See Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 14, 30-40, 238.
LOGS AND LOGGING.
guilty of obtaining goods under false pretenses held sufficient.-United Furniture Co. v. Wills, 227-166 S. W. 600.
§3 (Ky.) Though a conveyance of land re- served to grantor all of the timber thereon, which included beech trees, with the right to remove it within seven years, mast which grew on the beech trees and ripened and fell to the ground within that time belonged to the grantee and not to the owner of the timber.-Vincent v. Haycraft, 166 S. W. 613.
A sale or reservation of timber to be cut and removed within a specified time conveys or re- serves only so much thereof as may be cut and removed within that time.-Id.
See Libel and Slander, §§ 101, 120; Malicious Prosecution; Master and Servant, § 306.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
See False Imprisonment.
II. WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE. § 21 (Ky.) In a prosecution for maliciously causing the arrest of a purchaser of furniture who offered in payment an order on defendant drawn by a newspaper company with which defendant advertised, advice of counsel is no defense, where defendant did not inform them that there was any dispute over the account, or that the newspaper company claimed that de- fendant was indebted to it.-United Furniture Co. v. Wills, 166 S. W. 600.
§4 (Ark.) A party who had a complete reme- dy by appeal from an adverse order of the county court must pursue that remedy, and mandamus does not lie, after the time to ap- peal has expired, to compel the court to grant the relief demanded.-Callaway v. Harley, 166 S. W. 546.
87 (Mo.App.) Mandamus, being a discretion- ary writ, will not be granted if the record shows the relator is not entitled to it for any good reason.-State ex rel. Wiseman v. Urton, 166 S. W. 895.
§14 (Ark.) Failure of a county judge and clerk of certain counties to act under Act April 2, 1911 (Sp. Acts 1911, p. 473), requiring ad- vertisement for bids from banks to become coun- ty depositories, such failure was tantamount to a refusal to perform a mandatory duty, and sufficient to justify mandamus.-Robertson v. Derrick, 166 S. W. 936.
Where a mandatory duty of a public nature affecting the people at large is imposed on a pub- lic officer, no demand of performance and re- fusal to perform is essential to the maintenance of mandamus to compel him to act; he having failed to act within the time prescribed.-Id.
IL SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF RELIEF.
(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Off- cers and Boards and Municipalities. § 72 (Ark.) While judicial discretion in mat- ters committed to the county court will not be controlled by mandamus, yet, if the court fails or refuses to act at all, mandamus will issue to compel action.-Robertson v. Derrick, 166 S. W. 936.
§ 73 (Ark.) The duties imposed on the county publish notice of the receipt of bids from banks judge of certain counties and on the clerk to to act as depositories for public funds by Act April 12, 1911 (Sp. Acts 1911, p. 473), may be enforced by mandamus.-Robertson v. Derrick, 166 S. W. 936.
§ 115 (Ky.) The holders of city bonds could resort to mandamus to compel a council to levy an annual tax for the payment of interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the ultimate payment of the principal, if the coun- cil should fail to do so, as required by law.- Fowler v. City of Oakdale, 166 S. W. 195. III. JURISDICTION,
§ 160 (Mo.App.) Where an alternative writ of mandamus is broader than the law warrants, it may be amended, and the peremptory writ awarded for so much of the relief as is proper. -State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdemann, 166 S. W. 348. MANSLAUGHTER.
§ 71 (Ky.) In an action for maliciously caus- ing plaintiff's arrest for obtaining, under false pretenses, furniture in payment for which plaintiff tendered an order drawn on defendant See Homicide, §§ 42-62, 255, 309. by a newspaper company with which defendant advertised, evidence of defendant's indebted- ness and the right of the newspaper company
to draw such orders held sufficient to go to the See Criminal Law, § 444; Evidence, § 433. jury. United Furniture Co. v. Wills, 166 S. W. 600.
§ 72 (Ky.) In a prosecution for maliciously causing plaintiff's arrest for obtaining goods under false pretenses, a charge that probable cause means such cause as would induce a rea- sonable person to believe that plaintiff was
See Bigamy; Divorce; Husband and Wife.
$50 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a woman, believ- ing a man to be divorced, in good faith cele- brated a marriage with him, slight evidence will
be sufficient to uphold the validity of the mar- riage after removal of the impediment.-Gorman v. Gorman, 166 S. W. 123.
Where a woman, mistakenly believing a man to be divorced, entered into a marriage without knowledge of the impediment, the continued co- habitation of the parties after removal of the impediment is sufficient to establish a good marriage.-Id.
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.
See Husband and Wife, § 31.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 907, 1040, 1066, 1140; Frauds, Statute of, § 49; Municipal Corporations, § 753; Trial, § 191; Work and Labor.
I. THE RELATION. (A) Creation and Existence. 83 (Ky.) Where plaintiff, who could, under his contract with defendant, work whenever he desired, had a private arrangement with a third person, who acted as his substitute and looked alone to him for compensation, plaintiff, while at work, was an employé of defendant.-Louis- ville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.
(C) Termination and Discharge. § 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) It was no defense to an employer's breach of an employment contract that the employé refused to accept a lower salary than that agreed on.-Miller v. Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co., 166 S. W. 1182.
841 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for an em- ployer's breach of a contract of employment, the measure of damages is the compensation stipu- lated for in the absence of allegation and proof in mitigation that plaintiff could have obtained other employment.-Miller v. Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co., 166 S. W. 1182.
Where, after an employé was wrongfully dis- charged, he was ill for a time, the period of such illness could not be deducted from the period for which he was entitled to recover damages for breach of contract.-Id.
§ 44 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for an em- ployer's breach of a contract of employment, an instruction placing on plaintiff the burden of showing that he made diligent efforts to ob- tain other employment without success error.-Miller v. Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co., 166 S. W. 1182.
II. SERVICES AND COMPENSATION. (A) Performance of Services. 859 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff was employed to serve defendant, the fact that a receiver was temporarily appointed for defendant because of a difference between defendant's officers did not excuse plaintiff from rendering services so as to require defendant, after plaintiff had quit work, to accept further services after the receivership
was terminated.-Walden v. American Bankers' Assur. Co., 166 S. W. 1111.
§ 82 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff contract- ed to perform personal services at a yearly wage and at the expiration of the first year agreed that payment of the balance due him should be deferred, that agreement did not pre- clude him from acquiring a laborer's lien for services performed during the second period of service.-Carthage Ice & Light Co. v. Roberts, 166 S. W. 12.
III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN- JURIES TO SERVANT.
(A) Nature and Extent in General. § 88 (Tex.Civ.App.) A railroad company is not liable for injuries to an employé of a lumber company resulting from the negligence of other employés of that company, which was engaged at the time in constructing a track to be later turned over to the railroad company upon pay- ment of the cost of construction.-Angelina & N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.
§ 89 (Ark.) Where an injured servant was oc- cupying a dangerous position at the time of his injury merely for his own convenience and ac- commodation, his rights are no greater than those of a licensee.-Triangle Lumber Co. v. Acree, 166 S. W. 958.
§ 96 (Ark.) A railroad company was not lia- ble for injuries to a mechanic engaged in test- ing on the track a motor car, which he was re- pairing, caused by a collision with a hand car, if the hand car operators were not its em- ployés and not authorized to operate the car; the company not having given any general per- mission to the public to operate hand cars on its tracks.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.
§ 97 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff while as- sisting in moving a boiler by rolling it was in- jured by his glove catching on a bolt throwing him over and in front of the boiler, and he had prepared the boiler for moving, held, that his injuries were due to an inevitable accident and not to negligence; the danger not being such as should have been anticipated.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Freles, 166 S. W. 91.
§ 97 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where the engineer and fireman of a work train started it without giv- ing any warning, although they knew that there were a number of workmen around the train, they must have anticipated that such negligence might result in injury to a workman.-Angelina & N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.
(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and Places for Work.
§§ 101, 102 (Ark.) A master's duty to furnish a safe place extends only to such parts of the premises as he has prepared for the servants' occupancy or as he knows they are accustomed to use.-Triangle Lumber Co. v. Acree, 166 S. W. 958.
exercise' reasonable care to provide reasonably §§ 101, 102 (Ky.) The rule that a master must safe appliances for his servants does not apply where the appliances are of a simple nature, in which any defects can be readily observed by the servant.-Ohio Valley Ry. Co. v. Cop-- ley, 166 S. W. 625.
(B) Wages and Other Remuneration. § 73 (Mo.App.) Plaintiff, having ceased to S$ 101, 102 (Tex.Civ.App.) The right of an em- work for defendant under a contract of employ-ployer to conduct his own business in his own ment without notice of election to terminate it way is limited by his duty to exercise reason- as provided for thereunder, held not entitled to able care to furnish reasonably safe appliances recover for a subsequent period during which and place in which to work.-Texas Power & defendant refused to accept a tender of plain- Light Co. v. Burger, 166 S. W. 680. tiff's further services.-Walden v. American Bankers' Assur. Co., 166 S. W. 1111.
§ 107 (Ky.) A bridge carpenter, who was re- quired to assist in carrying ties to the place where they were fashioned, cannot recover for an injury received when a fellow worker stumbled over a post projecting out of the ground and threw a tie upon him, as the master is not an insurer as to the place to work.-Whitson v. American Bridge Co. of New York, 166 S.
§ 75 (Mo.App.) On a servant's abandonment of his contract for personal services, there can be no apportionment thereof, since to recover he must prove full performance or that per- formance has been prevented by act of God or unwarranted act of the employer.-Walden v.
§ 107 (Ky.) A T-rail cutter used to cut rivets is a simple tool, and an employé versed in the use of ordinary tools may not recover for an injury by a sliver flying from the cutter.-Ohio Valley Ry. Co. v. Copley, 166 S. W. 625.
§ 107 (Mo.App.) Though employés were en- gaged in the more or less hazardous undertak- ing of tearing down a building, it was the em- ployer's duty to furnish them with a place as reasonably safe as the nature of the work would permit.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S. W.
SI (Tex.Civ.App.) Where couplers were so equipped that it was necessary for brakemen to go between the cars to adjust them, so that they would couple by impact, they were not a compliance with the safety appliance acts adopted by Congress or by the state.-San An- tonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24. Failure of a railroad company to equip its en- gines and cars with couplers that will couple automatically by impact, without requiring brakemen to go between the cars to adjust the same, as required by safety appliance acts, is negligence per se.-Id.
$118 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to a driver of coal cars in a mine by striking a post set alongside the track while trying to regain his balance after having lost it in endeavoring to adjust a switch while the car was in motion, facts held insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the coal company. Wallace v. Co- lumbia Coal Co., 166 S. W. 769.
§ 118 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 8456, requir- ing the operator of a coal mine to provide safe means for hoisting the miners, is only a statu- tory expression of the common-law rule requir- ing the master to exercise reasonable care to keep the cage in a reasonably safe condition.- Ronchetto v. Northern Cent. Coal Co., 166 S. W. 876.
8 121 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 7828, rela- tive to guarding machinery, only requires such a guard as within the grounds of reason will protect employés using ordinary care.-Saling v. American Chicle Co., 166 S. W. 823.
Rolling machine, the rollers of which were covered by a hood to within two inches of a guard about an inch above the feed board, held sufficiently guarded within Rev. St. 1909, § 7828, though an employé's hand in some way was drawn or placed through the opening, and between the rollers.-Id.
8125 (Mo.App.) That an interval of time elapsed between an employer's assurance that a place was safe and an injury due to its unsafe condition did not defeat the employer's liability, where the conditions had not changed in the meantime.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S.
$125 (Tex.Civ.App.) A master's ignorance of the probable danger from an act or omission is not necessarily an excuse, as it is his duty to know what he could learn by exercising such diligence as the circumstances reasonably de- mand. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Tex- as v. Freles, 166 S. W. 91.
Where an employer did not know of a danger and could not reasonably have discovered it by the exercise of such diligence as the circum- stances reasonably demanded, he is not liable for an unforeseen injury.—Id.
$125 (Tex.Civ.App.) A foreman is charged with constructive notice of what will naturally happen from an order given by him, and, where he saw an employé's position, or, by ordinary care, could have seen it, the employer was liable for a negligent order causing injury to the em- ployé.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166 S. W. 685.
(C) Methods of Work, Rules, and Orders. § 133 (Ky.) If employé was warned that ele- vator was about to be started, held, that it was
immaterial whether the warning was given by a person in authority or by a coemployé.-Ken- tucky Midland Coal Co. v. Vincent, 166 S. W. 815.
§ 137 (Ky.) When a flagman is sent from a point on the track where it is being repaired to stop trains and compel them to detour, he has the right to assume that no trains will come from the rear, and those in charge of a train following him must maintain a lookout for his safety.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Taylor's Adm'x, 166 S. W. 199.
§ 137 (Tex.Civ.App.) An instruction that, where persons have a right to be on the track near a train that is standing still, it is the duty of the employés to give a warning before start- ing the train, and that the failure to do so would be such negligence as would entitle an- other employé injured as a result thereof to re- cover, is not erroneous.-Angelina & N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.
§ 139 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an employé carry- ing with coemployés a tie, was injured by the coemployés dropping it pursuant to the order of the foreman, the giving of the order was the proximate cause of the injury, authorizing a recovery if the foreman negligently gave it.- Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166 S. W. 685.
§ 145 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a rule requiring conductors, with the assistance of the trainmen, to inspect the cars and see that the doors are closed, imposed on the conductor alone the duty of initiating an inspection, and a brakeman who was injured by an open door had no other duty than to assist the conductor when he ini tiated an inspection. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carter, 166 S. W. 115.
§ 179 (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to charge the issue of negligence of a fellow servant is not erroneous; the common-law rule exempting the master because of such negligence being abrogated.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166 S. W. 685.
$180 (Tex.Civ.App.) Railroad company's fore- man having authority to direct a boiler maker to assist in moving a boiler in the roundhouse held a vice principal under Rev. St. 1911, art. 6641.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Freles, 166 S. W. 91.
§ 180 (Tex.Civ.App.) An employé of a smelt- ing company operating ore cars to haul ores from the roaster to the reverberatory, engaged in sweeping ore from the car track, was not a railway employé; and the common-law rule as to nonliability for the negligence of a fellow servant applied.-Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. v. Lopez, 166 S. W. 498.
§ 185 (Ky.) An employer is not liable for in- juries to an employé by a sliver flying from a T-rail cutter used to cut rivets, where the cutter was selected by a fellow servant from among a number of cutters supplied by the employer. Ohio Valley Ry. Co. v. Copley, 166 S. W. 625.
$185 (Ky.) In a minor servant's action for injury, held, that other servants who directed his work as they needed it, and told him what tools they wanted, were not his fellow servants. -Job Iron & Steel Co. v. Layne, 166 S. W. 978.
coemployés worked under the direct orders of § 185 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff and his the foreman, and the coemployés did what the foreman directed them to do, an injury sus-
tained by plaintiff in consequence thereof was caused by an act of the employer who could not escape liability on the ground that the negli- gence was that of a fellow servant.-Texas Pow- er & Light Co. v. Burger, 166 S. W. 680.
§ 189 (Ky.) Where the foreman of the opera- tor of a mine, who had authority to discharge any one employed therein, was negligent, the operator is liable to servants of contractors who mined the coal under an arrangement whereby they furnished the labor and the operator of the plant, power and machinery.-Big Branch Coal Co. v. Sanders, 166 S. W. 813.
§ 198 (Ky.) The engineer and brakeman op- erating a train are not fellow servants of a car cleaner, whose sole duty is to sweep out passenger coaches on the arrival of the train at destination.-Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.
§ 198 (Tex. Civ.App.) Employé of smelting company, engaged in sweeping off car track, and motorman in charge of ore cars, charged with no duties making him a vice principal, held fellow servants.-Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. v. Lopez, 166 S. W. 498..
202 (Ky.) In an action by a servant for in- juries caused by the negligence of a servant in a different department, it is not necessary to prove gross negligence.-Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.
(F) Risks Assumed by Servant. § 203 (Tex.Civ.App.) When an employé is in- jured as the result of an assumed risk, it is im- material what care he exercised.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166 S. W. 685.
§ 204 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to a railroad brakeman by reason of defendant's violation of the safety appliance acts, assumed risk constituted no defense.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.
§ 210 (Ark.) A railroad mechanic engaged in testing a motor car, which he was repairing, as- sumed the risk of a collision with a hand car running on the same track, if the hand car operators were not negligent.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544. $213 (Mo.App.) A servant engaged in chip- ping concrete with a file furnished by the mas- ter, which was highly tempered on the blunt end, but no more so than a chisel at the point, assumed the risk of flying articles from the con- crete, the point of the file, or the hammer.-Rog- ers v. Hammond Packing Co., 166 S. W. 880.
$217 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where an employé of a gin company knew that a ginhouse was so con- structed as to cause excessive vibrations of the machinery and gins while in operation, and also knew of the risk incident to such condition, he assumed any risk of injury due to such condi- tion.-Cisco Oil Mill v. Van Geem, 166 S. W. 439.
If it was the duty of an employé of a gin company to inspect the machinery and to repair any defects before operating it, he assumed the risk of any defect.-Id.
$218 (Mo.App.) Inexperienced employé who did not know of condition of plate of building on which rafters rested, and was assured by his employer's president that it was safe, in re- liance upon which he went on the plate and was injured when it broke, held not to have assumed the risk.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S. W. 883.
(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant. $228 (Mo.App.) An employé guilty of con- tributory negligence cannot recover for injuries due to an employer's failure to guard machinery as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 7828.-Saling v. American Chicle Co., 166 S. W. 823.
§ 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to a railroad brakeman by reason of defendant's
tory negligence constituted no defense.-San An- tonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24. § 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 6649, providing that contributory negli- gence of railroad employés shall merely dimin- ish the recovery, the negligence of an engineer co-operating with that of the company was not a complete bar, and an instruction that if he was negligent he could not recover was properly refused.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Riordan, 166 S. W. 133.
§ 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) Acts 31st Leg. (1st Ex. Sess.) c. 10, § 2, which provides that, in actions thereunder by employés of a common carrier or railroad for personal injuries, the contributory negligence of the employé shall not bar recovery, applies to a railroad operated by a lumber com- pany in conducting its own business, as well as to a common carrier.-Angelina & N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.
§ 235 (Mo.App.) Employé working on build- ing which was being taken down held not chargeable with negligence for injuries by the breaking of the plate on which the rafters rest- ed from a hidden defect.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S. W. 883.
Where an employé who did not know of a dangerous condition was assured by the employ- er, who did know thereof, that the place was safe, he had a right to rely thereon without making an inspection, such as would have dis- covered the defective condition.-Id.
§ 236 (Ark.) A railroad mechanic, engaged in testing, on the track, a motor car he was repair- ing, was required to exercise care for his own safety in avoiding trains, etc.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.
§ 236 (Mo.App.) A brakeman on a work train, who goes beneath a car of the train to make slight repairs without giving any of the train- of contributory negligence, precluding a recovery men notice of his intention so to do, is guilty for injuries caused by a movement of the train, unless the trainmen knew the facts or the cir- cumstances were such as to imply notice to them, or they were charged with the duty of warning the brakeman.-Harris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 166 S. W. 335.
A conductor in charge of a work train stand- ing on a siding waiting for a passenger train, who directed a brakeman to couple cars sepa- rated to permit a crossing, and who stated that on the arrival of the passenger train the work train would shove out, did not thereby assure the brakeman that the train would not be mov- ed without notice to him.-Id.
A brakeman who, in the line of his duty to inspect cars while the train was standing, went under a car to make repairs without giving no- tice to any of the trainmen held guilty of con- tributory negligence as a matter of law.-Id.
An employé may not rely entirely on the ob- ligations of others to observe care for his safe- ty, but must use reasonable precautions for his own safety, and then, in the absence of knowl edge to the contrary, act on the presumption that others will not be negligent.-Id.
ries to a brakeman by his foot becoming caught § 256 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for inju- in an automatic coupler, as he was endeavoring impact, the petition held to sufficiently allege to adjust the same, so that it would couple by commerce.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. that the defendant was engaged in interstate Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.
§ 258 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to a brakeman by his foot becoming caught in an automatic coupler, an allegation of the peti- tion held to sufficiently charge that the coupler was defective, and did not comply with the safety appliance acts.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.
§ 264 (Ky.) Though a servant suing for a personal injury alleged gross negligence, but
a recovery, the court properly authorized a re- covery for ordinary negligence.-Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.
§ 264 (Mo.App.) Where the substantial point of controversy was whether a coal miner was killed at his working place, where he was re- quired to repair the roof, or elsewhere, an alle- gation that he was killed between 15 and 25 feet from his working place did not require proof that it was within the exact distances specified. -Goode v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 166 S. W. 844.
§ 264 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to a servant, assumed risk is an affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded.-McDonald v. Central Illinois Const. Co., 166 S. W. 1087.
In an action for injuries to a servant by the caving in of a ditch in which he was employed, evidence that plaintiff was unaware of the dan- ger by reason of his inexperience, ignorance, or unfamiliarity with the particular line of work, was inadmissible, in the absence of an allega- tion of such fact in the petition.-Id.
§ 264 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries to a brakeman by defendant's violation of the safety appliance acts, evidence that the couplers required adjustment, which could be made with safety when the cars were not in motion, was admissible under defendant's general denial. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.
§ 264 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition for injuries to a railroad construction employé held suffi- cient to raise the issue of last clear chance by the engineer and fireman of the work train to avoid the injury.-Angelina & N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.
§ 265 (Ark.) There is no presumption of neg- ligence by an employer, and an employé suing for personal injuries has the burden of showing facts making the employer liable.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.
In order to make a railroad company liable for injuries to an employé from the operation of a hand car on the tracks by persons not au- thorized by it to do so, it must be shown that there was a custom of permitting the operation of hand cars on the tracks by persons not spe- cifically authorized, and that such custom was actually or impliedly known to the railroad offi- cials.-Id.
$265 (Mo.App.) The mere existence of a defect in the hoisting cage is not sufficient to raise the inference of negligence on the part of a coal mine operator, without a showing of actual or constructive knowledge by the master of the defect. Ronchetto v. Northern Cent. Coal Co., 166 S. W. 876.
In an action for injuries to a coal miner, evi- dence held sufficient to warrant an inference that the defect in a hoisting case had existed for some time, and that the exercise of rea- sonable care by the master would have led to the discovery of the defect.-Id.
§ 268 (Mo.App.) Where, in an employé's ac- tion for injuries, defendant claimed that the work was being done by a third party, evidence that defendant took out liability insurance held admissible to show that it was doing the work. -Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S. W. 883.
§ 270 (Mo.App.) A brakeman, suing for inju- ries caused by a movement of the train while he was under a car repairing defects, may not show that the custom as to starting trains among railroad crews with which he has work- ed, but may show a universal custom or the custom of the conductor in charge of the train.- Harris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 166 S. W. 335.
§ 276 (Ark.) The fact that hand cars were frequently operated on railroad tracks to carry passengers would not show a general custom to permit any person who desired to operate a hand car on the track, so as to make the rail-
road company responsible for the negligent acts of one operating a hand car who was not au- thorized to do so.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.
§ 276 (Ark.) Evidence held to warrant a find- ing that plaintiff was engaged in the line of his employment at the time of his injury.-Triangle Lumber Co. v. Acree, 166 S. W. 958.
$ 276 (Ky.) In a personal injury action by a bridge carpenter, hurt while carrying ties to the skids where they were fashioned, evidence held insufficient to show that he was injured while performing services outside of the scope of his employment.-Whitson V. American Bridge Co. of New York, 166 S. W. 603.
§ 276 (Mo.App.) In an action for personal in- juries received by a coal miner from a fall from the hoisting cage, evidence held not to show that it was a physical impossibility that plain- tiff's fall was due to the partial dumping of the floor of the cage during the ascent, as plaintiff contended, and to support a verdict for the plaintiff.-Ronchetto v. Northern Cent. Coal Co., 166 S. W. 876.
§ 276 (Mo.App.) Evidence, in an action by a servant held insufficient to show that the flying particle which struck his eye came from the head of the file he was using to chip concrete, in which case alone the master was liable, rath- er than from the concrete, the point of the file, or the hammer.-Rogers v. Hammond Pack- ing Co., 166 S. W. 880.
Where the evidence showed that the flying particles which struck the eye of a servant chip- ping concrete with a file might reasonably have come from the concrete or even the point of the file or the hammer, as well as the head of the file, in which case alone the master was lia- ble, no recovery could be had.-Id.
$276 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action by a brakeman held sufficient to support findings that an open car door struck him as claimed.- Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carter, 166 S. W. 115.
Evidence held insufficient to show that the door came open because of negligence on the part of the railroad.—Id.
§ 278 (Ky.) Evidence, in an action by a 16 year old servant employed in a galvanized sheet metal factory for injury from being caught in a disconnected belt hanging over a moving shaft, held to show defendant's negligence in not fur- nishing a reasonably safe place for work.-Job Iron & Steel Co. v. Layne, 166 S. W. 978.
$278 (Mo.App.) Evidence that a conductor in charge of a work train generally noticed where his men were before he gave signals to start the train, and that it was his duty to know where his men were, did not show a custom of the con- ductor not to start his train before notice to the crew of his intention to do so.-Harris v. Mis- souri Pac. Ry. Co., 166 S. W. 335.
Evidence that the engineer in charge of a work train, on receiving a signal from the con- ductor to start, generally whistled and then looked for a signal from the crew to let him know where they were, and that the conductor was alone authorized to give such signal, did not show a custom of the engineer to wait for a second signal before starting, on receiving a signal from the conductor.--Id.
In an action for injuries to a brakeman going under a car of a train to make slight repairs, caused by a movement of the train, evidence held not to show that the engineer was guilty of negligence in starting the train on a signal from the conductor.-Id.
§ 278 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action by a servant held to support a finding of negligence of the master in furnishing him a highly tem- pered file for use as a chisel.-Rogers v. Ham- mond Packing Co., 166 S. W. 880.
§ 278 (Mo.App.) In an employé's action for injuries from the breaking of the plate upon which the rafters of a building which was be-
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