the faith of their being so authorized." Some of the "recognized propositions of an estoppel in pais" were once laid down by the Court of Common Pleas (8). One of them was thus stated:-"If in the transaction itself which is in dispute one has led another into the belief of a certain state of facts by conduct of culpable negligence calculated to have that result, and such culpable negligence has been the proximate cause of leading, and has led, the other to act by mistake upon such belief to his prejudice, the second cannot be heard afterwards as against the first to show that the state of facts referred to did not exist." In that case it was held that the defendants were not, under the circumstances, estopped from showing that certain goods alleged to have been delivered to them as carriers had never reached their hands, although the plaintiff had received from them advice notes for such goods (t). These doctrines do not however apply to a statement of a fact not yet in existence, nor to a matter of future intention (u). A promise de futuro to be binding at all must be binding as a contract (x). It is generally considered that the general rule is, that a person cannot be made liable for a misrepresentation, unless it is a misrepresentation in point of fact, and not merely in point of

(s) Carr v. London and North Western Railway Co., L. R., 10 C. P. 316; 44 L. J., C. P. 109; 23 W. R. 747.

(t) See also Coventry v. Great Eastern Railway Co., L. R., 12 Q. B. D. 776.

(u) Bank of Louisiana v. Bank of New Orleans, 43 L. J., Ch. 269. (x) Maddison v. Alderson, L. R., 8 App. Cas. 467; 52 L. J., Q. B. 737; 31 W. R. 820.

law (y); but this has recently been questioned (z), and it is probable that the rule is not applicable to any but cases where both parties have the same means of knowing what is the law on a given point.

The six following are the most important kinds of estoppels by matter of pais :—(1) A tenant, during his possession of the premises, cannot deny that the landlord under whom he has entered, or to whom he has paid rent, had title at the time of his admission, and this extends to the case of lodgers. "The security of landlords would be infinitely endangered if such a proceeding were allowed" (a); and even if a tenant consents to give up possession to a person claiming to be the landlord, such person is estopped as the tenant would have been from disputing the landlord's title (b). So, where a person had dealt with property as an executor de son tort, his payment of rent to the superior landlord was held to estop him from denying his liability as assignee to perform the covenants in the lease (c). Nevertheless a tenant, although he cannot be permitted to prove that his landlord had no title, at the time of entry, may show that his title has expired (d), and may prove

(y) Per Mellish, L. J., in Beattie v. Lord Ebury, L. R., 7 Ch. 802; 41 L. J., Ch. 807; 20 W. R. 996.

(2) Per Bowen, L. J., West London Commercial Bank v. Kitson, L. R., 12 Q. B. D. 363; 53 L. J., Q. B. 347; 32 W. R. 758. (a) Per Lord Ellenborough, Balls v. Westwood, 2 Camp. 12. (b) Doe v. Mills, 2 B. & Ad. 17.

(e) Williams v. Heales, L. R., 9 C. P. 171; 43 L. J., C. P. 80; 22 W. R. 317.

(d) England v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682; cf. Langford v. Selmes, 3 K. & J. 220.

that a parcel of land, about which he and the lessor are disputing, was never comprised in the lease at all (e). So, too, a person who enters on land by the licence of the party in possession is estopped from denying the title of such party to such possession (ƒ). Conversely, a landlord who has granted a lease is estopped from alleging his want of title, and thiswhether the lease is by deed or not. Payment of rent and receipt of rent alike raise strong presumptions of tenancy, but do not operate by way of estoppel; for, "when a tenancy is attempted to be established by mere payment of rent, without any proof of an actual demise or of the tenant's having been let into possession by the person to whom the payment was made, evidence is always admissible on the part of the tenant to explain the payment of rent and to show on whose behalf such rent was received" (g).

(2) A bailee is estopped from denying that his bailor had, at the time the bailment was made, authority to make it (h). But when the bailee is evicted by title paramount he can set up that title against the bailor (i).

(3) A licensee is estopped from denying the title of the licensor to grant the licence. Thus, a licensee of a patent cannot dispute the title of the

(e) Per Lord Blackburn, Clark v. Adie, L. R., 2 App. Cas. 435; 46 L. J., Ch. 606; 26 W. R. 48.

(f) Doe v. Baytop, 3 A. & E. 188.

(g) Per Patteson, J., Doe v. Francis, 2 M. & R. 57.

(h) Gosling v. Birnie, 7 Bing. 338.

(i) Biddle v. Bond, 6 B. & S. 225.

patentee; but a licensee can show that what he has done does not fall within the ambit of the patent (k), and for this purpose he may refer to former patents to show what is a proper construction of his licensor's patent (7). It may here be observed that a patentee is not estopped from disputing the validity of the patent as against an assignee, except where it is proved that the assignee bought on the faith of the statements in the patentee's petition to the crown (m). To allow a licensee to dispute the title of his licensor would, according to Lord Westbury, be "inconsistent with the law, as it would be equally inconsistent with the ordinary reason and good sense of mankind" (n).

(4) An agent is estopped from denying the title of his principal (o).

(5) The acceptor of a bill of exchange is, by sect. 54 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1883 (p), precluded from denying to a holder in due course "(a) the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the bill; (b) in the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the then capacity of the drawer to indorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his

(k) Clark v. Adie, L. R., 2 App. Cas. 413; 46 L. J., Ch. 598; 26 W. R. 45.

(1) Couchman v. Greemer, 1 Official Reports of Patent Cases, 197. (m) Cropper v. Smith, 2 Official Reports of Patent Cases, 81; L. R., 26 Ch. Div. 700; 53 L. J., Ch. 891; 32 W. R. 60.

(n) See Crossley v. Dixon, 10 H. L. Cas. 304.

(0) Dixon v. Hammond, 3 B. & Ald. 310.

(p) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61.

P.

indorsement; (c) in the case of a bill payable to the order of a third person, the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement." By sect. 55, the drawer of a bill "is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse;" and the indorser of a bill, by indorsing it, "is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the genuineness and regularity in all respects of the drawer's signature and all previous indorsements, and is precluded from denying to his immediate or a subsequent indorsee that the bill was at the time of his indorsement a valid and subsisting bill, and that he had then a good title thereto." It has been held that subsequent acknowledgment of a forged signature to a bill cannot operate as an estoppel (p), and that the payment of a bill upon which a man's acceptance has been forged does not make him liable to pay a second similarly forged acceptance, even without notice of repudiation (g).

(6) Where a party, having an interest in property, stands by and permits another to deal with such property, as if he were the absolute owner, and as if there were no such secret equity, he will not be permitted to assert such secret equity against those with whom the apparent owner has dealt. This doctrine was discussed at length, in the case of Ramsden v.

(p) Brook v. Hook, L. R., 6 Ex. 89; 40 L. J., Ex. 50; 19 W. R. 508.

(a) Morris v. Bethel, L. R., 5 C. P. 47; 19 W. R. 137.