exposure to one person only was not an offence at common law, the words of" divers others of the liege subjects," &c., were material to be proved; and that, as they had not been proved, the conviction was bad. (Reg. v. Webb, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 183.)

Nume.]—In an indictment for the murder of "William Scarborough," Evidence of a it appeared that the deceased was the infant illegitimate son of the pri- by reputation. name acquired soner, Sarah Scarborough; that he was sometimes called " William," and " Coley," and was spoken of as "Sarah Scarborough's child," and on one or two occasions as "William Scarborough," in his mother's presence, and there was no proof that he had been baptized. Upon this it was held, by Coltman, J. that there was evidence to go to the jury that the deceased had acquired the name of " William Scarborough" by reputation. (Reg. v. Scarborough, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 72.)

to explain an

examination.

Proof of other felonies.]—Evidence of a distinct felony may be given in Proof of another re-examination, where it will serve to explain an apparently contradictory felony may be given in evidence fact elicited by cross-examination, as in the case of Reg. v. Chambers, upon re-exami3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 92, where the prisoner was indicted for having com- nation in order mitted a rape upon the person of his grand-daughter, Isabella Chambers, apparently cona child under the age of ten years; and it appeared, on cross-examination tradictory fact of the little girl, that the act for which the prisoner was indicted had not elicited on crosscaused her any pain, whereupon it was proposed to ask the witness whether her grandfather had done the same thing to her on previous occasions; which question being objected to on the part of the prisoner, as leading to the admission of evidence which would support another indictment for a distinct felony, Mr. Baron Rolfe admitted the evidence, as tending to explain the circumstance that the act in question had not occasioned any pain.

assignment of

necessary to

Perjury.]-In cases of perjury, although an assignment of perjury must Although an be proved by two witnesses, it is not necessary to prove by two witnesses perjury must be every fact which goes to make out the assignment of perjury, as thus :- proved by two A., to prove an alibi for B., had sworn that B. was not out of his sight witnesses, it is not between the hours of 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. on a certain day; and on this, prove by two perjury was assigned. Proof by one witness that between those hours A. witnesses every fact which goes was at one place on foot, and by another witness that between those to make out the hours B. was walking at another place six miles off, was held by Pat- assignment. teson, J. to be sufficient proof of the assignment of perjury. (Reg. v. Roberts, 2 Car. & Kir. 607.)

second only of

Counsel-Practice.]-Where two prisoners are jointly indicted, and the Addressing the second in the indictment only is defended by counsel, the latter will be jury where the permitted to address the jury before the other makes his statement, not- two prisoners withstanding the rule established in Reg. v. Richards and others, 1 Cox's is defended by Crim. Cas. 62. (Reg. v. Hazell and another, 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 220, Where a prinWilliams, J.)

counsel.

cipal and a

Where one prisoner was indicted for stealing, and the other for receiving, receiver are and the receiver was defended by counsel, but the principal felon was and the receiver jointly indicted undefended, the court called upon the principal to make his statement to only is defended the jury before the counsel for the receiver was permitted to address them. (Reg. v. Martin and another, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 56, Coleridge, J.) A barrister who acts as an interpreter must be sworn. (Reg. v. Kelly and another, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 75, Patteson, J.)

by counsel, the principal is first to make his

statement to the jury. Counsel acting

as an interpreter. Inducement

Confession Statement.]-Upon the trial of an indictment for attempting to poison, the only evidence of intent was a confession, proved by a Withdrawing medical man, he denying at first that he had held out to the prisoner any confession proinducement to make the statement. It was afterwards proved by another perly received on its afterwards witness that before the statement was made the medical man had said to appearing that it the prisoner, in the presence of her witness (whom she had attempted to was improperly

obtained.

InducementRemoving the influence under which a confession has been made.

Admissibility of

by a prisoner

poison), "it will be better for you to tell the truth;" and the medical man, on being recalled, admitted that he might have said so. The learned judge refused to withdraw the confession from the jury, and the prisoner was convicted; and it was held by the judges, upon a case reserved, that the conviction was on this account wrong. (Reg. v. Garner, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 175; 3 New Sess. Cas. 326; 18 L. J. 1, M. C.)

The prosecutor, in the presence of the constable, said to the prisoner, "it will be better for you to tell the truth, as it will save the shame of a search-warrant in your house." The statement was rejected. The constable then took the prisoner into a loft, and, in the absence of the prosecutor, the prisoner made a statement. The evidence was rejected. Half an hour afterwards the constable took the prisoner to the stationhouse, and on the way cautioned him not to say anything; after which he made a statement. Upon this it was objected, on the part of the prisoner, that the influence produced by the prosecutor's inducement was still operating upon the prisoner's mind; and Mr. Justice Williams thereupon said, These are all cases of degree. I am not satisfied that the influence was removed, and I shall refuse to receive the evidence tendered." (Reg. v. Collier and another, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 57.)

A statement made by a prisoner before suspicion attaches to him, and a statement made before search made, in order to account for his possession of property, which he is afterwards charged with having stolen, is admissible as evidence for him. (Reg. v. Abraham, 2 Car. & Kir. 550, Alderson, B.)

before he is suspected.

Proof of conviction and sentence

The prosecutor is not bound to call all the witnesses on the back of the

Transportation, returning from.]-On the trial of an indictment against a person for being at large, without lawful cause, before the expiration of his term of transportation, a certificate of his former conviction and sentence was put in; it purported to be that of J. G., "deputy clerk of the peace " for the county of L., "and clerk of the courts of general quarter sessions of the peace holden in and for the said county, and having the custody of the records of the courts of general quarter sessions of the peace holden in and for the said county." It was proved that Mr. H. was clerk of the peace of L., and that he had three deputies, partners, of whom J. G., who had signed the certificate, was one; and that each of them acted as clerk of the peace, and that for forty years they had kept the sessions records at their office. This was held sufficient proof of the conviction and sentence under the stat. 5 Geo. 4, c. 84, s. 24. (Reg. v. Jones, 2 Car. & Kir. 524, Coltman, J.)

Witness.]—The judges have laid down a rule that a prosecutor is not bound to call witnesses merely because their names are on the back of the indictment, but the prosecutor ought to have all such witnesses in court, so that they may be called for the defence if they are wanted for that purpose. If, however, they are called for the defence, the person calling them makes them his own witnesses. (Per Alderson, B., in Reg. v. Woodmakes them his head, 2 Car. & Kir. 520; see also Reg. v. Edwards and others, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 82, Erle, J.)

indictment, but if the prisoner wishes any not

so called he

own.

Evidence of a witness given

under compul

ing protection

cannot be used against him.

If a witness claims the protection of the court on the ground that his answer will tend to criminate himself, and there appears reasonable ground sion after claim to believe that it will do so, he is not compellable to answer; and if obliged to answer notwithstanding, what he says must be considered to have been obtained by compulsion, and cannot be given afterwards in evidence against him. Whether or not the mere declaration of a witness on oath that he believes that his answer will tend to criminate him, will be sufficient to protect him from answering, where sufficient other circumstances do not appear in the case to induce the judge to believe that the answer will tend to criminate him, is doubtful. (Reg. v. Garbett, 2 Car. & Kir. 474, the fifteen judges; S. C., 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 448.) A woman cohabiting with a prisoner, and passing as his wife, is a biting with a man competent witness for him. (Reg. v. Young, 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 291, Erle, J.)

A woman coha

may be a witness for him.

Excise and Customs.

See "Alehouse," ante, "Licence," post.

acts has been

offender the

WHERE it appeared from the affidavits on which a rule nisi to set aside If a conviction a conviction was granted, that such conviction had been obtained in under the excise pursuance of a conspiracy, and these affidavits were unanswered, the obtained by a Court of Queen's Bench will make the rule absolute, in the exercise of conspiracy to its jurisdiction, over all criminal proceedings in an inferior court, although screen the real the Court of Exchequer may also have jurisdiction by statute over the Queen's Bench subject-matter. Where, therefore, a maltster had fraudulently procured a will set it aside. conviction against his workman for maliciously doing certain things prohibited by the excise laws, with intent to injure his master, under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 52, s. 46, and had obtained a certificate under that section, the Queen's Bench set aside the conviction, although the party convicted was not made a party to the rule, and although, in such case, it is expressly provided by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 79, that a writ of certiorari may issue out of the Exchequer. (Reg. v. Gillyard, 3 New Sess. Cas. 207; 3 New Mag. Cas. 43.)

the couch.

the malt having

By stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 52, s. 33, a maltster is liable to a penalty for Mode of returntreading or forcing together in the couch frame any grain making into ing the malt into malt. The 1 Vict. c. 49, s. 5, enacts, "that any excise officer, upon suspicion of the grain having been trodden or forced together, may What is concluthrow the grain out of the couch frame and return it, and lay it level in sive evidence of the couch frame, and if any increase in the guage of the grain shall be been trodden. found, exceeding a certain proportion, then the increase so found shall be taken as conclusive evidence that the grain has been trodden or forced together, and the maltster shall thereupon be convicted of a penalty." Upon an information before justices against the defendant for the penalty, it appeared that the excise officer had, in pursuance of an order of the commissioners of excise, returned the grain by piling it in a cone in the centre of the couch, and then distributing it equally to all parts of the couch. The increase in the grain, when thus returned, having exceeded that allowed by the act, the defendant was convicted. Upon this it was held that the increase in the grain found, by such a mode of returning it, was conclusive evidence of the offence within the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 52, s. 33, as it did not appear that the mode of proceeding was unfair or improper, and, consequently, the conviction was right, and that the officer had some, if not an absolute, discretion to exercise in the matter, provided he does not use it improperly. (Reg. v. Speller, 1 Ex. Rep. 401; New Mag. Cas. 351; 17 L. J. 9, M. C.)

The following acts were passed in the last sessions of Parliament relative

11 & 12 Vict. c.

to the Customs and Excise :

Customs.

97. An act to repeal the duties of Customs upon the
importation of sugar, and to impose new duties
in lieu thereof.

Excise.

11 & 12 Vict. c. 121. An act to alter the laws and regulations of Excise

respecting the survey of dealers in and retailers
of spirits, and respecting the sale and removal
of spirits by permit, from the stock of such
traders, and respecting the distribution of
penalties and forfeitures recovered under the laws
of Excise.

False Pretences (see "Cheats and False Pretences," "Evidence,"
ante, "Indictment," post.)

Felony (see the different heads of Crimes, "Evidence,"
"Indictment," &c.)

c. 52.

58 Geo. 3, c. 43.

Fish.

11 & 12 VICT. BY the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 52, intituled "An Act to explain the Acts for preventing the Destruction of the Breed of Salmon and Fish of the Salmon kind" (passed 14th August, 1848), after reciting that " an act was passed in the fifty-eighth year of the reign of King George the Third, intituled An Act for preventing the Destruction of the Breed of Salmon and Fish of the Salmon kind, in the Rivers of England:' and that an act was passed in the session of Parliament held in the sixth and seventh years of the reign of Her present Majesty, to amend and extend the provisions of the said first-recited act: and that it is expedient to remove doubts which have arisen whether the said acts extend to the tributary streams of rivers, and whether certain of the provisions of the said secondly-mentioned act extend to salmon trout and fish of the salmon kind: it is The word "river" therefore enacted and declared, that in construction of the said acts in recited acts to respectively the words 'river' and 'rivers' respectively shall extend to and apply to tributary streams thereof. include all the tributary streams of such river and rivers respectively." Sect. 2. "And be it enacted and declared, that all the provisions, act to apply to penalties, and powers in the said act of the sixth and seventh years of salmon trout and the reign of Her present Majesty contained for the protection of and in kind as well as to relation to salmon shall extend and be applicable to salmon trout and fish of the salmon kind, as if in every case where salmon is in such act mentioned salmon trout and fish of the salmon kind had been also expressly mentioned therewith."

The last recited

fish of the salmon

salmon.

Not to extend to offences committed before passing of this act.

Sect. 3. "Provided always, and be it enacted, that with respect to any offence committed or charged to have been committed before the passing of this act, the said acts shall be construed as if this act had not been passed."

defendant having

Forcible Entry.

Allegation of the IN order to justify a conviction by justices under stats. 15 Rich. 2, c. 3, been summoned. and 8 Hen. 6, c. 9, it must be proved before them that there was as well an unlawful entry on the premises as a forcible detainer. Where, therefore, a conviction stated that justices had convicted G. A. of forcible detainer upon their own view, and that afterwards a complaint was made to the justices that the said G. A. forcibly entered the premises, and that notice of such complaint was given to the said G. A., who received the said notice, but said nothing, and then went on to allege that the justices received evidence upon oath of the unlawful entry, it was held that_the conviction was bad for not showing that G. A. had been summoned to answer the charge of the unlawful entry, or that he had any opportunity afforded him of defending himself against such charge. (Attwood v. Jolliffe and another, 3 New Sess. Cas. 116.)

Forgery.

order for the payment of

money.

THE cheques of a provident society, having different branches, were What is a forgery drawn in the name of the society, and signed by the chairman and three of a warrant or of the committee of any branch of the society. They were then countersigned by the clerk of the whole society. The bankers did not know the names or signatures of the chairman or committee-men, but relied upon the counter-signature of the clerk as a voucher for their authenticity. Held, that a forgery of the signatures of the chairman and three members of the committee of a branch of the society, by means of which the genuine signature of the clerk was obtained, was a forgery of a warrant or order for the payment of money. (Reg. v. Lee, 3 Cox's Crim. Cas. 80, Denman, C. J.)

cheque with a

than that authorized.

Where a party receives a blank cheque, signed, with directions to fill Filling up a in a certain amount, and he fraudulently fills in a different amount, and signed blank devotes the proceeds of the cheque to other purposes, he is guilty of greater amount forgery. (Reg. v. Wilson, 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 360, Coltman, J.) A. desired William Wilkinson, a mechanic in his service at Leeds, at Procuring A. B. weekly wages, to write his name across a blank stamp, which he did. A. of L. to accept a wrote on it a bill of exchange for 1487. 7s. 9d. drawn on "William Wil- bill as A. B. of kinson, Halifax ;" and A. wrote over the acceptance "Payable at Smith, to pass off the H., with intent Payne, and Co. bankers, London." A. intended, at the time the accept- same as the ance was written, to make the drawing to be on a Mr. William Wilkinson, acceptance of of Halifax, there being persons of that name resident there, but none of whom had given him any authority to draw. Held, by the fifteen judges, that this was a forgery. (Reg. v. Blenkinsop, 2 Car. & Kir. 531; 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 420.)

"Three days after the ship Selah has sailed from the port of Sunderland, please to pay to John Wilson, or bearer hereof, the sum of four pounds O shillings and pence (provided the said John Wilson has actually sailed in the said ship), being part of his wages in advance on her intended voyage to Alexander.

66

"JOHN ROBSON, Master."

"To Mr. John Stobart, owner of ship." Held to be an order for payment of money under the statute; also, that it was not necessary to aver in the indictment performance of the condition. (Reg. v. Lonsdale, 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 222, Alderson, B.) An unsigned forged paper, "Received from Mr. Bendon, due to Mr. Warman, 17s. settled," is a forged receipt within the statute 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 10. (Reg. v. Inder, 2 Car. & Kir. 635, fifteen judges.) It was the practice of the treasurer of the county of S., when an order had been made on him for the payment of the expenses of a prosecution, to pay the whole amount to the attorney for the prosecution, or his clerk, and to require the signature of every person named in the order to be written on the back of it; and opposite to each name the sum ordered to be paid to each person respectively. Held, that such signature is not a receipt, the forging of which is an offence against the statute 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 10, and that it is merely an authority to the treasurer to pay the amount. (Reg. v. Cooper, 2 Car. & Kir. 586, Erle, J.)

A. B. of H.

receipt for money

An instrument, purporting to be an agreement, stamped as such, and An agreement reciting that an arrangement had been made between the parties thereto, containing a in consideration of a certain sum, the receipt of which was thereby ac- is a receipt or knowledged, and then proceeding to release the party paying it from all acquittance further claim in the matter in respect of which it was paid, is a receipt or acquittance under the 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 10, and may be so described in an indictment for forgery. (Reg. v. Hill, 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 246, Coleridge, J.)

within the act.