each particular case the court must determine upon the facts actually given in evidence or proposed to be given in evidence, whether it seems probable that the accused person may have consulted his legal adviser, not after the commission of the crime for the legitimate purpose of being defended, but before the commission of the crime for the purpose of being guided or helped in committing it. We are far from saying that the question whether the advice was taken before or after the offence will always be decisive as to the admissibility of such evidence. Courts must in every instance judge for themselves on the special facts of each particular case, just as they must judge whether a witness deserves to be examined on the supposition that he is hostile, or whether a dying declaration was made in the immediate prospect of death. In this particular case the fact that there had been a partnership (which was proved on the trial of the interpleader issue), the assertion that it had been dissolved, the fact that directly after the verdict a solicitor was consulted and that the execution creditor was met by a bill of sale which purported to have been made by the defendant to the man who had been and was said to have ceased to be his partner, made it probable that the visit to the solicitor really was intended for the purpose for which, after he had given his evidence, it turned out to have been intended. If the interview had been for an innocent purpose the evidence given would have done the defendant good instead of harm. Of course, the power in question ought to be used with the greatest care not to hamper prisoners in making their defence, and not to enable unscrupulous persons to acquire knowledge to which they have no right, and every precaution should be taken against compelling unnecessary disclosures." If a solicitor improperly hands a document to a third party, he may give it in evidence (). Where the effect of an opinion of counsel was set out in a statement of claim, it was held that the plaintiff must produce it for the inspection of the defendant (7), or he would not be allowed to give it in evidence at the trial. Although letters written between co-defendants. simpliciter are not privileged, yet a letter written by one co-defendant to another with directions to send to the joint solicitor is (m). Where two parties employ the same solicitor, a letter by one of them to him, containing an offer to be made to the other, may be given in evidence against the writer (n); but in such case the joint solicitor cannot disclose the title of either. Thus, where a borrower and lender employ the same solicitor, he cannot be called to prove the abstract of the borrower's title as against the borrower (0). The rule of privileged communications has been confined strictly by the English law to the cases which have been mentioned. It does not extend to (k) Per Parke, B., Cleave v. Jones, 21 L. J., Ex. 106. (1) Mayor of Bristol v. Cox, L. R. 26 Ch. D. 678; 33 W. R. 255. (m) Jenkyns v. Bushby, L. R., 2 Eq. 548; 36 L. J., Ch. 820; 16 W. R. 189. (n) Baugh v. Cradocke, 1 M. & R. 182. (0) Doe v. Watkins, 3 Bing. N. C. 421; cf. R. v. Avery, 8 C. & P. 596. communications made confidentially to stewards (p), or medical men (7). When a secret is entrusted to a person confidentially employed, the court will restrain such person from making use of the secret, or divulging it to others ("). A pursuivant of the Herald's College is not a legal adviser (s). It seems that communications to clergymen are not strictly privileged (t); but the judges have shown an indisposition to receive communications which have been made to clergymen as such. Best, C. J., is reported to have said that he would never compel a clergyman, if he objected, to disclose such communications (u); and in a case (x) where a woman was indicted for the murder of her child, Alderson, B., objected to hear the chaplain of the prison as a witness to conversations which he had had with the prisoner in his spiritual capacity. The learned judge said: "I think these conversations ought not to be given in evidence. The principle upon which an attorney is prevented from divulging what passes with his client is, because, without an unfettered means of communication, the client would not have proper legal assistance. The same principle applies (p) Earl of Falmouth v. Moss, 11 Price, 455. (2) Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tr. 613; R. v. Gibbons, 1 C. & P. 97; Lee v. Hamerton, 12 W. R. 975. (r) Morrison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241. (8) Slade v. Tucker, L. R., 14 Ch. D. 821; 49 L. J., Ch. 644; 28 W. R. 807. (t) Broad v. Pitt, M. & M. 233. (u) Ibid. (x, R. v. Griffin, 6 Cox, C. C. 219. to a person, deprived of whose advice the prisoner would not have proper spiritual assistance. I do not lay this down as an absolute rule, but I think such evidence ought not to be given." The counsel for the prosecution said that after such an intimation he should not tender the evidence. On this branch of the law, Jessel, M. R., once said (y): "The principle protecting confidential communications is of a very limited character. It does not protect all confidential communications which a man must necessarily make in order to obtain advice, even when needed for the protection of his life, or of his honour, or of his fortune. There are many communications which, though absolutely necessary, because without them the ordinary business of life cannot be carried on, still are not privileged. The communications made to a medical man whose advice is sought by a patient with respect to the probable origin of the disease as to which he is consulted, and which must necessarily be made in order to enable the medical man to advise or to prescribe for the patient, are not protected. Communications made to a priest in the confessional, on matters perhaps considered by the penitent to be more important even than his life or his fortune, are not protected. Communications made to a friend with respect to matters of the most delicate nature, on which advice is sought with respect to a man's honour or reputation, are not protected. Therefore it must not be supposed that there is any principle (y) Wheeler v. Le Marchant, L. R., 17 Ch. D. 681; 50 L. J., Ch. 795. which says that every confidential communication which it is necessary to make in order to carry on the business of life is protected. The protection is of a very limited character, and in this country is restricted to the obtaining the assistance of lawyers as regards the conduct of litigation or the rights to property. It has never gone beyond the obtaining legal advice and assistance, and all things necessary in the shape of communication to the legal advisers are protected from production or discovery in order that that legal advice may be obtained safely and sufficiently." Bankers are bound not to disclose the state of a customer's accounts, except upon a reasonable and proper occasion, and what is a reasonable and proper occasion is a question for the jury (). The banker of a contributory can be compelled to give evidence as to his account under the 115th section of the Companies Act, 1862 (a). By the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1879 (b), it is provided that, subject to the provisions of the Act, a copy of any entry in a banker's book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of such, and of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded, and that, "on the application of any party to a legal proceeding, a court or judge may order that such party be at liberty to inspect and take copies of any entries in a banker's book, for any of the purposes of such (2) Hardy v. Veasey, L. R., 3 Ex. 107; 37 L. J., Ex. 76. (b) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 11. |