such resolution forwarded to the justices in special sessions on which they made the appointment. But it will lie to bring up the appointment itself, made by the justices in petty sessions, where the proceedings in vestry have not been conducted in conformity with the 58 Geo. 3, č. 69, amended by the 59 Geo. 3, e. 35, a poll having been demanded and refused, and the resolution having been carried by a show of hands. (Re Constables of Hipperholme cum Brighthouse, 2 B. C. Rep. 98; 5 Dowl. & L. 79.) When it will. A certiorari lies to the justices of sessions to bring up the record of an acquittal remaining in the court. (Jackson v. Õates, 11 Jur. 1105. A principal and be permitted to sever in their challenges so as trials. Challenge of Jurors. WHEN a principal and accessary are indicted together, they will not be accessary will not allowed to sever in their challenges, so as to be tried separately. (Reg. v. Fisher and another, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 68.) In this case Ann Fisher was indicted for having murdered Richard Fisher by poison, and Mary to have separate Hodge with having aided and assisted her in administering the poison; and upon being placed at the bar, their counsel applied that they might be tried separately. Platt, B., having consulted with Wightman, J., said, "I cannot regard this case otherwise than as that of a principal and an accessary; the indictment charges a principal and an accessorial offence, and justice might be defeated by allowing the two offences to be separated ; and, therefore, in exercising the discretion which I have, and fortified as I am by the opinion of the learned judge who is associated with me, and whom I have consulted, I feel that I must refuse the application. As to the case of Reg. v. Seeley, the judge may have allowed the challenges to have been severed, but it is an ill practice so to do." Cheats and False Pretences. False pretences AN indictment for obtaining money under false pretences stated that the by fraudulently misrepresenting prisoner, having certain cheese to sell, falsely pretended that certain pieces the quality of an of cheese called tasters were part and parcel of the cheese so offered for a party was sale, and of the same value and good quality, by reason of which said several pretences he obtained from A. B. certain money (specifying it), with intent to cheat and defraud, &c. The evidence showed that by reason article, whereby induced to purchase and pay for it of the false pretences, the prisoner had induced the prosecutor to enter into a contract and purchase a certain quantity of cheese, for which he paid the sum specified; and, upon an objection being taken that this merely amounted to a breach of warranty, and that the evidence showed that the money was obtained, not by reason of the tasters, but the contract then made, and Williams, J., upon the authority of Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B., overruled the objection, and the prisoner was convicted; and upon the case being afterwards considered by the judges, they held the conviction right. (Reg. v. Abbott, 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 430; 2 Car. & Kir. 630, S.C.) The cases of Reg. v. Dark, and Reg. v. Garlick, 2 Car. & Kir. 632, were precisely similar to the case of Reg. v. Abbott, except that in the case of Reg. v. Dark, it was proved that the cheese was sold for 5d. a pound, and was worth between 3d. and 4d.; and that in the case of Reg. v. Garlick, it was proved that the price of the cheese was 50s. a hundred weight, and its value about 3d. a pound. other servants, A., the servant of B., rendered an account to B. of 147. 1s. 2d. as due False representation by a servant from A. to his workmen; and B. gave A. a cheque for the amount. All to his master that that sum was so due except 7s., which A. kept when he got the cheque a certain sum is cashed, and paid the workmen the residue. In one count of an indictment due for wages to for false pretences, it was charged that by this false pretence A. obtained whereby the the cheque from B. with intent to defraud him of the same. It was master gives him objected that the intent was only to defraud B. of a part of the proceeds of the cheque. A. was convicted, and the fifteen judges held the con- which surplus the viction right, and that the evidence supported the count. (Reg. v. Leonard, himself. 2 Car. & Kir. 514.) Children (see "Indictment," "Murder," post.) Church-rate. See "Indictment," post. a cheque for more than is due, servant keeps made upon its justices, or in the an action of A CHAPEL-RATE was laid on the landholders of the chapelry only, exclu- If a churchrate sively of the holders and occupiers of the mills and houses, and it was held by which is duly the Exchequer upon a case stated for its opinion, that an occupier of land face is not queswithin the chapelry, who did not object to the rate before the justices tioned before the when summoned for nonpayment, could not question its validity in an Ecclesiastical action of replevin after distress on his goods under the justice's warrant. Court, it cannot It was further held, that a chapel-rate duly made, but objected to from be disputed in extrinsic circumstances, can only be questioned in the Ecclesiastical replevin. Court, and that an order of justices for payment of a chapel-rate need Order of justices not state that the proceedings were taken " upon oath." (Ramsbottom v. for payment of a Duckworth and another, 1 Ex. Rep. 506.) A church-rate made pursuant to a resolution of a vestry was stated in proceedings were the heading of the rate to be made "for and towards the repairs of the taken "upon church and other incidental charges of the said parish ;" and it was held by the Queen's Bench that the rate was bad because it appeared to be made not exclusively to defray expenses to which a church-rate is applicable. (Reg. v. Wilkinson and another, 3 New Sess. Cas. 180; 3 New Mag. Cas. 26.) chapel-rate need not state that the oath." The Queen's award a man warrant against It was further decided in the above case, that although by the Bench will not 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, s. 7, if a person refuse to pay a church-rate duly damus to parties assessed upon him, the validity of which has not been questioned in any to issue their ecclesiastical court, a magistrate may grant a warrant to bring such person a rate-payer who before two justices who may examine into the complaint, and order pay- refuses to pay a ment, &c., the court will not compel by mandamus a magistrate to issue his warrant where the rate is manifestly bad. M church-rate where the rate appears to be bad on its face. |