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LOCAL OPTION.

See Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 14, 30-40,
238.

LOGS AND LOGGING.

guilty of obtaining goods under false pretenses
held sufficient.-United Furniture Co. v. Wills,
227-166 S. W. 600.

§3 (Ky.) Though a conveyance of land re-
served to grantor all of the timber thereon,
which included beech trees, with the right to
remove it within seven years, mast which grew
on the beech trees and ripened and fell to the
ground within that time belonged to the grantee
and not to the owner of the timber.-Vincent
v. Haycraft, 166 S. W. 613.

A sale or reservation of timber to be cut and
removed within a specified time conveys or re-
serves only so much thereof as may be cut and
removed within that time.-Id.

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See Libel and Slander, §§ 101, 120; Malicious
Prosecution; Master and Servant, § 306.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

See False Imprisonment.

II. WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
§ 21 (Ky.) In a prosecution for maliciously
causing the arrest of a purchaser of furniture
who offered in payment an order on defendant
drawn by a newspaper company with which
defendant advertised, advice of counsel is no
defense, where defendant did not inform them
that there was any dispute over the account, or
that the newspaper company claimed that de-
fendant was indebted to it.-United Furniture
Co. v. Wills, 166 S. W. 600.

V. ACTIONS.

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§4 (Ark.) A party who had a complete reme-
dy by appeal from an adverse order of the
county court must pursue that remedy, and
mandamus does not lie, after the time to ap-
peal has expired, to compel the court to grant
the relief demanded.-Callaway v. Harley, 166
S. W. 546.

87 (Mo.App.) Mandamus, being a discretion-
ary writ, will not be granted if the record shows
the relator is not entitled to it for any good
reason.-State ex rel. Wiseman v. Urton, 166
S. W. 895.

§14 (Ark.) Failure of a county judge and
clerk of certain counties to act under Act April
2, 1911 (Sp. Acts 1911, p. 473), requiring ad-
vertisement for bids from banks to become coun-
ty depositories, such failure was tantamount to
a refusal to perform a mandatory duty, and
sufficient to justify mandamus.-Robertson v.
Derrick, 166 S. W. 936.

Where a mandatory duty of a public nature
affecting the people at large is imposed on a pub-
lic officer, no demand of performance and re-
fusal to perform is essential to the maintenance
of mandamus to compel him to act; he having
failed to act within the time prescribed.-Id.

IL SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF
RELIEF.

(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Off-
cers and Boards and Municipalities.
§ 72 (Ark.) While judicial discretion in mat-
ters committed to the county court will not be
controlled by mandamus, yet, if the court fails
or refuses to act at all, mandamus will issue
to compel action.-Robertson v. Derrick, 166 S.
W. 936.

§ 73 (Ark.) The duties imposed on the county
publish notice of the receipt of bids from banks
judge of certain counties and on the clerk to
to act as depositories for public funds by Act
April 12, 1911 (Sp. Acts 1911, p. 473), may be
enforced by mandamus.-Robertson v. Derrick,
166 S. W. 936.

§ 115 (Ky.) The holders of city bonds could
resort to mandamus to compel a council to
levy an annual tax for the payment of interest
and the creation of a sinking fund for the
ultimate payment of the principal, if the coun-
cil should fail to do so, as required by law.-
Fowler v. City of Oakdale, 166 S. W. 195.
III. JURISDICTION,

PROCEEDINGS,

AND RELIEF.

§ 160 (Mo.App.) Where an alternative writ
of mandamus is broader than the law warrants,
it may be amended, and the peremptory writ
awarded for so much of the relief as is proper.
-State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdemann, 166 S. W.
348.
MANSLAUGHTER.

§ 71 (Ky.) In an action for maliciously caus-
ing plaintiff's arrest for obtaining, under false
pretenses, furniture in payment for which
plaintiff tendered an order drawn on defendant See Homicide, §§ 42-62, 255, 309.
by a newspaper company with which defendant
advertised, evidence of defendant's indebted-
ness and the right of the newspaper company

MAPS.

to draw such orders held sufficient to go to the See Criminal Law, § 444; Evidence, § 433.
jury. United Furniture Co. v. Wills, 166 S.
W. 600.

§ 72 (Ky.) In a prosecution for maliciously
causing plaintiff's arrest for obtaining goods
under false pretenses, a charge that probable
cause means such cause as would induce a rea-
sonable person to believe that plaintiff was

MARRIAGE.

See Bigamy; Divorce; Husband and Wife.

$50 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a woman, believ-
ing a man to be divorced, in good faith cele-
brated a marriage with him, slight evidence will

be sufficient to uphold the validity of the mar-
riage after removal of the impediment.-Gorman
v. Gorman, 166 S. W. 123.

Where a woman, mistakenly believing a man
to be divorced, entered into a marriage without
knowledge of the impediment, the continued co-
habitation of the parties after removal of the
impediment is sufficient to establish a good
marriage.-Id.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.

See Husband and Wife, § 31.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 907, 1040, 1066,
1140; Frauds, Statute of, § 49; Municipal
Corporations, § 753; Trial, § 191; Work and
Labor.

I. THE RELATION.
(A) Creation and Existence.
83 (Ky.) Where plaintiff, who could, under
his contract with defendant, work whenever he
desired, had a private arrangement with a third
person, who acted as his substitute and looked
alone to him for compensation, plaintiff, while
at work, was an employé of defendant.-Louis-
ville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W.
190.

(C) Termination and Discharge.
§ 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) It was no defense to an
employer's breach of an employment contract
that the employé refused to accept a lower
salary than that agreed on.-Miller v. Sealy Oil
Mill & Mfg. Co., 166 S. W. 1182.

841 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for an em-
ployer's breach of a contract of employment, the
measure of damages is the compensation stipu-
lated for in the absence of allegation and proof
in mitigation that plaintiff could have obtained
other employment.-Miller v. Sealy Oil Mill &
Mfg. Co., 166 S. W. 1182.

Where, after an employé was wrongfully dis-
charged, he was ill for a time, the period of
such illness could not be deducted from the
period for which he was entitled to recover
damages for breach of contract.-Id.

§ 44 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for an em-
ployer's breach of a contract of employment,
an instruction placing on plaintiff the burden
of showing that he made diligent efforts to ob-
tain other employment without success
error.-Miller v. Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co., 166
S. W. 1182.

was

II. SERVICES AND COMPENSATION.
(A) Performance of Services.
859 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff was employed
to serve defendant, the fact that a receiver was
temporarily appointed for defendant because of
a difference between defendant's officers did not
excuse plaintiff from rendering services so as to
require defendant, after plaintiff had quit work,
to accept further services after the receivership

was terminated.-Walden v. American Bankers'
Assur. Co., 166 S. W. 1111.

§ 82 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff contract-
ed to perform personal services at a yearly
wage and at the expiration of the first year
agreed that payment of the balance due him
should be deferred, that agreement did not pre-
clude him from acquiring a laborer's lien for
services performed during the second period of
service.-Carthage Ice & Light Co. v. Roberts,
166 S. W. 12.

III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN-
JURIES TO SERVANT.

(A) Nature and Extent in General.
§ 88 (Tex.Civ.App.) A railroad company is
not liable for injuries to an employé of a lumber
company resulting from the negligence of other
employés of that company, which was engaged
at the time in constructing a track to be later
turned over to the railroad company upon pay-
ment of the cost of construction.-Angelina &
N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.

§ 89 (Ark.) Where an injured servant was oc-
cupying a dangerous position at the time of his
injury merely for his own convenience and ac-
commodation, his rights are no greater than
those of a licensee.-Triangle Lumber Co. v.
Acree, 166 S. W. 958.

§ 96 (Ark.) A railroad company was not lia-
ble for injuries to a mechanic engaged in test-
ing on the track a motor car, which he was re-
pairing, caused by a collision with a hand car,
if the hand car operators were not its em-
ployés and not authorized to operate the car;
the company not having given any general per-
mission to the public to operate hand cars on
its tracks.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.

§ 97 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff while as-
sisting in moving a boiler by rolling it was in-
jured by his glove catching on a bolt throwing
him over and in front of the boiler, and he had
prepared the boiler for moving, held, that his
injuries were due to an inevitable accident and
not to negligence; the danger not being such
as should have been anticipated.-St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Freles, 166
S. W. 91.

§ 97 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where the engineer and
fireman of a work train started it without giv-
ing any warning, although they knew that there
were a number of workmen around the train,
they must have anticipated that such negligence
might result in injury to a workman.-Angelina
& N. R. R. Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.

(B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and
Places for Work.

§§ 101, 102 (Ark.) A master's duty to furnish
a safe place extends only to such parts of the
premises as he has prepared for the servants'
occupancy or as he knows they are accustomed
to use.-Triangle Lumber Co. v. Acree, 166 S.
W. 958.

exercise' reasonable care to provide reasonably
§§ 101, 102 (Ky.) The rule that a master must
safe appliances for his servants does not apply
where the appliances are of a simple nature,
in which any defects can be readily observed
by the servant.-Ohio Valley Ry. Co. v. Cop--
ley, 166 S. W. 625.

(B) Wages and Other Remuneration.
§ 73 (Mo.App.) Plaintiff, having ceased to S$ 101, 102 (Tex.Civ.App.) The right of an em-
work for defendant under a contract of employ-ployer to conduct his own business in his own
ment without notice of election to terminate it way is limited by his duty to exercise reason-
as provided for thereunder, held not entitled to able care to furnish reasonably safe appliances
recover for a subsequent period during which and place in which to work.-Texas Power &
defendant refused to accept a tender of plain- Light Co. v. Burger, 166 S. W. 680.
tiff's further services.-Walden v. American
Bankers' Assur. Co., 166 S. W. 1111.

§ 107 (Ky.) A bridge carpenter, who was re-
quired to assist in carrying ties to the place
where they were fashioned, cannot recover for an
injury received when a fellow worker stumbled
over a post projecting out of the ground and
threw a tie upon him, as the master is not an
insurer as to the place to work.-Whitson v.
American Bridge Co. of New York, 166 S.

§ 75 (Mo.App.) On a servant's abandonment
of his contract for personal services, there can
be no apportionment thereof, since to recover
he must prove full performance or that per-
formance has been prevented by act of God or
unwarranted act of the employer.-Walden v.

§ 107 (Ky.) A T-rail cutter used to cut rivets
is a simple tool, and an employé versed in the
use of ordinary tools may not recover for an
injury by a sliver flying from the cutter.-Ohio
Valley Ry. Co. v. Copley, 166 S. W. 625.

§ 107 (Mo.App.) Though employés were en-
gaged in the more or less hazardous undertak-
ing of tearing down a building, it was the em-
ployer's duty to furnish them with a place as
reasonably safe as the nature of the work would
permit.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S. W.

883.

SI (Tex.Civ.App.) Where couplers were so
equipped that it was necessary for brakemen to
go between the cars to adjust them, so that
they would couple by impact, they were not
a compliance with the safety appliance acts
adopted by Congress or by the state.-San An-
tonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.
Failure of a railroad company to equip its en-
gines and cars with couplers that will couple
automatically by impact, without requiring
brakemen to go between the cars to adjust the
same, as required by safety appliance acts, is
negligence per se.-Id.

$118 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to a
driver of coal cars in a mine by striking a post
set alongside the track while trying to regain
his balance after having lost it in endeavoring
to adjust a switch while the car was in motion,
facts held insufficient to establish negligence on
the part of the coal company. Wallace v. Co-
lumbia Coal Co., 166 S. W. 769.

§ 118 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 8456, requir-
ing the operator of a coal mine to provide safe
means for hoisting the miners, is only a statu-
tory expression of the common-law rule requir-
ing the master to exercise reasonable care to
keep the cage in a reasonably safe condition.-
Ronchetto v. Northern Cent. Coal Co., 166 S.
W. 876.

8 121 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 7828, rela-
tive to guarding machinery, only requires such
a guard as within the grounds of reason will
protect employés using ordinary care.-Saling
v. American Chicle Co., 166 S. W. 823.

Rolling machine, the rollers of which were
covered by a hood to within two inches of a
guard about an inch above the feed board, held
sufficiently guarded within Rev. St. 1909, §
7828, though an employé's hand in some way
was drawn or placed through the opening, and
between the rollers.-Id.

8125 (Mo.App.) That an interval of time
elapsed between an employer's assurance that a
place was safe and an injury due to its unsafe
condition did not defeat the employer's liability,
where the conditions had not changed in the
meantime.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S.

W. 883.

$125 (Tex.Civ.App.) A master's ignorance of
the probable danger from an act or omission is
not necessarily an excuse, as it is his duty to
know what he could learn by exercising such
diligence as the circumstances reasonably de-
mand. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Tex-
as v. Freles, 166 S. W. 91.

Where an employer did not know of a danger
and could not reasonably have discovered it by
the exercise of such diligence as the circum-
stances reasonably demanded, he is not liable
for an unforeseen injury.—Id.

$125 (Tex.Civ.App.) A foreman is charged
with constructive notice of what will naturally
happen from an order given by him, and, where
he saw an employé's position, or, by ordinary
care, could have seen it, the employer was liable
for a negligent order causing injury to the em-
ployé.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166
S. W. 685.

(C) Methods of Work, Rules, and Orders.
§ 133 (Ky.) If employé was warned that ele-
vator was about to be started, held, that it was

immaterial whether the warning was given by
a person in authority or by a coemployé.-Ken-
tucky Midland Coal Co. v. Vincent, 166 S. W.
815.

§ 137 (Ky.) When a flagman is sent from a
point on the track where it is being repaired
to stop trains and compel them to detour, he has
the right to assume that no trains will come
from the rear, and those in charge of a train
following him must maintain a lookout for his
safety.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Taylor's
Adm'x, 166 S. W. 199.

§ 137 (Tex.Civ.App.) An instruction that,
where persons have a right to be on the track
near a train that is standing still, it is the duty
of the employés to give a warning before start-
ing the train, and that the failure to do so
would be such negligence as would entitle an-
other employé injured as a result thereof to re-
cover, is not erroneous.-Angelina & N. R. R.
Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.

§ 139 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an employé carry-
ing with coemployés a tie, was injured by the
coemployés dropping it pursuant to the order
of the foreman, the giving of the order was the
proximate cause of the injury, authorizing a
recovery if the foreman negligently gave it.-
Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166 S. W.
685.

§ 145 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a rule requiring
conductors, with the assistance of the trainmen,
to inspect the cars and see that the doors are
closed, imposed on the conductor alone the duty
of initiating an inspection, and a brakeman
who was injured by an open door had no other
duty than to assist the conductor when he ini
tiated an inspection. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co. v. Carter, 166 S. W. 115.

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§ 179 (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to charge
the issue of negligence of a fellow servant is
not erroneous; the common-law rule exempting
the master because of such negligence being
abrogated.-Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Coleman,
166 S. W. 685.

$180 (Tex.Civ.App.) Railroad company's fore-
man having authority to direct a boiler maker
to assist in moving a boiler in the roundhouse
held a vice principal under Rev. St. 1911, art.
6641.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas
v. Freles, 166 S. W. 91.

§ 180 (Tex.Civ.App.) An employé of a smelt-
ing company operating ore cars to haul ores
from the roaster to the reverberatory, engaged
in sweeping ore from the car track, was not a
railway employé; and the common-law rule as
to nonliability for the negligence of a fellow
servant applied.-Consolidated Kansas City
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Lopez, 166 S. W.
498.

§ 185 (Ky.) An employer is not liable for in-
juries to an employé by a sliver flying from a
T-rail cutter used to cut rivets, where the cutter
was selected by a fellow servant from among a
number of cutters supplied by the employer.
Ohio Valley Ry. Co. v. Copley, 166 S. W. 625.

$185 (Ky.) In a minor servant's action for
injury, held, that other servants who directed
his work as they needed it, and told him what
tools they wanted, were not his fellow servants.
-Job Iron & Steel Co. v. Layne, 166 S. W. 978.

coemployés worked under the direct orders of
§ 185 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff and his
the foreman, and the coemployés did what the
foreman directed them to do, an injury sus-

tained by plaintiff in consequence thereof was
caused by an act of the employer who could not
escape liability on the ground that the negli-
gence was that of a fellow servant.-Texas Pow-
er & Light Co. v. Burger, 166 S. W. 680.

§ 189 (Ky.) Where the foreman of the opera-
tor of a mine, who had authority to discharge
any one employed therein, was negligent, the
operator is liable to servants of contractors who
mined the coal under an arrangement whereby
they furnished the labor and the operator of the
plant, power and machinery.-Big Branch Coal
Co. v. Sanders, 166 S. W. 813.

§ 198 (Ky.) The engineer and brakeman op-
erating a train are not fellow servants of a
car cleaner, whose sole duty is to sweep out
passenger coaches on the arrival of the train
at destination.-Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.

§ 198 (Tex. Civ.App.) Employé of smelting
company, engaged in sweeping off car track,
and motorman in charge of ore cars, charged
with no duties making him a vice principal,
held fellow servants.-Consolidated Kansas City
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Lopez, 166 S. W.
498..

202 (Ky.) In an action by a servant for in-
juries caused by the negligence of a servant
in a different department, it is not necessary
to prove gross negligence.-Louisville, H. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.

(F) Risks Assumed by Servant.
§ 203 (Tex.Civ.App.) When an employé is in-
jured as the result of an assumed risk, it is im-
material what care he exercised.-Houston & T.
C. R. Co. v. Coleman, 166 S. W. 685.

§ 204 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries
to a railroad brakeman by reason of defendant's
violation of the safety appliance acts, assumed
risk constituted no defense.-San Antonio & A.
P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.

§ 210 (Ark.) A railroad mechanic engaged in
testing a motor car, which he was repairing, as-
sumed the risk of a collision with a hand car
running on the same track, if the hand car
operators were not negligent.-St. Louis, I. M.
& S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.
$213 (Mo.App.) A servant engaged in chip-
ping concrete with a file furnished by the mas-
ter, which was highly tempered on the blunt
end, but no more so than a chisel at the point,
assumed the risk of flying articles from the con-
crete, the point of the file, or the hammer.-Rog-
ers v. Hammond Packing Co., 166 S. W. 880.

$217 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where an employé of a
gin company knew that a ginhouse was so con-
structed as to cause excessive vibrations of the
machinery and gins while in operation, and also
knew of the risk incident to such condition, he
assumed any risk of injury due to such condi-
tion.-Cisco Oil Mill v. Van Geem, 166 S. W.
439.

If it was the duty of an employé of a gin
company to inspect the machinery and to repair
any defects before operating it, he assumed
the risk of any defect.-Id.

$218 (Mo.App.) Inexperienced employé who
did not know of condition of plate of building
on which rafters rested, and was assured by
his employer's president that it was safe, in re-
liance upon which he went on the plate and
was injured when it broke, held not to have
assumed the risk.-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co.,
166 S. W. 883.

(G) Contributory Negligence of Servant.
$228 (Mo.App.) An employé guilty of con-
tributory negligence cannot recover for injuries
due to an employer's failure to guard machinery
as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 7828.-Saling v.
American Chicle Co., 166 S. W. 823.

§ 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries
to a railroad brakeman by reason of defendant's

tory negligence constituted no defense.-San An-
tonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.
§ 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911,
art. 6649, providing that contributory negli-
gence of railroad employés shall merely dimin-
ish the recovery, the negligence of an engineer
co-operating with that of the company was not
a complete bar, and an instruction that if he
was negligent he could not recover was properly
refused.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Riordan,
166 S. W. 133.

§ 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) Acts 31st Leg. (1st Ex.
Sess.) c. 10, § 2, which provides that, in actions
thereunder by employés of a common carrier or
railroad for personal injuries, the contributory
negligence of the employé shall not bar recovery,
applies to a railroad operated by a lumber com-
pany in conducting its own business, as well
as to a common carrier.-Angelina & N. R. R.
Co. v. Due, 166 S. W. 918.

§ 235 (Mo.App.) Employé working on build-
ing which was being taken down held not
chargeable with negligence for injuries by the
breaking of the plate on which the rafters rest-
ed from a hidden defect.-Boten v. Sheffield
Ice Co., 166 S. W. 883.

Where an employé who did not know of a
dangerous condition was assured by the employ-
er, who did know thereof, that the place was
safe, he had a right to rely thereon without
making an inspection, such as would have dis-
covered the defective condition.-Id.

§ 236 (Ark.) A railroad mechanic, engaged in
testing, on the track, a motor car he was repair-
ing, was required to exercise care for his own
safety in avoiding trains, etc.-St. Louis, I. M.
& S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.

§ 236 (Mo.App.) A brakeman on a work train,
who goes beneath a car of the train to make
slight repairs without giving any of the train-
of contributory negligence, precluding a recovery
men notice of his intention so to do, is guilty
for injuries caused by a movement of the train,
unless the trainmen knew the facts or the cir-
cumstances were such as to imply notice to
them, or they were charged with the duty of
warning the brakeman.-Harris v. Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co., 166 S. W. 335.

A conductor in charge of a work train stand-
ing on a siding waiting for a passenger train,
who directed a brakeman to couple cars sepa-
rated to permit a crossing, and who stated that
on the arrival of the passenger train the work
train would shove out, did not thereby assure
the brakeman that the train would not be mov-
ed without notice to him.-Id.

A brakeman who, in the line of his duty to
inspect cars while the train was standing, went
under a car to make repairs without giving no-
tice to any of the trainmen held guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law.-Id.

An employé may not rely entirely on the ob-
ligations of others to observe care for his safe-
ty, but must use reasonable precautions for his
own safety, and then, in the absence of knowl
edge to the contrary, act on the presumption
that others will not be negligent.-Id.

(H) Actions.

ries to a brakeman by his foot becoming caught
§ 256 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for inju-
in an automatic coupler, as he was endeavoring
impact, the petition held to sufficiently allege
to adjust the same, so that it would couple by
commerce.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v.
that the defendant was engaged in interstate
Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.

§ 258 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries
to a brakeman by his foot becoming caught in
an automatic coupler, an allegation of the peti-
tion held to sufficiently charge that the coupler
was defective, and did not comply with the
safety appliance acts.-San Antonio & A. P. Ry.
Co. v. Wagner, 166 S. W. 24.

§ 264 (Ky.) Though a servant suing for a
personal injury alleged gross negligence, but

a recovery, the court properly authorized a re-
covery for ordinary negligence.-Louisville, H.
& St. L. Ry. Co. v. Armes, 166 S. W. 190.

§ 264 (Mo.App.) Where the substantial point
of controversy was whether a coal miner was
killed at his working place, where he was re-
quired to repair the roof, or elsewhere, an alle-
gation that he was killed between 15 and 25 feet
from his working place did not require proof
that it was within the exact distances specified.
-Goode v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 166 S. W.
844.

§ 264 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to
a servant, assumed risk is an affirmative defense
that must be specially pleaded.-McDonald v.
Central Illinois Const. Co., 166 S. W. 1087.

In an action for injuries to a servant by the
caving in of a ditch in which he was employed,
evidence that plaintiff was unaware of the dan-
ger by reason of his inexperience, ignorance, or
unfamiliarity with the particular line of work,
was inadmissible, in the absence of an allega-
tion of such fact in the petition.-Id.

§ 264 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries
to a brakeman by defendant's violation of the
safety appliance acts, evidence that the couplers
required adjustment, which could be made with
safety when the cars were not in motion, was
admissible under defendant's general denial.
San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 166
S. W. 24.

§ 264 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition for injuries
to a railroad construction employé held suffi-
cient to raise the issue of last clear chance by
the engineer and fireman of the work train to
avoid the injury.-Angelina & N. R. R. Co. v.
Due, 166 S. W. 918.

§ 265 (Ark.) There is no presumption of neg-
ligence by an employer, and an employé suing
for personal injuries has the burden of showing
facts making the employer liable.-St. Louis, I.
M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W.
544.

In order to make a railroad company liable
for injuries to an employé from the operation
of a hand car on the tracks by persons not au-
thorized by it to do so, it must be shown that
there was a custom of permitting the operation
of hand cars on the tracks by persons not spe-
cifically authorized, and that such custom was
actually or impliedly known to the railroad offi-
cials.-Id.

$265 (Mo.App.) The mere
existence of a
defect in the hoisting cage is not sufficient to
raise the inference of negligence on the part of a
coal mine operator, without a showing of actual
or constructive knowledge by the master of the
defect. Ronchetto v. Northern Cent. Coal Co.,
166 S. W. 876.

In an action for injuries to a coal miner, evi-
dence held sufficient to warrant an inference
that the defect in a hoisting case had existed
for some time, and that the exercise of rea-
sonable care by the master would have led to
the discovery of the defect.-Id.

§ 268 (Mo.App.) Where, in an employé's ac-
tion for injuries, defendant claimed that the
work was being done by a third party, evidence
that defendant took out liability insurance held
admissible to show that it was doing the work.
-Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 166 S. W. 883.

§ 270 (Mo.App.) A brakeman, suing for inju-
ries caused by a movement of the train while
he was under a car repairing defects, may not
show that the custom as
to starting trains
among railroad crews with which he has work-
ed, but may show a universal custom or the
custom of the conductor in charge of the train.-
Harris v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 166 S. W.
335.

§ 276 (Ark.) The fact that hand cars were
frequently operated on railroad tracks to carry
passengers would not show a general custom to
permit any person who desired to operate a
hand car on the track, so as to make the rail-

road company responsible for the negligent acts
of one operating a hand car who was not au-
thorized to do so.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.
Co. v. De Lambert, 166 S. W. 544.

§ 276 (Ark.) Evidence held to warrant a find-
ing that plaintiff was engaged in the line of his
employment at the time of his injury.-Triangle
Lumber Co. v. Acree, 166 S. W. 958.

$ 276 (Ky.) In a personal injury action by a
bridge carpenter, hurt while carrying ties to
the skids where they were fashioned, evidence
held insufficient to show that he was injured
while performing services outside of the scope
of his employment.-Whitson V. American
Bridge Co. of New York, 166 S. W. 603.

§ 276 (Mo.App.) In an action for personal in-
juries received by a coal miner from a fall from
the hoisting cage, evidence held not to show
that it was a physical impossibility that plain-
tiff's fall was due to the partial dumping of the
floor of the cage during the ascent, as plaintiff
contended, and to support a verdict for the
plaintiff.-Ronchetto v. Northern Cent. Coal
Co., 166 S. W. 876.

§ 276 (Mo.App.) Evidence, in an action by a
servant held insufficient to show that the flying
particle which struck his eye came from the
head of the file he was using to chip concrete,
in which case alone the master was liable, rath-
er than from the concrete, the point of the
file, or the hammer.-Rogers v. Hammond Pack-
ing Co., 166 S. W. 880.

Where the evidence showed that the flying
particles which struck the eye of a servant chip-
ping concrete with a file might reasonably have
come from the concrete or even the point of the
file or the hammer, as well as the head of the
file, in which case alone the master was lia-
ble, no recovery could be had.-Id.

$276 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action by
a brakeman held sufficient to support findings
that an open car door struck him as claimed.-
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carter, 166 S.
W. 115.

Evidence held insufficient to show that the
door came open because of negligence on the
part of the railroad.—Id.

§ 278 (Ky.) Evidence, in an action by a 16
year old servant employed in a galvanized sheet
metal factory for injury from being caught in
a disconnected belt hanging over a moving shaft,
held to show defendant's negligence in not fur-
nishing a reasonably safe place for work.-Job
Iron & Steel Co. v. Layne, 166 S. W. 978.

$278 (Mo.App.) Evidence that a conductor in
charge of a work train generally noticed where
his men were before he gave signals to start the
train, and that it was his duty to know where
his men were, did not show a custom of the con-
ductor not to start his train before notice to the
crew of his intention to do so.-Harris v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry. Co., 166 S. W. 335.

Evidence that the engineer in charge of a
work train, on receiving a signal from the con-
ductor to start, generally whistled and then
looked for a signal from the crew to let him
know where they were, and that the conductor
was alone authorized to give such signal, did
not show a custom of the engineer to wait for
a second signal before starting, on receiving
a signal from the conductor.--Id.

In an action for injuries to a brakeman going
under a car of a train to make slight repairs,
caused by a movement of the train, evidence
held not to show that the engineer was guilty of
negligence in starting the train on a signal from
the conductor.-Id.

§ 278 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action by a
servant held to support a finding of negligence
of the master in furnishing him a highly tem-
pered file for use as a chisel.-Rogers v. Ham-
mond Packing Co., 166 S. W. 880.

§ 278 (Mo.App.) In an employé's action for
injuries from the breaking of the plate upon
which the rafters of a building which was be-

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