rocal obligations.-Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S. W.
395.

A joint and mutual will executed by a hus-
band and wife in consummation of an oral
agreement between them for the equitable dis-
position of their property, which gives to the
survivor their property for life with remainder
to their daughters, is not void if regarded as a
contract between husband and wife, but is en-
forceable after the death of the wife acquies-
ing therein, on principles of equity.-Id.

Where a joint and mutual will executed by
husband and wife, which gave to the survivor
all their property for life with remainder to
their daughters, was executed in consummation
of a parol agreement between them to make an
equitable disposition of their property, and the
husband on the death of the wife probated the
will and took possession of the property devised
thereby, he was estopped from thereafter dis-
regarding the will.-Id.

(C) Execution.

§ 108 (Tex.Civ.App.) A joint and mutual will
executed by husband and wife pursuant to a
contract between them, which gives to the sur-
vivor a life estate in their property with re-
mainder to their daughters, need not be sepa-
rately acknowledged by the wife, but declares
a trust in favor of the children to become ef-
fective after the death of the survivor.-Larra-
bee v. Porter, 166 S. W. 395.

$114 (Tex.Civ.App.) Papers alleged to con-
stitute a testamentary disposition of property,
which were not attested as required by Rev. St.
1911, art. 7857, were insufficient as a formal
will under that article.-Maris v. Adams, 166 S.
W. 475.

(D) Holographic Wills.

§ 132 (Tex.Civ.App.) An envelope on which
was written "Notes" and B.'s name, a paper
inclosed asking B. and A. to accept this, and a
note to A. and B. also inclosed, both signed by
V., in whose handwriting all was written, ex-
cept the printed portion of the note, did not
constitute a holographic will, because not "whol-
ly written by the testator," as required by Rev.
St. 1911, art. 7858.-Maris v. Adams, 166 S. W.
475.

Where a printed form is used in writing a
will, so that it consists partly of the printing
and partly of the clauses written by the testa-
tor, no part of it can be admitted to probate
as his holographic will under Rev. St. 1911, art.
7858, dispensing with the necessity of attesta-
tion "where the will is wholly written by the
testator."-Id.

§ 134 (Tex.Civ.App.) If parol evidence was ad-
missible to show that a writing asking B. and
A. to accept this, and a note to them both sign-
ed by V., were found together in a sealed enve-
lope, and if the note was properly incorporated
into the writing by reference, then all three
were to be considered and construed together
in determining whether they could be probated
as a will.-Maris v. Adams, 166 S. W. 475.
(F) Mistake, Undue Influence, and Fraud.
§ 155 (Tex.) Undue influence held of itself to
imply the existence of a mind strong enough to
make a valid will, if unhindered by dominant in-
fluence, and, although the mind is not reduced
to a state of incapacity, to be shown if as a
result of its exertion independence of will and
action are subjected and surrendered.-Scott v.
Townsend, 166 S. W. 1138.

8 164 (Tex.) In a will contest on the ground
of the undue influence of contestee, the wife of
testator, to the exclusion of contestant, a step-
daughter, evidence that contestee was urging
the execution of some important paper by the
testator, which he was reluctant to execute,
though such paper was not identified as his will,
and that she had several times threatened to
take their minor son from him unless he sign-

ed such paper, held admissible.-Scott v. Town-
send, 166 S. W. 1138.

In a will contest on the ground of undue in-
fluence by the contestee; testator's wife, to the
exclusion of a daughter, held that the fact of
the contestee's hostility toward the daughter,
and her design to exclude her from benefits un-
der the will, was admissible.-Id.

In a will contest on the ground of undue in-
fluence whereby the contestee, testator's wife,
sought to obtain benefits for herself and her son,
innocent of any collusion, to the exclusion of
her stepdaughter, held that the contestee's dec-
larations of hostility toward the stepdaughter
were admissible, even though they would inev-
itably affect the interest of the son.-Id.
§ 164 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a will contest, where
the issue was whether the proponent procured it
by fraud and deception, a letter written by pro-
ponent to his uncle, seeking to borrow money,
and stating, "if you could know what I know
which is coming to you and your family through
my work I think you would remember me,'
properly admitted.-Sockwell v. Sockwell, 166
S. W. 1188.

was

8165 (Tex.) Where undue influence, as dis-
tinguished from mental incapacity, is in issue
and is independently proved, testator's declara-
tions, expressive of a mental state produced by
such influence, whether made contemporaneous-
ly with the execution of the will or within a
reasonable time before or after its execution,
are admissible on the question of his free agency
in executing it.-Scott v. Townsend, 166 S. W.
1138.

Declarations of a testator that the will was
produced by undue influence, or that it is not
his will or his statement of like nature, held in-
competent to prove the fact of undue influence
or as direct evidence that it produced the will.
Id.

In a will contest on the ground of undue in-
fluence by contestee, the wife of testator, held
that his declaration that she had been after him
to make a will was only a narrative statement,
not tending to show its effective operation on
his mind when he executed the will, and hence
within the hearsay rule and inadmissible.-Id.

In a will contest on the ground of undue in-
the exclusion of a daughter, testator's declara-
fluence by the contestee, the wife of testator, to
tion that his wife had always wanted him to
make his will and had always manifested a hos-
tile or unfriendly attitude toward his daughter,
held hearsay in character and inadmissible to
show the effect of such influence on testator's

mind. Id.

In a will contest on the ground of undue in-
fluence exercised by the contestee, the wife of
testator, to the exclusion of a daughter, testa-
tor's declaration, expressive of affection for his
daughter and her son, and an intention to pro-
vide for both of them in his will, held admissi-
ble.-Id.

testatrix at or about the time of the alleged ex-
§ 165 (Tex. Civ.App.) Declarations made by
ecution of a will offered for probate, disclosing
unfriendly feeling towards persons who were
beneficiaries under the will, were relevant and
material in a contest charging fraud, as tend-
ing to show that testatrix did not knowingly
and willingly make the bequest.-Sockwell v.
Sockwell, 166 S. W. 1188.

(G) Revocation and Revival.

179 (Tex.Civ.App.) If a will leaving a cer-
tain sum to G. and the rest to testator's heirs
was executed after the execution of an al-
leged will, consisting of a letter and a note
to B. and A., both signed by testator, it had the
effect of revoking such alleged will, if any there
was, though it was claimed that such was not
testator's intention.-Maris v. Adams, 166 S.
W. 475.

§ 188 (Tex. Civ.App.) A joint will executed by
husband and wife, which gives to the survivor

a life estate in the entire property, is executed
on a valid consideration, and the husband pro-
bating it on the death of the wife acquiescing
in its provisions and taking possession of the
property cannot revoke it.-Larrabee v. Porter,
166 S. W. 395.

V. PROBATE, ESTABLISHMENT,
AND ANNULMENT.

(A) Probate and Revocation in General.

§ 221 (Ky.) Civ. Code Prac. § 518, subsec. 5,
does not authorize an action in the county court
to set aside an order rejecting a will by infants
not parties to the proceedings, and not necessa-
ry parties within Ky. St. § 4860.-Patton v. Sal-
lee, 166 S. W. 1004.

Civ. Code Prac. § 518, subsec. 4, refers only to
an action wherein complainant is the unsuccess-
ful party, and does not authorize an action in
the county court by infants to set aside an or-
der rejecting a will in proceedings in which they
were not parties.-Id.

(G) Petitions, Objections, and Pleadings.
§ 272 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the replication of
the proponent asked that a subsequent will be
admitted to probate in connection with pro-
ponent's alleged will, the pleadings were suffi-
cient to authorize probate of the subsequent
will.-Maris v. Adams, 166 S. W. 475.

(H) Evidence.

§ 293 (Tex.Civ.App.) Whenever a person de-
ceased has executed a paper which does not
upon its face clearly evidence a testamentary
character, the courts cannot transform it into
a will by the aid of parol evidence, in violation
of Rev. St. 1911, art. 7857, declaring that every
will, except as otherwise provided, shall be in
writing.-Maris v. Adams, 166 S. W. 475.

Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 7857, providing that
all wills, except as otherwise provided, shall be
in writing, parol evidence as to the testator's
intent is not admissible, except to explain a la-
tent ambiguity, which can never arise as to the
question of testamentary intent.-Id.

Parol evidence showing the situation of the
testator or the surrounding circumstances at the
time of executing the will is admissible only
after the court has decided that the instrument
was executed with a testamentary intent, and
therefore constitutes a will, and is not admissible
to show the character of the instrument.-Id.

§ 297 (Tex.Civ.App.) Declarations of the tes-
tator made before or after the date of the will,
and relating to its execution, but not a part
of the res gestæ, are not admissible.-Maris v.

Adams, 166 S. W. 475.

Declarations of a testator at the time of ex;
ecuting a will that he "already had Adams and
Henry fixed" were not admissible to establish
the execution of a prior will, nor to identify a
note claimed to have been found with a letter
asking the payees to accept "this," in a sealed
envelope, indorsed "Notes,' as one of the notes
referred to on the envelope.-Id.

(K) Review.

356 (Ky.) The Statute of Wills is a com-
plete statute on the subject, and the sole rem-
edy for an erroneous rejection or probate of a
will is by appeal to the circuit court.-Patton v.
Sallee, 166 S. W. 1004.

§ 399 (Tex.) Where a bill of exceptions to the
admission of evidence did not show that declara-
tions of the testator, including an inadmissible
statement subject to a distinct objection, were
separately objected to, but merely disclosed an
objection to the entire declarations, there was
no reversible error in receiving the inadmissible
testimony; but such rule did not apply to en-
tire declarations, subject only to single objec-
tion. Scott v. Townsend, 166 S. W. 1138.

$400 (Tex.) In a will contest, erroneous ad-
mission of testator's incompetent declaration

to make a will held prejudicial.-Scott v. Town-
send, 166 S. W. 1138.

VI. CONSTRUCTION.

(A) General Rules.

§ 439 (Mo.App.) The court in construing a
will must ascertain the intention of the testator
and give effect thereto.-Snyder v. Toler, 166
S. W. 1059.

§ 464 (Tex.Civ.App.) In construing an alleg
ed will, consisting of a writing asking B. and
A. to "please except this," and a note to them,
both signed by V., and inclosed in a sealed en-
velope, the word "except" will be treated as
meaning "accept."-Maris v. Adams, 166 S.

W. 475.

§ 488 (Mo.App.) Even where a will is ambig-
uous, parol evidence must be limited to the con-
dition of testator's feelings towards the persons
affected by the will, so as to thereby place the
court in the possession of the facts as testator
viewed them.-Snyder v. Toler, 166 S. W. 1059.
§ 488 (Tex.Civ.App.) If an alleged will, con-
sisting of a writing asking B. and A. to ac-
cept "this," and a note to them, both signed
by V., and inclosed in a sealed envelope, in-
dorsed "Notes," was ambiguous on account of
the use of the words "Notes" and "this," it
explained by parol evidence.-Maris v. Adams,
a patent ambiguity, which could not be
166 S. W. 475.

was

(B) Designation of Devisees and Lega-
tees and Their Respective Shares.
tate to his daughter for life, with remainder to
§ 498 (Ky.) Where testator devised real es-
her descendants, and she left two sons and three
grandchildren, children of one of such sons, held
the grandchildren took no interest.-Smith v.
that the entire estate passed to the sons, and
Thom, 166 S. W. 182.

(F) Vested or Contingent Estates and In-
terests.

§ 634 (Ky.) A devise to devisees for life, with
gift over of the share of a devisee on his death
to his children, vests in the children of a dev-
isee a vested estate in remainder, and, on the
death of a child without issue during the life of
the devisee, the estate in remainder passes un-
der the will of the child or as intestate proper-
ty.-Jones v. Thomasson, 166 S. W. 1001.

Where a devise over is to the children of a
life tenant not named or to children named, the
children take a vested estate in remainder,
while, if the devise over is to the heirs of the
life tenant, the heirs take only a contingent re-
mainder, subject to be defeated by their death
before the death of the life tenant, unless the
word "heirs" means "children."-Id.

§ 634 (Ky.) Will construed, and held that the
beneficiary of a trust thereunder took a contin-
gent remainder, subject to be defeated only by
his death before that of the trustee, and that,
on his surviving the trustee, the remainder was
converted into a fee.-Bank of Taylorsville v.

(B) Character and Conduct of Witness.
§ 337 (Mo.App.) Where accused, charged with
violating the local option law, testified in his
own behalf, evidence of his reputation for vio-
lating the local option law was admissible and
inquiries as to his reputation to a time shortly
prior to the date of the offense charged were
proper.-State v. Fitch, 166 S. W. 639.

Statements by the injured person in rebuttal
of defendant's contention that plaintiff's claim
is a recent fabrication should be confined to
statements as to the occurrence of the accident
and the resulting injuries.—Id.

$340 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where, in a prosecution
for seduction, the district attorney asked one
of defendant's witnesses if he had not left an-

other county because he carried a pistol, and
if he had not so stated to a third party, it was
error to permit the attorney to call such third
party to contradict the witness; such evidence
not being admissible for impeachment.-Cap-
shaw v. State, 166 S. W. 737.

§ 344 (Tex.Cr.App.) Proof that a witness had
left another county because he had carried a
pistol was not admissible for the purpose of
impeachment.-Capshaw v. State, 166 S. W.

737.

(C) Interest and Bias of Witness.

§ 373 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an expert wit-
ness was not interrogated as to what he was
to be paid for attending court, evidence could
not be introduced, after he had testified and
left the county, that he was paid in connection
with his testimony.-Good v. Texas & P. Ry.
Co., 166 S. W. 670.

(D) Inconsistent Statements by Witness.
§ 380 (Ark.) Plaintiff, upon surprise at the
testimony of his witness and proper predicate
therefor, held entitled to introduce evidence of
statements contradictory to the testimony of
such witness.-Jonesboro, L. C. & E. R. Co.
v. Gainer, 166 S. W. 571.

§ 390 (Ark.) A test of competency of evi-
dence, contradicting a denial of a witness on
cross-examination that he made a certain state-
ment, is whether accused was entitled to prove
the statement as a part of his case, independ-
ently of the denial of the witness.-Tillman v.
State, 166 S. W. 582.

(E) Contradiction and Corroboration of
Witness.

$410 (Tex.Cr.App.) That two witnesses con-
tradicted each other, in that one testified that
he was in an office at the time of the shooting,
which another witness denied, would not
entitle the witness stating the affirmative to

show that he had made statements which cor-

roborated his evidence, though he could show
by other evidence that he was at the office at
the time testified.-Bain v. State, 166 S. W.
505.

§ 414 (Tex.) Where the defendant introduced
evidence that plaintiff's wife made no complaint
of the injuries for which recovery was sought,
to show that her claim was a recent fabrication,
plaintiff can introduce statements by his wife
at the same time as to the occurrence of the ac-
cident and the injury.-Houston & T. C. Ry. Co.

"Account stated."-Adam Roth Grocery Co. v.
Hotel Monticello Co. (Mo. App.) 166 S. W.
1125.

"Accretion."-Yutterman v. Grier (Ark.) 166
S. W. 749.

"Actionable negligence."-St. Louis Southwest-
ern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Freles (Tex. Civ.
App.) 166 S. W. 91.

"Aggravated assault."-Scott v. State (Tex. Cr.
"Another."-Elliott v.
App.) 166 S. W. 729.
City of Brownwood
"Conditional sale."-Skinner & Kennedy Sta-
(Tex.) 166 S. W. 1129.
tionery Co. v. Lammert Furniture Co. (Mo.
App.) 166 S. W. 1079.

"Court."-Robertson v. Derrick (Ark.) 166 S.

W. 936.

"Credible witness."-Hart v. State (Tex. Cr.
App.) 166 S. W. 152.
"Cuckold."-Hall v. Huffman (Ky.) 166.S. W.
770.

"Debt or demand arising upon contract."-
State v. Ehle (Ark.) 166 S. W. 535.
"De facto corporation."-Rialto Co. v. Miner
(Mo. App.) 166 S. W. 629.
"Delinquent child."-State ex rel. Cave v. Tin-
"Descendant."-Smith v. Thom (Ky.) 166 S.
cher (Mo.) 166 S. W. 1028.
W. 182: Harle v. Harle (Tex. Civ. App.) 166
S. W. 674.

"Election."-McClure v. Topf & Wright (Ark.)
166 S. W. 174.
"Exception."-South Texas Mortgage Co. v.
Coe (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 419.
"Expressly reserved."-Phenix Nat. Bank of
New York v. Hanlon (Mo. App.) 166 S. W.
830.

"Fee bill."-Farris v. Smithpeter (Mo. App.)
166 S. W. 655.
"Fine."-State ex rel. Jones v. Howe Scale Co.
of Illinois (Mo. App.) 166 S. W. 328.
"Forthwith."-Burlington State Bank v. Mar-
lin Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W.
499.

"General damages."-Town of Erlanger v. Cody
(Ky.) 166 S. W. 202.
"Good faith."-Burlington State Bank v. Mar-
lin Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W.
499.
"Indebtedness."-Fowler v. City of Oakdale
(Ky.) 166 S. W. 195; Embree v. Kansas
City-Liberty Boulevard Road Dist. (Mo.)
166 S. W. 282.

"Innocent third persons."-Chester v. Graves
(Ky.) 166 S. W. 998.

"Interest."-Ft. Worth Stockyards Co. v. With-

erspoon (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 502.
"Jerk."-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of
Texas v. Farris (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W.
463.

"Larceny."-Morton v. Commonwealth (Ky.)
"Lottery."-Commonwealth v. Jenkins (Ky.) 166
166 S. W. 974.
"Lurch."-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of
S. W. 794.
Texas v. Farris (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W.
463.
"More or less."-Rust v. Carpenter (Ky.) 166
S. W. 180.
"Necessary parties."-Patton v. Sallee (Ky.)
166 S. W. 1004.

"Negligent homicide."-Chant v. State (Tex.
Cr. App.) 166 S. W. 513.
"Newly discovered evidence."-(Mo. App.) Adam
Roth Grocery Co. v. Hotel Monticello Co.,

"Novation."-L. & A. Scharff Distilling Co. v.
Springfield Coal, Ice & Transfer Co. (Mo.
App.) 166 S. W. 654.

"Nul tiel corporation."-Rialto Co. v. Miner
(Mo. App.) 166 S. W. 629.
"Original construction."-City of Louisville v.
Stoll (Ky.) 166 S. W. 811.
"Penalty."-State ex rel. Jones v. Howe Scale
Co. of Illinois (Mo. App.) 166 S. W. 328.
"Place of business."-Guthrie v. State (Tex. Cr.
App.) 166 S. W. 730.

"Plants."-Fezler v. Gibson (Mo. App.) 166 S.
W. 1096.

"Probable cause."-United Furniture Co. v.
Wills (Ky.) 166 S. W. 600.

"Shall then be situated."-Burlington State
Bank v. Marlin Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.)
166 S. W. 499.

"Special damage."-Town of Erlanger v. Cody
(Ky.) 166 S. W. 202.
"Sufficiently guarded."-Saling

V. American
Chicle Co. (Mo. App.) 166 S. W. 823.
"Sum certain."-Davis v. McColl (Mo. App.)
166 S. W. 1113.

"Theft."-Moore v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 166
S. W. 1153.

"Tools."-Campbell v. Honaker's Heirs (Tex.
Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 74.

"Trade or profession."-Campbell v. Honaker's
Heirs (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 74.