year from the date of its making (b); but it applies to a contract defeasible by a contingency which may occur within that period (c). A contract to serve for a year, the service to commence the day after the day on which the contract is made, is within the statute (d).

DECLARATIONS OR CREATIONS OF TRUSTS.

Sect. 7. "All declarations or creations of trust or confidence of any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing, signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect." The beneficial owner is the only person who is enabled to declare the trust (e).

It is provided by sect. 8, "that when any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements by which a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law, or be transferred or extinguished by an act or operation of law, then and in every such case such trust or confidence shall be of the like force and effect as the

(b) Cherry v. Heming, 4 Ex. 631; Smith v. Nesle, 2 C. B.,

N. S. 67.

(c) See Davey v. Shannon, L. R., 4 Ex. D. 81; 48 L. J., Ex. 459; 27 W. R. 599.

(d) Britain v. Rossiter, L. R., 11 Q. B. D. 123; 48 L. J., Ch. 17; 26 W. R. 868.

(e) Kronheim v. Johnson, L. R., 7 Ch. D. 60; 47 L. J., Ch. 132; 26 W. R. 342.

same would have been if this statute had not been made, anything hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithstanding."

When the plaintiff had conveyed an estate to the defendant without consideration, on the understanding that the defendant should in certain events re-convey it to him, and on the plaintiff applying for a reconveyance, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds; the Court made a decree for re-conveyance, on the ground that the Statute of Frauds was never intended to prevent a court of equity from giving relief in a case of a plain, clear and deliberate fraud (f).

In Foster v. Hale (g), Lord Alvanley said, "It is not required by the statute that a trust should be created by writing, and the words of the statute are very particular in the clause respecting declarations of trust. It does not by any means require that all trusts shall be created only by writing, but that they shall be manifested and proved by writing; plainly meaning that there should be evidence in writing proving that there was such a trust. Therefore, unquestionably, it is not necessarily to be created by writing, but it must be evidenced by writing, and then the statute is complied with; and indeed the great danger of parol declarations, against which the statute was intended to guard, is entirely taken away. I admit that it must be proved in toto not only that there was a trust, but what it was."

(f) Haigh v. Kaye, L. R., 7 Ch. 469; 41 L. J., Ch. 567; 20 W. R. 597.

(9) 3 Vesey, 707; cf. Smith v. Matthews, 3 De G. F. & J. 139.

CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS FOR 10%. AND

UPWARDS.

Sect. 17. "No contract for the sale of any goods, wares or merchandises, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same; or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part of payment; or that some note or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized" ().

Under this section there are three statutory modes of proving a contract for the sale or purchase of goods for the price of 107. and upwards:

1st. By showing that the buyer accepted, and actually received, part of the goods.

2nd. By showing a payment and receipt of earnest money.

3rd. By showing that the contract, containing the consideration for it, was reduced to writing, and signed at least by the party who is charged upon it (i).

Under this section the contract is void, as well as

(h) This section is extended by 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 7, "to all contracts for the sale of goods of the value of ten pounds and upwards, notwithstanding the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready for delivery; or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery." (i) Egerton v. Matthews, 6 East, 307.

the right of action gone, if its formalities are not observed (k). The acceptance may be implied from the buyer's conduct in dealing with the goods (1), and it may precede the actual receipt (m); but it cannot be implied without some consent (n). The receipt may be constructive (o).

The writing must be signed by the party charged, or by his agent, who, under the seventeenth as well as under the fourth section of the act, may be appointed without writing (p). Such agent must be a third person, and not one of the contracting parties (q). Under this, as well as under the fourth section, the contract may be proved by several sufficiently connected writings. Where, after a long correspondence, the defendants wrote to the plaintiff, offering to purchase at a certain price, adding the words, "waiting your reply," and the plaintiff afterwards accepted the offer verbally, it was held that there was a binding contract within the statute (r); but where the defendants, in reply to a letter from the plaintiff, wrote accepting the offer therein contained, but saying "there are, however, some details

(k) Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C. 735.

(1) Currie v. Anderson, 2 E. & E. 592; Kershaw v. Ogden, 3 H. & C. 717.

(m) Cusack v. Robinson, 1 B. & S. 299.

(n) Smith v. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431.

(0) Marshall v. Green, L. R., 1 C. P. D. 35; 45 L. J., C. P. 153; 24 W. R. 175.

(p) Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 378.

(q) Farebrother v. Simmons, 3 B. & Ald. 333.

(r) Watts v. Ainsworth, 1 H. & C. 83.

P.

EE

necessary to be introduced in the contract which I will prepare," this was held insufficient to satisfy the statute (s).

A letter from the purchaser, referring to the terms of the contract, but declining to accept the goods because they were damaged, has been held a sufficient memorandum (t); and letters between the purchaser and his agent employed to purchase, if they contain the terms of the contract, are sufficient to support an action by the vendor (u). The names of the parties or of their agents must appear in the agreement; and the Court of Exchequer, in Vandenburgh v. Spooner (x), held in effect that it must be collected from the agreement which of the parties is the seller; but the same court, in Newell v. Radford (y), held that parol evidence was admissible to prove which of the parties named is the seller. Contracts may be signed, either with both the christian and surname, or with the initials of the christian name prefixed to the whole surname (s), or with the surname alone; but not with merely the initials of the christian and surname (a).

(8) Ball v. Bridges, 22 W. R. 552.

(t) Bailey v. Sweeting, 9 C. B., N. S. 843; cf. Wilkinson v. Evans, 1 H. & R. 552.

(u) Gibson v. Holland, L. R., 1 C. P. 1.

(x) 4 H. & C. 519.

(y) L. R., 3 C. P. 52; 37 L. J., C. P. 1; 16 W. R. 79.

(z) Lobb v. Stanley, 5 Q. B. 574.

(a) Sweet v. Lee, 3 M. & G. 452.